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ROGER DAVID OWEN 
THE AMBIGUITY OF THE MODEM NIETZSCHE, WEBER. FOUCAULT AND THE FATE OF 
THE SUBJECT IN MODERNITY 
Ph. D, 1989 
It is argued here that Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault represent a 
discrete tradition of theorising in the human sciences. More particularly, 
that they constitute a tradition of theorising about the fate of the 
modern subject. This argument is established by examining each theorist in 
relation to three areas. Firstly, the philosophical and methodological 
position occupied by each Is analysed. SecondLy, the diagnoses of modernity 
offered by these theorists are examined. Finally, the politics of the forms 
of theor! sLng deployed by Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault are elaborated. 
It is shown on a philosophical, level, that these theorists can be grouped 
about the notions of perspectivism, subjectivity and genealogy. With regard 
to modernity, it is pointed out that each theorists treats the modern as 
an ambiguous achievement. Their analyses being structured about an 
opposition between discipline and self-discipline In the constitution of 
the ind! vLduaL's subjectivity. In relation to the political dimension of 
their forms of theorising, It is Illustrated that each displays a reflexive 
concern with the nature of the human sciences. For aLL three theorists, It 
is shown, the role of the human sciences manifests itself as a reflection 
on the possibility of meaningful action by the Individual in the modern 
age. 
In the conclusion, it is argued that this tradition avoids the problem 
posed by the subject-object distinction for the human sciences. It is 
po inted out that this t rad It ! on represents mode of critique for 
articulating our 'common concerns'. It is also claimed that this form of 
theorising cannot be easily assimilated under either of the rubrics 
'modernism' or 'postmodern[sm'. 
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What the brazen Fascists hypocritically Laud and pLtabie 
humanist experts naively put into practice - the indefatigable 
seff-destructiveness of enlightenment - requires philosophy to 
discard even the Last vestigages of innocence in regard to the 
habits and tendencies of the spirit of the age. 
- Theoobr Adbrno and Max hbrkheimer 
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INTRODUCTION 
The attempt to enc"uLate the thought of NLetzsche, Weber and Foucautt 
within a single volume might seem a somewhat fooLhardy undertaking. It 
wouLd be so. ThLs, however, Ls not the enterprIse of thLs thesls. The 
considerabLy more Limited objective to be accompLLshed here is to show 
that these three theorists can be seen to constitute a tradition of 
theorising in the human sciences (broadLy conceived). More specificatty 
stitt, our argument is that Nietzsche, Weber and FoucauLt constitute a more 
I 
or less discrete tradition of theorising modernity, in particuLar the fate 
of the modern subject. ',, 
Strong has argued that the claLm to know NLetzsche Ls (borrowLng 
Wittgenstein's metaphor) rather Like the cLalm to know Parls or Rome'. 
'Knowing' here means being able to find one's way about, perhaps even to be 
able to give directions. In this thesis, certain routes through the 
thoughts of Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault will be indicated. Like all 
tourists guides, there is an element of the arbitrary in which streets, 
buiLdings, nightspots and restaurants wiLL be recommended. In the end, 
perhaps aLL one can hope for is that the traveLLer had an interesting stay. 
In this introduction, the comments wiLL geared towards orientating the 
visitor to the itinerary which awaits them (this is, after aLl, a package 
hotiday) and to lessenIng the possLbiLities of cuLture shock. 
Why consider Nietzsche, Weber and Foucautt? The answer to this question 
today is undoubtabty different to that which would have been proferred 
even ten years ago. A series of origLnaL Angto-American studies of 
Nietzsche, often in response to the emergence of stightly oLder ContinentaL 
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works, has re-awoken Interest In this most abused phtiosopher 2. The pre- 
figuring of current debates on Interpretation, subjectivity and meaning in 
Nietzsche's work has resufted In a path being beaten increaslngLy back to 
his door. Perhaps too, the fact that this present generation of schotars do 
not remember Qn an experientiaL sense) the N&zL depLoyment of Metzsche 
for their own ends has meant a more sober appreciation of Nietzsche's 
philosophy could emerge. Weber, too, is emerging anew, though from a 
different form of subjugation. Indeed, it was the very sobriety of Weber's 
work which made it so attractive to a post-war Angto-American audience. 
I 
Here it seemed was a figure whose heroic refusaL of va Lue-- judgements 
matched the mood of an' empiricaLly orientated human sciences. This Anglo- 
Amer ! can appropr ! at ! on of Weber has been summed up recent Ly by Lassman 
and VeLody who note: 
In the main, postwar AngLo-American soclat science has made 
use of a particuiar interpretation of Weber's work that has 
served to justify its own current practice. ... In generaL 
term it is possibLe to point to the existence of two main 
trends In the interpretation of Weber's work. One of these, 
the most infLuential, has attempted to pick usefui 
socioLogicai concepts at random from Weber's "Interpretive 
Sociotogy" without giving much thought to the context in 
which they are being put forward. It is most unfortunate 
that Weber has sometimes become LittLe more than a usefut 
quarry for concepts and ideai-types' (Lassman and VeLody 
1988 p160). 
More recentLy, this 'orthodoxy' has re-examined and powerfut new 
interpretations of Weber have been put forward3. These 'heterodox' 
interpretations have tended to be more sensitive to the cuiturai context 
of Weber's work, in partLcuLar to the debates that animated the human 
sciences in Germany during Weber's Life. One side-effect of this 
lsensttLsatLon' towards Weber has been that his reLatLon to Nietzsche is 
- 13 - 
be Ing rescrutInLsed and taken serLousLy as an Issue In ach lev Ing 
Interpretive adequacy with regard to Weber's work. The significance of the 
thought of FoucauLt is, perhaps through Its very contemporary nature, both 
more and less dIffIcuit to indicate. On the one hand, the sheer weight of 
work on FoucauLt's ideas, either expLLcating or appLyLng them, can be taken 
to show Its Importance. On the other hand, the Lack of temporaL distance 
from his texts makes judgement as to their Lasting significance ImposLble 
to render. What is certainLy the case is that Foucautt has contributed to 
the increase in contemporary importance of the ideas of Nietzsche and 
Weber4. As such, the treatment of these theorLsts together wouid seem to 
be a reasonabLe undertakLng. 
in (re)constructing the tradition of theorLsing constituted about 
Nietzsche, Weber and FoucauLt, three dimensions wLLL be considered. FirstLy, 
the phiiosophlc&L and methodotogicaL reLations that exist between them. 
SecondLy, their treatment of the issue of the fate of the modern subject 
in terms of discipline Thirdly, the politics of their individual modes of 
theorlsLng. It is usefut to specify these in rather more detait. 
The dLscussions of NLetzsche, Weber and FoucauLt offered here begLn by 
hightLghtLng their theoreticaL positions, partLcuLarty in terms of the 
methodoLogicaL approaches they deploy. By focusing in each case on the 
notions of 'perspectivism', 'subjectivity' and 'geneatogy', the retations 
between their positions are brought out. This graduatist approach aLLows 
us to be sensitive to the particularity of each theorist while building up 
an outLLne of the theoreticat nature of the tradition being specified here. 
In considering the diagnoses of modernity put forward by these 
theorists, we focus on the concept of ldiscipLlnel as it is (explicitly or 
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LmpLIcLtty) deployed by these theorists. In particular, the opposing of 
'discipline' and 'self-discipline' Is Illustrated as we take up the issue of 
the fate of the subject within modernity considered as an ambiguous 
achievement. We are here concerned to establish substantive similarities 
between Nietzsche, Weber and Foucauft in terms of their treatment of this 
issue. 
Finatly, the poLitics of the theories considered are drawn out. Nietzsche 
and Weber are shown to be attempting the generation of a form of 
theorising which wUL enabLe the subject to invest their life with meaning. 
I 
White this issue is slmLtarLy of concern to FoucauLt, it is pointed out 
that th is question becomes subordinate to the probLem posed by 
disciplinary power for the individual's subjectivity in modernity. In each 
case, reftection on the form of theorlsing deptoyed in the human sciences 
I Ls shown to be of centra L concern. 
This threefoLd deLLneation of the tradition constituted by these 
theorists enabies us to Locate the phiLosophical, substantive and politicat 
dimensions of the form of human science being articuLated. The question of 
the 'superiority' of this tradition to other approaches is not expticitLy 
discussed. Indeed, whether or not one may evatuate rivaL traditions wouLd 
appear to require another thesis in itseLf. However, some obstacLes for 
atternative approaches are IndLcated. 
Returning to our eariler metaphor, we may now say that you - the 
travetLer - have read the itinerary and Looked over the thumbnaii maps in 
the brouchure. However, as with aLL package hotidays, some formaL points 
remain. These concern the styie of the tour offered. 
Veyne recounts that in 1560 before Pasquier pubLlshed his Recherches de 
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La France, he cLrcuLated the manuscript amongst his friends. Veyne goes on: 
The most frequent reproach they made to him concerned his 
habit of frequentLy furnishing the references to the sources 
he cited. This procedure, it was noted, was too reminiscent 
of the "shadow of the schooLs" and was hardLy appropriate to 
a work of history. (Veyne 1981 p4). 
Times change. Today not onLy references but aiL kinds of asides are 
contained in the footnotes, occasionalLy one must seek the author's entire 
basis for his argument there. Retaining a certain sympathy with Pasquier's 
friends, footnotes have been mLnimised as far as possibie in this thesis. 
Our second (and finat) point concerns the rather more serious issue of 
the use of the pronoun 'we' in this thesis. Who is this 'we"? It may be 
argued that the use of this pronoun constitutes an impLicit appeaL to the 
idea of a theoretical reason common to all subjects (perhaps with its 
roots in the Christian notion of the 'equality of souls before God'). If 
I some form of this argument is accepted, it wouLd foLLow that the use of 
this pronoun is singularly inappropriate to this thesis (in which the 
*ýO, S& 
theorists considered k the idea of a transcendental subjectivity on which the 
notion of theoretLcat reason is predicated). It must be stated, therefore, 
that the deployment of the pronoun 'we' in this thesis is purely 
performative in character. If this stiLL remains probLematic, then so be Lt. 
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NOTES 
1. Strong, Freclerich Nietzsche and the PoLitics of Transfiguration (1975) 
pp4- 7. 
2. On the AngLo-American side, a few of the interesting pubLLcations are: 
Strong op. cit., Nehamas Nietzsche: Life As Literature (1985), Schacht 
Nietzsche (1983) and Schutte Beyond NlhiLLsm (1984). On the Continent, 
interesting work has been done by, most notabLy, Derricla Spurs: Nietzsche's 
StyLes (1972: trans. 1979) and DeLeuze Nietzsche and PhiLosophy (1962: 
trans. 1983). 
3. Three book whLch have itLustrated this heterodoxy though in different 
ways are: Hennis Max Weber: Essays Ln Reconstruction (1988) (probabLy the 
singLe most powerfuL reinterpretatLon of Weber), Eden PoLiticaL Leader 
and Nih! Llsm (1983) (partLcutarty for its Location of Weber in reLatLon to 
Nietzsche), and Mommsen & OsterhammeL (ed) Max Weber and his 
Contemporaries (1987). 
4. FoucauLt's own essays on Nietzsche, notabLy 'Nietzsche, GeneaLogy, 
History' In Reader pp76-100, were a part of the increasing Interest In this 
th inker. More recentLy heterodox interpretations of Weber have been 
ut[Lised In conjunction with interpretations of FoucauLt, the 
best exampte 
of this work being Gordon's 'The SouL of the Citizen: 
Max Weber and MicheL 
Foucauft on RationaLity and Government' in Whimster & Lash 
(ed. ) Max Weber: 
RationaLity and-Modernit-y (1987). 
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LANGUAGE. SUBJECTIVITY, PERSPECTIVISM 
Introduct ! on 
In this chapter, we wLLL introduce the philosophicaL themes which are 
embodied in Nietzsche's thought. The themes whLch structure hLs anaLys*Ls of 
n1hMsm and his positing of the figure of the Overman. In other words, we 
shaLL be concerned with rendering expL[cLt the presu ppos it Lons of 
Nietzsche's phiLosophy. We shaLL approach this task by examining a series 
of issues. InitiaLLy, we shaLL be concerned with Nietzsche's phiLosophy of 
Language, concentrating on two aspects in particular: (D his analysis of 
the grammatical catagories of language and the reLfkatLon of these 
catagorLes, and UD his conception of Language as, LnherentLy, rhetorical 
in form, here we shaLL focus on his treatment of Language as metaphor. In 
the next two sections, we wLLL draw out the LmpLLcatLons of this phLLosophy 
of Language in relation to deveLopLng the themes of subjectivity and 
p-erspectivism in Nietzsche's thought. Finatly, we wiLL attempt to retate 
these themes to Nietzsche's treatment of the question of origins and his 
conceptLon of genealogy. The anaLysLs of these Lssues shouLd provLde us 
with the basis necessary to move to a consideration of Wetzsche's 
treatment of nihilism as the defining characteristic of modernity. 
1. The Sublect of Grammar 
' Reason' Ln Language: oh what a deceitfut oLd woman! I fear 
we are not getting rLd of God because we stM beLieve in 
gramn-ar ... (TI 'Reason' 
in Phliosophy 5) 
For Nietzsche, grammar is no neutraL reflection of the structure of the 
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wor Ld, on the contrary, qr arnma r- it) particutar -ic ject/predLcatt-- tf - sub 
distinction - Ls a cuLturaL invention which, relfied onto the worLd, poses a 
c isc er Lou, . sue for phLLosophy, In eLucLdatLnq Nietzsche's comment, 
Ho iL ingda Le notes: 
Because the grammar of the language we have inherited is 
founded upon a relationship between subject and predicate, 
we cannot help thinking this subject-predicate relationship 
into the real world in the form of. 'thing' and the 'action' 
of a thing, of 'being' and 'doing'; ultimately we be[LeVe in 
'God-worLd' only because we believe in 'subject-predicate. 
(TII/AC p190) 
When Nietzsche refers to the phLLosopher- as being 'caught in the riets of 
'anquage' (TP I p4, 2), he is not making the faciLe claým that e car), 
somehow, step outside of Language, but, rather, the cLaim that we must 
investigate how the structure of Language has been unconsciousLy rettied 
in vat-ious phiLosopl)Lcal positions. As Strong has indicated, for Nietzschtýý. 
gua j 'Lan ge contains a hidden philosophical mythology. ' (Strong 1984- p8-7, cf. 
T1 /-AC pl Q, I ). tjor eover', we shou Ld not under est imate the s ign ifL car, ce of this 
mythology. 
The singular family resemblance between all. Indian, Greek 
and German philosophizing is easy enough to explain, Where 
there exist a language affinity it LS quite impossible, 
thanks to the common philosophy of grammar -I mean thanks 
to the unconscious domination and directing by sLmLtar 
grammaticaL functions - to avoid everything being prepared 
i I-) advance for a simiLar evolution and succession of 
philosophical systems: just as the road Ls barred to certain 
other possibilities of world interpretation. (BGE 20) 
Nletzscý)e sets himseLf the task of unearthLng the consequences of this 
'unconscious domination', this grammaticaL refication, it) particular, in 
re[atLon to the subject-predicate distinction. Approaching this obLLqueLy, 
we car-ý note that Lt Ls through lanquage 
that the dlstýnctton bet,., ýeen the 
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lreaP wor id and the 'apparent' wor Id emerges, 'The signif icance of Language 
for the evoLution of cuLture Lies ir) thLs, that inankind set up [n Language 
a separate wor, Ld beSL des the other worLd, ' (HA 11), The dlstýnctýon between 
i ea L! and 'appar ent' wor Lds is c Lose ly re Lated to the operat, or) of the 
subject-predicate distinction. - the subject as, in essence, immutable and the 
acts of the subject as historicaLLy contingent. Strong has suggested that 
when 'combined with the generaL archLtectonLc features of Language, the 
subject-object di-: ýtLnctLon produý: es partLcuLariY unfortunate consequences. ' 
(Stt ong 1 
9784. 
p9, -)). The. -iýe being twofoLd: (1) a privileging of consciousness 
and (LI) an 'ImperatIve towards ahLstoricLty' (Strong 1984 p93). WhiLe each 
of these aspects is s i9r) if ! cant in their own right, it is in tht-i-ir 
combination that Nietzsche sees the maLn phLLosophicaL probLem arising. 
The priviLeg[ng of consclousness, the separatLon of 'doer' and 'deed' 
ýwhých impLies an Lntlent: oriaLity), invoLves a conception of the subject-as- 
unity -a transcendentaL subjectivity - which 'makes mar) qua subject a 
pr ime mover Ln Ms own r ight; it tends to fix a supposed correctness on 
whatever reflexive conctusions the subject may arrive at. ' (, '-)trong 1984. 
p93). It is f rom th Ls that is generated the 'imperative towards 
ah istor ic Lty'. For, if the IrefLexLve conc Lus Loris' of conscLousness are 
ahistor-IcaL, it is quite Legitimate to mummify, 'sub specie aeterni", out 
subjectivity. What is represented by these two points, taken together, is 
the phUosophicail pr'LvLLeqitn9 of theoretical reason. By which is meant a 
reason which operates ahistoricaLLy and is founded on a conceptLon of a 
transcendentaL subject. This being distinct from, and superior to, practicaL 
reason - by whLch we refer to a conception of reason as practice, grounded 
i in particular cultural forms of Life. The reifLcation of the subject- 
predicate dLst inct [on Leads 1-0 a concept ýon of the subjeý--t 3S 
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transcendentaL and this, Ln turn, acts as a f'oundation for generating an 
ahistorical, theoretlcaL reason. We can LLLustrate this understanding by 
reterenc-E tCj thE K.: jr, tLan conception of theoreticaL reason . As McIntyre 
points out, for Kant: 'The rationaL agent prescribes the maxims which 
express the universal generaLizatLons to himseff... And since reason is the 
same in aLL Lndividuals, alt Lndlv[duaLs wiLL LegLsLate the same set of 
max Lrris. ' (Mcirityre 1978 p25). This Kantian understandIng faLLs Lnto what 
Nietzsche terms the error of' imaginary causes", which is to say it posits 
a transcenclentaL subject wh ich is unprob[ematLcaLLy expressed by the 
grammatical structure of Language, Lnstead of recognLsing that thLs subject 
is produced by the reification of a grammatical catagory. Moreover, this 
procedure is repeated in Its pr [, v 1 Leg Lng of consciousness as the 
homogeneous ground of reason. For Kant, Lt is the archLtectonýc structure 
of our conscLousness vvhLch defines the. form of reason, but, Niet--sche 
cLaims, this privileging of consciousness is founded on a Logically invalid 
in fer ence (from the operatLon of the subject- predicate distinction Ln 
language to the posItIng of subject-object distinctLon in the worLd). 
Here we come fuLL cLrcte to the remark of Nietzsche's with which we 
opened this section. Our beLief in God - taken both LAer-aLly and as a 
metaphor for absoLute .. /aLues - is produced through the operation of an 
transcendentaL reason, which, in turn, is generated through our unconscious 
reificatLon of 9r amma ti ca L catagories. For Nietzsche, an adequate 
philosophy must not only, as here, explore kand thus partially undermine) 
the roLe of such a grammaticaL reifLcation, it must, further, present a 
philosophical, style of reasoning which avoids such relfication . 
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Language and Metaphor 
In the last section, we noted the role played by grammar in Nietzsche's 
anaLys1s of Language. In this sectLon, our concern wILL focus on the 'Lssue 
of Language as inherentLy rhetoricaL in nature3. We shaLL be attemptLng to 
draw out the significance of this conception of Language for Nietzsche's 
reLatLon to the concepts of 'reason', 'truth' and 'subject livity'. 
If the transpositlon Of grammatical relations and catogories represents 
one condition of possibiLity for the emergence of nihLL! sm4, anuther is 
indicated by our adoptLon of the correspondence theory of truth. In the 
context of the distinction between 'rea P and 'appar-ent' wor Lds, the 
correspondence theory acts an imperative towards the belief that because 
we have terms Uke 'witt', 'good', 'true', 'God' and 'substance', thert- is 
necessarily something whLch corresponds to these terms. A true statement 
is one Ln whLch the structure of the statement, the arrangement of the 
terms depLoyed, corresponds to the structuraL arrangement of trie 'thil-)q. s' 
designated by these terms in the wor-Ld, Nietzsche fLnds this probLemat[c 
not just because it acts as a further buttress for the beLLef in the 
subject as an entity distinct from the acts performed by that subject, but 
aLso because Lt acts as a , /e! L, an LLLusLon, an error (in the 
fu[L itrony of 
these terms)'ý' which is no Longer useful. Indeed, this bekef is now 
harmfuL. 'God is dead; but given the way of men, there may be stiLl caves 
for thousands of years in which his shadow wILL be shown. - And we - we 
still have to vanquish his shadow, too. ' (GS 108). The correspondence 
theory of truth is one such shadow. It Ls usefut to note here that, for 
NLetzsche, the fa[sLty of a belLef does not necessariLy constLtute an 
argument against it, as he says: 'The condLtions of Life might incLudL- 
error. 1 (GS 121 ). What is s ign if ! cant is it's va lue 
f or L if e: 'The ,a Lue f or 
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lif'e Is ultimately decisive. ' 
reLation to another context: 
(WP 493). As Nietzsche puts this point in 
The onLy way to refute priests and reLLgions is this: to 
show that their errors have ceased to be benefIcLaL - that they rather do harm; In short, that their own , proof of 
power" no Longer hoLds good - (WP 158). 
In modernity, the "proof of power" of the correspondence theory of truth, 
as a form of the wILL to truth, no Longer hoLds good. Why? Nietzsche's 
argument operates on varLous grounds, one of wh[ch we noted above6. In 
generaL, we can say that the correspondence theory of truth represents a 
denLaL of the death of God, or, more accuratety, an attempt to repLace the 
authority of God wLth the authority of reason. This, for Nietzsche, 
represents the icat[on of seLf-responsIbUity: 'One wants to get around 
the wILL, the w! LLLng of a goaL, the risk of positing a goaL for oneself-, 
one wants to rLd oneself of the responsib[Lity' (WP 20). In other words, 
passive nihilism, the 'decLine and recession of the power of the spirit: ' 
(WP 22). We wILL be exploring Nietzsche's analysis of nihilism in the next 
chapter 7, however it is necessary now to Look at is his account of how 
language seduces us Into an acceptance of the correspondence theory of 
truth. At the same time, we wilL indicate the generat features of 
Nietzsche's phiLosophy of Language. 
Let us begin by noting the Nietzsche's character Lsat Lon of the conception 
of Language which Leads us to adopt the correspondence theory: 
The significance of Language for the evolution of culture 
L ies, in this, that mankind set up in Language a separate 
world beside the other world, a place it took to be so 
firmly set that, standing upon itself, It could I Lft the 
rest of the world off its hinges and make itself master of 
it. To the extent that man has for Long ages believed In the 
concepts and names of things as in aeternae veritas he has 
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appropriated to himself that pride by which he raised himself above the animal: he real Ly thought that in Language 
he possessed knowledge of the world. (HA 11) 
How is it that this shouLd come about? To explain this Nietzsche develops 
an alternative conception of Language and provides us with a psychological 
allegory of its origin. This development and provision draw on, and 
radicallse, the Romantic conception of Language which we find, for instance, 
in Herder, a conception of Language which connects metaphor with the 
emergence of speech itself. The aLLegory Nietzsche offers us goes as 
fo L lows: 
PsychoLgical explanation. - To trace something unknown back 
to something known is alleviating, soothing, gratifying and 
gives moreover a feeling of power. Danger, disquiet, anxiety 
attend the unknown - the first instinct is to eliminate 
these distressing states. First principle: any explanation 
is better than none. ... The cause-creating drive is thus 
conditioned and excited by the feeling of fear. ... Thus 
there are sought not only somek[nd of expLanation as cause, 
but a selected and preferred kind of explanation, the kind 
by means of which the feeling of the strange, new, 
unexperienced is most speedily and most frequently abolished 
- the most comrwn explanations. (TI 'The Four Great Errors' 
5). 
The device by which we most readily translate the strange into the 
famLLLar is metaphof-O. However, it is pschoLogicaLLy entaLLed, for Nietzsche, I 
that having metaphoricaLly assimiLated the strange, the unknown', we must 
florget that this assLmHatlon is (merety! ) metaphorical in operation - 'Onty 
by forgetting this primitive worLd of metaphor can one Live with any 
repose, security and consistency (TP IV p86) - and redesdLbe 
it as 
conceptuaL, that is, give it a soLidity and form, make it into a causal 
explanation. As he puts it: 
Everything which distinguishes man from the anLmaLs depends 
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upon this ability to volatilize perceptual metaphors in a 
schema, and thus to dissolve an image into a concept... (TP 
IV p86 ) 
We may scarceLy recogntse that our concepts are, what Rorty wouLd ca[L"t 
metaphors which have died off into LLteraLness, yet this is the cLalm 
Nietzsche is making. Language and rhetoric are co-extensive. This ctaim has 
severaL LmpLLcatLons, which Nietzsche recognLses, wLh regard to our 
conceptions of 'reason', 'knowledge' and 'truth'. 
If. 'No such thing as an unrhetoricat "natural" Language exists that 
couLd be used as a point of reference: ' (in De Man 1979 p105/106), if: 
'Tropes are not something that can be added or subtracted from Language 
at wUL; they are Lts truest nature. ' (in De Man 1979 p105/106), then Lt 
folLows that our formuLations of 'reason' (which, after aLL, must be 
expressed through Language) are themseLves rhetoricat. Thus Wetzsche 
argues: 'ALL rhetorLcaL figures (i. e. the essence of Language) are Logicatty 
invalid inferences. This is how reason begins. ' (TP I p48). On this model, 
Ulnowing Ls nothing but working with the favourite metaphors, ' (TP I p5l) 
- and truth? Truth, Ln the famous phrase, is., 
A moving army of metaphorsq metonymLes and 
anthropomorphismss in short a summa of human reLatLonships 
that are being poeticaLty and rhetorLcalLy subtimated, 
transposed, and beautifLed untlL, after Long and repeated 
use, a peopLe considers them as soLld, canonLcal, and 
unavoidable. Truths are MusLons whose Musory nature has 
been forgotten, metaphors that have been used up and have 
Lost theLr imprint and that now operate as mere metat, no 
Longer as coins. (TP IV p84) 
It is not difficult to see that if one operates this conception of 
language, then, as with Wittgensteln's Later phitosophy, it undermines any 
attempt to generate firm foundations for knowtedgell - the philospher of, 
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language as Sapper. Nietzsche depLoys this modeL of Language with 
devasrting irony, on the Kantian synthetic a prior[, for exampLe: 'A 
synthetic judgement describes a thing according to its consequences, i. e. 
essence and consequences become identLfied, L. e. a metonymy. ' (TP I p52). 
Now it is aLl very welL to satirlse our phiLosophicaL conceptions of 
'reason', 'knowtedgel, 'truth', etc., but, such a move demands an aLternate 
phiLosophy consistent with the conception of Language depLoyed here. We 
wiLL be examining various aspects of this philosophy Ln the remaLnInq 
sections of this chapter, it is reLevant though to sketch here what a 
particular aspect of such a philosophy might took Like. As our example, we 
shaLL take the way 'reason' might be conceived within such a framework. 
We can begin by reminding ourseLves that, for Nietzsche, there is no 
theoreticaL reason divorced, superior, or separate to practical reason. 
PractLcaL reason here signifyLng the way(s) we go about LLving, our everday 
practices, as phlLosopher, father, poLLticaL activist, Lover, etc. ... In this 
sense, Nietzsche is being rigorously nominalistic about our use of the term 
'reason', undercutting the homogeneity ascribed to it by ph[Losophers. 
Recalling Nietzsche's comments on the value for Life as the uLtImate 
trLbunaL, we may go so far as to suggest a way of acting is ratLonaL in so 
far as It fosters the LLfe of the individuaL, that Is the LndivLdual's 
ind! vLduaLLty; and Lrrat, lonaL in so far as it hinders such fostering. 
TheorettcaL reason, on this modeL, is that form of practicaL reason which 
reflects on the forms, rationality and LrratlonaLlty of our practLces 
(including itself as a practice, or set of practices, for theoretical reason 
may also be irrational). It is useful to add two points to what has been 
posLted so far. 
DeLeuze has suggested that in the context of Nietzsche's thought: 
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any proposition is Ltseff a set of symptoms expreSSLng p way 
of being or a mode of existence of the thinker, that LS tO 
say the state of forces that he maintains or tries to 
MaLntaLn with himself and others (consider the role of 
conjunctions In this connection). In this sense a 
proposition always reftects a mode of existence, a "type". (DeLeuze 1983 px). 
What this impLies is the cLalm that, for Nietzsche, our mode of expression 
affirms a particular mode of being, which is to say, a style of 
reasoning 12 . This point can be specified through the second point we shaLL 
mention. If Language is, as has been argued here, thoroughLy rhetoricaL, for 
Nietzsche, and, moreover, reasoning is throughLy Linguistic (i. e. it makes 
no sense to taLk of reasoning 'outside' of Language), then Lt foitows that 
reasoning is throughLy rhetorLcaL'3. This imp L Les that our mode of 
expression embodies a (necessarLLy rhetoricaL) styLe of reasoning which is 
constitutive of a partLcuLar mode of being. The rhetoricaL nature of 
reasoning is significant here not just because it enables us to speak of 
reasoning in terms of style(s), but because it aLso instances a particuLar 
exempLar of the wilt to power. That Is, our mode of expression Is 
inherentLy performative, it seeks to persuade, to encourage, the adoption 
of a partLcuLar mode of being'-*. We can now see the kind of notion of 
'reason' which operates In Nietzsche's texts, the cogency of this notion of 
'reason' is, of course, another question and one which it wou Ld be 
premature to try to answer here before examLng NLetzschels remarks on 
subject[vLty and perspectivism. 
What has been indicated in this section is the sort of account of 
language we can find Ln, NLetzsche. It has been suggested elsewhere"I that 
there are sim! LarLties between Nletzsche's account and that offered by the 
Later WIttgenstein. This is an interesting paraLLeL which, partLcularLy in 
respect of theLr common reLation to and rebeILLon agaLnst Schopenhauer, 
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wouLd repay further study, however, we can, for the moment, indicatE t. -, O 
faLt- ly strong points Ln common: (1) a rejection of correspondence theorLez- 
of truth and thus of the trad! tLonaL ep[stemoLogicaL enterprise and QD a 
treatment of Language as practice, that is, of Language as inseparabte from 
our everyday practices and forms of Life. Beyond this point, Lt wouLd be 
fooLhardy to commit ourselves with respect to Wittgensteln's position on 
the issues of rhetoric and reason, which anyway, whiLe they might serve as 
usefuL indicators, are besides our ma Ln concern: the outLining of 
Nietzsche's generaL phýLosophicaL position. A significant point which was 
raised briefLy in this discussion was the issue of the vaLue for Life of 
particutar beLiefs ýand modes of being) over time, we shaLL return to this 
is: --sue, which is centraL to an understanding of Nietzsche, in the next 
chapter. At this stage, however, we can productlveLy move to a d1scussion 
of Nietzsche's conception of subjectivity, a discussion which wLLL indicate 
ýýQme of the ways r--ýLetzsche -leveLops hils generaL phLiLOSOPI)LcaL posLtLon Ln 
L Loin to the account of Language he presents. 
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3. SubjectLylty and StyLe: Becoming Who One Is 
What does it mean to taLk of subjectivity in reLation to Nietzsche? After 
aLL, have we not already noted that Wetzsche regards the subject as a 
fiction? Yet, at the same time, the notion of a 'fiction' is probLemat[c 
here, a 'fiction' by contrast with what? - facts, perhaps? But we have 
aLready seen that Wetzsche aboLLshes the distinctLon between the reaL 
and the appararent which is aLso the distinction between fact and 
interpretation. After aLL, he notes: 'facts is precLseLy what there is not, 
on Ly Interpretations. ' (WP 481 ). Here, perhaps, in the form of our 
questioning we find a cLue, we find a point of entry into this area. By 
treating Nietzsche's cLaLm that the subject is a fiction as, in effect, the 
cLalm that the posUing of the subject, aLded and abbetted by the structure 
of Language, Ls a particuLar kLnd of interpretatLon - one whLch Metzsche 
wants to move away from. To taLk about subjectLvity In retation to 
Nietzsche, then, is to examine his reasons for rejecting the interpretation 
which posits the subject as a given unity - the T in 'I think therefore I 
am' is aLways the same 11116 - and to anaLyse the notion of subjectivity 
whLch Wetzsche offers withLn hLs own Lnterpretive act! vLty. It shouLd be 
noted that the use of 'Lnterpretation' here shouLd not be taken to impLy 
that there is some sLnguLar object beLng interpreted, as we shaLL come to 
see in this, and the next, section, Nietzsche's paradoxicaL cLalm that there 
are lonLy inter pretat Lons I has radicaL and far-reaching LmpUcatLons which 
attempt to dissoLve the scheme/reatity distinction that Language imposes 
on us. 
What form does Nietzsche's rejection of the subject as a given unity 
take? We can begin by noting that whlLe we have, hLtherto, concentrated on 
the 'subject' s Ide of the subject-predicate distinction, Nietzsche's 
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argument revoLves equaLLy about our reif ication of predicates. Today, he 
says, we know that the wLLL is 'merely a word' (TI 'Reason' in Philosophy 
5), wh L Le 'th ink ing' is 'a qu ite arbitary f ict ion' (WP 477). What leads 
NLet-zsche to make these outlandish sounding remarks? ActuaLLy, his point 
a reLativeLy straýghtforward one: sLmpLy that to speak of 'w! Uing' or 
'thinking' as conceptuatly isoLatabLe is absurd, 'w iLL ing' is aLways a 
'wULLng something', 'thinking' is aLways a 'thinking something'. That is, we 
cannot separate 'w! LLln9l from what is being wLLLed, 'thinking' from what is 
being thought about. In other words, Nietzsche Ls rejecting the distinction 
between form and content as regards human activity. If we refLect on this 
for a moment, we may find that it doesn't surprise us; for what wou Ld be 
the presuppositions underlying such a distinction between form and 
content'? On one LeveL, it wouLd need to be assumed that we couLd identify 
something caLLed 'thinking' (i. e. 'it' wouLd have to be homogeneous in its 
appLication). UnderLyLng this assumption, it wouLd be required that there 
be a subt A dollnq thLas 'triLnkLnql, appLyinq the process we desLqnate by j g-- cI- 
this term, moreover, this subject would itself have to be a unitary 
constant. For, as was mentioned above, to make the claim 'I thýnk therefore 
am' requires that this T is aLways the same T, for if the T is not 
the same T how can we identify its activity 'thinking' as the same 
cLp "his theme, in a way strangeLy reminiscent of LN t-', sch ee de ve LoSL 
Wittgenstein's argument concerning the possibiLity of a private Language 
through a consideratLon of the assumptLons begged Ln the use of the 
phrase 11 think. It is worth quoting this at Length given its significance 
for Nietzsche'- rejection of the notion of the subject as a unitary given. 
The argument goes as folLows: 
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t he ph 1[ ospher must say tohi mse Lf: when I ana L yse t he event 
expressed in the sentence 'I think' I acquire a series of 
rash assertions whLch are difficult, perhaps impossible, to 
prove - for example, that it is I who think, that it has to 
be something at all which think--, that thinking is an 
activity and operation on the part of an entity thought of 
as a cause, that an 'P exists, finally that what is 
designated by 'thinking' has already been determined - that 
I know what thinking is. For if I had not already decided 
that matter within myself, by what standard could I 
determine that what is happenIng is not perhaps 'wLLLing' or 
'feeLing"? Enough: this 'I think' presupposes that I compare 
my present state with other known states of myself in order 
to determine what it is: on account of this retrospective 
connection with other 'knowledge' at any rate it possesses 
no immedLate certainty for me. In pLace of the ' immediate 
certainty' in which the people may believe in the present 
case, the philosopher acquires in this way a series of 
metaphysical questions, ... (BGE 16). 
'I think' represents then a hLghLy probLematicat statement. What Nietzsche 
estabLishes here LS that the cLaim 'I thLnk', whLch is the claLm that there 
is an 11' and that this T performs something formaLLy LdentifiabLe as 
'thinking', is not setf-evident but rests on a whoLe series of assumptions. 
'Yet this stLLL does not expLain, in Ltsetf, why Nietzsche - even given that 
'both the doer and the deed are fictLons. ' (WP 477) - shouLd reject thýs 
interpretation of subjectivity. To expLore thits point requires we examine 
what Nietzsche concýeves of the impLications of this interpretive positing 
.F I 
of the subject-as-unity to be. 
Without pre-empting our discussion of Christianity and NihiLlsm too 
much'15, we can refer Nietzsche's rejection of the subject as 'a neutraL 
substratum' (GM 1 13) to his clLscussLon of the emergence of sLave moraLity 
in the essay "'Good and EvLL, " "Good and Bad"' (GM 1). Here Nietzsche argues 
of the weak: 
This type of man needs to beL [eve in a neutral independent 
"subject, " prompted by an instinct for self-preservation and 
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se t -af Lrmation in which every L1e is sanctified. The 
subject (or to use a more popuLar expression, the soul) has 
perhaps been believed in hitherto more firmLy than anything 
eLse on earth because it makes possibLe to the majority of 
mortaLs, the weak and oppressed of every kind, the subLIme 
seLf-deception that interprets weaknes-Z, as freedom, and 
their being thus-and-thus as a ff, ýeerit. (GM 1 13) 
NLet--sche does not sug that thIs has not at tLmes been a posLtLve gest 
vaLue for Life: in the context of modernity, however, it operates as an 
negative force. To expand this point a Uttie, we can note two points of 
signLficance: (j) NLetzsche suggests that we beLleve Ln the concepts 
"truth, " llreaLLty'l and "substantlwLy" onLy because we believe in the 
subject (WP 4-85), and UL) this interpretation of subjectivity has been 
'taught best and Longest' by Christianity (BGE 12). Taking these two points 
together, we can see that beLief In the subject constltutes- one of the 
condLttons for the emergence of nihiLism, given that this emergence is 
marked by the wLLL to truth turning against Christian moraLity. There is, 
moreover, a further ground or) which Nietzsche rejects this conception of 
this beLncj that this beL[ef in I-oul atomism" (BGE 12), in our 
subjectivity as possessing a transcendentaL unity, is the ground on which 
is based the cLalm to generate a conception of the good life which is 
universaLLy appLicabLe. That is, a system of moraLity which should be 
appLied to aLL. This is anathema to Nietzsche, for whom it is precLsety 
su ch tota L is ing mora L systems whLch resuLt in the formation of 
ressentiment and bad conscience'. ConsequentLy, this 'souL-hypothesis' 
must be overcome. 
Given that Nietzsche rejects the IsouL-hypothes[s, which treats of the 
subject as a given unity, our question nece--sar! Ly becomes: with what is it 
replaced? Our starting point here will be a remark which foLtows 
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Nýetzsche's rejection of soul . 9tomism. 'Between ourse[ves, it is not at aLL 
necessary by the same act to get rid of 'the soul' itself and thus forgo 
2) He goes on: of the oldest and most venerable of hypotheses' (BGE 12 
the road to new forms and refinements of the sout-hypothesis 
stands open: and such conceptions as ImortaL SOUL' and 'SOUL 
as muLt ! pL Lcity of the subject' and SOUL as soc i at 
structure of the drives and emotions' want henceforth to 
posssess civic rights in science. (BGE 12). 
With the demLse of the interpretation of the subject as a unitary given, a 
range of options are opened up for us in trying to conceptuahse 
subject ivity. Nietzsche's SOUL-hypothesLs conceives of the subject as 
muLtiplicity (WP 490). We can get a first approximation of what he refers 
to by this through a consideration of the foLLowing two passages: 
"The subject" Ls the f ictLon that many simi Lar states in us 
are the effect of one substratum: but it is we who first 
created the "simiLarity" of these states; our adjusting them 
and making them sim[Lar is the fact, not their simitarity 
which ought to be denied -). (WP485) 
The assumption of one singLe subject is perhaps unnecessary; 
perhaps it is just as permLss! bLe to assume a muLtipLicity 
of subjects, whose interaction and strugg[e is the basis of 
our thought and consciousness in generaL'? A kind of 
aristocracy of "ceLLs" in whých dominion resides? To be 
sure, an aristocracy of equaLs, used to ruLLng jointLy and 
unclerstandýng how to command? (WP 490). 
What Metzsche is suggesting here is that we consist of many states or 
seLves or subjects, and that to generate an account of subjectivity 
requLres that we theorise both how these seLves Lnteract and how our 
subjectivity comes to have the 'sembLance of unity' (WP489). We wILL 
consLder these poLnts concurrent[y as we outLine Wetzsche's account of 
subject ivLty. 
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We wiLL approach thLs Lssue by way of the notLon of a style of reasoning 
(whLch was touched upon in the Last section). ThLs notion has been 
developed recently by HackLng who argues: 'My reLatMst worry [--, to 
repeat, that the sense of a proposition Fý the way In which it points to 
truth or faLsehood, hinges on the styLe of reasoning appropriate to p. ' 
(Hacking 1982 p49) and again: 
For my part, I have no doubt that our dLscoveries are 
'objective', simply because the styles of* reasoning we 
employ determine what counts as objectLvity. My worry is 
that the very candidates for truth or falsehood have no 
existence independent of the styles of reasoning that settle 
what is to be true or fatse in their domain. (Hacking 1982 
49). 
There is some resembLance between this notion depLoyed by Hacking and 
Nietzsche's concept of reasonLng, this consisting primarLLy in the idea that 
our styLe of reasoning creates our worLd. However, Nietzsche's concept of 
rea--onLng takes this process a step further Lnto the cLaim that our styLes 
of reasonLnq are constittutLve of not just our worLd but aLso our seLves. If 
we reLate this back to our earLLer discussion, it becomes cLear. Whereas 
Hacking taLks of the styLe of reasoning appropriate to a proposition p; for 
Nietzsche, a proposition p embodies a style of reasonLng. This apparently 
sLýqht dLfference has consýderabLe consequences2l. 
It was suggested earLier by 'styLe of reasoning' is intended a styLe of 
Living, a set of practices we engage in everyday Life. We have atso seen 
that NLetzche rejects the schema of 'doer' and 'deed' as fictitious. If, 
however, this schema is rejected, one LS left with the doin_q, the living, 
the practices in which we engage. We can, therefore, say our seLfhood Is 
constituted through the totaLLty of our practices, which is to cLaim that 
we are constAuted through our acts. This poLnt has been summed up by 
- 35 - 
Nehamas who notes that for NLetzsche: 'no person remams beyond the 
totaLLty of its exper Lences and act ions. I (Nehamas 1985 p155). The 
lrnpLicatLon of this Is simpLy that we are constituted through the st-yLes 
of reason we depLoy. FormaLLy speaking, in stating a proposition p, one 
aff Lrms a styLe of reasonLng r whLch ýs constLtutive of a mode of' 
ex istence e. 
But what of Nietzsche's notion of 'multipLicity`ý This idea enters the 
arena once we note that in our Lives we depLoy a range of different styLes 
ot reasor)Lnq embodLed [n the dLfferent practLcaL actMtýes in whLch we 
engage. Each particular style of reasonLng const[tutLng a spec! fLc self, 
aff irmIng a given mode of existence. Our subjectivity is the mu[tLpLLcity 
of seLves formed through these different practices. We can Investigate this 
idea in greater detalL by consLdering Nietzsche's notion of 'character', a 
move which wLLL indicate aLso how we come to conceive of ourseLves as a 
un Lty. 
'Ly begins with Nietzsche's comment on what is Tr,, ýs e. xposttion necessarL 
needfu 1: 
Une thin_q is needful. - To "give style" to one' s character - 
a great and rare art! It is practised by those who survey 
aL L the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then 
f it the into an artistic plan unti L everyone of them appears 
as art and reason and even weaknesses de LL ght the eye. Here 
a Large mass of second nature has been added; there a piece 
of original nature has been removed - both times through 
Long practice and daiLy work at it. Here the ugly that could 
not be removed is concealed; there it has been reinterpreted 
and made sublime. ... In the end, when 
the work is finished, 
it becomes evident how the constraint of a single taste 
governed and formed everything Large and smalL. Whether this 
taste was good or bad is Less important than one might 
suppose, if only it was a singLe taste! (GS 
290). 
This passage shows that what is significant, for Nietzsche, 
is the 
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'enforcement of an LnterpretLve homogeneýty throughout aLl aspects of one's 
be ing. ' (Davey 1987 p276). We can iLLustrate thLs po Lnt further by 
reference to Nietzsche's comments on weak and strong characters: 
Weakness of the wi 11: that is a metaphor that can prove 
misleading. For there is no will, and consequently neither a 
strong or a weak wLLL. The muLtLtude and disgregatLon of 
impuLses and the Lack of any systematic order among them 
resuLt in a "weak wLIL"; their coordLnatLon under a single 
predominant impulse results in a "strong wLIL": in the first 
case it is the oscillation and the Lack of gravity; in the 
Latter, the precision and clarity of direction. (WP 46). 
The subject as mu Lt lpLicLty thus consists in the notion that our 
subjectivity is formed through the interaction of our muLtipLe seLves. Each 
styLe of reasoning (embodied in a given seLf) attempts to enforce its own 
styLe over the other styLes of reasoning. As Nietzsche puts this point: 
'each one has its perspectýve that it wouLd Like to compet aLL the other(s] 
to accept as a norm. ' (WP 481 ). We wiLL cons Lder the re Lat ion between a 
re-i-asorIMO and a perSpeCtLve Ln the next sectLon, the pDint made 
here though shouLd be cLear. We can back up this Interpretation of 
Nietzsche further by reference to two exempLes. The first concerns his 
conceptuaLLsation of 'the weak'. Nietzsche uses the term 'weak' to designate 
those Ln whom the muLtipLe seLves are not weLded into a coherent whoLe, 
FoLLOW[nq nLS naracterLsatlon of styLe as needfuL, he states: 'Lt is the 
weak characters wLthout power over themseLves that hate the constraLnt of 
styLe. 1 (GS 290). In this context, the positing of the subject as unLtary, 
as a 'neutraL substratum' makes sense; for this Ls the means by which the 
weak subvert the constraint of sty[e and give themseLves the sembLance of 
unity. Moreover, this aLso operates as the first move in undermining those 
of strong character as we shaLL see in our discussion of ressentiment7l. 
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The second example concerns Goethe, who, for Nietzsche: 
did not sever himself from L Lfe, he pLaced himself within 
it; nothing could discourage him and he took as much as 
possible upon himself, above himself, within himseLf. What 
he aspLred to was totalit)r, he strove against the separation 
of reason, sensuality, feeling, wi LL... ; he disciplined 
himself to a whole, he created hLmseLf. (TI Expeditions of 
an Untimely Man 49). 
Goethe's attempt to transform himseff into a totaLity, to give styLe to his 
character, represents 'the highest of aLL possIbLe faiths' (TI Expeditions 
of an UntLmeLy Man 49). This, for Nietzsche, is what is invoLved in 
'becoming who one is', a phrase which indicates both that who one is 
changes over time as one engages in new practices, undergoes new 
experiences, and that one is actively involved in this creation of oneself. 
We can further specify this notion of subjectivity by adopting and 
adjusting a recent argument put forward by Maclntyre. 
In 'Dramatic Narratives, EpLstemoLogLcaL Crises and the Phitosophy of 
Science'", Macintyre argues that we can understand selfhood Ln terms of a 
narrative. Transposing this into the Nietzschean terms of' the subject as 
muLtLplicLty, we get the notion of the subject as consisting of a set of 
narrat[ves recountLng dLfferent storLes and depLoying dLfferent styLes. Our 
subjectivity consists in the way in which these stories and styLes interact 
and mesh together. In a strong character, Like Goethe, this meshing is 
accompL[shed by the generation of an overarching narrative which exhibits 
a styListLc coherency; Ln a weak character, the narratives remain more or 
less discontinuous and stytistLcatLy varied. A further benefit of thLs 
metaphor of narratLvity is that it is usefuL in indicating the mobiLity of 
our sense of ourseLves as a subject over tLme. Maclntyre suggests that our 
response to a personaL crisLs can be descibed in terms of a rewriting o-f 
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the narrative that constitutes the T. This rewriting consisting of two 
moves: M an explanation of how our previous narrative was unable to cope 
with the given crisis-event and (U) a reLnterpretatLon of this crisis- 
event such that we overcome it, such that we assimLLate it into our sense 
of ourseLf. In our terms, this consists in a rewriting which is both a re- 
coordination and a rewriting of some of our varLous narrative seLves. The 
abiLity of this modeL to cope with crises indicates its fLexiblLity in 
terms of conceiving of our subjectivity as non-statLc, as mobiLe. In terms 
of this modeL that we can make sense of NLetzsche's epigram: 'What does 
not kiLL me makes me stonger' (TI Maxims and Arrows 8) and his formuLa for 
happiness: 'a Yes, a No, a straight Line, a goal ... ' (TI Maxims and Arrows 
44). The former of these aphorLsms represents the cLaLm that the 
overcoming of a crLsis-event forces one to reintegrate one's various 
selves. The tatter formulation may be read as suggestLng that the posLting 
Lc a usetuL device in the task of renderInq one subjectLvity of a qnal 
coherent. 
To conclude this section, let us note the diverse facets of Nietzsche's 
account of subject Lv ity. The f irst move in this account is negative: an 
attack on the conception of the subject as a given unity. The second move 
has two reLated eLements: (1) an aLternatLve account of our subjectivLty, 
the subject as muLtLpLicity, and QD an expLanation of how we came to 
conceive of the subject as a given unity, as a IneutraL substratum'. The 
notion of a 'styLe of reasoning' was depLoyed to facLLLtate this account of 
our subjectLvitY and it is to further utiLLsation of this notion that we 
turn as we transfer our focus to the issue of perspectivism. 
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Perspectivism 
In tras sect[on, we shaLL be concerned wLth N[etzsche's formuLations 
concerning the perspectLvaL character of existence. FLrstLy, it wiLL be 
shown that NLetzsche rejects the conditLons of poss[bLLLty of epistemoLogy. 
SecondLy, we wiLL set out the sense in which Nietzsche uses terms 'fiction', 
'interpretation' and 'perspective' by reference to his abotition of the 
d1stinction between the IreaLl and the 'apparent'. ThLrdly, we wiLL consLder 
the notLon of a 'styLe of rea--onLng, Ln reLatLon to the doctrine of 
perspectLvism. FLnaLLy, the sense in which one can refer to two distinct 
versions of perspectLvism will be examined, as will some of the criticaL 
probLems posed for the notion of perspectivIsm. 
Ls- here taken to refer to the attempt to specify the 
criteria which must be satisfied for something to be defined as 
'knowLedge'. Its aLm Ls 'to deLLneate a reaLm secure from the phenomenaL 
vagaries of the knower' (Strong 1985 p165). ConsequentLy, lepistemo[ogy 
must either seek to establish a knowing self that transcends the vagaries 
of phenomenal life or despair of attaining knowtedge at aLl. ' (Strong 1985 
p165). As was pointed out in the Last section though, to speak of a 
transendentaL subjectivity is ruLed out by Nietzsche; as is, therefore, any 
attempt to Specify either the knOWLnq subject or the knowLedge as 
distLnguLshabLe from the act of knowing2-1, ThLs rejectLon of the 
possiblLity of ePistemoLogy emerges in Nietzsche's assertion that: 
physics too is onLy an interpretation and arrangement of the 
world (according to our own requirements, if I may say so! 
and not an expLanation of the world: ... (BGE 14). 
and, moreover, other interpretations may be made (cf BGE 22) which, in 
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knowLedge terms, are equaLLy vaLid, At this point, the spectre of reLativLsm 
appears to be emerging, however we wLLL postpone dLscuss-Lon of this issue 
untiL we have exaMLned Nietzsche's doctrine of perspectLvLsm. 
'InterpretatLon' and 'fictLon' are terms frequentLy depLoyed by Nietzsche, 
however, as was noted in our discussion of subjectivity, he appears to 
depLoy these terms wh! Le denying the term to which they are generatty 
opposed L. e. 'fact' (WP 481, for example). On one level, th[s strategy Ls 
part of Ms poLemicaL attack on the distLnctLon between the reaL and the 
apparent worLds. Beyond this (though reLated to it), this usage is Linked 
in to his notion of perspectivism. An entry point to this issue is 
avaLLabLe in the foLtowing remark: 
There are many kinds of eyes. Even the sphinx has eyes - and 
consequentLy there are many kinds of "t rut hs, and 
consequentLy there is no truth. (WP 540) 
H -e Met---he appears to be ciafflninq that our ýItruth" depanoez- on trie er L 
perspective we dep[oy, there is no abs-oLute or underLying truth, no YeaL 
worLd'. This can be clarified further: 
The perspective therefore decides the character of the 
"appearance"! As if a worLd wouLd stILL remain over after 
one deducted the perspective! (WP 567) 
Our perspectLve generates the apparent worLd, our Lnterpretation, our 
fiction, but this is the onLy wortd, 'The llreaL worLd, " however one has 
hitherto conceived it - it has aLways been the apparent worLd once again. ' 
(WP 566). 
Two points require anaLysLs at this point: (D what are the impLicatlons 
Q constLtutes a perspectLve? We can nf thLis perspeactlvLsm? and M) what 
examine this first point throuqh a passage from The Gay Science which is 
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hLghLy Lmportant for an understandLng of perspectvism as the human 
condLtion: 
How far the perspectLve character of existence extends or 
indeed whether existence has any other character than this; 
whether existence without interpretation, without "sense, " 
does not become "nonsense"; whether, on the other hand, all 
existence is not essentiaLLy actively engaged in 
interpretation - that cannot be decided even by the most 
industrious and most scrupulously conscientious analysis and 
seLf-examination of the intellect; for in the course of this 
analysis the human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself Ln 
its own perspectives, and only in these. We cannot Look 
around our own corner: it is a hopeless curio4sity that 
wants to know what other kinds of intellects and 
perspectives there might be; for example, whether some 
beings might be able to experience time backward, or 
atternateLy forward and backward (which would involve 
another direction of Life and another concept of cause and 
effect). But I think today that we are at Least far from the 
ridiculous immodesty that wouLd be involved in decreeing 
from our corner that perspectives are only permitted from 
this corner. Rather has the worLd become "infinite" for us 
aLL over again, inasmuch as we cannot reject the possibiLlty 
that it may include infinite interpretations. (GS 374) 
In this passage, all the major points consequent to the doctrine of 
perspectivism are brought out. FirstLy, we cannot get outsLde our human 
perspectives. SecondLy, we operate (as a species) a variety of perspectives 
and consequentLy, it is absurd to cLaLm that a given perspective represents 
the truth. ThLrdLy, we are faced wLth the possibULty that there may be, 
for us, an infinite number of possible perspect[ves - the challenge 
Met. -sche poses Ls the affLrmatior, of thLs pussibMty24, We wiLL be 
return[nq to the first of these points towards the end of this section, 
wh! Le the Latter two shouLd be born in mind reLatLve to the discussion of 
Christianity and NihLLLsm In the next chapter. For the moment, it is 
necessary to pick up our second Issue which concerns the format features 
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of a perspective. 
DiscussLon of this 'Lssue can beqin by reference to the issue of value in 
NLetzsche's formutatLon of what makes up a perspectLve. ThuS: 
The apparent worLd, L. e. ,a worLd viewed according to 
vaLues; ordered, seLected according to vaLues, i. e., in this 
case according to te viewpoint of utiLlty in regard to the 
preservation and enhancement of a certaLn species of anLmat. 
(WP 567). 
and again: 
That the value of the world Lies in our interpretation (- 
that other interpretations than merely human ones are 
perhaps somewhere possible -); that previous interpretations 
have been perspective valuations by virtue of which we 
survive in Life, i. e., in the wILL to power, for the growth 
of power; that every elevation of man brings with it the 
overcOMLng of narrower interpretations; that every 
strengthening and increase of power opens up new 
perspectives and new horLzons - this idea permeates my 
writings. (WP 616). 
per-- LLLve: Lnen LnvoLves a vatuation, a rankina Ot vaLues about which 
we generate our wor[d. It is important to note here that: 'One may not ask: 
If who then Lnterprets? " for the interpretatLon j'L'seLf is a form of the wILL 
to power, exLsts (but not as a ''being" but as a process, a becoming) as an 
affect. ' (WP 556). In other words, the T is formed through the actMty of 
interpreting, is generated from the perspective. Both the knower (the 
Dubject) and the known (the worLd) are constituted through the actLviy of 
knowing. How does this fit in with the notion of a 'styLe of reasoning' 
which was utiLlsed to expLore Nietzsche's account of subjectivity? 
In actuaLLty, a perspective consists precLseLy in the depLoyment of a 
particular style of reasoning. We can explore this by reference to 
strong and weak indivLduaLs. It wiLL be di--tLnctLon between 
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recaL!. ed that a strong indlvLduaL is one who weLds his disparate seLves 
into a coherent whoLe, whereas a weak indMcluaL is one in whom these 
z-. PL,, /es remaLn more or Less dLsparate. One's perspectLve(s) deveLop out of 
the setves one consists of and the way in which seLves are more or Less 
coordinated. In the weak LndlviduaL, the Lack of coherent coordination of 
the selves results in the positýnq of a 'neutral substratum' which is 
termed 'the subject'. But what is LnvoLved in this process? It wiLL be 
recaLLed that, for Nietzsche, each of our selves attempts to impose its 
perspective on the other seLves. To put this another way, each of the 
styLes of reasoning we depLoy attempts to dominate the other sty[es of 
reasonLng. In the case of the weak ind iv idua L, this resuLts in the 
con-timu, ing war of rivaL s-tyLes of reasoning. The positing of a IneutraL 
sur-)siLr---, tum' is, thus, the means by which the weak indLviduaL maintains at 
ieas, i 'r-he sembLance of unLty. In contrast, the strong indLviduaL is the one 
who coordinates these warring perspectives into a coherent who Le, 
depLoying each when it is deemed appropriate. In terms of the narrative 
metaphor that was utilised earLier, we can state that the weak individuat 
unabLe to coordinate his perspectives into an aesthetic unity invents a 
narrator who teLLs a[L the disparate stories as a means to giving himseLf 
a superf LclaL unity, whLLe, Ln contrast, the strong ind*LvlduaL organises his 
disparate stories into an overarching narrative totaLity. It should now be 
cLear what NLetzsche means by the term 'perspective' and we can consider 
the question of whether there are two distinct versions or LeveLs of 
perspectivism and examIne the probLem of reLativism that has been posed 
for this doctrine. 
Up to thýs stage in our argument, we have been focusing on the form of 
human perspectLve vaLuations of the worLd. We have, for Metzsche, a 
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potentiaLLy infinite number of such perspectives open to us. This version 
of perspectivLsm may be termed 'immanent perspectivism, since its operation 
Lmmanent to the make-up of the human body. However, there are aLso, 
Metzsche argues, an inf LnLte number of perspectLves we cannot cleptoy or 
even grasp as perspectives: 'We cannot Look around our own corner ... ' (GS 
374). NLetzsche's poLnt here is that just as our physlotogicaL constitution 
makes a variety of perspectives avaitabLe to us, at the same time it ruLes 
out the possibility of other perspectives. To take up the example Nietzsche 
gives (cf GS 374): we cannot experience time backwards and consequentLy we 
cannot even conceive of a perspective generated out of such an 
experLentiaL framework. Indeed, since one cannot conceive of such a 
perspective, it actuaLLy makes no sense to caLL this perspective a 
'perspective' at aLL. This second version of perspectivism may be termed 
lontoLogicaL perspectLvism' since its argument is that our ontotogicaL 
'Sets II spectLves POSSL Lmit-S- to the oera for us as a parti-cuLar Ii 
kind of being. It is apparent, therefore, that Nietzsche does operate with 
two versions of perspectivism. For our concerns, immanent perspectivLsm is 
the important version and it is to this that we shaLl refer by the term. 
The second issue to be examined here is the reLatLvist spectre raised 
for cerspectivism, whLch Ln its strongest form is the argument that 
perspeCtLViSM is seLf-refutLng. This can be expressed as foLLows: 
Suppose we character I ze Ni etzsche' s perspect ivi sm as t he 
thesis (P) that every view is an Lnterpretation. Now Lt 
appears that if (P) is true, and if every view is in fact an 
interpretation, this would apply-to (P) itself. In that case 
(P) also turns out to be an interpretation. But if this is 
so, then not every view need be an interpretation and (P) 
seems to have refuted itseLf. (Nehamas 1985 p66). 
ThiLs- argument onLy appears to work, however, because of the assumptLons 
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underlying its use of the term 'true'. To hold that perspectivism is true 
LMpLLes that it is possibLe to determine that a given view is true or 
Lsef that a qLvL-n vieýj orresponds to Lhe way reality is. But thLs 
assumption necessariLy impLies that perspectivism, given its rejection of 
the correspondence theory of truth, Is faLse. The paradox Lies in the use 
of the term 'true' in this context and not in perspectLvism which rejects 
this true or faLse dichotomy aLong with the distinction between reaL and 
apparent worLds. In effect, what is going on in the generation of this 
'paradox' is the affirmation of two different (and conf L ict ing) 
phiLosophicaL vocabutaries2l. 
Another form of the reLativist argument hoLds that the probLem with 
perspect! vLsm is that it ruLes out the poss[bUity of distinguishing 
between different knowLedge cLaims on grounds of epistemoLogicaL adequacy, 
and is consequentLy thrust into reLatLvism. This, therefore, raises the 
standard reLat[vLst paradox: a thesis (R) that everýthLng is reLatLve if it 
is true LmpLLes that (R) is reLative and, consequentLy, that not everything 
need be relative. On one LeveL, this is the same argument that we have 
just deaft with, however if we remove the phrase 'if it is true', a sLightLy 
different and more subtle probLem is being posed. Yet if we remove this 
phrase, we can justlfLabLy hoLd that Nietzsche's position is not (R). This 
can be detalLed as foLLows: If we remove the phrase 'if It is true', the 
.I reLatLVLSt argument wouLd now hoLd that perspectivLsm 91ves us no grounds 
for dLstinguLshing the force of different knowledge claims. This, however, 
ts not the case, as can be LLLustrated by reference to Nietzsche's point 
that perspectives can and must be evaluated in terms of their value for 
[ ife (cf. WP 493). 
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To conclude this sectLon, Let us sum up the principal features of our 
discussion. Firstly, we noted briefly Nietzsche's grounds for rejecting the 
epLstemoLogLcaL enterprise as a non-starter. Secondly, the general features 
of perspectivism were outLined. Thirdly, we illustrated the features that 
constitute a perspective. Fourthly, it was shown how one's perspective is 
related to one's subjectivity and one's world. Fifthly, it was pointed out 
that Nietzsche operates two (more or Less) distinct LeveLs of 
ýpe., --Pect iv ism. Finally, it was argued that perspect[vism Ls neither self- 
refuting or relativist. In the next section, we will, be examining how 
Nietzsche goes about anaLysLng how perspectives emerge and whether a 
perspective is of value for Life. 
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GeneaLoqy and OrLqins 
The ý)urpose of this sectLon is to Outi-Lne Nietzsche's conception of 
geneaLogy. Th iss being understood as his mode of tnvest[gating the 
emergence of perspectives and evaLuating their vaLue for Life. This task 
wiIL be approached in it La L Ly through a consideration of Wetzsche's 
rejectlon of the pursuLt of the origin (Ursprung) Ln favour of an anaLysis 
posed ýn terms of emergence (Entstehung) and descent (Herkunft). We wiLL 
then move to cons-Ider the operation of this form of analysis through an 
examination of the essay "'Good and Bad, " "Good and EvW", focusing on the 
emergence of sLave moraLity, which Is to say, the perspective of the sLave. 
From this we wLLL move to a discussion of how Nietzsche's principLe of 
evaLuatLon operates and, in partLcuLar, how the vaLue of a perspective may 
-0-a- vary over time. FinaLLy, we wiLL dekneate the prlncipaL features of 
geneaLogy and the notion of critique which it depLoys. 
FoucauLt2--7 has suggested that we fLnd two uses of the term LJrsprun_q Ln 
NLetzschels texts, The f ir--t Ls unstressed and used LnterchangabLy wLth the 
terms Entstehun_q and Herkunft among others. The second use Ls stressed 
and Ls used In 'an ironLc and deceptLve manner' (Reader p77): 
In what, for instance, do we find the originaL basis 
Wrsprunq) of moraLLty, a foundation sought after PLato? "In 
destabLe narrow-minded concLusions. Pudenda ori_qo. " (Reader 
p77). 
The most sLgnLf! Cant text with regard to these different usages of 
Ursprun_q is, Foucautt suggests, the preface to On the GeneaLoqY of Morats. 
Here the terms Herkunft and Ur-sprung are opposed: 
This use of the term Herkunft cannot be arbitary, since it 
serves to designate a number of texts, beginning with Human, 
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AL I Too Huffien, which deaL with the origin of moraL Lty, 
asc et, 1 ci sm, j ust Lce, and pun 1 shment . And yet t he word used 
in aLL these works has been Ursprung It wouid seem that a, 
this point in the Genealogy Nietzsche wished 'LO vaLidate an 
opposition between Herkunft and Ursprung which did not exist 
ten years earLLer. (Reader p78) 
At the Least there appears to have been a seff-conscious conceptuaL 
cLarification by Nietzsche here. But why shouLd he feeL such a move 
neces--arye We can approach this by pointing out the different senses of 
Herkunf't and Ursprun_q. The former of these refers to origin in the sense 
of extraction or provenance, i. e. origin in a 
_genealogical 
sense, where 
geneaLogy here is used in its normaL sense of referring to lir)ea_qe. The 
Latter, however, deptoys the concept of origin in the sense of source, as 
primal. It is now possLbLe to see why Wetzsche shouLd wish to oppose 
these two terms. Ur-, czpr,, jng as primordial source when used in retation to 
the origin of perspective iMPLLes an essence from which the perspective 
f Lows, a 'rea L wor Ldl as cause of the perspect lve. As Foucau Lt puts it, such 
ed: an endeavour wouLd be dLrect 
to "that which was already there, " the image of a primordial 
truth fuLLy adequate to its nature, and it necessitates the 
removaL of every mask to ultimately disclose an orLginal 
ýdentity. (Reader p78). 
'z, uch a proJect wouLd be precLseLy antLthetLcaL to Nietzsche's critique oý 
1ý 
the dL'-=r-LnctLon between 'real' and 'apparent' worLds, and his epousaL of 
per--pectivL'Sm. That he shouLd, therefore, take up the notLon of Herkunft Lss 
not surprising; particularly since, as Foucault notes, this concept does not 
represent a 'catýgory of resemblance' (Reader p8l) but rather lalLows the 
sorting out of different traLts' (Reader p8l). Having here indicated the 
general outline of the genealogical project, we can examine precisely 
the 
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sense of the 'sortLng out of dLfferent traLts' through an anaLysLs of the 
essay "'Good and Bad, " "Good and EvLP' which is the first of the analyses 
offered in On the GeneaLoqý of MoraLs. 
In this essay, Nietzsche attempts to draw out, to distinguish, two points 
of emergence and Lines of descent of the concept 'good'. One in relation to 
the master (the strong LndividuaD and one Ln reLation to the slave (the 
weak indiv idu a D. Nietzsche begins with a critique of 'the EngLish 
psychoLogists'? -15 - these IoLd, coLd, and tedious frogs, ' (GM II)- who 
hypothesise that 'originaLLy': 
one approved unegoistic actions and caLLed them good from 
the point of view of those to whom they were done, that is 
to say, those to whom they were usefuL; (GM 1 2). 
In opposition to this hypothesis Nietzsche suggests that, on the contrary, 
it was not those who were the beneficaries of acts who termed them 'good', 
rather: 
it was "the good" themselves, that is to say, the nobLe, 
powerful, high-stationed and hLgh-mLnded, who felt and 
established themseLves and their actions as qood, that is, 
of the first rank, in contradistinction to all the Low, Low- 
minded, corTrnon and pLebLan. It was out of this pathos of 
distance that they seized the right to create values and to 
coin names for values: what had they to do with utility! (GM 
1 2). 
What grounds does NLetzsche present for thIs cLaiLm? NLetzsche puts 
forwrd 
two arguments, The first is the negative one that the argumen t. of 
'the 
E,, -, qL;. -mh psychoLogists, Is a psychoLogLcal ab--urdLty27. Much more 
Lmportant 
though Is the second point: 
The signpost to the ri_qht road was for me the question: what 
was the reaL etymoLogicat significance of 
the designations 
for "good" coined in the various Languages'? I found they aL[ 
Led back to the same conceptual transformation - that 
- 50 - 
e,, erywhere "nobLe, "aristocratic" in the sociaL sense, is 
the basic concept from which "good" in the sense of "with 
aristocrat Lc souL, "nobLe, " "with a souL of a high order, " 
" w'L tha priviLeged sou L" necessarlLy deveLoped: a 
deveLopment which aLways runs paraLLel with that other in 
whLch "common, " "pLebian, "" Low" are f LnaL Ly transformed 
into the concept "bad. " (GM 1 4). 
From this Nietzsche deveLops the argument that 'a concept denoting 
poL it icaL superiority always resolves itse If into a concept denoting 
super Lor Lty Ot the sou P (GM 1 6). What is s ign if Lcant, for Nietzsche, here 
is that the nobLe LdentJies himseLf as good and onLy then Ldentifies the 
pLebian as bad. In other word, this perspective is an active affirmation of 
seLf. What then of that other or*LgLn of the concept "good"-ý 
For Nýetzsche, we can trace the Lineage of the concepts "good" and "ev! P 
back to the 's Lave revoLt in moraLltyl (GM 1 10), that is, 'when 
ressentimen., itseLf became creative and gave birth to vaLues: the 
ressentiment of natures that are denLed the true reaction, that of deeds, 
. ar, U- ----0mQ-ersate themseLves wLth an l. maginary revenge. ' (GM 1 10). 
The term 
! -ess-cantimcant here refers to the sLavels rejectLon of the worLd, this worLd 
which made the sLave a sLave. The form of emergence of this "good" is as a 
negation. Nietzsche suggests that: 
slave moral, ity from the outset says No to what is "outside, " 
what is"diff erent, " what Ls "not itseff"; and this No is 
As creative deed. This inversion of the value-positing eye 
- this need to direct one' s view outward instead of back to 
oneseL-ý' - is of the essence of reSsentiment: in order to 
exist, stave morality aLways first needs a hostiLe external 
wor I d; it needs, physioLoqLcalty speaking, external, stimuLi 
in order to act at aLL - its action is fundamental, reaction. 
(GM I 10) - 
UnabLe to act against the worLd and against the master, the sLave 
descr ibes them as "eviii, P. On Ly hav ing def ined the Other as "ev LP does the 
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-Lave turn to hLmself a--, therefore, "good,,: 
here precLseLy is his deed, his creation- he has conceived 
"the eviL enemy, " "the Evil One, " and this in fact is his 
basic concept, from which he then evoLves, as an 
afterthought and pendant, a "good one" hLmsetf. (GM 1 10). 
Here are the two points of emergence, here are the Lineages of the concept 
"good". One an active affirmation of the world, of becoming. The other a 
reactive negation of the world in favour of a 'real world', of becoming in 
favour of being. Having indicated these 'different traits', we wiLl examine 
Nietzsche's critique of slave morality. 
It must be remembered that Nietzsche is seff-consclously speaking from 
the standpoLnt of modernity, addressLng his comments to modern man3O. The 
, =-Lqr)LfLcance of this point wiLL become apparent Later in our discussion. We 
begin with the famous discussion of the Lambs and the birds of prey: 
That Lambs disLike great birds of prey does not seem 
strange: only it gives no ground for reproaching these birds 
of prey for bearing off little Lambs. And if the Lambs say 
among themselves. "these birds of prey are evil; and whoever 
is least t ike a bird of prey, but rather its opposite, a 
Lamb - would he not be good? " there is no reason to f ind 
fault with this institution of an ideal, except perhaps that 
the birds of prey might view it a Little ironically and say: 
11 we don't dLsL ike them at at L, these good Little Lambs; we 
even Love them: nothing is more tasty than a tender Lamb. 
(GM 1 13). 
This extravagent metaphor expresses Nietzsche's point that the strong 
indiv[duaL can only express himself as he is, while the weak demand the 
strong express themseLves as other than they are. The condLtion of 
possibiLity for this demand is, as we have seen, the reLficatLon of the 
subject- predicate distinction. It is: 
onLy owLng to the seductlon of Language (and of the 
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fundamentaL errors of reason that are petrified in it) which 
conceives and misconceives atL effects as conditioned by 
something that causes effects, by a "subject, " (GM 1 13) 
that the weak 'gain the right to make the bird of prey accountable for 
being a bird of prey. ' (GM 1 13). In modernity, for Nietzsche, though we are 
largeLy bound within the Linguistic and ethicaL structures of the weak, the 
Death of God signaLs a point of renewed struggLe between "good and bad'' 
and "good and evLP31 . The name of this struggLe in modernity is NihiLisa; 
the movement to which and the nature of which wiLL constitute our next 
chapter. 
At this moment, however, It is useful to reflect on the way in which 
Nietzsche operates a principle of evaluation for determining the value of 
vaLues. It is notLceabLe in the above discussion that whiLe Nietzsche is 
undoubtabLy predisposed towards the strong individuaL, he does point out 
that there is nothing wrong with sLave moraLity for the sLaves. - 'there Is 
nO reaSOn tL-', f Lnd f aU [t w Lth tý-ý LS Lnsst Ltut I or-, of an idea 1ý I (GM 1 13). What 
Nietzsche objects to is the unLversaL application of this ideal, in 
partLcuLar [ts appLicatLon to the nobLe man. To put this another way, 
Metzsche does not object to the sLave defLning the nDbLe as "evit" and 
hlmsetf as "good", but onLy the move from this point to the positing of 
the subject as a 'neutraL substratum' and the transformation of sLave 
ty into a set of unLversaL eth[caL standards. It is dLfficuLt to see mora L ill 
that Nietzsche can sustain this position however given that, white these 
two aspects are togica[Ly distLnct, it does appear to be a psychologicaL 
imperative for the sLave to make this move32-. This Is, no doubt, why 
Nietzzsche descrLbes the stave revoLt in moraLLty as such a fundamentalLy 
dangerous one, it has, in his sense, an 'awe-LnspLring, Jewish rigor (cf GM 
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1 7). It must be noted though that Nietzsche does not regard this 
triumphal phenomenon in an altogether negative sense. Thus he notes in the 
essay 'What is the MeanLng of AscetLc IdeaLsT: 
It must be a necessity of the f irst order that again and 
again promotes the growth and prosperity of this life- 
inimical species - it must indeed be in the interest of life 
itself that such a setf-contradictory type does not die out. 
(GM 111 11). 
This point wILL emerge in greater detalL in the next chapter, however, it 
may be noted here that, as regards Nietzsche's prLncLpLe of evaLuating I 
vaLues, that while Nietzsche holds that 'value for Life' is the ultimate 
criterion for adjudicating between rivaL perspectives, something 'life- 
inimical' may be of 'value for Life'. This is the point Nietzsche Is making 
when he suggests that man 'will rather will nothingness than not wiLL. ' (GM 
p97). The second point we shouLd consider here is that whether a 
perspective has 'value for Life' is dependent on context. With the entrance 
of Zarathustra, Nietzsche hoLds that man may be overcome now that opposed 
to ascetic ideaLs are Zarathustra's counter-ldeaLs (cf EH GM ). At this 
point, ascetic LdeaLs lose their "proof of power". Having here sketched the 
outt[ne of Nietzsche's criterion for evaLuatLng vaLues, we are in a position 
to detineate the formaL features of geneaLogy and its mode of critique. 
In a sense, we have already outlined Nietzsche's concept of genealogy: as 
a tracing of the Lineage of perspectives, as a seperation, of its different 
traits. We can, however, fILL in some of the detaLL of this sketch now. 
FlrstLy, it can be said that geneaLogy performs a form of conceptuaL 
anaLysis; be this in terms of an etymologicat tracing or a reversaL of a 
conceptuaL hierarchy". SecondLy, this anaLysis Is pLayed out through the 
figures of particuLar human types: the nobte, the stave and the priest, for 
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example. Thirdly, genealogy operates a form of immanent critique; it 
undermines the self-evident or transcendental status of our values by 
tracing their mundane and humble Lineages, that is, by exhibiting their 
historicity. Fourthly, a rhetorical critique is deployed; the juxtaposLng of 
our 'highest' values with the basest of points of social emergence. Finally, 
a value critique may be utLL! sed which evaluates our values in terms of 
their IvaLue for Life'. 
WhiLe a distinction has been drawn here, for purposes of cLarity, between 
[mmanent and rhetorLcal moments of crLtLque, such a distinctLon is 
artLfLc! aL. Reason and rhetoric, it wLLL be recaLted, are LnherentLy entwined 
for Nietzsche. This is centrat to the fundamentat aim of Nietzsche's 
genea tog ica L enterpr ise: the transformation of his readers. Here the text 
is poLiticaL practice. For if Nietzsche can seduce us with the style of' 
reasoning depLoyed in his texts, then it foLLows from his views on the 
constituting of our subjectivity that we, his readers, in adopting this 
style of reasoning are transforming ourseLves, are invoLved ln_a rewriting 
of the narratives which constitute our 'Ills". On this reading, geneaLogicaL 
critique Is truLy a practical critique. 
To concLude this section, we may review the points that have been 
established as signHicant. Firstly, the generaL kind of operation that 
Nietzsche terms 'genealogy' was noted and we indicated the sense of 
'orLginl wLth whLch this enterprLse is concerned. SecondLy, the LnitiaL 
dLscusslon was rendered concrete through an exposUlon of the essay "'Good 
and Bad, " "Good and EvLP' in which was noted Nietzsche's deLLneation of two 
origins of the concept "good" corresponding the perspectives of master and 
s[ave. ThlrdLy, it was pointed out that Nietzsche's evaLuation of a 
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perspeCtLve in terms of its 'vaLue for Life' is not absoLute but, rather, 
depends on the context within which the perspective is being depLoyed. 
, r-LnaLLy, we outLined the formaL features of geneaLogy, in partLcuLar the 
modes of crLtique Lt utLLLses and the consequences of these modes of 
cr it ique. 
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ConcLusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to expLore the different dimensions 
of Nietzsche's overaLL philosophicaL position as a mode of Laying the 
groundwork for our discussion of h. s substantive concerns. We began by 
notLng hLs antL-foundatLonaL account of Language. It was shown that, for 
Metzsche, the grammar of our language when treated as reftecting the 
structure of the world resuLts in a series of metaphysicaL assumptions 
being treated as given. Nietzsche's concern was to expose this grammaticaL 
reification as such and thus undermine the 'given' status of our beLLef in, 
for exampLe, the subject. 
It was then Mustrated that by treatLng language as inherentLy 
rhetoricaL, by treating concepts as metaphors that we have forgotten are 
metaphors, Nletzsche Ls abLe to mount an attack on the correspondence 
thecirv of truth. it was suqqec-:,, ea, within the framework of this attack, 
that Nietzsche rejects the notion of theoretLcat reason in favour of a 
conception of reason as practice and this this conception can be usefuLLy 
denoted by the idea of 'styles of reasoning'. 
This notion of Istytes of reasoning', it was argued, can be depLoyed in 
terms of expLaining Nietzsche's conception of the 'subject as muLtipLicLty, 
particuLarLy when combined with the depLoyment of the metaphor of 
narrativLty. Prior to thLs exposition, the centraL features of Nietzsche's 
rejectLon of the idea of the subject as a given unity, as a 'neutraL 
substratum' were aLso indicated. 
From this POLnt, we moved to an expLanatlon of NLetzshe's doctrine of 
perspect[vism beginning with his critique of the very idea of epitstemoLogy. 
The signLficance of IvaLues' reLative to one's perspective was indicated, as 
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was the reLatLonship between perspectivism and Nietzsche's account of 
subjectivity. We aLso noted at this point Nietzsche's setting up of 'the 
vaLue for Life' as his criterion for adjudicating between respective 
perspectives. 
FinaLLy, it was shown how these concerns reLate to Nietzsche's concept of 
genealogy and hLs rejection of the search for origins. In the course of 
thLs discussion the features of this concept of genealogy, in particuLar, 
in modes of critique were indicated. 
Having set out these features of Nietzsche's position, we wiLL now move 
to a dLscussion of his geneaLogy of nihilism as the condItLon of the 
modern. At severaL points in this inLtLat exposition we have referred ahead 
to the notLons of ressentiment and bad conscience. By now expLoring these 
notions in reLatLon to the emergence of nihilism, it wM be possibLe to 
generate Nietzsche's account of the fate of the subject in modernity 
(whLch is aLso his account of the Typus Mensch produced in modernity). 
This account wLLL put us in the position of being abLe to indicate, in the 
finat chapter on Nietzsche, how his abstract philosophLcaL concerns and his 
concrete ethLcaL concerns combine in the figure of the Overman. 
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Notes 
1. Cf. TI 'Reason' in Philosophy 1. Here Nietzsche analyses philosophers as 
'conceptual Ldolators', compLaing of their Egyptianisln 
2. Cf, TI The Four Great Errors 4. In relation to the subject also see 3 Ln 
the same section. 
3. Nietzsche gives a sustained treatment of this issue in the essay 'On 
Truth and Lies in a NonmoraL Sense', TP IV pp79-100. 
4.. This is because nihiLism emerges from the wM-to-truth of ChrLstaLnity 
turning against Christian mora I ity, without the reLfLcatLon of the 
catagorLes 'subject' and 'God' Christianity wouLd not have devetoped its 
universalistic claims, as such its seff-undermining would not have 
occurred. 
5. Cf. Opening of section 3 and section 4- of this chapter. 
6. In relation to GS 108. 
7. Cf. Section 3 of Chapter 2. From ChrIstLan to Nihilist. 
8. This point is discussed In TP IV 
9. Do we recogn Ise the figure of God here? Yes. 
10. Cf. Rorty's 'The Contingency of Language', (1986) pp3-6. 
11. For a discussion of WUtgenstein In this mode cf. Rorty Philosphy and 
the Mirror of Nature (1981). pp367-372 and also his Consequences of 
Praqmatism (1982) Ch. 2. 
12. The use of this phrase is freely adapted from its deployment by 
Hacking in a series of papers, to note one: 'Language, Truth and Reason' in 
Hollis and Lukes (ed. ) Rationality and Relativism (1982). 
13. IncipU Derrida. Cf. especially the essay 'White Mythology: Metaphor in 
the Text of Ph[Losphy' In Margins of PhI losophy (1982). 
14. It should be noted that this in no way Implies an interpretation of 
- 59 - 
the wLLL to power as a wanting of power, rather the point is mere[y to 
Mustrate that we can do no other than seek to persuade since the modeL 
of Language Nietzsche deploys implies that our utterances are necessarily 
performatLve in character. 
15. Cf. Schacht Nietzsche (1983) p4 and Strong Frederich Wetzsche and the 
Politics of TransfLquratLon (1975) pp78-86, for example. 
16. Cf. discussion of BGE 16 below. 
17. Cf. WIttgenstein PhUosophLcal InvestigatLons (1958) Remarks 256-280. 
18. Cf. Sect Lons 2 and 3 of next chapter. 
19. Cf. SectLon 2 of next chapter, 
20. Cf. discussion of this point in section 4 of this chapter reLative to 
perspectivism and also Hacking's 'Making Up People' in Reconstructing 
Individuatism ed. HeLLer, Sosna, WaLLberg. (1986). 
21. Cf. section 2 of next chapter. 
22. This paper is from Ethics No. 60. It seems to me that McIntyre moves 
away from this specific use of the metaphor of narratLvity in his Later 
work (e. g. After V[rtue (1981)). 
23. Cf. for exampLe, WP 477. 
24. This refers to Nietzsche's notion of amor fati, cf. WP 1041, atso EH 11 
10. 
2S. On the f irst point cf. GM 1 13 and on the second point cf. Nehamas 
Nletzsche: Life as Literature (1985), pp 179-194. 
26. This point was brought to my attention by Dr. Paddy Fitzpatrick. 
27. Cf. Foucautt's essay Uetzsche, GeneaLogy, History' in Reader pp76-100. 
28. Cf. Nietzsche states that his imputse to pubLlsh the Genealogy came 
from the topsy-turvy arguments put forward by Dr. PauL R6e, cf. GM Preface 
4. 
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29. Cf. GM 1 3. 
30. This point is characteristic of Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault, i. e. an 
awareness of the historicity of their own texts and the audience addressed 
by these texts. 
3 1. Cf . GM 1 16. 
32. As, for exampLe, indicated by Nletzshe comments in GM 1 13. 
33. This is the strategy Nietzsche depLoys in the second essay of GM, 
where he argues that forgetting is LogicaLLy prior to remembering, cf GM 
11 1. 
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NIETZSCHE . CHRISTIANITY AND NIHILISM 
Introduction 
In this chapter, we will explore the relationship between Nietzsche's 
critique of Christianity and the deveLopment of his account of NILMsm. 
In effect, we will examine Nietzsche's genealogy of nihilism Our strategy 
wilt be to argue that Nietzsche offers a genealogical account of the type 
of man (Typus Mensch) that has been produced by and is characteristic of 
modernity'. For it is his concern with the Typus Mensch promoted by 
Christianity that Leads Nietzsche to present his diagnosis of the modern 
souL. We wilL open this discussion with an account of some of Nietzsche's 
more general, comments on the origins of religions before moving to a more 
detailed examination of his character ! sat ! on of Christianity. This move wilt 
LnvoLve an examination of Nietzsche's portrayaLs of the priest and believer 
as psychologicaL types and of his anatysis of asceticism Having considered 
the reLatlon of these themes to the phenomenon of nLhiLism, we wiLL 
attempt to reconstruct Nietzsche's notion of nihilism as the defining 
feature of the modern and of modern man. Finally, we wiLL note the way in 
which Nietzsche's theorlsing can viewed in terms of the concept of 
discipline, a concept which, it will be argued, is central to his account. 
1. On the OrLgins of Religions 
A useful starting point Is to note Nietzsche's formulation of the 
psychotogy of reLigLous betLef. Thus: 
On the origin of religion. - In the same way as today the 
uneducated man beLleves that anger is the cause of his being 
angry, spirit the cause of his thinking, souL the cause of 
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his feeting - in short, just as there is sti LL thoughtLessLy 
posited a mass of psychoLogicaL entities that are supposed 
to be causes - so, at a yet more naive stage, man expLained 
preciseLy the same phenomena with the aid of psychoLogicat 
personal entities. Those conditions that seemed to him 
strange, thrilling, overwhelming, he interpreted as 
obsession and enchantment by the power of a person. ... In 
other words In the psychological concept of God, a 
condition, in order to appear as effect, is personified as 
cause. (WP135) 
The problematic character of religion is immediately presented by this 
passage: 'Morality and religion fall entirely under the pyschoio_qy of' 
error', or, more specificaLLy, under the error of imaginary causes (TI The 
Four Great Errors 6). Yet Nietzsche's position is, as one might expect, 
rather more compLex than a critique based on the falsLty of reLigion in 
epistemoLogicaL terms, for, as we have noted: 
The faL seness of aj udgement 1s to us not necessar iIy an 
objection to a judgement... The question is to what extent 
it is LIfe-advancing, species-preserving, perhaps even 
species breeding; and our fundamental tendency is to assert 
that the falsest judgements ... are the most 
indispensable 
to us, (BGE 4). 
It Is, rather, in reLation to the question of 'what type of human being 
one ought to breec4' (A-C 3) that reLLgions must be anatysed; the 
psychoLogLcai type of the reLigtous man becomes the issue to be examined. 
For Nietzsche, the l[rludimentary pyschology of' the religious man' has as 
consequence the betitt[Lng of man by hLmsetf: 
he has separated the two sides of himseLf, one very paitry 
and weak, one very strong and astonishing, 
into two spheres, 
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and caL led the former "man, 11 the Latter "God. " (WP136)2. 
This debasement of man by himself Leads to a development crucial to 
Nietzsche's character isat ion of Christianity: the emergence of the priest as 
(soLe) mediator between man and God. The priest, as an actor 'of something 
superhuman which ... [he] has to make eas! Ly perceptibLel(WP 138), 
generates the conditions through which he can ctalm to be the highest type 
of man by virtue being the representative of divinity and by making the 
criterion of access to truth membership of the priesthood (WP 139). For 
Nietzsche, this eLevation of the priestLy type resuits in the vaLues 
embodied in this type being constituted as the highest vaLues, and 
concurrentLy, the practices through which these vaLues are promoted being 
the highest form of human activity. Nietzsche's concern with the meaning of 
ascetic ldeaLs begins with this insight and wILL be one of the principLe 
themes of the next sect [on. 
However, in terms of Nietzsche's abiding concern with devetoping a 
strategy for the 'revatuation of aLL vaLues', his generaL comments on 
re L ig ion, wh i Le operat ing on a Level of his familiar concerns with 
Language, causaLity and psychoLogy, presents none of the meticuLous 
geneaLogical detaLL that Nietzsche's centraL question demands. This shouLd 
not however surprise us. For to anatyse 'religion' as a unitary phenomenon 
would be to deploy the Egyptianism that he so often critIsed in others (TI 
'Reason' in PhiLosophy 1). In order to anaLyse genealogically the vatue of 
Christian values, it is necessary to treat ChristianLty in its own right; as 
De Leuze has po inted ou t, geneaLogy is the art of difference or 
distinction-'. Nietzsche's questions on the origin(s) and nature(s) of 
religion(s) demands such a non-reductive approach and 
thus, having noted 
the generaL psychologicaL point, it is necessary 
(both for Nietzsche and 
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for us) to move to a detaLLed examination of the Christian perspective in 
terms of the Typus Mensch promoted by ChristLanity. 
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2. ON CHRISTIAN PRIESTS AND ASCETICISM 
Nietzsche's writings on ChrLstLanlty, scattered and often repetitive as 
they are, present the would be interpreter with an immediate problem; 
where preciseLy does one start? Here we shaLL locate two beginnings, 
representing the points of emergence of the Christian interpretation of 
the worLd. This witt enabLe us to proceed to a discussion of the concepts 
of ressentiment and bad conscience around which Nietzsche constructs his 
portrayaL of the Christian priest and beLlever. 
The first of our starting points is Judaism: 
I only touch on the problem of the origin of Christianity 
here. The first proposition towards its solution is : 
Christianity can be understood only by referring to the soil 
out of which it grew - it is not a count e r-movement against 
the Jewish instinct, it is actually its logical consequence, 
one further conclusion of its fear-Lnspirlng Logic. (A-C 24). 
The falsified so[L represented here - 'the Jewish instinct' - is 
consequent to the 'the raclLcal falsification of alL nature, ' (AC 24) and the 
'contradiction of their natural values' (AC 24) as the price paid for 'being 
at any cost' (AC 24 ). Or, put psychoLogicaLLy: 
the Jewish nation .-. pLaced in impossibLe circumstances, 
voluntarlLy, from the profoundest shrewdness of seLf- 
preservation, took the side of aLL d6cadence instincts - not 
as being dominated by them but because it divined in them a 
power by means of which one can prevalL against 'the 
worLd'(AC 24). 
The ambivalence nature of Judaism reflected here; that it falsifies nature 
yet that this falsification emerges from an instinct 
for seLf-preservat[on, 
is a theme that we shall find also in our examination of 
Christianity . 
Nietzsche's objection to Judaism as a world- interpretation becomes clearer 
once we examtne It in terms of the 
Typus Mensch promoted by Judaism as 
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embodied in the figure of the Judaic priest: 
this kind of man has a Life-Interest In making mankind sick 
and in inverting the concepts 'good' and 'evil', 'true' and 
'false' in a mortally dangerous and wortd-caturrniating 
sense. (AC 24) 
The reasons behind this assertion wiLL be cLarified Later in our 
examination of the distinction Nietzsche makes between a noble moratity 
and a moraLlty of ressentiment, however, for the moment, Let us turn to 
our second point of departure. 
The second moment to which we must attend concerns the soLL on which 
Christianity flourished and the nature of this blossoming: 
On the or! 
-qin 
of reli_qions. - The distinctive invention of 
the fonders of religions Is, first: to posit a particular 
kind of Life and everyday customs that have the effect of a 
disciplina voluntatis and at the same time abolish boredom - 
and then: to bestow on this Life style an interpretation 
that makes it appear to be illuminated by the highest value 
so that this Life style becomes something for which one 
fights and under certain circumstances sacrifices ones Life. 
Actually, the second of these is the more essential. The 
first, the way of Life, was usually there before, but along 
side other ways of Life and without any sense of its special 
value. (GS 353) 
In other words, the 'founders of reLlgions' make avaiLabLe a perspective 
valuation of the world which is adopted by a particular social grouping as 
a means of Identifying their self with one particular particular self, of 
generating a unity by the subsumption of their different seLves under the 
domination of a particular perspective. The Life style, Nietzsche claims, 
that was distLnguLshed by Chrlstianity was that of the herd: 
Christianity only takes up the fight that had already begun 
against the classical ideal and the noble religion. ... 
Christianity accommodated itself to already existing and 
established antipaganism ... more precisely, to the 
- 67 - 
retiglons of the lower masses, the women, the sLaves, the 
non-nobte ctasses. (WP 196). 
The distinction between the nobiLlty and the herd thus becomes important 
to our analysis. Although this theme was touched on in the Last chapter, It 
is usefuL to repeat the saLlent points. 
This distinction is developed by Nietzsche in the essay "'Good and Evil, " 
"Good and Bad"' in terms of the respective forms of morality of the noble 
and the stave. The ethics of the herd, stave ethics, 'begins by saying no 
to an "outside, " an "other, " a non-seff, and that no is its creative act. ' 
(GM 1 10), that is a reactive act. In contrast, the noble 'spontaneously 
creates the notion goocý and Later derives from it the conception of the 
bad' (GM 1 11), an active seff-affirmation. These two distinctions; between 
nob Le and s Lave, and between act Eve and react Eve modes (or forces) prov Ede 
the bases of expLLcatLon for the concepts of ressentiment and bad 
conýlence that occupy the heart of NLetzsche's anaLysis of ChrLstianity. It 
is at this point also that our two beginnings re-unite: the slave revolt in 
morals and the Judaic inversion of natural (noble) values are joined 
together Ln the concept of ressentiment. 
We can approach this area via the Ldea of reactive forces. DeLeuze, in a 
detalLed anaLysis of the concepts ressentiment and bad conscience has 
suggested that: 
In a normal or healthy state the role of reactive forces Is 
aLways to Limit action. ... But, conversely, active 
forces 
produce a burst of creativity: In this way a riposte is 
formed. (Deteuze 1983 p111). 
In other words, the active type (the noble) embodies both active and 
reactive forces but the retationsh[p between them is 'such that the Latter 
are themseLves acted. '(DeLeuze 1983 plll). In contrast, ressentiment is 
- 68 - 
defined by: 'a type In which reactive forces prevaLL over active forces. But 
they can onLy prevalL In one way: by ceasing to be acted. '(Deleuze 1983 
pi 11 We are concerned here with articuLating the deveLopment of 
ressentiment as opposed to Its dynamics, however, it shouLd be noted that 
this concept has two moments which, foLLowing DeLeuze, we may LabeL: 
topotogicaL and typoLogicat. The first : 'constitutes ressentiment as raw 
content: it expresses the way in which reactive forces escape the action 
of active forces' (DeLeuze 1983 p124) and the second : 'expresses the way 
in which ressentiment takes on form: ... reactive forces are then opposed 
to active forces and separate them from what they can do'(DeLeuze 1983 
pl 24). We can see, in these two moments, the movement we traced in the 
Last chapter from the sLavels 'No' (the topoLogicaL aspect) to the positing 
of the subject as a 'neutraL substratum' (the typotogicaL aspect). Our 
question thus becomes: who eLaborates this formaLisatLon of content, who 
articutates the fictLon(s) by means of which active forces are prevented 
from achieving what they can do? It is here that the Judaic priest emerges 
as 'the "artLst" of ressentiment' (DeLeuze 1983 p125). It was the Judalc 
prLest: 
who, with frightening consistency, dared to invert the 
aristocratic value-equations (9ood=nobLe=powerfuI= 
beautifuL= happy=betoved of God) and to hang on to this 
inversion with their teeth, the teeth of the most abysmal 
hatred (the hatred of impotence) saying "the wretched alone 
are the good; the poor, impotent, lowly alone are 
the good; 
the suffering, deprived, sick, ugly alone are pious, alone 
are blessed by God, blessedness is for them alone - 
<GM 1 
7). 
Through the figure of the priestt another world is Fictioned from the 
point of view of which the affirmation of 
Life appears 'evW as such (cf. 
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AC 24). A second fiction is also developed in this attack on the 'natural'; 
the postulation of God as opposed to nature results in 'an imaginary 
teleology Qthe kLngdom of God', 'the Last Judgement', 'eternaL kfel). ' (AC 
15). However, at the same time, the postutation of free wlil via the idea 
of the sou L acts as an enabLlng device for the weak in providing them 
with grounds for condemning the nobLe whiLe simultaneousLy interpreting 
'weakness as freedom, and their being thus-and-thus as a merit. ' (GM 1 13). 
The devetopment of ressentiment by the Judaic priest may thus be described 
by these two aspects: the fiction of free wiLL, whereby the nobte is 
condemned for being nobLe and the weak praised for their weakness, and the 
fiction of an after Life, whereby those weaknesses, having been constitued 
as virtues, result in eternal bliss while the noble values, having been 
constituted as vices or sins, resuft in eternaL damnation and heLl fire (GM 
1 7). This was the adlievement of the Judaic priest, however, 'Christianity i 
raised alt this to the second power' (WP 182). 
It is at this pointt that of the emergence of the Christian priest, that 
we must aLso turn our attention to the concept of bad conscience- 
For it 
Is through this notion that Nietzsche expLores the distinctive 
'contribution' of the Christian priest to the promotion of a given Typus 
Mensch. The first point of importance to note is Nietzsche's contention 
that: 
'All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly 
turn inward - this is what I call the 
internalization of 
man: thus it was that man first developed what was 
Later 
called his "souL. " (GM 11 16). 
Those active forces prevented from expressing 
themselves, displaced by the 
fictions of ressentiment, turn against themseLves and produce 
pain. We can 
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examine this by reference to the topological and typological dimensions of 
bad conscience. The topotogIcal aspect of bad conscience may be defined, 
Deleuze suggests, as the 'Multiplication of' pain by the interiorisation or 
introjection of force' (DeLeuze 1983 p129). In its typotogical aspect, 
however, this pain is given meaning and itseLf internatised, it is as the 
artist of this movement that the Christian priest plays his role. 
The pa in generated by the internatisation of force requires an object 
on which to vent itseff, this is the rote of the priest: 'if one wanted to 
express the value of the priestly existence in the briefest formula it 
woutd be: the priest alters the diretion of ressentiment. ' (GM 111 15). The 
priest's raison dletre is to redirect ressentiment In such a way that it 
injures neither himself nor the herd: 
For every sufferer instinctively 
suffering; more exactly, an agent; 
a _quilty agent who 
is susceptible 
some Living thing upon which he 
other, vents his effects, actuaLl 
15). 
seeks a cause for his 
stLit more specificalLy, 
to suffering - in short, 
can, on some pretext or 
y or in eff I gy: (GM III 
Initially, this "guilty agent" is the other, the noble, the master, however, 
'ressentiment is an explosive substance: it makes active forces become 
reactive. '(DeLeuze 1983 p. 131), In other words, the Christian priest has 'set 
the bad conscience of the nobLe sout against its setf-sufficiency; they 
have Led astray, to the point of seff-destruction, the brave, magnanimous, 
daring, excessive inctinations of the strong sout' (WP 205). The absorbtion 
of the nob Le into the herd resu its in a further redirecting of 
ressentiment. The new d[rection taken is into Mmself: 
11 1 suffer: someone must be to btame for it" - thus thinks 
every sLckLy sheep. But his shepherd, the ascetic priest, 
teL Ls him "Quite so, my sheep! someone must be to btame for 
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L t: but you yourseLf are this someone, you aLone are to 
bLame for it - you alone are to blafw for yourself! " (GM III 
15). 
The depLoyment of the concept of sin Is particuLarLy important in this 
process of internaLLsing fauLt, redirecting suspicion onto oneseff in an 
on-golng procedure of inspection and supervision. We can iltustrate this 
self-suspicion by reference to the Journal of the seventeenth- century New 
Engtand Puritan, Thomas Shepard. This journaL constitutes a regutar record 
of setf-interrogatLon, thus: 
March 18.1 saw if my mind acted it spun nothing but deceit 
and deLus[on, if my will and affections acted, nothing but 
dead works. ... I saw the Lord made me Live by faith by 
making me feel a want of both, to distrust myself and trust 
more unto the Lord. (Paden 1988 p70). 
As Paden has noted in this context, if 'the Antichrist is the "self" In all, 
subjectLvLty here is no mere innocent bystander ... but is itself the 
primary antagonist to God. ' (Paden 1988 p70). The Logic of Puritanism is: 
the Logic of reflexive self-examination, every religious 
assertion - including every act of confession and every act 
of seLf-accusatLon - could become suspect of its own 
possible self-deception. (Paden 1988 p78). 
On this picture, Puritanism represents bad conscience in its purest and 
most deveLoped form. As DeLeuze notes, we may now sum up the reLationship 
between Judaism and Christianity as twofoLd. On the one hand, Christianity 
compLetes the project of Judaism: 'The whoLe power of ressentiment end 
with the God of the poor, the sick and the sinners. ' (Deteuze 1983 p. 132). 
Yet, on the other hand, Christianity a Iso makes its own orLginaL 
contribution to the issue: 'It is not content to comptete ressentiment, it 
changes its direction, It imposes ... bad conscience. ... 
Ressentiment says 
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"its your fault", bad conscience says "Its my fault"., (DeLeuze 1983 p. 132). 
But what was the purpose of these manoeuvres, why dLd the form of bad 
conscience manifest itself, via the activity of the priest in this way? In 
answering this question we must recognLsethe subtle ambivalence of t 
Nietzsche in his character isat Lon of the Christian priest. 
This ambivalence itself reflects, what we may call, the paradox of' 
asceticisra The asceticism of the Christian priest represents for Nietzsche: 
'Anti-natural morality ... [it] turns ... against the instincts of Life - it 
is a now secret, now Loud and impudent condemnation of these instincts. ' 
(TI - Morality as Anti-Nature 4). This presents two related problems for 
Nietzsche, given his naturatistLc mode of accounting for phenomena: how can 
moraL asceticism emerge and how can it coninue to survive? Nietzsche's 
answer is to suggest that given the 'ascetic Life is a setf-contradiction. ' 
(GM III- 11 ), then Lt must be: 
a necessity of the f irst order that again and again promotes 
the growth and prosperity of the life-inimical species - it 
aust indeed be in the interest of life itself that such a 
seLf -contradictory type does not die out. (GM 111 11). 
The struggLe of Christian asceticism against nature is, in Nietzsche's 
terms, the struggle of 'nature against something that is also nature. ' (WP 
228)4-. The question thus becomes: in what way is Christian asceticism 'in 
the interest of lifle itseIP? We have seen that, reLative to bad conscience, 
the priest provides a meaning for suffering. Through the ascetic rejection 
and condemnation of noble values, the constitution of each subject as 
sinner in perpetual punishment, and the fiction of eternal bliss for those 
who Live according to the ascetic values, the priest provides the reason to 
go on Living. For aLthough it is based in 'a wHl to nothin_qness, an 
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aversion to Life, a rebellion against the most fundamental presuposLtions 
of L Lfe; ... it is and remains a wili' (GM 111 28) and, for Nietzsche, 'man 
would rather will nothingnes-s than not w1LP (GM 111 28). Here, the paradox 
of Christian asceticism is resolved, the expression of the form of bad 
conscience expLained: 
the ascetic ideal springs from the protective instinct of a 
degenerating life which tries by aLl means to sustain itseLf 
and to fight for its existence;. .. The No he says to Life 
brings to Light, as if by mag L c, an abundance of tender 
Yeses; even when he wounds himseLf, this master of 
destruction, of setf-destruction - the very wound itseLf 
afterward compel! 6 him to live. (GM 111 13). 
As such, the ascetic priest - 'this apparent enemy of Life' - represents 
one of 'the greatest conservin_q and yes-creating forces of Life. ' (GM III 
13). To put this another way, Christian asceticism is the means by which 
the weak avoid seLf-destructLon. This can be briefLy expLained by reference 
to the effect Christianity has on the weak indLviduaL. It wM be recaLLed 
that the weak LndividuaL is one whose seLves are disparate, in confLict, 
unorganised. Chr Lst ian ity by emphas is ing a partlcuLar perspective, a 
particuLar seLf aLready operant in the weak IndividuaL, enabLes that 
perspective to dominate and organLse the others. Thus the superf[cLaL unity 
of the weak inclivicluat which resuited from the psychologically necessary 
positing of a 'neutrat substratum' caLLed 'the subject, is repLaced by the 
identification of that substratum with a particular self. As such a form of 
unity, a kinding of wilLing reptaces an Musory unity, an inabiLity to wM. 
This is the sense of Christianity which Nietzsche deploys when describing 
it as having prOvided the great bulwark against theoretical and practical 
n 1h iI ism (WP 4). 
We have examined most of the characteristics of the Typus Mensch bred 
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by ChristianLty: sick, impotent, mediocre, embodiments of ressentiment and 
bad conscience The finaL characteristic of the Christian to be examined in 
this section is his fanaticism From where does this emerge and how does 
it manifest Ltseff"? FanaticLsm emerges from the absolutism of Christian 
mora L ity and Christianity's pretensions to un iversa I ity which are 
themseLves grounded on its teaching of soul atomism By positing a 
transcendentaL subjectLvity, ChrLstianity can make the cLaim that there are 
universaL moraL standards. It is but a short step for Christianity to 
affirm that it embodies those very standards LtseLf. By representing Itseff 
as 'fact'l rather than interpretatLon, ChrLstLanity demands the adoptLon of 
its standards; in effect it insists that aLL become Christians. We saw this 
fanaticism in its LnItIaL instant as the absorbtlon of the nobLe into the 
herd. It Ls this aspect of Christianity that Leads Nietzsche to describe it 
as 'the true calamity in the history of European heaLth' (GM 111 21). This 
intoLerance towards the Other, the need to transform the Other Lnto the 
Same, is exhibited on severaL LeveLs (WP 315). FlrstLy, with regard to the 
nobLe, the master, as we have aLready noted. SecondLy, with regard to the 
pagan, the infideL (the Crusades, the Missionary Society). FinaLLy, and most 
sLgnLficantLy for this discussion, with regard to the seLf of the beLlever. 
WhLLe this wLLL to a sLngte moratity represents: 
a tyranny over other types by that type whom this single 
morality fits: it is destruction or a Levelling for the sake 
of the ruling type (whether to render the others no Longer 
so fearsome or to render them useful) (WP 
315), 
it atso represents a tyranny over the seLf of 
the Christian type. By this 
Latter point is meant the eternal vigilance required of 
the Christian, the 
watchfutness reLative to the subtLe schemes of 
the Other as represented in 
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the figure of the DevLL and the need to be on continuaLly on guard as to 
the origins of any given thought or desire. Such a setf-tyranny is 
represented in a particutarty stringent way by the Logic of Puritanism 
(which was discussed above). As Nietzsche puts it: 'nothing but insanely 
important souls, revolving about themselves with a frightfuL fear' (WP 
339). It is with the consequences of this wILL to seLf- interrogation that 
we shaLl begin our discussion of the movement from Christianity to 
Nih! L ism. 
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3. FROM CHRISTIAN TO NIHILIST 
AnseLL-Pearson has argued that 'the western manipuLatLve conception of 
truth ... begins with the Socratic maxim that "Virtue is knowLedge, man 
sins onLy from ignorance, "' (AnseLL-Pearson 1986 p501). The psychologicat 
anxiety2l of on-going se If- inter rogation can be negated, on this conception, 
by the achievement of a perfect state of knowLedge, and even a state of 
imperfect knowLedge reduces the risk of acting from ignorance and thus 
potentiaLly sinning. Or, put in Nietzschean terms, this wLLL to truth 
'ensLaves man to positivism, to seeking the facts about the worLd at any 
cost. ' (AnseLL-Pearson 1986 P501 ). However, given the potential 
psychological relief offered by this manipulative conception of truth, it is 
of little surprise that Christian moraLIty should embrace such a will to 
knowtedge, a wiLL to truth, as integraL to its practice, or that the 
Christian as a human type is impelled towards a morality of truthfulness 
(WP 277/278) and thus towards science (schoLarship). (it is on the basis of 
th is insight that Nietzsche locates the 'more concealed forms of the cult 
of' the Christian moral ideal. ' in Rousseau, in J. S. MiLL and in Socialism 
amongst others)6. This point compLetes the outHne of the Christian as a 
human type. Hav ing thus noted the reLation between the Christian 
imperative towards self- interrogation and the wiLL to truth in Christian 
moratity, we can begin to chart the movement from Christianity to NLhUism 
within European culture and present a portrayal of the Nihilist as a human 
type. 
Our point of departure here is Nietzsche's cLaim that 'it is in one 
particular interpretation, the ChrLstLan-morat one, that nLhitism is rooted. ' 
(WP 1). How is this claim justified? If the advantage of the Christian 
moral hypothesis was that it acted as 'the great antidote against practicaL 
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and theoreticaL nihilism, (WP 4)0 how is it that this same hypothesis can 
be the soil in which European nihilism develops? it is here that the will 
to truth embraced by Christianity becomes a cruclaL factor, for Nietzsche 
suggests that: 
this [truthfulness) eventually turned against morality, 
discovered its teleology, its partial perspective - and now 
the recognition of this inveterate mendaciousness that one 
despairs of shedding becomes a stimulant. Now we discover in 
ourselves needs implanted by centuries of moral 
interpretation - needs that now appear to us as needs for 
untruth; on the other hand, the value for which we endure 
Life seems to hinge on these needs. This antagonism - not to 
esteem what we know, and not to be allowed any longer to 
esteem the Lies we should Like to tell ourselves - results 
in a process of dissolution. (WP 5) 
This 'process of dissotution' resutts in, and is partiatLy constitutive of, 
nihilism, 'this uncanniest of all guests' (WP 1). It is the 'rebound from 
"God is truth" to the fanaticaL faith "All is false"; ' (WP 2). This movement 
manifests LtseLf in two phases: firstly, the 'end of Christianity - at the 
hands of its own moraLlty ..., which turns against the Christian God' (WP 2) 
and secondly, the 'end of the moral Interpretation of the world' (WP 3). For 
Nietzsche it is this 'Skepticism regarding moratity ... [that) is decisive. ' 
(WP 3). This is so since, as Nietzsche recognIses, other absolutes wiLL be 
put forward to repLace God; conscience, reason, social instinct, history, 
happiness, aLL stake their claim to act as the new ArchLmedean point from 
which our moral values may be derived (WP 20, see also WP 18 ). In the 
space between these two stages, this pLuratity of other criteria offer 
themselves up and infiltrate our practices and science (WP 53). However, 
agaInst the skepticlsm of nihIlLsm, these act merely as local anaesthetics 
and temporary anodynes to the pain of nlhUism. In its first guise, this 
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skepticLsm takes the form of pessimism (c: f. Wp 9). 
What is the sign of this pessimism? it is a weariness, the cry "in vaLn 
so far! " (WP 8). It is manifested both as strength 'in the energy of Lts 
Logic' and the rigor of its attack on moraL vaLuations; and as dectine 'as 
growIng effeteness, as a sort of cosmopoLltan fLngering, l (Wp 11 )7. 
Pessimism is the inablLity to answer the question "for what? ". Thus: 
'Modern pessimism is an expression of the uselessness of the modern world 
- not of the worLd of existence. ' (WP 34). Nihitism is pessimism raised to 
the second power: 
The development of pessimism into nihilism. -... The 
repudiated world versus an artificially built "true, 
valuable" one. - Finally: one discovers of what material one 
has built the "true world": and now all one has left is the 
repudiated world, and one adds this supreme disappointment 
to the reasons why it deserves to be repudiated. ... (WP 37) 
With the compLetion of the process engendered by pessimism one reaches 
nihilism. Modern man Lives in a worLd he repudiates - consequentLy, 'The 
a im is Lack ing; "why? " f inds no answer. ' (WP 1 ). That is; 
one grants the reality of becoming as the only reality, 
forbids oneself every kind of clandestine access to 
afterworLds and false divinities - but cannot endure this 
world though one does not want to deny it. (WP 12). 
Thus 'the catagorles "aim, " "unity, " "being" which we used to project some 
vaLue into the worLd - we pull out again; so the worLd Looks valueless. ' 
(WP 12). Given this valuelessness, we must now examine what forms 
nihilism manifests itself in and what its consequences are for the Typus 
Mensch characteristic of modernity. 
As with pessimism, its preliminary form, nihilism is ambiguous. It can be 
la sign of increased power of the spirit: as active nih! Lism. '; however, it 
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may aLso signify 'clecLine and recession of the power of the spirit: as 
passive nihikLsm. ' (WP22). The former 'reaches its maxLmum of retative 
strength as a vioLent force of destruction' (WP 23) and in this form it is 
not 'merely the belief that everything deserves to perish: one helps to 
destroy. - ... The reduction to nothing by judgement is seconded by the 
reduction to nothing by hand. ' (WP 24). The tatter manifestation of nihitism 
is the opposite of the first; 'the weary nihilism that no Longer attacks' 
(WP 23)and wh ich takes refuge in I se I F-narco t iza t ion' (WP 1-29)9 
intoxicatLon by a 'medLey of means' as escape. 
In both these manifestations, the meaning of nLhiLism is that 'the 
highest values devaluate themselves. ' (WP 1) and thus 'ItIhe most universat 
sign of the modern age... I is that) man has Lost di_qnity in his own eyes 
to an incredible extent. ' (WP 18). The radicaL distinction Nietzsche draws 
between active and passive forms of nihLLLsm is h[ghLy significant for his 
argument. We shaLL examine preciseLy how shortLy. For the moment, Let us 
direct attention to the forms of Life in which passive nihilism exhibits 
itseLf in modernity. 
In the flrst pLace, modern man suffers from a '[plrofound weakening of' 
spontaneity' (WP 71). His occupations - hLstorianel, critic, anaLyst, 
interpreter, observer, cotlector, reader are aLL reactive in their 
operation (cf. WP 69), a response to stimuLi. Modernity is characterised by 
an 'lolverabundant devetopment of Lntermediary forms; atrophy of types; ' (WP 
74), the 'predominance of deaLers and intermediaries' (WP 76) and by the 
'modern spirit's Lack of discIpLine, dressed up in alL sorts of moraL 
fashions. ' (WP 79). In contrast to Niezsche's Formula for happiness -Ia 
Yes, a No, a straight line, a goal... ' (TI. Maxims and Arrows 44) - the 
modern spirit substitutes ItoLerance (for "the incapacity for Yes and No"); ' 
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(WP 79). All of these attrLbutes Lead NLetzsche to the principle that there 
'is an eLement of decay in everything that characterlses modern man: ' (WP 
109). However, as already noted, there is an ambiguity to nihilism - 
'lolverall insight: the ambiguous character of our modern world - the very 
same symptoms couLd poLnt to decline and to strength. ' (WP 110). This 
amb igu ity allows Nietzsche to suggest that 'close beside this sickness (in 
modern man] stand signs of an untested force and powerfuLness of the souL. 
The same reasons that produce the increasing smallness of' man drive the 
stronger and rarer individuals up to greatness. ' (WP 109). 
What are Nietzsche's grounds for this suggestion? To examine this we 
must return to an anaLysLs of passive (reactive) and active forms of 
nihiism. We have noted that tolerance, for the reactive nihMst, signifies 
an incapacity for de$ýcision. However, it is also (in this mode) a 
signification Of pity as a toLerance for the weaker forms of reactive Life 
thlough which the passive nLhiL! st negates his own sickness. It was this 
pity which choked God (Z- Retired from service), whose pity became 
unbearabLe for reactive man such that God had to die (Z- The UgLiest Man) 
and which moves then to the pity of the stronger reactive man for the 
weaker and eventuaLLy to setf-pity and the escapism of setf-narcotization. 
This is the decay, the sickness, of modern man, In contrast, active n! hLL! sm 
'as a sign of increased power of the spirit', is the point at which the 
wiLL to nothingness as a negative, as the weariness of the last man, is 
ended. Here the wM to nothingness is transmuted into an affirmation, an 
affirmation of destruction, of seff-destruction, an affirmation of becoming 
and of being overcome (Z- ProLogue 4). That is the point at which the wILL 
to nothingness turns against the reactive forces and negates them, thus 
transmuting itseff into an affirmation of the Life that reactive forces 
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deny'. ThLs necessarlLy Lnvolves the destructlon of alL those morat vaLues 
which persist, indeed, of aLL known moraL vaLues. This is the roLe and 
deLlght of the actLve nLh! List, those 'stronger and rarer' LndLvLduaLs who 
prepare the ground for the Overman. The geneaLogLst constitutes such a 
figure, indeed the geneaLogist is the exempLary exemptar of the active 
n 1h iL ist. 
We began by fiLling out the characteristics of the Christian as a type, 
noting the wLLL to truth inspired by Christian moraLlty, and Mustrating 
how this resuLts in the undermining of Christianity by its own moraLlty. 
The consequence of this process was the devetopment of pessimism as a 
preLLmLnary form of nihilism which, through its LnabLLity to answer the 
question 'For whatT, repudiates the modern worLd and Leads to nihiLism 
proper. In its reactive form, characteristic of the majority of modern 
mankind, this results in an inabiLity to act and sterile escapism. Yet, in 
its active form, it resuLts in the deveLopment of conditions whereby the 
Overman may become the dominant human type. 
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4. DISCIPLINARY REGIMES 
So far, we have been concerned with outlining Nietzsche's genealogy of 
nihilism. This section, however, will Consist of a reflection on this 
genealogy Ln terms of discipUna It will be argued that two distinct 
notions of discipline can be identified in Nietzsche's work based on the 
distinction between the weak and the strong Individual. Such a reflection 
will clarify both Nietzsche's claim that modernity is characterised by an 
l[olverabundant development of intermediary forms: atrophy of types' (WP 
74) and his espousal of active nihilism. 
Let us begin by taking up Nietzsche's conception of the strong 
individuaL. This indIvEduai, it wilt be recaLted, is one who organises his 
muLtipte seLves into an aestheticaLLy coherent whoLe. One who enforces 'an 
interpretive homogeneity' Oavey 1987 p276) throughout at[ aspects of his 
being. This aesthetic coherence, however, does not just appear through some 
pure act of witting. On the contrary, it is very much a practical 
procedure. Thus Nietzsche states: 
Here a large mass of second nature has been added; there a 
piece of original nature has been removed - both times 
through Long practice and daily work at Lt. (GS 290). 
Consider as a fairly trivial example of this someone with a fierce temper, 
who sets himself the task of counting to ten everytime he feels himself 
getting angry and thus gradually brings his temper under control. Of 
course, this example refers only to a singular instance but it brings out 
the point that it is the practical disciplining of oneself that is 
significant here. To enforce an interpretive homogeneity over all aspects 
of oneseLf, therefore, demands that one construct for oneseLf a 
disciplinary regime, an aestheticaLLy coherent set of disciptinary practices 
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which one imposes on oneself. 
In contrast, the weak LndlviduaL is one in whom the multiple selves 
constitutIng thL9 LndlvtduaL Lack co-ordLnatLon and are not brought under 
the setf-imposed styListic schema of the strong individuaL. The weak are 
those who Lack seLf-cliscipLine and who faLL to set up the constraints of a 
discipLinary regime as a context for their actLons"O. In his comments on 
the origin of religionsý Nietzsche writes: 
The distinctive invention of the founders of religions is, 
fi rst: to posit a particular kind of life and everyday 
customs that have the effect of a disciplina voluntatis and 
at the same time abolish boredom - and then: to bestow of 
this life an interpretation that makes it appear to be 
illuminated by the highest value so that this life style 
becomes something one fights for and under certain 
circumstances sacrif 
, 
ices one's Life. Actually, the second of 
these is the more essential. The first, the way of Life, was 
usuaLLy there before, but along side other ways of life and 
without any sense of its special value. (GS 353). 
The way of Life of the weak, the herd, is taken up by Christianity and 
affirmed as exempL! fyLng the highest vaLue. This was achieved through the 
imposition of a single perspective over all other perspectives. To put this 
in other terms, Christianity enables a particular self to dominate all the 
other seLves that constitute the indlvLduaL. CentraL to this procedure is 
the invention of the soul and the representation of the individual as a 
transcenclentaL subject. It may be noted here that ChrlstLanity, at Least 
later, developed numerous dLscipL! nary regLmes to complement thLs way of 
life of which monastic existence is one example, white the self- 
interrogatory regime of the Puritan would be another". Our question, 
therefore, becomes: what, if anything, distinguishes this kind of regime 
from that of the strong Lndividual, of the nobLe? 
- 82 - 
The primary feature marking the difference between the two is In their 
reiation to subjectivity. In terms of the present discussion this concerns 
the operation of the strong LndivLduaL's regime around a conception of the 
subject as muLtLpL! cLty, in contrast to the Christian regimes movement 
about the axis of the souL This difference has significant impLicatLons 
which can be described by a series of oppositions. FirstLy, the nobLe 
regime treats our subjectivity as requiring the achievement of a coherent 
unity as an on-going practical concern , while the Christian regime treats 
the unity of the subject as given. Thus, secondLy, the nobLe regime aims at 
the formation of an individuaLls 'nature' (becoming who one is), whiist the 
Christian regime treats the nature of the subject as given and acts as a 
device to attempt to control this given and fatLen nature. ThIrdLy, whILe 
the nobte regime is geared towards the disciptined expression of one's 
muLtLpLe seLves, the Christian regime consists precLseLy in the denlaL and 
prevention of expression of one's muLtLpLe seLves in the name of a specific 
singular self. This results in those seLves dominated by this singular 
Chr ist ! an seif redirecting themseLves inward and thereby producing 
ressentiment and bad conscience FinaLLy, the nobLe regLme is individu&L- 
specific, white the Christian regime cLaLms a universaL status and is thus 
imposed on the indiv[duaL LmpersonalLy12. These oppositions may be 
summariLy expressed as the contrast between setf-expression and setf- 
f Lage L Lat Lon. 
The will to truth and the will to knowledge are specific elements of 
the 
Christian regime. The will to knowledge represents a means whereby 
the 
Christian aims to ameliorate his sinful nature by acting in accordance with 
reason, by aiming at a perfect state of knowledge"5. 
The will to truth 
operates both as a part of thLs will to knowledge and 
in its confessLonaL 
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aspect as a continuaL seLf-Lnterrogatlon. The point at which the wILL to 
truth turns against Christianity exposing its 'partial perspective, (WP 5) 
the point at which the wLLL to truth interrogates and undermines the 
dLscipt[nary regime which produced it. 
Insofar as the dLsc! pL! nary regime of Christianity is productive of a 
given Typus Mensch, then with the break up of this regime, which announces 
the arrival of nihitism, it is not surprising that a great diversity of 
intermediary forms emerge. This 'atrophy of types' (WP 74) represents the 
point at which the Christian regime with its distinctive vaLuation of the 
worLd disintegrates and yet, despite the ctaims of reason, sociaL 
conscience, etc., the positing of a new Archimedean point (a universal 
discipUnary regime) to replace Christianity is ruled out by the same wILL 
to truth which undercut the universal claim of Christianity. We can sketch 
this atrophying of types in a bit more detaiL. 
WhMsm Is the point at which: 
one grants the reality of becoming as the only reality, 
forbids oneself everykind of clandestine access to 
afterworLds and false divinities - but cannot endure this 
world though one does not want to deny it. (WP 12). 
In its passive form, this resuLts in the lack of any discipLinary 
framework; unable to integrate their multiple selves, the weak take refuge 
in self-narcoticism 
Deep down: not knowing whither. EiTtiness. Attempt to get 
over it by intoxication: intoxication as music, intoxication 
as cruelty in the trelic enjoyment of the destruction of the 
nob L est; intoxication as blind enthusiasm for single human 
beings or ages (as hatred, etc. ). - Attempt to work blindly 
as an instrument of science: opening one's eyes to many 
small enjoyments; e. g. , also in the quest of 
knowledge 
(modesty towards oneself); resignation to generalizing about 
oneself, a pathos; mysticism, the voluptuous enjoyment of 
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eternaL emptiness; art "for Its own sake" C' le fait") and 
"pure knowLedge" as narcotic states of disgust with oneseff; 
some kind or other of continuat work, or of some stupid 
LLttLe fanaticism; a medLey of aLL means, sickness owing to 
generaL immoderation (debauchery kILLs enjoyment). (WP 29). 
A vast array of devices for escape, for cutting out the unendurabUlty of 
this transient worLd of becoming. Many of these intermediary forms taken 
up by the weak, the herd, draw on fragments of the Christian regime; thus, 
for exampLe, the 'quest for knowLedge'. But under WhiLism the raison d'etre 
of these f ragments, he Id together in the tots I ity of the Chr tst [an reg Lme, 
Is absent; the foundational justification for these practices no Longer 
ho Ld-- 14% This Ls what Nietzsche means by the 'atrophy of types'. 
In contrast, the active nihilist (the strong individual) organises his 
selves under a disc! pLLnary regime geared about the wLLL to nothingness. 
The styLe of this regime is one of destruction, of totat skepticism towards 
all moral values. Where that will to nothingness which characterises the 
Christian is orientated towards a rejection of the apparent world, the 
worLd of becoming, the wiLL to nothingness embodied in the active nihiList 
is directed at the IreaL worLd' constructed out of Christian moraLlty. As 
such, it engages in the aboUtion of the distinction between 'reaLl and 
'apparent' worlds, the transient world of becoming is the only world Left. 
It Es here that Zarathustra enters to teach the Overman'5 through the 
doctrine of EternaL Recurrence. The kind of disc! pLLnary eLement embodied 
in Nietzsche's portrayaL of the Overman and the overcoming of nihitism is 
considered in the next chapter. For the moment, Let us conciude our 
dLscussLon of ChristLanity and Nih[LLsm. 
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Conciuslon 
In this chapter, we have traced Nietzsche's geneaLogy of n! hLLLsm through 
an examInation of the Typus Mensch characterLst[c of, fLrstLy, ChrLstlanity 
and, secondLy, nlhiLlsm ltseLf. We have seen how concepts of ressentimerd 
and of bad conscience are used by Nietzsche to generate an account of 
Christianity in terms of the Typus Mensch it produces. The emergence of 
NLh! Llsm and the dimensions of its ambiguity can now be seen as 
simuLtaneously a sign of weakness and of strength. By treating these 
dimensions in relation to the notion of a disciplinary regime, we have 
indicated the significance of thLs ambiguity, for Nietzsche, as the defining 
feature of modernity. 
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Notes 
I. It is interesting to compare this to Weber's concern with investigating 
a cuLture in terms of Typus Mensch that has 'the optimal, chances of 
becoming the type' in HennLs Max Weber. Essays in Reconstruction (1988) 
pl 52. 
This was a theme expLored by various German phiLosophers, notabty 
Feuerbach cf. KolakowskL Maln Currents of Marxism VoL. 1 (1981) ppll4. -ll9. 
3. In Deleuze Wetzsche and PhLLosol? U (1983) ppl-3. 
4. A fuLl and Lnteresting discussion of this issue can be found in Nehamas 
Nietzsche: Life as Literature (1985) ppl06-137. 
5. Weber, of course, shared this concern wLth investLgatLng the practicaL 
affects of psychoLogicaL anxiety, most notably in his analysis of Calvinism. 
Cf. PESC pp98-128. 
6. Cf. Chapter 3, Section 2 for a discussion of Nietzsche's attitude towrds 
these 'more conceaied forms 
7. It seems unlikely that Nietzsche would have had much time for the 'body 
beautifut' set, cf. Reader p350 for a sLmilar comment by FoucauLt. 
8. By 'historian' Nietzsche is naturaLLy referring to the practitioner of 
tradLtionaL history as opposed to geneaLogy which is active. 
9. For a discussion of this point, cf. DeLeuze op. cit. ppl7l-175. 
10. Cf. GS 290 on this aspect. 
11. Cf. Paden 'Theatres of HumLLty and SuspLc! cAVn: Desert Saints and New 
Engtand Puritans' (1988) pp64-79. 
12. We couLd crudeLy describe the nobte regime as an internai disciplining, 
and the Christian regime as an external disciplining, one devetoped by the 
lndlvLduaL, the other deveLoped LnstLtutLonalLy. 
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13. On the perfectability of man, cf Paden op. cit. on Cassian, pp64-68. 
14. This point is simitar to Weber's when he taLks of the Puritan having 
chosen to work in a caLLLng whiLe we are forced to do so, PESC pl8l. 
15. Cf. TI How the 'ReaL WorLd' at Last Became a Myth 6. 
. 01 
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THE OVERMAN AýU THE POLITICS OF PHILOSOPHY 
Introduction 
In this final chapter on Nietzsche, the philosoph[caL and moraL concerns 
outlined in the preceding pages will be brought together. Our aim here is 
to expLicate Nietzsche's notion of the Overman and to eLudicate his 
conception of the role of philosophy in modernity. This project will draw 
on the earLler discussions of his notions of subjectivity, dLsc! pLLne and 
geneatogy, as weLL as introducing the idea of Eternal Recurrence These 
themes wilt aid us In unearthing the politics of Nietzsche's mode of 
philosophicaL theorLsing. 
1. The Overman and EternaL Recurrence 
The Overman: this figure is the goaL of Nietzsche's philosophicaL 
activity. However, a fuLL description of the Overman requires an account of 
the doctrine of EternaL Recurrence. As Nietzsche writes, this doctrine 
represents the highest point of his phLLosophy: '6,000 feet beyond man and 
t ime, (EH Z1). Various issues are raised here. What is it that 
distingulshes the Overman from the actLve riLhitist, for exampLe? What sort 
of doctrine is this 'EternaL Recurrence"? What is the form of Nietzsche's 
phitosophicaL activity here? These questions tead us to the heart of 
Nietzsche's existentLaL potitics. 
In the Last chapter, it was argued that the geneaLogist constitutes the 
active nihilist Par excellence The strong individual who 
faces up to the 
collapse of moral values and affirms thLs condition actively 
through 
genealogical critique. In the discussion of 
Nietzsche's place in relation to 
the themes of subjectivity and self-discipline, it was pointed out 
that the 
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strong [ndividuaL is the one who weLds hLs Life Into a coherent totaLlty, 
who becomes what he is. How then does this strong individual who is stLLL 
a man come to be overcome? What is it that distinguishes the strong man 
from the Overman? These two questions are intimateLy retated. The means 
by which man is to be overcome is provided by the doctrine of EternaL 
Recurrence and, at the same time, it is this which separates man and 
Overman. 
Although the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence is central to Nietzsche, it 
is certainLy the case that UttLe etaboration of this idea can be found in 
his texts. Zarathustra was seen by Nietzsche as the teacher of this 
doctrine, yet it Ls largety unstated by this figure. Moreover, when this 
'most abysmaL idea' is put forward, it is uncLear what its status is: 
CosmoLogical theory or ethicai doctine? l We can begin to expiore this 
issue by reference to the section Of The Vision And The Riddle, Here 
Zarathustra states a versLon of EternaL Recurrence: 
'Behold this moment! II went on. 'From this gateway Moment 
a Long, eternal road runs back: an eternity behind us. 
'Must not all things that can run have ready run along 
thLs Lane? Must not aLL things that can happen have already 
happened, have done, run past? 
'And if all things have been here before: what do you 
thLnk of this moment, dwarf? Must not this gateway, too, 
have been here - before? 
'And are not at L things bound fast together in such a way 
that this moment draws after it all future things? Therefore 
- draws itself too? 
I For at L things that can run mist also run once again 
forward along this long Lane. 
'And this slow spider that creeps along in the moonlight, 
and this moonlight itself, and you and I at this gateway 
whispering together, whisperLng of eternal things - must we 
not all have been here before? 
I- and must we not return and run down that other 
Lane 
out before us, down that Long, terrible Lane - must we not 
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return eternaLLy. Q Of' the Vision and the Riddle 2). 
In this aLlegoricat vision, Nietzsche appears to present Eternal, Recurrence 
as a cosmoLog[cat theory, as the Idea that any (and every) moment in the 
universe wILL recur eternaLLy. The history of the worLd, our life - these 
things wILL recur identically. This is the thought Zarathustra finds so 
abysmat. As it is spoken in The Convalescent: 
' "Alas, man recurs eternaLl 
eternaLLy! " 
II had seen them both naked, 
smallest man: all too similar 
greatest all too human! 
'The greatest all too smaLLI - 
And eternal recurrence even for 
disgust at all exisý, Ance! Q The 
. y. 1 The LittLe man recurs 
the greatest man and the 
to one another, even the 
that was my disgust at man! 
the smaLtest! that was my 
Convalescent 2). 
Yet, Ln the same secti. on, the anLmaLs teLL Zarathustra, and Nletzsche teLis 
us, that he Ls to be the teacher of Eternal Recurrence and that to teach 
this Ls to teach the path to the Overman. Zarathustra's fLnaL affLrmation 
of this doctrine is the affirmation (and redemption) of the existence of 
aLL the base and mean moments of man for the sake of those moments which 
are great and nobLe. This interpretation of EternaL recurrence is further 
supported by some of Nietzsche's unpubtished remarks in The Will To Power 
where he states: 'the Law of conservation of energy demands eternal 
recurrence. (WP 1063) and, elsewhere, Ln greater detaLL: 
If the world may be thought of as a certain definite 
quantity of force and as a certain definite number of 
centers of force - and every other representation remains 
indefinite and therefore useless - it follows that, in the 
great dice game of existence, it must pass through a 
calculable number of combinations. In infinite time, every 
possible combination would at some time or another be 
realized; more, it would be realized an infinite number of 
t1 mes. And since between every combLnatLon and its next 
recurrence all other possible combinations would have to 
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take place, and each of these combinations conditions the 
entire sequence of combinations in the same series, a 
circular movement of absolutely identLcaL series is thus 
demonstrated: the world as a circular movement that has 
already repeated itself infinitely often and plays its game 
in infinituin (WP 1066). 
Two different sorts of probLem emerge for us at this point. The first 
concerns the vaL! dLty of the position Nietzsche appears to subscribe to in 
this passage. The second raises the question of whether or not this is 
indeed the position Nietzsche affirms. 
The account of history in this passage asserts that since the history of 
the universe is made up of a finite amount of energy, then any given 
distribution of this energy must recur eternaLLy given an infinite period 
of time. If this is Nietzsche's anatysis of Eternat Recurrence then it 
cannot be sustained, and that for two reasons. FirstLy, it does not foLLow 
from the fact that there is a f[nite amount of energy that there are a 
finite number of distributions of this energy. Secondky, even if thLs were 
granted, it wouLd not foLLow that a particuLar distribution of energy need 
recur7-. ThLs Later poLnt was made by SimmeL, whose argument has been 
usefu I Ly summar ised by Schacht3: 
it would be at least possible for a world ... to contain an 
analog of a relatively simple model (involving marked wheels 
of equaL size revolving at specified rates of n, 2n and 
n/n), of which It can be shown mathematically that a certain 
state of the model (the originaL alignment of the marked 
points) will never be repeated. (Schacht 1983 p263). 
It wouLd appear then that the EternaL Recurrence, on this interpretation, 
Is severety fLawed. This may expiaLn why Nietzsche never pubLished any of 
his 'proofs' of EternaL Recurrence. Yet this falture to pubLlsh the 'proof' 
demanded by such a cosmologLcaL doctrine raises the question as to whether 
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such a theory is Nietzsche's intention. Why is it that the dwarf, the Spirit 
of GravLty who Ls Zarathustra's opponent, Ln Of' The Vision And The Riddle 
is rebuked by Zarathustra for saying 'ALL truth Es crooked, time itsekf is 
a cLrcie. ' Q Of the Vision and the Riddle 2). In Ecce Homo, Nletzsche says 
of The Gay Science that 'in the end it even offers the beginning of 
Zarathustra, and in the penuttimate section of the fourth book the bas1c 
idea of Zarathustra. ' (EH Z 1). The Less poetic form of expression depLoyed 
in this earlier formulation may help us to get a better grasp of the 
nature of Eternal Recurrence as a doctrine. It is necessary here to quote 
the reLevant passage in its entirety: 
The greatest weight. - What, if some day or night a demon 
were to steal after you into your Loneliest LoneLiness and 
say to you: "This Life as you now Live it and have Lived it, 
you wLtL have to Live once more and innumerabLe times more; 
and there will, be nothing new in it, but every pain and 
every joy and every thought and sigh and everything 
unutterably small or great in your Life will have to return 
to you, all. in the same succession and sequence - even this 
spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this 
moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existance is 
turned upside down again and again, and you with it, speck 
of dust! " 
Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and 
curse the demon who spoke us? Or have you experienced a 
tremendous moment when you would have answered him: "You ar6 
a god and never have I heard anything more divine. " If this 
thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you 
are or perhaps crush you. The question in each and 
everything, "Do you desire this once more and innumerable 
times more? " would upon your actions as the greatest weight. 
Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself 
and to Life to crave nothing fwre fervently than this 
ultimate eternal confirmation and seat? (GS 341). 
The demon is Zarathustra, yet here Nietzsche's primary concern is with the 
response of the Lnd! vLduaL to this thought, not the 'truth' of the thought 
itseLf. It Ls the psychological consequences of the idea of EternaL 
- 93 - 
Recurrence which are important*. In a sense, it is Nietzsche's principte of 
setection; a sorting of the wheat from the chaff, of those who are fated 
to remain alL too human and those who w[It pass over the bridge, who wLLL 
become Overmen. This version of EternaL Recurrence seems more pLausibLe. 
Consider the foLtowing comment from Ecce Homo in which Nietzsche 
considers why the ascetic ideal of the pr[est was so powerful: 
Answer: not, as peopLe may beLLeve, because God is at work 
behind the priests but faute de mieux - because it was the 
onLy ideaL so far, because it had no rLvat. "For man wouid 
rather wILL even nothingness than not wILL. " - Above aLL a 
counterideal was Lacking - until Zarathustra. (EH GM). 
A counterideal. This does not impty that EternaL Recurrence is true, rather 
that it is of slmLLar mythLc dimensions as the figure of God. What is 
important in terms of thLs discussion is its 'proof of power', which is to 
ask: in what does the 'value for life' of the doctrine of Eternal 
Recurrence consLst? 
PrLmarity, it consists in providing the strong LndLvLduaL with the means 
to both face up to the lack of absolute values and yet to still evaluate 
his own actions and life. It enabLes the strong InclLvidual to endow his 
Life with positive meaning and vatue. To examine how Eternat Recurrence 
achieves this, it is necessary to return to Nietzsche's position on the 
issue of subjectivity. 
It will be recalled that for Nietzsche what is needful is to give one's 
life a coherent style. The nature of this style is relatively unimportant, 
its uniformity is the significant feature. But how is the individuaL to 
decide on the question of the performance or non-performance of a given 
action? ParticutarLy if both these possibiiities are consonant with the 
style of the individual's subjectLvity. WithLn a qLven set of styL! stLc 
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parameters a potentlaLLy inflnLte number of narratLves are possLble. In 
this interpretation, the significance of EternaL Recurrence is that to be 
able to affirm this doctrine is to be able to say of one's Life 'Thus I 
witted it, aLL of it. ' Expressed positively the demon's thought becomes the 
injunction: 'Live your Life such that if you had to Live your Life over and 
over again, even eternaLLy, you wouLd iive it in the same way. ' 
The question this poses to the individuaL pondering various courses of 
action is 'Which course of action wouLd I wish to Live an infinite number 
of timesT. It shouLd be noted that, as with Nietzsche's injunction to 
stylistic coherency, this criterion for decision-making is flormal in 
character. The nature of the act ion is Less Lmportant than the mature 
desire to repeat it eternaLLy. In this way, the Individual forms his Hfe 
into a work of art; each etement, every brushstroke, is affirmed as 
integraL to the totaLlty. Eternat Recurrence thus provLdes the LndivLduaL 
with meaning and vaLue for his life. However, the sketch given so far does 
not entirely distinguish the Overman from the noble man, nor does it 
compieteLy expiaLn why the Eternat Recurrence is such an labysmaL thought'. 
To ML in the picture however, requires a detour through Nietzsche's 
not [on of the W! II to Pdwerý. 
'This world is the will to power - and nothing besides! (WP 1067). ThLs 
section is essentiaLLy a discussion of the imptications of the theory of 
the Will to Power for Nietzsche's doctrine of EternaL Recurrence. An 
apposite starting point is Nietzsche's rejection of the KantLan 'thLng-Ln- 
itself': 
The properties of a thing are effects on other "things": 
if one removes other "things, " then a thing has no 
properties, 
i. e., there is no thing without other thIngs, 
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L. e. , there is no "thing- in-LtseLf. 11 (WP 557). 
That is 'the "thing" in which we believe was only invented as a foundation 
for the various attributes' UP 561). With regard to subjectivity, we posit 
a transcendental, subject as the cause of a variety of actions performed by 
an individual. Nietzsche argues that this tendency also characterises our 
treatment of things: 'we take the sum of its properties - llxll - as cause 
of the property llxll: whLch is utterLy stupid and madP (WP 561). As a 
ph[losophicaL thesis, the Will to Power is initially the argument that 
"thingness" is a property which we have ascribed to things through a faise 
reversaL of cause and effect. In contrast to the Kantian d1stinction 
between 'reat' and 'apparent' worLds which is presupposed by the idea of a 
'thing- in- itself 19 Nietzsche poses the everyday world of flux and perpetual 
change. In this worid, the onLy worLd, a thing is constituted by its 
effects. What are the LmpLicatLons of this thesis? 
Now, for Nietzsche, the worLd is constituted by the perspective; this 
perspective being an ordering and vaLuing of the worLd. Perspectivism as 
such does not require an ontoLogical pturaLlsm, however, Nietzsche's notion 
of the WILL to Power does seem to entalt such a position. We can expLain 
this as foLlows: a 'thing' Is constituted by its effects, yet these effects 
are the product of a particular perspective valuation; this implies that 
different perspectives may produce different effects and, therefore, 
different 'things'. The cruciaL point though is that aLL the 'things' in a 
given perspective-worLd are constituted by their effects on the other 
'things'. As Nietzsche puts it: 'If I remove aLL the reLatLonships, aLL the 
"properties, " all the "activities" of a thing, the thing does not remain 
over; ' (WP 558). 
This is not such a strange sounding cLaim as it might immediateLy 
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appear. As Nehamas has pointed out, in some ways Nietzsche's position with 
regard to 'things' paraLLeLs Saussure's arguments on Lanquaged,. For 
Saussure, a particuLar set of noises or inscriptions do not constitute a 
'word- in-itseff', on the contrary, its status as a 'word' with a more or 
Less specific meaning is given by its position in a system of differences. 
Thus, for example, the meaning of 'cat' is given through its differentiaL 
retatLonships with such terms as 'mat', 'cot' and 'cap'. So too, for 
Nietzsche, there are no 'th ings- in-themseLves' rather 'things' are 
constituted as 'things' through the totaL system of reLationshLps they have 
to other 'things'. This entaiLs, for Nietzsche, that 'everything' is more or 
less directly related to every other 'thing'. Consequently, to remove any 
given 'thing' is to change, however subtLy, the totaL system. The remarks 
offered up to this stage deal only with the synchronic dimension, it is 
necessary that we atso take note of the diachronic or historicaL axis. 
Nehamas's account is again usefuL for our purposes. He points out that 
for Nietzsche: 
There can be no antecedent ground of the unity or identity 
of an object through time any more than there is such a 
ground in the case of an object at a particular time. Over 
time an object Is constituted by the best history of a group 
of phenomena, a history embodied in the best narrative of 
the relations among them. Such narratives reveal that 
different phenomena have served the same purpose or that 
different purposes have succeeded one another in ways that 
allow them to be parts of a single history and therefore 
parts of a single object through time. (Nehamas 1985 pJ00)7. 
Wetzsche's geneaLogicat essays are exampLes of such narratLve accounts. It 
witi be recatted that in each of these essays Nietzsche is concerned with 
tracing the conditions of emergence of a particutar phenomenon. Moreover, 
in the fragmented narrative which constitutes his geneatogy of nihitLsm 
- 97 - 
NLetzsche is cLearLy concerned wLth chartLng how we have become to be as 
we are. It foLLows that for Nietzsche the particuLar system of 
relationships which characterLses a state of affairs, at a given point in 
time, conditions the states of affairs which foLLow. In one of the passages 
in which may be used to indicate Nietzsche's EternaL Recurrence as a 
cosmoLogLcat theory, this 'conditioning' is bLown up into fuLl determinism: 
And since between every combination and its next recurrence 
all other possible combinations wouLd have to take place, 
and each of these combinations conditions the entire 
sequence of combinations In the same series, a circular 
movement of absolutely identical series Is thus 
demonstrated: (WP 1066). 
Our reasons for rejecting the cosmoLogicaL determ! nLst interpretation of 
Wetzsche have aLready been given. Suffice it too say here that such a 
determInism wouLd be unabLe to account for the hLgh pLace that NLetzsche 
assigns to contingency in human affaLrs. The significant issue for our 
concerns is the point that not onLy are 'things' defined by a system of 
rekatLonships synchronicaLLy but aLso by the reLatlonships of the systems 
of differences diachronicaLty. The LmpLication of this, for Nietzsche, Ls 
that to remove a IthLng' from a gLven tota[ity Is not just to aLter that 
system but to change those which reLate to Lt. 
Now, naturaLly, for Nietzsche we cannot move back in t1me and change an 
event, however, this is not his concern. What is significant to him is that 
the individual may desire to do so. It is this wiLl to change history which 
he is attempting to counter with the notion of the Will to Power. In part 
we have already seen this in Nietzsche's account of subjectivity. Within 
the parameters of the narrative conception of subjectivity which Nietzsche 
deploys, it wou Id be inauthentic to desire to 
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change an aspect of one's past since this past is constitutive of who one 
is today. The affirmation of one's Life which Nietzsche Lays down as the 
criteria for the Overman requires a total affirmation. This joes some. wa5 
to expLaining why for Nietzsche the doctrine of EternaL Recurrence is such 
an 'abysmaL thought'. However, the fult dimensions of its horror are 
reveaLed when it is grasped that this affirmation goes beyond one's own 
Life and involves affirming the whole of human history as weLL. That this 
is so is axiomatic to the idea of the Will to Power. For were any aspect 
of history to be altered then the whole of history following that moment 
would be changed including oneself (if indeed one still existed). A full 
affirmation of oneself consequently requires a total affirmation of all of 
history. One need onLy refLect on the events of this century to grasp the 
terror of this thought. It is approprLate that Nietzsche makes the moment 
of this thought appear in the image of a shepherd choking: 
And truLy, I had never seen the Like of what I then saw. I 
saw a young shepherd writhing, choking, convuLsed, his face 
distorted; and a heavy, btack snake was hanging out of his 
mouth. (Z Of the Vision and the Riddle 2). 
It Ls not untLL the much Later sectLon, The Convalescent, that Zarathustra 
understands that being the shepherd was the symbolic representation of his 
own fear at the thought of EternaL Recurrence. Yet instinctively 
Zarathustra recognLses the course of action the shepherd must take: 
The shepherd, however, bit as my cry had advised him; he 
bit with a good bite! He spat the snake' s head away - and 
sprang up. 
No Longer a shepherd, no Longer a man -a transformed 
being, surrounded with Light, lau_qhin_q! Never yet on earth 
had any man laughed as he laughed! Q Of the Vision and the 
Riddle 2). 
- 99 - 
This is significant for two reasons: firstty, Nietzsche's ctalm that the 
affirmation of Eternal Recurrence brings with it a feeling of joy, of 
power; and secondLy, the passage's LmpL! cit espousaL of Lnstinct. In the 
context of Nietzsche's concern with breedinc , it becomes ctear that the la 
doctrine of EternaL Recurrence constitutes a princLpLe which Nietzsche 
I 
wishes to breed into man. The expression of EternaL Recurrenceas the 
injunction to Live your Life such that if you had to Live over again 
eternatly you wouLd live it in the same way, is the starting point for a 
breeding programme such that this princIpLe becomes automatic. This 
principLe of recurrence then constitutes the centraL point of the 
discipLinary regime, a regime which one must impose on oneseLf to give 
one's Life vaLue; that is, to be an Overman. 
To concLude this section, it seems appropriate to sum up the features of 
Nietzsche's position which have been identified. We began by indicating 
Nietzsche's concern with formulating a basis upon which the LndivLduaL 
might reinvest his Life with meaning and vaLue. This basis was the 
doctrine of EternaL Recurrence, the demand that one affirm one's own 
existence wLth alt the impLications this affirmation has. It Ls the 
acceptance of Eternal Recurrence which distinguishes the Overman from the 
strong LndLviduat as such, since for past nobies there were foundatLonaL 
values which acted as ArchLmedean points for their seff-affirmation, 
whereas for the post-nLhMst no such values exist and consequently only a 
formal principle is avaUabLe. Here we have offered an interpretation of 
Eternai Recurrence as primarlLy a prescriptive injunction (though the force 
of this injunction may draw on a cosmoLogicai doctrine as a myth[c 
resource). In the next section we wiLl examine the politics of this 
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doctrIne as embodLed Ln the Overman and retake up the Lssue of the role 
Nietzsche assigns to philosophy. 
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The PoLLtics of Philosophy 
To some extent, the poLLtLcs of Nietzsche's phLLosophy has been 
illustrated in the previous section. An existential, politics whereby the 
IndividuaL is enabLed to reinvest his or her Life with meaning and vatue. 
In this section, the poLLtlcs embodied in the figure of the Overman wLLL be 
contextuaLlsed by reference to Nietzsche's fragmentary remarks on the 
poiiticaL nature of modernity. Through an exposition of Nietzsche's position 
on this issue, which will involve examining Nietzsche's comments on various 
potiticat theorists and theories, we wiLL be abLe to further grasp the kind 
of potitLcs LnvoLved in Nietzsche's espousaL of the Overman. 
A usefuL starting point is to remind ourseLves of the ambiguous nature 
that modernity has for Nietzsche by noting the foLLowing comments: 
PrincipLe: There is an eLement of decay in everything that 
characterises modern man: but cLose beside this sickness 
stand signs of an untested force and powerfuLness of the 
sout. The salm reasons that produce the increasing sffallness 
of Imn drive the stronger and rarer individuals up to 
greatness. (WP 109). 
Overall insight: the ambiguous character of our modern world 
- the very same symptoms couLd point to decline and to 
strength. (WP 110). 
Two significant issues arise here: firstLy, the operation of Nietzsche's 
distinction between the weak herd and the strong few; and secondLy, the 
immediate probtem that Nletzschean poHtLcaL anatysLs is posed with if 
poLiticaL institutions are ambiguous phenomena (how then may we evatuate 
them? ). By taking up the first issue and etaborattng the way in which this 
distinction is operated, we can also resolve the question of how Nietzsche 
does in fact evaluate political phenomena. This exploration will begin by 
Looking at Nietzsche's critiques of various soclaL theorists before going 
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on to Look at how he handles a generaL poLItIcaL issue such as 'democracy'. 
WhLle a number of sociaL theorLsts provoke NLetzsche's ire, the most 
significant are Rousseau and John Stuart MLLL. We wILL begin by anatysing 
the styLe of Nietzsche's rejection of Rousseau. For Nietzsche, Rousseau 
represents the bad conscience of his age, the spirit of ressentiment is 
ative and weLL here. He views Rousseau as: 
a symptom of self self-contempt and heated vanity - both 
signs that the domineering will is Lacking: he moraLises 
and, as a man of rancor, seeks the cause of his wretchedness 
in the rulLng classes. (WP 98). 
To see how Nietzsche arrives at such an assessment, we must first identify 
the form of argumentation that Nietzsche Locates in Rousseau. This 
strategy can be seen at work Ln the foLLowing passage: 
MoralitY as a means of seduction. - "Nature is good, for a 
wise and good God is its cause. Who, then, is responsible 
for the ' corruption of mankind'? Its tyrants and seducers, 
the rulin g orders - they ffmst be destroyed" Rousseau's 
Logic (WP 347, cf. also WP 100). 
For Nietzsche, Rousseau's argument involves three significant assumptions: 
'the ruLe based on feeL! ng; nature as the source of justice; man perfects 
himself to the extent to which he approaches nature' (WP 100). This 
romanticism manLfesting LtseLf as an pLea for 'passion ("the sovereign 
right of passion'T (WP 100), aga in: 'the "LiberUnism of passion" 
(Rousseau's intent)' (WP 106). But isn't this espousal of passion in some 
sense similar to Nietzsche's own espousal of 'Instinct"? It would appear 
not, Nietzsche argues that: 
LibertLnage, the principLe of " laisser aller, " shouid not be 
confused with the wL LL to power which is the 
counterprincipLe). (WP 122). 
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I YVO Is 14 And, moreover, he goes on to identify in the section My Five 
My struggle against the eighteenth century of Rousseau, 
against his "nature, " his "good man, " his beiLef in the 
domination of feeling - agaLnst the softening, weakening, 
moralization of man: an ideal born of hatred for 
aristocratic culture; in proxi the doination of the feetigs 
of an unbridled ressentirnent, devised as a banner for the 
struggle (- the morality of guilt feelings of the ChrLstan, 
the morality of ressentilnent a posture of the mob). (WP 
10ý1). 
Here we reach the heart of Nietzsche's critique of Rousseau, that at root 
Rousseau's idealised concept of 'nature' is ut! Lised as a means for the 
weak to refuse responsLbility for themseLves, that Ls, ressentiment. We can 
see here how the figure of the Overman represents a point from which 
Nietzsche is able to generate his critique. The Overman represents an 
indivLduaL taking totaL responsibiLity for their own Life, saying 'Thus I 
wMed it'. In contrast, Rousseau's 'good man' represents a totaL abnegation 
of responsibility; firstly, in the identification of self as a response to 
'the tyrants and seducers' and secondLy, in a Libertinage of feeLings which 
refuses seff-discipLine7. The critique Nietzsche deveLoped, in the essay 
"'Good and Bad, " "Good and Evil"', of stave morality might equatLy appLy to 
Rousseau, whose position is fundamentaLLy one of: 
The fwre concealed forms of the cult of the Christian moral 
ideal. - The insipid and cowardly concept "nature" devised 
by nature enthusiasts (- without any instinct for what is 
fearful, implacable and cynical even in the "most beautifuL" 
aspects), a kind of attempt to read moral Christian 
"humanity" into nature - Rousseau's concept of nature, as if 
"nature" were f reedom, goodness, innocence, fairness, 
justice, an idyl - still a cult of Christian morality 
fundamentally. (WP 340). 
To invest Christian moraLlty Into 'nature' is not, for Nietzsche, a 
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productive move. Rather, it is one which mereLy reaffirms the Christian 
denlaL of the worLd in yet another form. 
We can Mustrate this point on grounds not directLy considered by 
Nietzsche by reference to the Logic of Puritanism discussed in the Last 
chapter. There it was pointed out that Puritanism represented bad 
conscience in its purest form, this being exempLified in: 
the Logic of ref LexLve seLf-examination, every reLLgious 
assertion - incLuding every act of confession and every act 
of seLf-accusatLon - couLd become suspect of its own 
possibLe seLf-deception. (Paden 1988 p78). 
A sLm! Lar Logic is apparent in the Rousseaulan seLf. This aspect can be 
brought out by considering a recent argument by Gutman. He quotes the 
foLlowing passage from Rousseau's Confess[ons: 
since I have undertaken to reveal myself absolutely to the 
public, nothing about me must remain hidden or obscure. I 
must remain incessently beneath his gaze, so that he may 
follow me In aLL the extravagencies of my heart and into 
every least corner of my Life. Indeed, he must never lose 
sight of me for a single instance, for If he finds the 
smallest gap in my story, the smallest hiatus, he may wonder 
what I was doing at that moment and accuse me of refusing to 
tell the whole truth. I am Laying myself sufficiently open. 
(Rousseau 1953 p65 in Gutman 1988 p106). 
As Gutman indicates, this confession 'develops as a response to social 
accusation, ... It consists In totaL exposure, and ... 
its reveLations are to 
be subjected to an external (and judging) gaze. ' (Gutman 1988 p106)111. In 
other words, the Puritan regime of setf-suspicion is objectified. White the 
self is still rendered transparent, it is now subject to the gaze of the 
other, as weLL as the gaze of the seLf. Rousseau's Logic represents the 
sociaLlsation of the Logic of Puritanism, and as such it, too, exempLifles 
bad conscience Thus aLthough Nietzsche did not consider this aspect of 
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Rousseau's work, an examination of Rousseau's conception of the seLf in 
NLetzschean terms Leads to the same concLuslon that Nietzsche reached 
concernLng Rousseau's thought. 
If Rousseau represents the ChrLstlan moraLLsation of 'nature', what does 
MILL represent? " Nietzsche's critique can be Located as beginning with 
this remark on UtUltarlanism per se: 
The vaLue of an action must be judged by its consequences 
- say the Utititarlans -: to judge by its origin impLies an 
Lmposs[bLL! ty, nameLy that of knowin_q is origins. 
But does one know its consequences? For five steps ahead, 
perhaps. Who can say what an action wM stinutate, excite, 
provoke? As a stirmius? Perhaps as a spark to touch off an 
expLosLon! - The UtitLtarians are naive - (WP 291). 
Th is comment poses a togicaL probLem for consequent ialist forms of 
argument. If an action is to be judged by its consequences, to what extent 
can another action be judged as consequential? Given Nietzsche's notion of 
the Will to Power, the consequences of any given action will be timeless; 
as such the possibiLity of judging these consequences in any but a 
temporary manner is ruled out. It follows that the indivLduaL cannot deploy 
utilitarianism as a meaningfuL ethical criterion. However, this immanent 
critique is oniy the initiaL stage of Nietzsche's argument. The most 
s[gnLfLcant area of NLetzsche's cr[tLque Ls the attack on the idea of 
'reciprocity'. This manifests itself in the following form: 
Marginal note on a niaiserie anglaise. - "Do not do unto 
others what you would not have them do unto you. " That 
counts as wisdom; that counts as prudence; that counts as 
the basis of morality - as the "golden ruLe. 11 John Stuart 
Mill believes in it (and what Englishman does not? ) But this 
rule does not brook the slightest attack. The calculation, 
"do nothing that ought not to be done to you, " prohibits 
actions on account of their harmful consequences: the 
conceaLed premise is that an action will always be requited. 
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But what if someone holding the Principe in his hand were to 
say: "It is precisely such actions that one nust perform, to 
prevent others from performing them first - to deprive 
others of the chance to perform them on us. "? (WP 925). 
It is not so much that Nietzsche is advocating a moraLity of pre-emptive 
strikes, rather, his point is that the concept of 'reciprocity' which 
constitutes Mitt's "goLden ru tell breaks down in the face of the 
MachlaveLLIan ethLc of pre-emptLon. However, the prLmary attack that 
Nietzsche operates on this recLprocaL moraLity deveLops out of his own 
deontological theory of ethics. Thus Nietzsche argues: 
And in aIL decent act ions, are we not detEberately 
indifferent to the prospect of what may happen to us? To 
avoid an action that might have harmfuL consequences for us 
- that wouid mean a ban on decent actions in generaL. (WP 
925). 
To Mustrate, this Nietzsche uses the exampte of a vendetta Here the 
person decLaring the vendetta may not wish to be shot but the Liketihood 
of this event does not prevent him from undertaking the vendetta to 
vindicate his honour. As one might expect, however, Nietzsche's 
deontoLog[cal stance does not resembLe standard versions of such theories 
such as Chrlstianity. In the tradLtional stamp, deontoLogicaL theorLes 
invoLve the ascription of an absoLute obtigation to the performance or 
non-performance of particular classes of actions which applies equally to 
aLL indLviduaLs. Nietzsche's position, in contrast, makes the ascription of 
such obt[gatLons an individuaL affair. An action may performed for its own 
sake but this value is not inherent to the action, on the contrary, what 
gives it vaLue is the specific LndLvLduaL's affirmation of it. In other 
words, Nietzsche's position may be characterised as a deontological 
subjectivism 
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Let us now return to Nietzsche's onsLaught on MILL. The fLnai move In 
this critique is to show that MM's position exemptMes herd moraLLty. In 
the section Against bhn Stuart Mill, Nietzsche argues that Mill's "golden 
ru tell: 
wants to estabLish aLL human intercourse on the basis of 
mutuat services, so that every action appears as a kind of 
payment for something done to us. The presupposition here is 
LgnobLe in the Lowest sense: here an equivaLence of vatue 
between my actions and yours is presupposed, here the most 
personat vatue of an action is simply annuLled (that which 
cannot be batanced or paid in any way -). (WP 926). 
The 'vaLue' of MILL's formulation is in the fact that 'it betrays a type of 
man: it is the instinct of the herd that finds its formuta in this rutel 
(WP 925). The betief in 'equivaLence' and 'reciprocity' must be, Nietzsche 
argues, predicated on the belief in 'equality'. 'Equality' however, is, in 
turn, based on a belief in the 'soul'; thLs pos[tLng of 'equalltyl Ls 
preclseLy one of the purposes Nietzsche ascribed to the invention of the 
'sout' by the masses in the essay "'Good and Bad, " "Good and Evil"'". As 
such, MULs argument represents another of the more concealed forms of' 
the cult of the Christian moral ideal (cf. WP 340). 
However, on a practical, Level, Wetzsche seems Less opposed to the 
posLtIon artLcuLated by MILL In On LIberty. NLetzsche notes, for example, 
that this Imoral, LiberaLity is one of the best signs of our age. ... If 
anything can reconclie us to our age, it is the great amount of immoratity 
it perm[ts itself without thinking any the worse of itself. ' (WP 747). It 
wouLd appear then that Nietzsche's objection is not so much directed at 
the form of society which MILL advocates, but rather the presuppositions 
upon which MLLL grounds his advocacy (in particutar, the unIversatity MILL 
attributes to his "golden rule"). The apparent ambiguity of Nietzsche's 
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posltýn here can be expLaLned by anaLogy to his stance concerning 
Language. RecaLl Nietzsche's argument that Language contains a 'hidden 
mythoLogy', that it seduces us towards beLlef in 'the subject', 'substance', 
etc. through its grammaticaL structure and the relfication of metaphors 
into concepts. He does not suggest, however, that we try to formu tate a 
non-metaphysicaL Language; such a project would be, for him, doomed to 
inevLtabLe fallurel3. With regard to 'morat LiberaLity', Nietzsche is not so 
much concerned with this state (which he appears to view rather 
posLtLvety) as wLth the LdeoLogLcal reifLcatLon of thLs state through a 
ser ies of abstract concepts: such as 'equa L ity, I 'equivatencel and 
'reciprocity'. It is this conceptual mummification in the spirit of the herd 
which represents the point of Nietzsche's critique of MLLL. This is not to 
say though that Nietzsche was entirety unconcerned with the nature of 
modern potLticaL instLtutions themseLves. On the contrary, the institutLon 
of democracy was of great concern to him as we shall now see. 
In Human. AIL Too Human Nietzsche begins his glance at the state by 
considering democracy as a poLlticaL institution in modernity. Thus: 
Permission to speak! - The demagogic character and the 
intention to appeal to the masses is at present common to 
all political parties: on account of this intention they are 
compelled to transform their principles into great al fresco 
stupidities and thus to paint them on the wall. This is no 
Longer alterable, indeed it would be pointless to raise so 
much as af inger against it; for in this domain there apply 
the words of Voltaire: quand ia populace se fn6le de 
raisonner, tout est perdu. (HH 438). 
ALL may be lost but Nietzsche does not seem overly distressed by this 
condition, indeed he finds the desire for democracy on behaLf of the herd 
qu ite understandabLe. He comments: 
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if the purpose of all politics really is to make Life 
endurable for as many as possible, then these as-many-as- 
possible are entitled to determine what they understand by 
an endurable Life; ... They want for once to forge for 
themselves their own fortunes and misfortunes; and if this 
feeling of self-determination, pride in the five or six 
ideas their head contains and brings forth, in fact renders 
their Life so pleasant to them they are happy to bear the 
calamitous consequences of their narrow-m4ndedness, there is 
Little to be objected to, always presupposing that this 
narrow-mLndedness does not go so far as to demand that 
everything should become politics in this sense, that 
everyone shouLd Live and work according to such a standard. 
(HH 438). 
As a poL! tlcaL institution, democracy satisfies the demands of the herd (cf 
WP 215). The cruciat issue from Nietzsche's perspective is that the wLLL- 
to-democracy shouLd not entalt the demand that everyone be requIred to 
manifest this wILL. The probLem of democracy, for Nietzsche, is that its 
grounding on the idea of 'equaL rights' LmpeLLs it towards such a 
universalist requirement. The basis for this cLaLm can be Located in 
Nýetzschels genealogy of 'equal rights'. This concept's lineage is directly 
tracabie to the ChrlstLan idea of the lequaHty of souLs before God' (WP 
765). As such it also involves a concealed commitment to ressentiment, for 
as Nietzsche argues, wherever 'responsibititLes have been sought it was the 
instinct of revenge that sought' (WP 765). As our detaited dLscussion of 
Christianity shows, ressentiment implies a universal morality. It is this 
totaLLsing tendency of the will-to-democracy that Nietzsche has in mind 
when he suggests that: 
Democracy represents the disbelief in great human beings and 
an eiLte society: "Everyone is equal to everyone else. " "At 
bottom we are one and all self-seeking cattle and mob. " (WP 
752). 
Yet white Nietzsche attacks the foundationat vaLues on which democracy 
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rests, he aLso perceives the opportunities opened up by clemocray as an 
institutLon. As he puts Lt: 
The same conditions that hasten the evolution of the herd 
animal also hasten the evolution of the Leader animal. (WP 
956)14-. 
How does this 'hastening' operate? In the context of modern mass 
democracy, Nietzsche suggests that the de_qeneration against which 
Christian asceticism acted manifests ItseLf again in the various forms of 
passive nihMsm. The herd aLLows itseLf to be dLscLpL! ned by externaL 
forces. This, Nietzsche argues, is no reason for discouragement, on the 
contrary: 
Whoever has preserved, and bred in himself, a strong will, 
together with an ample spirit, has more favourabLe 
opprtunities than ever. For the trainabLtLty of men has 
become very great in this democratic Europe; men who Learn 
easily and adapt themselves easily are the rule: the herd 
animal, even highly intelligent, has been prepared. Whoever 
can command finds those who must obey: I am thinking, e. g., 
of Napoleon and Bismarck. (WP 128). 
It is precLseLy the 'ever greater weakness of man' (WP 130) which provides 
the ever greater opportunity for the emergence of the Overman. One further 
comment is usefuL here; as regards the weak and the Overman, NLetzsche 
suggests: 
In a certain sense, the latter can maintain and develop 
himself most easily in a democratic society:. nameLy, when 
the coarser means of defence are no Longer necessary and 
habits of order, honesty, justice, and trust are part of the 
usuat conditions. (WP 887). 
It appears then that Nietzsche's attitude towards democracy is decLdedLy 
ambiguous. On the one hand, he objects to the universaLlsing thrust of the 
will-to-democracy and the values on which this will is grounded. On the 
other hand, as a poLLticaL institution Nietzsche sees democracy as 
providing optLmaL conditions for the emergence of the Overman. The task of 
evaLuatLng democracy (or any other dimension of modernity) can be seen to 
consist of two requirements: Ma geneaLogicaL tracing of the Lineage of 
its foundatLonaL vaLues (and a critique of these vaLues) and (U) an 
analysis of the conditions which the phenomenon opens up relative to the 
emergence of the Overman. 
The centrat issue that has been estabLLshed by Nietzsche's treatment of 
both poUticaL theories and poLLUcal institutions is that his revaLuation 
of the vaLues they embody is deveLoped from the perspective of the 
Overman. This figure functions as the criticaL device whereby Nietzsche 
develops his critique of values in terms of their 'value for Life'. As the 
great 'Yea-sayer', the Overman represents the highest point of the 
affirmation of Life, and as such it provides Nietzsche with a non- 
transcendentaL site from which to articulate his critical concerns. 
To conctude this section, Let us note the important areas covered. 
FLrstLy, modernLty represents, for NLetzsche, an ambLquous phenomenon. 
SecondLy, Nietzsche's value critique of sociat theorists operates from the 
perspective of the Overman. ThlrdLy, Nietzsche's concern with politicaL 
institutions operated on two LeveLs: a vaLue critique of the institution's 
foundationat vaLues and a practicat evaLuatlon of the possLbMtLes opened 
up by the institutLon for the development of the Overman. Finally the 
Overman functions in this politLcai dimension of Nietzsche's act VL y as a 
crLticaL sLte for the task of revaLuating vaLues. 
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ConcLusLon 
In this chapter, Lt has been shown that the potitics of the Overman are 
twofold. The first dimension Is the affirmatory politics of the self which 
is dLspLayed in Nietzsche's doctrine of EternaL Recurrence. This doctrine 
provides a formaL device whereby the indLviduai can overcome nihiLlsm and 
reinvest his Life with meaning and value without recourse to foundational, 
vatues. The second dimension is the critical politics of evaluating values, 
Here the Overman functions as a non-transcendental site for the critique 
of vaLues. Together these positive and negative dimensions constitute the 
poLitics of Nietzsche's philosophy: the diagnosis of modernity and the 
concern with the fate of the human subject. 
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NOTES 
1. For a variety of recent positions taken on the doctrine of EternaL 
Recurrence, cf - Strong FrederLch NLetzsche and the Po L it ics of 
TransfLquratlon (1975) pp260-295, Schacht N[etzsche (1983) pp2S3-266, 
Schutte Beyond NlhiLism (1984) pp66-75, Nehamas Nietzsche: LLfe as 
Literature (1985) ppl4l-169, DeLeuze Nietzsche and PhiLosophy (1983) pp47- 
49 and 68-72. 
2. Both these points are discussed welL in Nehamas op. cit. ppl43-148. 
3. Schacht himseLf does not regard SLmmePs objection as in-Itseff crucLaL, 
cf. Schacht op. cLt. pp263-266. 
4. This pyschoLogLcaL conception is particuLarly weLL discussed in Nehamas 
op. cit. ppl5l-154. 
5. It should be noted that the discussion of the Will to Power is not 
intended to ! LLuminate alL its aspects, merety those directly reLated to 
our concerns. For two fulL and usefuL discussions of this concept, cf. 
Strong op. cit. pp218-259 and Nehamas op. cit. pp74-105. 
6. Whether or not this paraLLeL between Nietzsche and Saussure opens 
Nietzsche up to the kind of deconstructive exercise that DerrLda performs 
on Saussure is an open question. From Derrida's comments on Nietzsche, 
most notabLy in Spurs: Nietzsche's StyLes (1979), it wouLd appear that 
Nietzsche's texts open themseLves up in a refLexive and deLLberate manner 
for Derrida. For discussions of Saussure by Derrida, cf. Of GrammatoLogy 
(1976) pp 27-73. 
7. Foucault makes a similar point in the essay 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History', cf. Reader pp87-88. 
8. Breeding is used by Nietzsche in detiberateLy poLemicaL fashion as a 
concept here. The terms 'rearing' and 'educating' come perhaps cLosest 
to 
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what Is Intended by this use of the idea of 'breeding'. 
9. The importance of Iresponslb! Lityl and lseff-disclpUne' is centraL to 
Weber and Foucault as well as Nietzsche, cf. chapter 5 and chapter 8 
respectivety. 
10. Nietzsche comments on this soclaL dimension of 'truthfutness' in WP 277 
and 278. 
11 - One might th ink that M1L L's defence of gen Lus in On Liberty wou Ld put 
him closer to Nietzsche. The presuppositions involved Mitt's philosophy 
however, appear to rute thLs out. 
12. Cf. GM 1 13. 
13. Cf. chapter 1, sections 1 and 2. An somewhat different but interesting 
conception is deveLoped by Haar in 'Nietzsche and MetaphysicaL Language' in 
ALLIson (ed. ) The New Nietzsche (1985) pp5-36. 
14. Here, yet again, is the ambiguous character of modernity for Nietzsche. 
- 115- 
Max Weber 
\ 
- 116- 
BETWEEN NIETZSCHE AW THE NEO-KANTIANS 
Reflect ions on Weber's Methodotqy 
Weber's 'methodoLogicaL' treatises spring uLtimatety from 
his awareness of this particuLar situation, that ' after a 
thousand years of aLLeýgedty or supposedLy excLusive 
orientation to the magnificent pathos of the Christian 
ethic, our eyes have become bLinded to it'. His essays 
emerge with an inner Logic from his recognition of the 
questionabLe character not mereLy of modern science and 
cuLture but of our present orientation to Life in generaL. 
- Karl Ldwith 
NevertheLess, by the road of reason, Weber reached a point 
which was not that different from that reached by another 
humanist, Nietzsche, who pursued the road of unreason. God, 
even Rickert's God, was dead now. History ceased to be a 
meanLngfuL process and became the scene of insolubLe vatue 
confLIcts. Man, confronted by the ethicaL meanLngLessness of 
the universe, found nothing Left but the wilL to power. 
- George Iggers 
Introduction 
In this chapter, Weber's methodoLogicaL considerations wILL be addressed. 
The quotations above by LbwLth and Iggers, though we may not entirely 
agree with them, raise the question of Weber's reLatLon to Nietzsche. 
ConsequentLy, Lt wLLL be argued here that an adequate conceptuaLisatLon of 
Weber's positLon requLres an examLnatLon of the NLetzschean themes and 
perspectives which pervade his work'. To facILLtate this anatysis, three 
areals, in particular, will come under scrutiny. Firstly, we will consider 
the Lssue of value, specifLcaRy Weber's formuLation of the fact-vaLue 
distInction. Secondly, that nature and status of ideal-types wILL be 
examined, notabLy in reLation to perspectivism. ThlrdLy, we shatt take up 
the conception of the subject that Weber depLoys. In discussion of each of 
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these issues, Nietzschean and neo-Kantlan eLements wM be counterposed to 
bring out the pecuLlar location occupied by Weber in his writings. FinaLLy, 
a short discussion of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of CapitaLism 
will be uttLised to indicate the initial features of Weber's concept of 
modernity. 
1. KnowledQe and Vatue 
The question of value occupies a central but ambiguous position in 
Weber's writings. In this section, the character of this ptace wilL be 
brought out through a consideration of the issue of value in relation to 
Nietzsche and Rickert. By the juxtaposition of these antithetical theorists, 
the ambiguity and tension that characterlses Weber's depLoyment of the 
term 'vaLue' wilL be contextuaLlsed and, thus, brought into focus. 
To begin, Let us briefly explore the importance of the issue of value 
for Nietzsche. The concern here wilt be, at Least initially, only with the 
relation of value and knowledge in Nietzsche's philosophy. A starting point 
for this discussion is immediately afforded by Nietzsche's genealogical 
concerns. In the essay "Good and Bad, " "Good and Evil", which has atready 
been exam ined 2, Nietzsche argues that our values are socially contingent 
historicaL constructions and in no way can we identify 'real' 
transcenclentaL vaLues. A given hierarchy of vatues, such as that operated 
by Christianity, is rooted in a particular perspective valuation of the 
wor Id. 
The imptications of this cLalm wILL emerge as we consider the doctrine 
of perspectivism which Nietzsche puts forward. It witt be recatled that 
'for Nietzsche, the whoLe epistemologicat enterprise is f lawed' (Strong 
1985 p165). Against the Kantian argument that 'the unity of the worLd is 
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derived from the unity of the archetectonics of the facuLty that makes 
knowing possibLe - from the nature of the seLf' (Strong 1985 pl7l), it is 
cLaimed that 'the unity of the known and the unity of the knower are 
derived from the activity of knowing' (Strong 1985 pl7l). In other words, 
our mode of knowing is productive of both us and the worLd. Given that, 
for Nietzsche, the act iv ity of knowing is aLways an activity of 
interpreting from a particutar perspective and that 'the vatue of the worLd 
ties in our interpretation' (WP 616) (and that, moreover, 'we cannot reject 
the possibility that it may include infinite interpretaticns' (GS 374))q it 
folLows that to speak of vaLue-free, objective knowLedge, to speak of a 
fact-vaLue distinction Is a nonsense for Nietzsche. As he has put it: 'facts 
are preciseiy what there is not, onLy interpretations' (WP 481). This is not 
to say that Nietzsche does not operate a notion of objectivity, merely that 
this Nietzschean objectivity is not vatue-free. The notion of objectivity 
depLoyed by Nietzsche must be: 
understood not as "contemptation without interest" (which is 
a nonsensicat absurdity), but as the abitity to control 
one' s Pro and Con and to dispose of thefr4 so that one knows 
how to empLoy a variety of perspectives and affective 
interpretations in the service of knowLedge. (GM 111 12). 
It wilt be recalled that the strong individual is one who coordinates his 
various perspectives into a coherent whoLe. For Nietzsche, it is this 
strong inclividuat who approaches objectivity through this coordination of 
perspec tves: 
There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective 
"knowing"; and the more affects we attow to speak about one 
thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe 
one thing, the more compLete wM our "concept" of this 
thing, our "objectivity, " be. (GM 111 12). 
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It should be noted that these perspectives are not reducible to eachother, 
they are 'different eyes'. Despite this notion of 'objectivity', the point 
rema ins that the very idea of vatue-free knowledge represents 'a 
nonsensical absurdity' for Nietzsche, 
Against this Nietzschean backdrop, Rickert's idea's seem more immediatety 
retated to our commonsense conception of Weber's methodotogy. For instance, 
Rickert's distinction between the natural and cultural sciences in terms of 
their respective interests: 
only a concept that is Likewise Logical can constitute the 
opposite of the logical concept of nature as the existence 
of things as far as it is determined according to universal 
Laws. But this, I believe, is the concept of history in the 
broadest format sense of the word, i. e., the concept of the 
nonrepeatable event in its particularity and individuality, 
which stands in format opposition to the concept of a 
universal Law. (Rickert 1962 p15) 
appears to be directly adopted by Weber in his methodological discussions, 
It is readity apparent in Science and History in which direction Rickert's 
discussion of vatues WILL proceed. For exampte, in discussing the 
objectivity of a given historical investigation Rickert claims that what 
guides selection of the data of history and thus ultimately determines the 
foundation of all historical concepts is values However, Rickert is 
sensitive to the potential problems raised by this formulation. He notes 
that a 'representation of events that makes reference to values is only 
valid for those who belong to the same culture' (Rickert 1962 p133) and 
further: 
if the objectivity of a representation of events that makes 
reference to values is always confined to a more or Less 
large circle of men with a common cultural background, it is 
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an historically limited objectivity. (Rickert 1962 p136). 
As a way of moving to a discussion of the notion of objective values 
which Rickert raises in order to resolve some of the problems he sees as 
associated with the historicalLy reLative nature of objectivity in the 
cutturat sciences, it is usefuL to note his commitment to the idea of 
social scientific activity as, in some sense, value-free even at this stage. 
Rickert's proposaL here is to distinguish between theoreticat vatues and 
practicat vatues, or in his terms, between a value-relation and a valuation 
The Latter of these implies a notion of vatue-judgement, while the former 
indicates oniy that a particuLar phenomenon is 'worth knowing'. For exampte, 
the socialist and the conservative make very different kinds of value- 
judgement in the poLiticai sphere, however they both hoLd that 'poLltics' as 
an area of human activity is worth knowing about, they have a value- 
reLation to potitics as a theoreticat vatue (cf. Aron 1970 p78). Rickert 
argues that insofar as it is logically possibLe for a socIaL scientific 
account to rest purely on theoretical values which are common to a 
particutar community, then this account is value-free in the sense of 
having empirical objectivity. That is being vaUd for aLL the members of 
the community whatever the differences they have on the levei of practicat 
vaLues. An integrat component of this is that if the account has universal 
vaLidity across a community, the account in itself cannot be utitised to 
justify one particular valuation as opposed to another. Rickert himself has 
expressed this ciuster of points as foLtows: 
Of course, our Line of thought can be convincing only if we 
keep in mind the difference between positive or negative 
valuation and the purely theoretical value relation that is 
completely independent of this alternative. This is why the 
objectivity of concept formation in history that is 
exclusively intended here should not be linked with that 
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sort of objectivity that, for example, is juxtaposed to the 
historical, representation that is "subjective" because it is 
governed by "confessional, " presuppositions. Representations 
of historical events written from different confessional 
standpoints wiLL never proceed in a purely theoretical, 
vaLue-retevant fashion. This is why they cannot in fact 
possess scientific objectivity. Suppose, however, that all 
vatue judgements are disregarded. Then, for exampLe, in a 
representation of the reality that is called "Luther, " the 
same aspects that are essential for Protestants must also be 
essential for CathoLics. (Rickert 1986 p200). 
This specification of the nature of the empirical objectivity of the social 
sciences stilt leaves open though the problem of the cultural relativity of 
this objectivity. Moreover, even if some theoreticaL vaLues appear to be 
common across cultures, it could still be claimed that: 
f rom a pure Iy scientlfc point of v1 ew, the ent i re 
development of humani, may be regarded as a completely 
indifferent and meaningLess chaos of individual events, the 
representation of which must be far inferior in scientific 
importance to the search for general Laws. In general, the 
relating of reality to values is always a matter of humakn 
caprice. The consensus of many or of all makes no 
difference. (Rickert 1986 p205). 
Thus, for Rickert, 'if historical science claims that its problem is a 
scientific necessity, it must assume that in the domain of value as welt, 
it is not only a question of the caprice of many or att persons. ' (Rickert 
1986 p205). This necessar! Ly impLies the mete-empirical ctatm that there 
must be: 
sorne vaLues that are unconditionally vatid and that alL 
human vaLue positions stand in a more or Less proximate 
relation to them that is defined as more than capricious. If 
this were not so, purety scientific history with a vatue- 
retevant, individuaLlsing concept formation couLd never be 
written. (Rickert 1986 p205). 
In other words: 
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We must, in fact, assumet if not the existence of an already 
definite body of knowledge of what values are valid, then 
the vatidity of objective values and the possibility that we 
can approach knowiede of it ever more cLosely. (Rickert 1962 
p 139). 
Rickert utiLlses RlehL on this point, arguing that: 
"unless he possesses an ideal to aspire to, man cannot 
achieve his full spiritual stature. " But the values that 
constitute this ideal "are discovered, and, Like the stars 
in the sky, with the progress of culture they gradually 
enter into man's f ietd of vision. They are not old values or 
new values; they are the values. (Rickert 1962 p145). 
In other words, the objectivity of the cuLturaL sciences is Legitimated by 
the claim that there are some values which exist which are objective 
vaLues. On this point Aron has noted that, for Rickert: 
there is at Least one value which ffust be admitted by any 
sc 1 ence, namely t rut h. This is sufficient t0 justify 
t heoret 1 ca LIyt he i dea of a un i versa Lt heory of va I ues, and 
therefore the possibility of a universal history. (Aron 1970 
p78). 
The possibitity of a universal history demands that there are certain 
values that are objectively valid for mankind. Truth would appear to be 
such a vatue in so far as, Rickert might argue, it is difficutt. to conceive 
of a culture for which truth would not be a value. 
It is cLear, at any rate, that Rickert's distinction between vatue 
relations and practl&at valuations, and his positing of the existence of 
objectively valid va lues, is radically at odds with Nietzsche's 
perspectLvist approach. Rickert was welt aware of this point: 
This [Nietzsche's) point of view is, if one wtil, indeed 
consistent. But its consistency destroys the objectivity of 
every science, that of the naturat sciences as weLt as of 
the culturat sciences ... The scientist is the very one who 
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must assume the absolute vaL! dlty of theoreticaL vatues if 
he does not wish to cease to be a scientist. (Rickert 1962 
p144). 
Given this antagonism between the the positions of Nietzsche and Rickert, 
an approach which draws on both is difficuLt to imagIne. Yet this Is 
preciseLy the position occupied by Weber. 
The question of Weber's formutation of the reLationship between soclaL 
scientific knowledge and values can begin with his rejection of Rickert's 
notion of discovering the values. As Rickert himself noted: 'Weber was 
convinced that there was no way theoretical research could deal with the 
question of the vatidity of vaLues. ' (Rickert 1988 p79). In contrast, Weber 
argues that there is an 'IrreconcitabLe confLict' between vaLues, in other 
words, 'poLytheism' (cf. FMW ppl47-149). In this at Least, Weber seems 
closer to Nietzsche than Rickert. 
This polytheism, though, operates on two distinct Levels. On the one 
hand, in the conflict of 'various Life-spherest each of which is governed 
by different Laws' TMW p123), potitics and science wouLd be exampLes of 
su ch L ife-spheres. On the other hand, in the c Lash of 'u Lt ! mate 
Weltanschauungen' (FMW p117), that is, the conftLct of our different vaLue- 
orientations towards LHO. It is with the introduction of this notion of a 
'Life-sphere', which may aLso be termed a value-sphere., that indicates 
Weber's attempt to avoid the totaL undermining of the status of scientific 
knowLedge which Rickert has Located in Nietzsche. How does this operate? 
The first point to note is that, for Weber, it is our vaiue-orientation 
which determines the issues and area's that the scientific researcher 
choses to address. However, once the particuLar site of the investigation 
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has been specified, it is on the basis not of the vatue-orlentation but, on 
the contrary, of the vaLues immanent in science as a vaLue-sphere, as a 
discrete way of Life, that scientific knowLedge is generated. To be a 
scientist, for Weber, presupposes a commitment to truth as a vaLue. In 
other words, it is truth as a YaLue immanent in science as a vaLue-sphere 
that enabLes us to takk of objectivity in the sociaL sciences. It is 
unclear, however, to what extent Weber conceives of the objectivity as 
being partial and historically contingent. A point that can be illustrated 
by reference to the tension exhibited in Weber's work retative to the issue 
of progress in science. 
Weber approaches this issue in Science as a Vocation by contrasting the 
position of science with the position of art: 
A work of art which is genuine 'fulfillment' is never 
surpassed; it will never be antiquated. Individuals my 
differ in appreciating the personal significance of works of 
art, but no one wi LL ever be ab Le to say of such a work that 
it is 'outstripped' by another work which is also 
'fulfillment'. 
In science, each of us knows that what he has accomplished 
will be antiquated in ten, twenty, fifty years. That is the 
fate to which science is subjected; it is the very ffeaning 
of scientific work, ... We cannot work without 
hoping that 
others will advance further than we have. In principle, this 
progress goes on ad infinitum (FMW p138). 
At Least two interpretations of this passage can be given. On the one 
hand, the notion of scientific progress which Weber is ascribing to here 
may be read as resembling the (more or Less) straightforward triumphal 
process traditionally assigned to the natural sciences. On this reading, 
progress in the social sciences would consist in the on-going refinement 
of methodological procedures and ideaL-types, the 'objectivity' of the 
soclaL sciences increasing concommitently with this progressive refinement 
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of scientific procedures. On the other hand, however, Weber may be read in 
terms of his rejection of 'the neo-kantian categorical objectivity' (Bruun 
1972 p138), that is, his rejection of the notion of 'objective values'. It is 
this move which, Bruun argues, enables Weber to lemphasise to a far 
greater extent the importance and positive rote of the personality of the 
scholar in the field of social science' (Bruun 1972p138). Yet it emerges 
from this move that it is precisely that white 'Weber's elaboration of the 
subjective point of view permits the scholar to Leave an imprint on an 
age, ' (Bruun 1972 p139) it necessarily 'compels him to acknowledge that his 
work will by necessity grow obsolete and unimportant' (Bruun 1972 p139). 
In others words, given that the personality of the social scientist, the 
values he holds and questions he asks, is relative to the particular period 
in which that scholar is working, it follows that with regard to another 
period in which these questions are no Longer seen as the important 
questions then the work of that scholar becomes 'obsolete and unimportant'. 
On this reading, the objectivity of a social scientific account is not 
historically contingent but inherent to the operation of science itself. 
While the notion of progress that Weber deploys becomes somewhat 
unorthodox here, this reading can be seen to fit into the pattern of his 
methodological reflections. Having illustrated this tension in Weber's work 
in relation to the notion of 'objectivity, the next step in the analysis of 
his position is to examine the nature of the claim for value-freedom that 
he makes. 
On this point, it is necessary to refer back to the distinction that 
Weber draws between vatue-orlentations and value-spheres. It seems here 
that there is an equation of va Lue-or ientat ions with practical valuations 
and of vaLue-spheres with theoretical values On one level, then, it would 
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appear that Weber is simpLy reformutating the distinction operated by 
Rickert. On another Level, thoughg the form of this reformulation is 
significant. The deptoyment of the notion of a vaLue-sphere can be seen in 
this context as Weber's attempt to hoid on to a conception of sociaL 
scientific knowledge as objective knowledge white rejecting Rickert's 
positing of objective vatues in favour of a Nietzschean poLytheism. The 
significant move here is Weber's rooting of the vaLue-sphere of science in 
the seLf of the scientist. In this sense, it is in science as a way of Life, 
as a set of setf-forming practices, that Weber grounds his ctaim for the 
objectivity of social scientific knowledge. The notion of a value-sphere, on 
this reading, cLosety resembLes the notion of perspective in Nietzsche's 
sense, or, to put it in other terms, a value-sphere embodies a style of' 
reasoning. Having noted this point, however, it must be yet again indicated 
that Weber draws a distinction between practicaL and theoreticaL vaLues, a 
move which distances him from Nietzsche who rejects any such distinction. 
At this point, we are in a position to explain Weber's formulation of the 
fact-vatue distinction. This disUnction operates, unsurprisingty, around 
Weber's divorcing of practicaL and theoreticat vaLues. WhUe it is the 
practical values of the researcher which determine the selection of the 
issues to be investigated, the site of the investigation, it is on the 
basis of the theoreticaL vatues immanent to the vatue-sphere of science 
that objective knowledge is generated. The construction of 'facts' is 
resultant upon the theoreticaL values involved in the scientific method 
being depLoyed retative to a given probLem seLected on the basis of the 
practical values of the social scientist. Weber's fact-vaLue distinction can 
thus be reformulated as the claim that theoretical values cannot be 
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UL sed to Legitimate practical values. The status of this distinction will 
be Lef t, for the moment, suspended. 
In this section, it has been Mustrated that Weber draws on and 
transforms etements from both Rickert and Nietzsche. This path is by no 
means without hazard, as was pointed out by reference to the ambiguity 
that characterises Weber's conception of 'objectivity' as regards the soclat 
sciences. However, it is clear that, on the issue of knowledge and values 
at least, Weber is attempting to retain both Rickert's notion of vaLue-free 
objectivity wh! Le abandoning Rickert's idea of object lve va Lues and 
Nietzsche's polytheism without denying the distinction between practical 
and theoreticat vaLues. The extent to which this interweaving of 
Nietzschean and neo-Kantlan threads goes on wILL become ctearer as we 
move to examine Weber's notion of an ideal-type and his conception of 
subject 1vit 
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2. ldeaL-Types 
In this section, Weber's conception of an ideaL-type and of ideaL-typicaL 
anaLyses wiLL be examined. It has aLready been noted that Weber's notion of 
a vaLue-sphere may be linked to Nietzsche's doctrine of perspectivism and 
this issue wilt be taken up in more cletaiL here. Weber's conception of 
reality will also be taken up in this context. The delineation of these 
issues and reLationships shoutd take us a step further in the Location of 
the Nietzschean Lnput Lnto Weber's methodoLogicaL procedures. 
WoLfgang Mommsen has described Weber's hLstorlographicaL standpoint as a 
'perspectivisticalLy empLoyed neo-Kantianism which went radically beyond 
Rickert' ýMommsen 1983 Ln HennLs 1988 p239). However, as Hennis notes, 
Mommsen fails to relate thLs conception of Weber's methodology to the 
Nietzschean inf Luence on Weber's thought and thus does not raise the 
question of whether this standpoint can be meaningfuLLy catogorLsed as 
Ineo-KantLan'. To begin the analysis of this question, it is useful to take 
I up the ýssue ot Weber's conception of' r, eality. 
In an examination of the retatLonship between Weber and Rickert, Bruun 
has argued that: 
Just Like Rickert, Weber concludes from the view of reality 
as boundless that a scientific reproduction of the whole of 
reality Ls a practical, indeed a Logical, impossibility. 
(Bruun plOO). 
The impilcation of this is that: 
a scientif [c discipt [ne is never justIf ied in cLaiming that 
its concepts reproduce reaLLty, but onLy that they represent 
a selection from reality. (Bruun p100). 
However, Weber takes a further step reLative to this conception of reatity 
which moves him away from Rickert and 
in the direction of Nietzsche. This 
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emerges in the cLalm that, for Weber: 
the idea of the inexhaustabLLLty of reaLLty in Its LrrcnedLate 
aspect impLies the existence of an equaL, or perhaps even 
greater, infinity of potentlat causaL expLanatLons; (Bruun 
1972 p98). 
Two significant points emerge from this notion of infinite expLanations. 
FirstLy, a Link with Nietzsche, for whom there were aLso no HmLts to the 
ways in which the worLd can be interpreted. SecondLy, a 'weak' notion of 
causaLity which distinguishes him from Nietzsche (who rejected the concept I 
of causatity (WP 551)). This conception of causaLity operated by Weber is 
tweak' since the idea of an 'infinity of potentlaL causaL expLanations' 
wouLd LmpLy that there might be equaLty vaLld yet contradictory causaL 
expLanations. It seems here that Weber is caught between the acceptance of 
a Nietzschean standpoLnt as to the Lnf! nLte number of ways the world may 
be interpreted and the desire to hoLd onto a concept of causaLLty, that is, 
to affirm a neo-Kantlan conception of interpretative adequacy as taking 
the form of explanation. 
A further tensLon between the Nietzschean and neo-KantLan threads 
permeating Weber's conception of reaLlty emerges in reLation to the 
question of whether or not he depLoys a distInction between 'reaL' and 
'apparent' worids in his methodoLogLcaL argument. To take up this point it 
is necessary to examine his conceptIon of the ideal-type. 
In the essay 'Objectivity in Social Science and Social PoLLcy', Weber sets 
out the integraL features of an LdeaL-type. It is worth quoting at Length 
in this instance: 
It offers us an LdeaL picture of events. --. This conceptual 
pattern brings together certain reLationships and events of 
historical Life into a complex, which is conceived as an 
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LntenaL Ly consistent system. Substantively, this construct 
Ls in Itself Like a utopia which has been arrýved at by the 
analytLcal accentuation o-ý certain elements of real ity. Its 
reLationshLp to empirical data consists solely in the fact 
that ... we can make the characteristic featuresof this 
reLationshLp pragmatically clear and understandable by 
reference to an ideaL-type. This procedure is indispensable 
for heuristic as well as expository purposes. The i dea I- 
typical concept wLLL help to develop our skill in imputation 
ýn research: it is no "hypothesis" but it offers guidance to 
the construction of hypotheses. It is not a description of 
reality but aims to give unambigous means of expression to 
such a description. ... An ideaL-type Ls formed by the one- 
sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the 
synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or Less 
present and occasionally absent concrete individual 
phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sideLy 
emphasLsed viewpoints into a unified analytical construct. 
In its conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be 
found anywhere in reality. lt is a utopia. Historýcal 
research faces the task of determLnLng in each individual 
case the extent to which this i-dea L -construct approximates 
to or diverges from reality, (MSS p90 ). 
WhLLe, this passage raises a wide range of issues, however, onty certain of 
triem are reLevant to our concerns. FirstLy, the Issue of 'comparLng' an 
ideaL-type to reaLLty. SecondLy, the concept of reaLity referred to here. 
FinaLLy, the extent to which the paraLLeL between LdeaL-typicaL anaLyses 
and perspectLvism may be meanýngfu[Ly mooted. 
Concepts, for Weber, are necessarLty partiat and seLective in their 
representation of reaLLty. An ideaL-type as a LogicaL compLex of concepts 
not onLy shares thLs partiatity but, through a deLlberateLy utopian 
accentuation of this conceptuaL seLectLvity, extends it to the point that 
it cannot be catagorLsed as a description of reality. This raLses the 
question as to the point at which a conceptuaL compLex ceases to be a 
descr[ptLon and becomes an LdeaL-type. For Weber, Lt wouLd appear to be 
the case that what distinguishes an ideat-type from a description is its 
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r-efer-ence. Whereas a straightforward conceptuaL compLex refers to reaLLty, 
an idea[-type refers to a utopia which is found nowhere in reatity. What 
, 1, L. hen c)f the notLon of comparLnq an ideaL-type wLth reaLLty. -' The probLem 
that emerges here is in Weber's statement that it is through an ideaL- 
type, . Use Lf not a clescr lpt Lon, that we g Ive 'express Lon to such a 
description. ' (MSS p90). Yet if our conceptuaL description is generated by 
an ideat-type, it is difficuLt to see how we can determine 'the extent to 
whých this ideaL-construct approxLmates to or diverges from reality' except 
by reference to other ideaL-type--. To put this simpLy, if an LdeaL-type 
produces our description of reaLLty, it cannot be compared to this reality 
other than by recourse to other ideaL-typically created descriptions of 
reaLLty which are invoLved ýn the same probLematic. This point was 
recognLsed by Landshut who: 
sees Ln the artLfLciaLLtv of this construction an 
abandonment. of Weber's own LnveStLqatLve aim to attain a 
knowLedge of reaLLty in its own meaning - 'a Lack of 
reLat ion between vaLue orLentatLon and reaL Lty' based more 
generaL ly on an erroneous 'disjunction between humanity and 
the worLd'. (LowLth 1982 p62). 
What emerges here Is the, Perhaps unwLttLngty, perspect[vist aspect of 
Weber's theory of ideall. -types. It w'LLL be recaLLed that NLetzsche Put tMs 
po int in the foLLowing way: 'The perspect[ve therefore decLdes the 
character of the "appearance"" (WP 567). Correspond Lng Ly, L6w[th has noted 
that 'the basLc phLtosophicaL character of ... [the ldeaL-typel LLes in the 
fact that Lt Lays open reaLity whLLe at the same time constructing Lt. ' 
(Lbw ith 1982 p62), a po Lnt which wou Ld appear to indicate the 
perspectivist. character of the ideal-type as a methodoLogicat device4. 
However, NLet--Sche qoc-s on to state, IA-c if any world would remaLn over 
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after one deducted the perspectLve! ' (WP 567). It is not cLear whether 
Weber wouLd make this further step. For whLLe Weber embraced the necessity 
C) f Looking at reaL'Lty through a variety of IdeaL-types (and in this 
dLmenslon hLs procedure may readLLy be reLated to NLetzsche's statement: 
'Task: to see thLngs as they are. Means: to took on them from a hundred 
eyes, from many persons. ' (in Strong 1985 p172)), he aLso stated that 
nothLng: 
is more dangerous than the confusion of theory and history 
stemming f rom naturalistic prejudices. Th'L s confusLon 
expresses itself fir st Ly tn the belief that the "true" 
content and essence of historical reality is portrayed in 
such theoretical constructs, or secondly, in the use of 
these constructs as a procrustean bed into which history is 
to be forced or thLrdty, in the hypostatization of such 
"ideas" as real "forces" and as a reality which "true" 
operates behind the passage of events and which works itseLf 
out in hLstory. (MSS p94). 
WhiLe directed at crude versions of Marxism, this statement does seem to 
ImpLy that Weber wants to draw a dLstlnction between idea I-typLca L ty 
generated descriptLons of reaLity and reaLlty ýtsetf. ThLs apparent probLem 
may be ascribabte to the structure of Language, the 'unconscious 
dominatLon' of grammaticaL categories. After aLL, it wLIL be recaLLed that 
Nietzsche simiLarLy often taLks as if there were a worLd separate from the 
interpretatLons of it, for exampLe, 'Ln the statement: 'the vatue of the 
worLd Lies in our interpretation' (WP 616). Supporting this version of 
Weber Ls Bruun's comment that there 'seems no doubt that Weber's 
discussions atways reLate to reaLLty in its perceivable aspect. ' (Bruun 
19 72 pl 41 ). To c Lar If y th is issue, it is usef uL to take up the idea that 
there may be two more or less dLstinct leveLs of perspectivism beLng 
operated by Weber. 
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It was noted in the previous section that Weber's notion of a vaLue- 
sphere can be seen as corresponding to Nietzsche's conception of a 
perspect[ve. Each invoLves a vaLuatLon of the worLd Ln terms of a 
comm Ltment to a set of uit imate idea Ls. The s Lqn H Lcant f eature which 
dLstLnguLshes these two conceptions is that whLLe for Nietzsche this 
valuation is always a practical one, for Weber it is a valuation in terms 
of a commitment to a set of theoretical vatues. And it is the distinction 
Weber makes between practical and theoreticaL vatues which aLLows him to 
introduce two LeveLs of perspectivLsm into his argument. We can expLore 
this with regard to Weber's conception of the seLf and the activity of the 
sociaL scientist. 
The theoreticaL perspective of the scientist invoLves, for Weber, a 
commItment to truth as the uttLmate LdeaL. The objectivity of the soc[aL 
sc lent if ic account is grounded on th is wLLL to truth. As L6w ith notes that 
IthLs reduction of scientific truth to linteLlectuaL integrity' corresponds 
4- Z to NLP-L,.:. --che'-- reductLon of Truth in toto to 'honesty' as the 'uLtimate 
vLrtue' of 'f ree, seLf-possessed' M'Lnd--. ' (L6w! th 1982 p67). From the 
theoreticaL perspectLve of the socýaL scLentLst, the 'objectivLty' of an 
account is generated on the basis of the integrity of the socLat scientist 
towards himseLf as a socLaL scientLst. However, withLn the framework L)f 
this theoreticaL scientific perspective, there operates a second form of 
perspectivism whLch reLates to the practicaL vaLues heLd by individuaL 
schoLars. It is these pract[cat vaLues which for Weber determine the issues 
whIch the schoLar takes up and, consequentLy, the ideaL-types which a qLven 
sociaL scientist constructs. If this exposition is referred back to the 
Nietzsche quote utitised above (p123), it becomes possibLe to see this two- 
tier perspect! vLsm more cLearLy. Nietzsche's position was that: 
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The perspectLve therefore decides the character of the 
"appearance"! As if a worLd wouLd st iLt remain over after 
one deducted the perspective! (WP 567). 
IIf we beg in w ith the LdeaL-type, 
. 
this impLies that the practical 
perspective 'decides the character of the "appearance"' but that a worLd is 
stILL there if one removes a practicaL perspective, nameLy the reaLity 
which is generated out of the scientist's theoretical perspective. However, 
if the theoreticaL perspective is removed, then there is no worLd Left over 
in Nietzsche's sense. In practice, of course, the theoreticaL perspective 
of the sociaL scientist onty comes Lnto pLay in the activity of research, 
of constructing ideal-types. The distinction between theoreticaL and 
practicaL LeveLs of perspectivism Ls an anatytic rather than empiricat 
distinction. To estabLish the points put forward concerning theoreticat 
perspectivism, and thus in effect our argument, requLres that Weber's 
account of subjectivity resembLes Metzsche's. To put this negativety, if 
Weberis account of the subject posits our subjectLvity as in some sense 
given and transcendentaL, it wouLd foLLow that the cLaLm being made here 
(that Weber operates a form of perspectMsm) cannot be sustained. After 
aLL, the appearance- rea i ity distLnctLon, which ýs rejected by Weber, is 
itseLf pred; Lcated on a notion of transcendentaL subjectivity (as ou r 
discussion of Nietzsche established). Before we move onto this account 
however, it witL be usefuL to sum up the sLgnfLcant points put forward in 
this section. 
We began by noting that Weber's notion of reality as susceptible to 
inf in lte causa I accounts puLLs in both NLetzschean and neo-Kantian 
directions. It was then considered whether such a tension characterLses 
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Weber's theory of ideaL-types partLcuLarLy in terms of whether or not he 
operates a distinction between 'rea LI and 'apparent' worLds. It was 
LndLcated that there is a slippage in the notion of comparLng LdeaL-t. - ypes 
and reality which blurs the distinction between appearance and reality. In 
contrast to this it appeared that Weber did intend to operate such a 
distinction. To clarify this apparent antLnomy, it was suggested that we 
can identify a two-tier version of perspectLvLsm at work in Weber's 
methodoLogy which is structured about his retention of the neo-Kantlan 
dLstLnct*Lon between practicaL and theoreticaL vaLues. FinaLLy, it was noted 
that the force of this suggestion is dependent on the nature of Weber's 
account of the subject. 
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3. SubjectMty and CaLLLnq 
In this section, Weber's conception of the subject wLtt be examined. 
Centrat to this an anaLysis wilL be a i[LustratLon of the Nietzschean formý 
of this aspect of Weber's work. At the same time, the points at which 
Weber d1stances hLmseLf from a purety Nletzschean account wiL[ be 
indicated, as weLL as the significance of such moves in terms of the 
reasons under[yLng them. 
A useti-A starting pLace for this discussion is to consider Weber's 
ontolo_qical politics5, Thts dimensýon of Weber's thought ýs set out cLearLy 
in the foLLowing passage: 
so Long as L ife remains immanent and is interpreted in its 
own terms, it knows only an unceasing struggle of ... gods 
wLth one another. Or speaking directly, the ultimately 
possLbLe attitudes towards life are LrreconcitabLe, and 
hence t he'L r struggle can never be brought to a final 
concLusion. Thus it is necessary to make a decisive choice. 
(FMW p152). 
i- T--t ý has been seen to Th. -- cition f--)t'- thie necessLty of mak[ng a ldecLsýve choLce 
illustrate Weber's debt to the neo-Kantian Legal phýLosopher Radbruch. It 
had been proctaýmed by Radbruch that a phLLosophy of Law appropýate to 
modernity: 
mus t CIO J USt 'L ce to the paradoxLes, ant-inomLes and 
reLativities of Life. It must be ant[nomic, that is to say, 
it must not cloud the irremovable contradictions between the 
highest LegaL values, such as justice, expediency, legal 
security; on the contrary it must fearlessly state them as 
such. it must be relativistic, ... it must present the 
various conflicting concepts of Law and Life ... without 
one-sidedly identifying it with one or the other. And it 
must be decisionistic ... it must vigorously appeal to 
responsible decision of the individual's Legislation between 
such antinomies and reLatLvitles. (Turner and Factor 1984 
p3l). 
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Or, more succinctLy: 11 have no fear of irreconCLLabLe antLnomies, to decide 
oneself is to Live!, (Turner and Factor 1984 p3l). This decLsionistLc: 
perspectLve paraLLeLs Weber's insLst6nce that: 
FLquratLveLy speaking, you serve this god and offend the 
other god when you adhere to this position. And Lf you 
remain falthfuL to yourseLf, you wLLL necessariLy come to 
certain finaL concLusions that subjectIveLy make sense. (FMW 
P151). 
However, Weber's Language at times suggests that it is not so much that 
ý:, ne makes a choice but that one adheres to the daemon aLready within one. 
The foLLowLng -statement by Weber LLLustrates this point: 
We shaL L set out to work and meet the I demands of the day' , 
Ln human retations as welL as in our vocation. This, 
however, is pLain and siýmple, if each f inds and obeys the 
demon who ho L ds t he fi ber s of his very Iife. (FMW pl 56). 
Thts , --ýropo--ItLon would appear to indicate that there is a true seLf which 
the subject must seek to dLscover. As such, it represents a contrast with 
the seLf-constructive positýon of declsýonLsm. It wouLd appear then that 
there ýs something of a tension operating in Weber's conception of the 
subject between a seLf that is created and one that is discovered. 
It is this very tension though whLch Lndýcates Weber's commitment to an 
-a ti Past partlaLLY NLet--schean conception of subjectIvity, 
for Lt Ls 
Lsomor. phic with the apparent antLnomy in NLetzsche's injunction: 'You must 
become who you are [my ita L ics3. ' (in Nehamas 1985 pl 71 ). The surface 
clifficuLties of such a positLon have been sketched out by Nehamas: 
It seems, t hen, that the seLf, even 1t 
point discovered, must f irst be created. 
faced with the diffLCU[t probLem of seeing 
be what one is before it comes into being 
is itseLf something that is. ConverseLy, 
something that is, if it is what one aLrE 
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is to be at some 
We are therefore 
how that seLf can 
itsetf, before it 
if that seLf is 
ýady Ls, how is it 
POSS'LbLe- to become that self-e How couLrj, and why should, that 
seLf be what one property is and not some, or any, other? 
Why not, in particular, one' s current seff, whtch at Least 
has over at L others the signif icant advantage of existing? 
(Nehamas 1985 ppl74/175). 
Without going into the cletaLL of Nehamas's argument, it is usefuL to sketch 
out the saLlent features of the interpretive soLution that he offers, ThLs 
re--oLution revoLves about the assertion that this conception of the subject 
may be read as anatogous to the modeL of a LLterary text. To itLustrate 
this, Nehamas depLoys the exampLe of Proust's narrator, who: 
beLieves. "that in fashioning a work of art we are by no 
means free, that we do not choose how we sha kL make it but 
that it pre-exists and therefore we are obLiged, sLnce it is 
both necessary and hidden, to do what we shoutd have to do 
if it were a Law of nature, that is to say to dLscover it. " 
Yet this discovery, whIch he expLicitty describes as "the 
di scovery of our t rue Life, can be made of In the ver y 
process of creating the work of art which describes and 
constitutes it. And the amb'Lguous retation between discovery 
and creatLon ... aLso captures perfectLy the tension in the 
ve? -y Idea of beLnq abLe to become -who one actuatLy I--. 
(Nehamas 1985 D188). 
The Weberlan subject, LLke the NiLetzschean subject, ts invoived ýn an 
ongoing process of seLf-creatýon and seff-discovery. However, this format 
simýLarLty between Nietzsche's and Weber's position shouLd not bLind us to 
the exLstance of sigi-fLcant differences atso. ThýS Lssue can be examined by 
reterence to Nýetzzschels notLons of style and virtue. 
It w! LL be recaLLed that, for Nietzsche: 
One thing is needful. - To "give style" to one' s character - 
a great and rare art! ... In the end, when 
the work is 
finished, it becomes evident how the constraint of a single 
taste governed and formed everything Large and smaLL. 
Whether this taste was good or bad is Less important than 
one might suppose, if onLy it was a single taste! (GS 
290). 
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For Nietzsche, the strong LndividuaL makes his Life into a work of art. 
This task is by no means straightforward since with regard to the various 
selves constitutive of the LndLvLdual, Nietzsche notes: 'each one has its 
perspective that it wouLd Like to compeL aLL the other(s) ... to accept as a 
norm. ' (WP 481). Nietzsche is making a reLated point when he states: 
My brother, if you are Lucky you will have only one virtue 
and no more: thus you wilt go more eas! Ly over the bridge. 
To have many virtues is to be distinguished, but it is a 
hard fate; and many a man has gone into the desert and 
killed himself because he was tired of being a battle and 
battleground of virtues. 
BehoLd how each of your virtues desires the highest pLace: 
it wants your entire spirit, that your spirit may be its 
heraLd, it wants your entire strength in anger, hate and 
Love. (Z Of Joys and Passions p64). 
It Is this notion of 'one virtue' which distinguishes Weber from Nietzsche; 
a cLaim that can be cLarlfLed by noting their respective attitudes to 
Goethe. 
For Nietzsche, Goethe represents a first approximation to the Overman. 
Goethe attempted, on this reading, to form his Life into a work of art: 
'What he aspired to was totality, he strove against the separation of 
reason, sensuality, feeling, will ... he disciplined himself to a whole, he 
created himseLf' (TI 49). In other words, Goethe imposed an order on his 
various confLLcting virtues and gave his character a coherent styListLc 
identity. He provided an aesthetic justification for his Life. Weber's 
portrayaL of Goethe LnvoLves a significant diffe4nce. He argues: 
As far as his art is concerned, even with a personatity of 
Goethe's rank, it has been detrimental to take the Liberty 
of trying to make his ' life' into a work of art. And even if 
one doubts this, one has to be a Goethe in order to permit 
oneself such Liberty. Everyone will admit at Least this 
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much: that even with a man L ike Goethe, who appears once in 
a thousand years, this Liberty did not go unpaid for. (FMW 
pl 37). 
WhLLe Weber does not here entireLy reject Nletzsche's conceptLon of tr)e 
Overman and the aesthetic justifLcatLon of life, it does seem that he wants 
to distance himseLf from this conception. We can take up this distancing 
act through Weber's notLon of a caLLLng. W Uh regard to the 
conceptuaLL-mation of Goethe just quoted, the centraL issue for our concern 
invDLves the phrase 'As far as hLs art was concerned, ', What Weber Ls doinq 
here is arguing for the priority of Goethe as an creative artist over 
Goethe as himseLf a work of art. For Weber, Goethe's caLLLng, his vocation, 
was to be an artist. To try to make one's own Life into a work of art 
represents, for Weber, a probLem insofar as it invoLves the attempt to 
engage with severaL ca LL ings. In Nietzsche's terms, it represents an 
acknowLedgement and co-ordinatLon of various 'virtues', whereas Weber 
appearss to cLaLm that one virtue is centrat in a given Lnd"LvLduat and that 
-ernipt to integratel any tothers wLth this one Ls to its detrLment. We 
can express this abstractLy as foLLows: for Nietzsche, one's caLLLnq . LS 
towards the totaLLty of one's Life, forming one's personality into an 
aesthetic whoLe, this work of art justifying one's existence; In contrast, 
for Weber, one's Life is justified by a commitment to a given caLLing (such 
as art or science or politics), the totality of one's Life should be 
addressed to this caLting and not vice versa. In effect, Weber is engaged 
in what WoLin has catled a foundationaL operation which attempts to 
LegLsLate the form of modern man as exLst&nce about a caLLln 96 . This 
ex-mr-clse iS qLven a parttcuLar resonance by the integrity with which 
Weber 
attempted to foLLow the scientific caLLLng 
despite the confLict with the 
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politicaL dimension of his personaHty which this excLusory operation 
engendered. 
To concLude th;, - - section, it is usefuL to summar[se the points that have 
been indicated. It was shown firstLy that Weber's conceptLon the subject is 
formaLLy SLMUar to that deptoyed by Nietzsche in terms of articulating a 
conception in which a perpetuat retationship between creation and discovery 
is pLayed out. It is worth noting here that Weber's concept of reatity 
operates around an identLcaL notion of creation and discovery; we neea 
merely recaLL 1-6with's comment that the philosophical, character of the 
ideaL-type 'Lies in the fact that it Lays open reaLity whLLe at the same 
time constructing it, ' (L6with 1982 p62). Having established this, it was 
LItustrated how Weber distinguishes his position from Nietzsche's Ln terms 
of advocati-nq the prýorLty of the caLLLng of the subject, the vatue-sphere 
they are committed to, over the totaLity of the subject as aesthetic 
construct. This positLon Ls, in its rejection of a transcendentat mocleL of 
subjectivity, perfectLy compat ib Le with the two-tier version of 
perspectivism which was ascribed to Weber in the Last section. Indeed, the 
(3ýsti-nction drawn here between Weber's conception of the subject and 
NLetzsche's paraLleLs the distinction between their respectýve forms of 
perspectivLsm ýn that it is preciseLy in the notion of a caLL[ng that Weber 
articuLates his notion of a vaLue-sphere as consisting of the affirmation 
of a given set of theoretLcaL vatues. Having deveLoped the argument to 
this stage, it is necessary that we move to an examination now of the 
issue of whether Weber's form of argument in his substantive work can be 
meaningfutLy described as genealogicaL in nature. 
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4.. Genea Logy 
The question as to whether Weber's style of analysis is genealogical, in 
character demands a series of responses. We must take up again his 
relation to values as well as the formal features of his substantive work. 
The issue of whether Weber structures his anaLyses around a concern with 
human types wiLL aLso need examination. SimLLarLy, the question of origins 
must be raised. OnLy once having indicated Weber's position with regard to 
each of these issues wILL it be possLbLe to pLace Weber's form of anaLysLs 
in its reLatLon to the concept of geneaLogy. 
A usefuL starting point for this discussion is the recent 
character isat ion of Nietzsche's geneatogicaL enterprise by FoucauLt. In 
'Nietzsche, GeneaLogy, History', Foucauft points out that a significant trait 
of geneaLogy is its 'affirmation of knowLedge as perspective' (Reader p92), 
he goes on: 
Historians take unusual pains to erase the elements in their 
work which reveal their grounding in a particular time and 
place, their preferences in a controversy - the unavoidabLe 
obstncLes of their passion. Nietzsche's version of 
historical sense is explicit in it's perspective and 
acknowledges its system of injustice. (Reader p92). 
This 'MstoricaL sense' paraLLeLs Weber's on at Least two Levets. FirstLy, 
the acknowLedgement of perspective is explicLtLy drawn out by Weber. Thus 
in referring to his studies on the 'Economic Ethics of the WorLd ReLigions', 
he po[nts out that 'they quite deliberately emphasise the elements Ln 
which it differs from Western civMsatLon' (PESC p27 ). Weber's position is 
distinguished from Nietzsche's however in that, given the grounding of 
Weber's accounts on theoretical values, he refuses to commit himself to 
the task of evatuating the vaLue of vatues. It is worth notLng that Weber's 
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decLaration of this refusaL in the 'Author's Introduction' to The Protestant 
Ethic and the SpLrit of CapitaLLsm is cLoseLy folLowed with what couLd 
easiLy stand as a reference to NLetzsche. Thus: 
The question of the reLative vaLues of the cuLtures which 
are compared here wILL not receive a singLe word. It is true 
that the path of human destiny cannot but appaLL him who 
surveys a section of Lt. But hewLLL do weLL to keep his 
sma LL DersonaL commentaries to himself, uniess he knows 
himseLf to be caLLed and gifted to give them expression In 
artistic or prophetic form. (PESC p29). 
With regard to the second LeveL of simLtarlty, it is cLear that, for Weber, 
the social scientists must necessar! Ly acknowledge 'their grounding in a 
particuLar time and pLace, ' since the practicaL vaLues which orientate them 
towards the construct Lon of spec if ic idea L-types, the quest Lons they ask, 
are themseLves spat lo-tempora L Ly dependent. This point can be iLLustrated 
by the foLLowing passage: 
n in the f1 a tLme of specLaLisation, aLL work eLd ot 
cuLturaL science wiLl regard the materLaL as an end in 
LtseLf, once the materiaL has been defined by a specific 
probLematic and some methodoLogical principLes have been set 
up. One then no Longer constantLy and deLiberatety measures 
the cognitive vaLue of discrete facts and fLndLngs against 
uLtimate vaLue assumptions: indeed, one aLtogether ceases to 
be conscious that these f acts are anchored in vaLue 
assumptions. And it is a good thing that this is so. But at 
a certain point a different perspective enters: the 
meanLngfutness of unreftectiveLy appLied perspectives 
becomes uncertain, and the way is Lost in the duSk, The 
Light of the great culturaL probLems aLso moves on. Then 
science too prepares to change its standpoint and 
its 
conceptuaL apparatus and to Look down from 
the heights of 
thought towards the stream of events. (MSS p112 in LowLth 
1982 p35). 
The significant Part of Weber's remarks is the 
indication that concommitant 
with a change in our Weltanschauungen 
there is a shift in what Constitute 
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the 'great cuLturaL probLems'. Thus the perspectives embodied in our idea[- 
typicaL constructions, and these constructions themsetves, become obsoLete 
in the sense of that they no Longer address the ',. s--, --ues WhIch concern us. 
The historicity of the historian is, for Weber, an LnevitabLe part of the 
structure of hLstorLcaL knowLedge. 
Having established two dimensions of the similarity of Weber's style of 
anaLysis and that embodied in the concept of geneaLogy, the issues of 
ori_qins and human types may Leg! tLmateLy be raised, The question of 
origins may be deatt with briefty in that it shouLo be readiLy apparent 
from Weber's generaL methodoLogicaL stance that his anaLyses are not 
concerned with unearthing any lprimaL source'. After aLL, it is precLseLy 
the unL-causaL ctaim made by Marxism for the mode of production as the 
central generating mechan 
iSM7 
of socLaL and hLstoricaL change that Weber 
objects to. Marx's anatysis of the roLe of the 'economic base' for the 
emergence of cap[tatism represents, for Weber, a rich and frultfuL ideaL- 
type not a total expLanation. One of the aims of Weber's work on the 
Prot-e-stant ethic was specificaLLy to L[Lustrate that severaL oriqins may be 
identLfied for capitaLi, sm, that is, that as a phenomenon capitaLlsm has 
severaL --ra'AS which must be indicated. Whereas Marx was concerned with 
'he dynamLcs of the tnterreLatLonshLp between the forces and reLations, of 
produCtLon as artticuLat-ed Ln cLas-s struggLe, Weber's Lnterest Lay Ln: 
what manner (Ri ch t un_q) t he spec ific re Ii9i ous f orms of t he 
diverse ascetic tendencies of Protestantism ... have 
influenced the conduct of life, there, where such influence 
in fact existed. ... 
The cLarificatLon of the 'characterological' effects of 
specLf Lc forms of piety, insofar as such effects are here 
relevant. ... 
the rise of the ethical Lebenssti I spiritual Ly adequate to 
the economic stage of capita L ism and which si_qni F1 es i ts 
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tt-iumph in the "souls" of men (Weber 1978 in HennLs 1983 
pl 43). 
This reference to 'the "souls" of' men' is significant in that it indicates 
Weber's concern with human types. The discussion of this aspect of Weber's 
form of argumentation witL draw on the recent reLnterpretatýon of Weber 
offered by HennLs'5, it is usefuL to start though by indicating how this 
concern has been characterLsed within the more orthodox tradition of Weber 
schotarship. Wrong presents us with a good -starting point here. He argues 
-1 , -hat there 
is: 
a tendency in Weber' s thought to see a system of cuLturat 
values or an institutionaL structure as embodied in a 
concrete human type. Thus Weber stresses the Calvinist 
rather than Calvinism: ascetic Protestantism 'Ls carried by a 
type of man who fears God, drives hLmseLf at work and denies 
himself all materiaL and sensual pleasures. (Wrong 1970 
p2135 ). 
I This represents, for Wrong, a fLaw in Weber's styLe of anaLysis. He goes on 
to a-uq gest that if Weber: 
had possessed an adequate theory of personality, he mýght 
have avoided this tendency to overconcretize cultural values 
and social roles. He might have recognLsed that values and 
roles do not completely shape their carriers even though 
they exist only in subjective attitudes of Liveing men. 
(Wrong 1970 p23/24). 
i 
in other words, Just as Metzsche's anaLysýs of the emergence of nihiUsm 
is structured about a concern with the human types invoLved in this 
emergence, so too Weber presents his anatysis of the emergence of 
cap ita L is-m in an account bu L Lt around the f igure of the Ca tv Ln 
ist. However, 
Weber's concentration on the issue of human, types expresses much more 
for 
Hennis than a methodologicaL fLaw, it Indicates Weber's lcentraL questioni. 
This centrat questions concerns nothing Less 'than the estabLishment of 
the 
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genesLs of modern man - no! Menschentum - vLa a MstorkaL-differentlal 
investigation! ' (Hennis 1983 p156). Without entering the detaLL of HennLs's 
argument, this interpretation can be backed up by reference to the 
foLiowing passage which HennLs quotes: 
Without exception every order of social relations (however 
constituted) is, if one wLshes to evaluate it, ultimately to 
be examined in terms of the human type <mnschlichen Typus) 
to which it, by way of external or internal (motivational) 
seLectLon, provides the optimal chances of becoming the 
dominant type. For without it empirical research is neither 
really exhaustLve, nor Ls there the necessary real 
foundation for such an evaLuatLon, be Lt a consciously 
subjective, or an evaluation claiming objective validity. 
(Weber 1973 in Hennis 1983 p169). 
This passage couid just as weLL have been written by Wetzsche as by 
Weber, certainly it indicates Nietzsche's concern in tracing the geneaLogy 
of nlh[Llsm. As for Wrong's crLtlcaL comments on Weber as operatIng an 
oversociatised conception of man, these remarks falL to acknowLedge the 
ideal-typicaL character of the Calvinist in Weber's texts. A falLure which 
nullifies their critical, force. 
It has been pointed out in this section that Weber's form of anaLysis is 
distinguished from geneaLogy by its refusaL to evatuate vaLues. However, 
this distinction itseLf sL! ps at times. It is readLLy apparent in ToLitics 
as a Vocation' that, on a rhetorical Level at Least, Weber's argument 
pushes the reader towards an evatuation of 'Leadership democracy' as 
superior to 'LeaderLess democracy". This point returns us to Weber's 
concern with the issue of a calling. It appears that in the same way that 
Wetzsche's texts attempt to leglislate that the Overman be the domLnant 
type of a post-nihilist age, so Weber is concerned with the articulation of 
the individuaL with a calting as the human type which should be the 
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dominant type In modernity. At Least the essays on the scientific and 
political callings appear to act as attempts to ie_qislate a form of self- 
conceptua L Isat Lon, to encourage those engaged in these pract ices to 
exclusively acknowledge a particular set of theoretical values, a specifLc 
perspective. This dimension of Weber's textuaL activity w! LL become cLearer 
in the detailed examination of 'Science as a Vocation' and 'Politics as a 
Vocation' offered in the next two chapters". For the moment, Let us 
concLude this section. 
The points indicated here can be summed up as foilows. It was shown that 
Weber's mode of anaLysis shares many of the features that constItute a 
genealogical, approach. Thus his analyses involve an explicit perspective 
and acknowledge the hLstoricity of the scholar. They also Involve a concern 
with points of emergence and Lines of descent rather than with the 
identLficatton of some lprLmat source' or centraL generatLng mechanIsm. 
Further, the mode of anaLysLs is structured around an attention to human 
types. In genera[, however, Weber's ana lyses do not take up the 
geneatogicaL vaLue critique which is, perhaps, the raison dletre of 
N[etzsche's LnvestLgatlons. The extent to whLch Weber's exam[natLon LnvoLve 
a more or Less impLicLt set of evaLuat[ons wM be one of the area's to be 
addressed in the following chapters. 
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NOTES 
1. UntLL recentLy, FLe[schmann's 'De Nletzsche 6 Weber' (1964) was the onLy 
significant study of Weber's reLationshLp to Nietzsche. However, severaL 
papers have now taken up this theme. NotabLy Hennis 'The Traces of 
Nietzsche in the Work of Max Weber' (1988) and Schroeder 'Nietzsche and 
Weber. Two 'Prophets' of the Modern WorLd (1987). 
2. Cf. Chapter 1, section 5 and Chapter 2, section 2. 
3. This dimension of Weber is weLL discussed in Brubaker The Limits of 
RatlonaUt, y (1984) pp6l-90. 
4. The character Lbwlth assigns to the ideat-type aLso represents a good 
picture of Foucault's concept of 'dispos[tif', cf. Chapter 7, section 2. 
5. For a discussion of this cf. Wotin 'Max Weber: Legitimation, Method and 
the PoLitics of Theory' (1981). 
6. In WoLln op. cLt. 
7. This usefuL phrase is taken from Vetody 'SoclaLism as a SocioLogicaL 
ProbLem' (1988). 
8. Henn is I reinterpretation is contained in Max Weber: Essays in 
Reconstruction (1988). 
9. Cf. Chapter 5, section 2. 
10. Cf. Chapters 5 and 6. 
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DISCIPLINE AND CHARISMA. 
Max Weber's 'PolLtics as a Vocation' and the Fate of the Subject in 
Modern ity 
It Is the fate of charisma, whenever it comes into the 
permanent institutions of a community, to give way to powers 
of tradition or of rationat socialisation. And of att 
those powers the most irresistibLe is rational 
discipline, 
- Max Weber 'The Meaning of Discipline' 
Not sumn-ter IsbL oom LI es ahead of us, but rat her a po i ar nL ght 
of icy darkness and hardness, 
- Max Weber 'Politics as a Vocation' 
Introduction 
In this chapter, Weber's remarks on poL[tics as a vocation wL[L be 
examLned In the context of his overalL project of anaLysing, and coming to 
terms with, the fate of the human subject in modernity. Weber's distinctive 
formuLati. on of the modern Ls necessariLy expLored withLn the framework of 
such an investigation. Our route into this discussion wiLL operate about 
the notions of discipline and charisma, these two concepts providing the 
axes around which an understanding of Weber's theorisation of the pLace of 
the indiv[duaL in modernity may proceed. At the same time, we wLLI be 
concerned to accommodate Weber's remarks on rationallsation, bureacracy and 
Legitimacy within this structure. Finally, we wilL attempt to Mustrate the 
relationship between the concepts charisma and personality as mediated by 
Weber's idea of a callin_q. This meandering path wiLl, it is hoped, Lead us 
to a cLearer understanding of the significance of Weber as a theorist of 
modern[ty and, more particutarly, of the modern subject. 
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I. Disciptine 
That the concept of discipline depLoyed by Weber has, perhaps, not 
received the attention it deserves relative to its importance in his 
formuLation of modernity may not necessariLy surpise us. In the dominant 
trend of AngLo-American interpretation, Weber's 'theory' of bureaucracy 
appears more LmmediateLy appLlcabLe to mainstream soclaL scientific 
concerns', however there is Little doubt that bureaucracy, for Weber, was a 
(important) sub-section of the 'ever-widenlng grasp of discipLine' TMW 
p262). Given this state of affairs, an anaLysis of the dLscipL! nary nature 
of the modern is centraL to our understanding of Weber. In this section, 
our concern wilL be to generate (at Least partlatty) the grounds for such 
an understanding by tracing Weber's _qenealogy of 
discLpLLne, by examining 
the relationship between discipline and rationalisation as exempLied in 
various forms, and, finatLy, by expLorLng the links between discipLine and 
n ih LL ism. 
(a) The Genealogy of Discipline 
Weber's trac[nq of the descent of disciptLne, wh! Le sketchy, operates on 
two dLscernibLe LeveLs. The first concerns dLscipL! ne in reLatLon to the 
military. The second examines discipline relative to religion. 
'The discipline of the army gives birth to aLL discipline. ' (FMW p261). 
Military discipline, which in Weber's account begins with the idea of 
'warrior communism', has had ambiguous implications in terms of its social 
and poLLtIcaL consequences, however, we are concerned presently with this 
discLpLinels own development. The 'pr imeva P constitution of warrior 
communism, that is of a community of warriors as a rule operating within a 
polity, involved the separation of the warrior 'from the 
family and from 
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aLL private economic interests' such that the disciptinLng of the warrLor 
in the service of his master is uncompLicated by alternative commitments 
(cf. FMW pp257-260). The fuLL deveLopment of the Institution which Weber 
names the bacheior house resuLts in the compLete excLusion of famLL[aL 
relations, white females (bought, captured, or claimed) are provided on 
impersonaL grounds. HistoricaLLy, Weber suggests, discipLine was most 
effective when these bachelor houses were organ[sed in a highly 
centraLlsed styLe. Weber goes on to argue that the growth of discipline in 
miLitary organisatlons has been mediated by economic changes and 'on the 
basis of an increased concentration of the means of warfare in the hands 
of the war tord. ' TMW p260): 
This has been achieved by having a condottlere recruit 
mercenary armies, in part or wholly, in the manner of a 
private capitalist. Such an arrangement was dominant in the 
Late Middle Ages and the beginning of the modern era. It was 
followed by the raising and equipping of standing armies by 
means of political authority and a collective economy. ... 
FLnaLLy universal conscription was introduced during the 
nineteenth century. The whole development meant, in effect, 
the clearly increasing importance of discipline ... (FMW 
p260) 
WhUe the economLc organLsatLon of the poLLty is thus an infLuentlaL factor 
In the devetopment of discipLine, the discLpLIne of the army is a major 
factor in the determination of the soclaL and poLiticaL order. The 
ambiguity of this influence, already referred to, can be illustrated by 
Weber's ctalm that: 
Discipline, as the basis of warfare, gave birth to 
patriachaL kingship amongst the Zulus, where the monarch is 
constitutionally limited by the power of the army Leaders 
(Like the Spartan Ephors). Similarly, discipline gave birth 
to the Hellenic polLs with its gymnasiums. (FMW p257) 
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The form of the polity is reLated by Weber to the styLe of mLLltary 
organLsation and discipline exemplified by the given society, thus: 
When infantry drLil is perfected to the point of virtuosity 
(Sparta), the pot is has an inevLtabLy 'aristocratic' 
structure. When cities are based on navaL discipLine, they 
have Idemocratic' structures (Athens). ... The ruLe of the 
Roman partIcLate, of the Egyptian, Assyrian, and finalLy of 
modern European bureaucratic state organisations - all have 
their origin in dLscLpLine. (FMW p257) 
Without impLying a futt-bLown determinism around this concept, it does 
appear that discipline is a central focus for Weber's analytic concerns. 
Before turning to the forms of rational discipline in modernity, however, 
we must note Weber's remarks on discipline and religion. 
WhLLe Weber notes that the monk is the counter-part to the warrior, as 
is the monastry to the warrior community, our concern here refers to the 
discLpLine of Puritanism. This reLlgious form of discipLine is reLated to 
mUltary discipilne both historicaLLy and symboLicalty. With regard to the 
historicaL reLatlonsh[p, Weber notes: 'CromweLL's victortes - despite the 
fierce bravery of the Cavallers - were due to sober and ratLonaL Puritan 
dlscLpLLne. '(FMW p256). WhUe to locate the symboLlc Linkage one need onLy 
note Puritan hymn UtLes such as 'Onward Christian Soldiers' and 'Fight the 
Good Fight'? -. 
Our major concern, however, is with the ethicaL terms of discipLine 
in 
its Puritan form. The presupposition of a "sense of duty" and 
"consc ient iousness. " CMen of Conscience' versus 'Men of Honour, ' in 
CromweLL's terms. )' (FMW p254). In the The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit 
of CapitaLlsm Weber describes these Puritan presuppositions, 
in reLation to 
the process of ratlonatisation, as promoting 
individuaL autonomy based on 
catcuLated rationaL action. It appears, 
however, that in so far as 
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Puritanism promotes discipLine, it is precisety [nvoLved Ln undermining 
indivLduaL autonomy. For, as Weber notes, 'of aLL those powers that lessen 
the importance of LndividuaL action, the most Lrresist! bLe is rational 
disc ip I ine. I (FMW p253). To eLucidate what seems to be a paradoxicaL 
posLtion, we must expLore the reLationship between dLsciptine and 
rationaLlsatLon. 
(b) Discipline and Rationalisation 
ThLs reLationship approaches the heart of Weber's account of the ptace 
of the individual in a disenchanted world, that is the concern with the 
possibility of Individual freedom in the 'iron cage' of modernity. Here some 
careful distinctions are required. Firstly, we must distinguish between 
discLpLine and self-discipline and secondLy, we must draw a Line between 
discipLine and bureacracy. These distLnctLons prov[de our access to Weber's 
analysis of the fate of individual Liberty. 
Disciptine, as we have noted, is portrayed by Weber as a disciplining of 
the ind[viduat. That is a more or Less compLex set of soclaL ruLes are 
imposed on the individual, ruLes about, for exampLe, soclaL reLationships, 
diet (particuLarty in the monastry), hours of sLeep, financLaL status, and 
severaL other aspects of everyday existence. This regime that governs the 
individuaL is Laid down externatLy and Its operation remains outside the 
inclividuats controt. In contrast, the Puritan determines his own regime, 
through his Inner caLlLng he generates a code of behaviour and discipLines 
himself to the standards and conduct this way of Life demands. A 
distinction operates here then between the determination (or shaping) of 
an individual and self-determination by an individual. 
This distinction 
notabty paraLLeLs Nietzsche's oppostion of weak and strong 
LndividuaLs3. 
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Our second distinction LnvoLves a straightforward caution: whiLe 
bureaucracy is the form of discIpLIne that Weber concentrates on in his 
accounts of modernity, we shou Ld be carefu I not to equate the two. Weber 
defLnes 'the content of disciptine, as: 
nothing but the consistentLy ratLonaLlsed, methodLcalLy 
trained and exact execution of the received order, in which 
aLL personaL criticism is unconditionatly suspended and the 
actor is unswervLngLy and exciusiveLy set for carrying out 
the command. In addition, this conduct under orders is 
uniform. ... What is decisive for discipLine is that the 
obediiince of men is ratlonaLty uniform. (FMW p253) 
White this description fits his account of bureoc-ýacy, it also applies to 
other area's of modern Life, notably the factory mass production Line, 
prison and the army4. ConsequentLy, many of our comments which are geared 
to an understanding of poLltics in modernity may aLso reLate to other 
parts of the socLaL body, as wUL become cLear in our comments on 
discipLine and n! hLLLsm . 
Towards the end of The Protestant Ethic and the SplrLt of CapLtaksm 
Weber states that: 
One of the fundamentat eLements of the spirit of modern 
capitaL ism, and not onLy of that but of aL L modern cuLture; 
ratLonat conduct on the basis of the 'idea of the caLLing, 
was born ... from the spirit of 
Christian asceticism. (PESC 
P180) 
However, wh! Le the 'Puritan wanted to work in a calLing; we are forced to 
do so. '(PESC p181). This comment reflects, at Least partially, the 
distinction between discipline and self-discipline already noted, for the 
fotlowijnq reasons. The process of ratlonaLlsatLon, that is the increasing 
goverance of actions by a schema of formal rationality, originates 
in the 
irrational belief of the Puritan and the potential for mastery of the world 
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is embodied in the practice of the Puritan which is generated through Ms 
se Lf-d isc ip L ine. In other words, it is the seLf-discipLLne of the 
Puritan that generate the regimes of rationallsation. However, the 
reLlglous foundations of man's inner cakting upon which the self-discipLine 
of the Puritan was based have been 'hoist by (their] own petard': 
Today the spirit of religious asceticism - whether finally, 
who knows? - has escaped from the cage. But victorious 
capitalism, since it rests on mechanical foundations, needs 
its support no longer. The rosy blush of its laughing heir, 
the Enlightenment. seems also to be irretrivabLy fading, and 
the idea of duty in one's calling prowls about in our Lives 
Like the ghost of dead religious beliefs. (PESC p181/182) 
As wIth Nietzsche, modernity is ushered In by the products of Christianity 
turning on their creator5. With the undercutting of the idea of an inner 
caLLIng and, therefore, of the seff-disciptIne of the indLviduat, there 
emerges 'the distinctive irrationality which forms itself in the process of 
ratLonaLisation, ': 
That which was originally a mere means (to an otherwise 
valuable end) becomes an end or end In itself. In this way, 
means as ends make themselves independent and thus Lose 
their original 'meaning' or purpose, that is, they lose 
their original purposive rationality orientated to man and 
his needs. This reversal marks the whole of modern 
cLviLisation, whose arrangements, institutions and 
activities are now so rationaLlsed that whereas humanity 
once established itself within them, now it Is they which 
enclose and determine humanity Like an ' iron cage' Human 
conduct, from which these Institutions originally arose, 
must now in turn adapt to its own creation which has escaped 
the control of Its creator. (L6w! th 1982 p48) 
ConsequentLy, the process of rationaLlsation, whLch expressed the 
autonomy of the Puritan, becomes a major factor in the structural 
domination of the individual. Alexander6, has pointed out the positive and 
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negative sides of this process. On the one hand: 
Wortd-mastery, or at Least the potential for it, has come to 
man through ratLonaLisatlon. Humans have replaced God as 
masters of their destiny. Modern people are governed, or at 
Least would Like to think of themselves as governed, by 
institutions that are man-made, that have been cunstructed 
fortheir effectiveness in achieving human goals. In 
principle, Leaders are held accountable for the way these 
institutions work. (Alexander 1987 p188) 
On the other hand, ALexander suggests, for Weber, 'this-worldLy ascet! cLsm 
made it possible not only to master the worLd but to master other human 
belngs. '(Atexander 1987 p193): 
Depersonatisation and self-discipline promoted autonomy in 
part because they allowed the actor to distance his ego from 
emotions that represented dependency. But this rejection of 
one's own dependency needs forced one to reject the needs of 
others as weLt. The capacity to make a 'toot' out of 
oneself, therefore also allowed one to depersonaLLse and 
objectify others. Domination could become ruthless only when 
the personal and idiosyncratic qualities of the other were 
eliminated. (ALexander 1987 p193) 
This 'paradox' can be more concreteLy HLustrated by reference to Weber's 
comments on the retationship between bureaucracy and mass democracy. 
These two instLtutlons are, he suggests, inextricabLy I[nked: 'Bureaucracy 
InevLtabLy accompanies modern mass democracy'(FMW p224). At the same time, 
'democracy inevitably comes into confLict with the bureaucratic tendencies 
whLch ... democracy has produced. '(FMW p226). In what areas and why do they 
conf L Lct? An answer to th Ls quest Lon requ ires that we de I ineate more fu L Ly 
the characters that Weber ascribes to bureaucracy and modern democracy. 
As one would expect, Weber is careful not to treat bureaucracy as a 
unitary phenomenon embodying set characteristics across time and space. 
The nominaLLsm that runs through his analyses operates just as clearly In 
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deLlneating the various forms and directions taken by bureau cra tic 
organLsatLons. This does not, however, prevent us from noting some generat 
poLnts reLative to contemporary forms of bureaucracy. Thus Weber suggests: 
The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic 
organisation has always been its purely technical 
superiority over any other form of organisation. ... The 
extraordinary increase in the speed by which public 
announcements, as well as economic and political facts, are 
transmitted exerts a steady and sharp pressure in the 
direction of speeding up the tempo of administrative 
reaction towards various situations. The optimum of such 
reaction t ime is normally attained only by strict 
bureaucratic organLsation. (FMW p214/215) 
Given that these factors govern the need for bureaucrat ! sat ! on in the 
increasLngLy compLex and fast-chang ing sLtuatLons that characterise 
modernity, it is stilL necessary to identify those aspects of modern 
bureaucracies that generate this efficiency and speed of response. These 
elements, Weber claims, are twofold: firstly, 'a discharge of business 
according to calculable rules' TMW p215) and secondLy, an operation 
'without regard for persons'(FMW p215). Both of these considerations are 
'of paramount importance for modern bureaucracy, ': 
The pecuL iarity of modern culture, and specif icat Ly of its 
technical and economic basis, demands this very 
calcuLabL L Lty' of result. When fuL Ly developed, bureaucracy 
also stands, in a specific sense, under the principle of 
sine ira ac studio. Its specific nature, which is welcomed 
by capitalism, develops the more perfectly the more the 
bureaucracy is Idehumanised, ' the more completely it suceeds 
in eliminating from official business Love, hate, and all 
purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which 
escape calculation. This is the specific nature of 
bureaucracy and it is appraised as its special virtue. (FMW 
p215/216) 
Thus, wh! Le on the one hand, bureaucracy is the most efficient means of 
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attaining the goals of the modern state, on the other hand this efficient 
execution requires the dehuman[satLon of the Lndividuat. How does this fit 
in with Weber's conception of modern mass democracy? 
The analysis of democracy, Weber puts forward, focuses on two levels; 
the state and the nature of the modern poLlticaL party. With regard to the 
state, Weber suggests th at the most i mportant factor operating 'is the 
levellin_q of' the 
_qoverned 
in opposition to the ruLing and bureaucrat ica L Ly 
articulated group, which in its turn may occupy a quite autocratic 
position, both in fact and in form. ' (FMW p226). The power of the 
bureaucratic apparatus becomes a central Issue In art icu tat Ing the 
reLationship between individuation and domination. Concerning this power 
position, Weber states that: 
Under normal conditions, the power position of a fully 
developed bureaucracy is always overtowering. The 'potiticaL 
master' finds himself in the position of the 'dilettante' 
who stands opposite the 'expert', facing the trained 
official who stands within the management of administration. 
(FMW p232) 
The bureaucratLc apparatus, by a process of spec ia L ! sat ! on and an 
adherence to secrecy, undermines the effective controt of government by 
politicians and imposes its own form of domination. Consequently, one of 
Weber's centraL themes in 'PoLLtics as a Vocation' is the formuLation of a 
form of democratic government most able to resist the encroachment of 
bureacratic power. With regard to poLit[caL parties, Weber notes that the 
formal democratisation of the party resuLts in power resting with 'those 
who, with[n the organisation, handle the work continuously. ' (FMW-103). 
Further, the mass nature of these parties while offering greater potentiaL 
expression by the individual in influencing the values and goals that 
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govern society, simuLtaneousLy leads to the treatment of citizens as tooLs 
for the production of votes by the party 'machine'. This process of 
rationaLlsation Ln the polltLcal sphere produces pari passu indiv[duaL 
autonomy and seif-expression on the one hand, and the dehumanisation and 
objectification of individuaLs on the other. Weber's probLematic concerns 
the necessity of retaining a baLance between these two movements; to 
res ist the tendency of the objectified expressions of dLscipL! ne to 
ruthlessLy domLnate the individuaL and to cLose the space of individuaL 
freedom. Weber's articulation of a defence against this disciplinary 
tendency wLLL be deaLt with in the next section. However, his concerns aiso 
go beyond this point into an analysis of the existential condition of the 
human subject in modernity, And before we move to an anatysis of his 
defence of individuaL freedom,, some remarks must be made regardIng the 
nature of this existentIaL condition in so far as it reLates to d1scIpLine. 
(c) Discipline and Nihilism 
For Nietzsche, a centraL characteristic of nihiLism is that '[an] aim is 
lacking; "why? " finds no answer. ' (WP 2), as passive n! hLL! sm, the result of 
this 'Lack' is self-narcotisation expressed through a ImedLey of means' of 
escape. In Weber's work, this insight is deployed in terms of historically 
grounded figures exemplifying two distinct forms of escape. The first form 
of escape involves the perception of the nature of the modern world 
but a 
refusal to accept any responsibility for this condition. 
Alexander 
identifies three figures embodying this form: 
Here is the bureaucrat who obediently foL Lows his orders; 
the practical politician who pleads his 
helplessness before 
[nterest-group demands and the pressures of the moment; 
the 
scientist who becomes a cog in 
the research machine. In this 
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mode of fLight the indivLduaL becomes a mere tooL of the 
disciptned spirit; he is no more than a means for some 
determinate power or end. (Atexander 1987 p199) 
The most extreme of this form is the 'I was obeying orders' defence 
offered at Nuremburg. That is, the subsumpt ! on of seLf to the 
depersonaLising force of disc! pLLne as a mode of denying responsibit[ty for 
the world. Our second form of escape involves an total denial of the world 
in favour of a fantasy worLd in which a given 'god' operates as an 
Archimedean point. Here stands the outright Marxist, for example, but also 
the bohemian or hedonist. This position involves seff-discipLine as the 
creation of self, but from bad conscience which results In a reduction of 
seff, be it as a tooL for revoLution or as a vesseL for pLeasure. Given 
that this situation arises out the Loss of a set of commonly held cultural 
vaLues formed abou t the f Lgure of God, Weber's commitment to a 
poLytheistic metaphysics may appear to be rather paradoxicaL. However, as 
sha LL be Mustrated in the next section, it is through the idea of 
irreducLbLe vaLue confLicts that Weber finds a route out of nihitlsm and 
towards a mode of generating meaning for the life of the indLviduaL. 
In thLs sectLon, we have traced the context of Weber's use of the 
concept of discipline and its place in his character ! sat 
! on of modernity. 
We have noted the two sides of ratLonaLisation, that is, 
domination and 
individuation, and explored this concretely in relation to Weber's comments 
on bureaucracy and democracy. Finally, we have seen 
how the concept of 
discipline is related to nihilism in modernity. 
These formulations provide 
the context for our discussion of Weber's 
'Politics as a Vocation, the site 
for Weber's attempt to generate a space 
for individual freedom where a 
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meanLngfui lncllvLduaL expression may take pLace. This attempt brings the 
concept of charisma to the fore. 
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2. CHARISMA 
Of the themes that run through Max Weber's essay ToLitics as a 
Vocation', there are perhaps three central concerns. The first of these Ls 
with the position of the LndividuaL in reLation to the structuraL forces of 
domination in an increasingLy discIpUnary society. The second concerns the 
poss lb! L ity of generating meaning for an LndlviduaPs existence in 
modernity. The third invoLves generating a non-ideoLogicaL defence of 
LLberaL institutions. This section wLLI constitute an attempt to Mustrate 
these themes and their inter- re Lat ionsh Lp. To facilitate this, we shaLL 
address Weber's comments on modern politics, his concept of 'charisma' and 
the idea of a caLI[nq drawing on our discussion of dLsc[pLLne where 
required. As part of this project, we wLLL aLso examine Weber's discussion 
of Legitimation and his comments on the ethics of poL! tLcs before 
delineating the implications of 'Politics as a Vocation' for our 
understanding of Weber as a socLaL theorist. 
(a) Char isma and Ca II ing 
We have aLready traced the context of domination within which the 
modern subject operates, a centraL etement of which concerns the make-up 
of the modern state. In ToLitics as a Vocation', Weber moves to a detalLed 
discussion of this sphere, that is, the sphere of poLitics. He begins by 
asking what we mean when we use the term 'politics', suggesting that, 
in 
this context, we are referring to the 'Leadership, or infLuencing of' 
the 
Leadership, of a political association, hence today, of a state. '(FMW p77). 
Here a state ts identified as 'a human community that (successfuLty) cLaims 
the monopoly of' the le_qitimate use of physical 
florce within a given 
terrLtory. '(FMW p78)15. These preliminary formulations lead Weber to reflect 
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upon what grounds this 'reLation of men dominating men' rests. In response, 
he sets up a series of ideaL-types, three of which concern 'inner 
justLfication' and two of whLch reLate to 'externaL means'; our concern, as 
was Weber's, is primarLLy with the former. These 'Inner justifications' are, 
briefly: the authority of the 'eternal yesterday', that is, of traditional 
cuLturaL mores; the authority of charisma, the devotion of indLviduaLs to a 
4 person possessed of an extraordLnary 'gift of grace, and, finaLLy, the 
authority of 'LegaLlty', i. e. authority guaranteed 'by virtue of the beLLef 
in the vaLLdLty of LegaL statute and functionaL "competence" based on 
rationaLLy created rules. '(FMW p79). It Ls readiLy apparent that the modern 
state, as described in the previous section, approximates most ctosely to 
the third of these types; our concern, however, is with the concept of 
'char isma'. 
EarLy on in 'Politics as a Vocation', Weber decLares that he is, in this 
essay, 'interested above aLL in': 
domination by virtue of the devotion of those who obey the 
purely personal 'charisma' of the ' Leader. ' For this is the 
root of the idea of a cailin_q in its highest expression. (FMW 
p79). 
We wLLL, therefore, attempt to sketch this notion of a calling before going 
on to comment on Weber's deployment of the concept of 'charisma'. In The 
Protestant Eth[c and the SpLrit of Capitatism, Weber devotes a chapter to 
'Luther's Conception of The Calling' in which he claims that: 
if we trace the history of the word [calling) through the 
civi t ised Languages, it appears that neither the 
predominantly Catholic peoples nor those of classical 
antiquity have possessed any expresion for what we know as a 
calling (in the sense of a life-task, a definite 
field in 
which to work), while one has existed 
for all predominantly 
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Protestant peoptes. (PESC p79) 
That this idea emerges with the Reformation is, for Weber, a commonpLace 
observation; however, he is at pains to point out what was distinctively 
new about it. This, he suggests, was as foLLows: 
the valuation of the fuLfiLment of duty in worldly affairs 
as the highest form which the moral actvity of the 
individual could assume. This it was which inevitably gave 
every-day worldly activity a religious significance, and 
which first created the conception of a calling in this 
sense. ... The on Ly way of Liv1 ng acceptab Iy to God was not 
to surpass worldly morality in monastic asceticism, but 
solely through the fulfillment of the obligations imposed on 
the individual by his position in the world. That was his 
caLLing. (PESC p80) 
This retigious conception of a calLing is transformed by Weber Lnto a 
secular ethic which, however, retains its existential force. The figure of 
God no Longer acts as a judge on the ind! vLduaLs mode of existance, rather 
the LndMduaL is required to take up this role himself and face up to 'the 
demands of the day'. At the same time, Weber retains much of the or[ginaL 
rhetorical force of the idea of a calling through his use of Language, 
notably his appeals to 'the gods', 'fate' and 'destiny'. Thus, In the context 
of Weber's 'poLythelsm', choosing a calLing becomes the fate of the 
LndMduaL, which is in every sense a fatef'ul decision. On one leveL, then, 
we may read 'PoLLtics as a Vocation' as a kind of guide to this decision in 
so far as the indiv[duaL is considering the catLing of poLLtics. On a 
second Leve 1, however, it may be seen as Mustrating the fLgure an 
IndivLduaL must create hlmseLf into if he is to enter this area. To discern 
how this conception of a calling is intimately Linked, as Weber suggests, 
to charisma, requires that we understand how, and in what sense, charisma 
is 'the root of the idea of a callin_q in its highest expression. ' TMW p79). 
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(b) Charisma and the Ethics of Politics 
Weber's claim is that the emergence of charismatic domination has been 
historicalLy Linked with two particuLar types of man: the magician or 
prophet, on the one hand, and the war Lord or gang Leader, on the other. 
These two figures are paraLteled by the two ethicaL standpoints Weber 
suggests can be taken with regard to poLitics, that is, an ethic of 
responsibility or an ethic of absolute ends. 
The charisma of the prophet is generated out of his personaLity as 
expressed through his committment to a set of Weals. THis portrayal is 
transfigured by Weber in his delineation of the modern politician via a 
discussion of the Sermon on the Mount. With regard to the instruction to 
'turn the other cheek, ' for example, Weber poLnts out that: 
ItIhis command is unconditionaL and does not question the 
source of the other's authority to strike. Except for a 
saLnt it is an ethic of indignity. This is it: one must be 
saintLy in everything; at Least in Intention, one must Live 
Like Jesus, the apostLes, St. Francis, and their Like. Then 
this ethic makes sense and expresses a kind of dignity; 
otherwise it does not. (FMW p119) 
In so far as the form of such an ethic operates in potitics, it expresses a 
commItment to actlon accordIng to prlncLpLes whatever the consequences. As 
Weber notes 'If an action of good intent Leads to bad resuLts, then, in the 
actors eyes, not he but the worLd, or the stupidity of other men, or God's 
wilL who made them thus, is responsibLe for the eviL. ' TMW pl2l). 
In contrast, the charlsma of the gang leader Is expressed through a 
pragmatic commitment to success, that Is the achievement of certain ends 
held to be desirabLe in so far as the consequences of actions leading to 
the achieving of these ends do not outweigh the benefits attained by 
gaining them. In its modern potiticaL form, Weber terms this an ethic of 
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responsibL[ty and suggests that an indLviduaL operating according to this 
form of ethic 'takes account of the average deficiences of people; as 
Fichte has correctly said, he does not even have the right to presuppose 
their goodness and perfection. He does not feel in a position to burden 
others with the results of his own actions so far as he was able to see 
them; he witt say: these resuLts are ascribed by my action. ' TMW pl2l). 
However, Weber is welL aware that such ideal-typicaL constructions 
reflect only partiaL truths and are by no means entirely opposites. Just as 
a prophet may also be a warlord and a magiclan may be a gang-leader, so 
to the two ethics Weber has set out may act as suppLements in the person 
of the poLitican. As Weber puts it: 
it is Immensely moving when a rnature man - no matter whether 
old or young In years - Is aware of a responsibility for the 
consequences of his conduct and really feels such 
responsibility with heart and SOUL. He then acts by 
following an ethic of responsibiLity and somewhere he 
reaches the point where he says: ' Here I stand; I can do no 
other. ' That is something genuinely human and moving. And 
every one of us who is not spiritually dead must realise the 
possibility of finding himself at sometime In that position. 
In so far as this is true, an ethic of uLtLmate ends and an 
ethic of responsibILLty are not absolute contrasts but 
rather supplements, which only in unison constitute a 
genuine man -a man who can have the 'caLLing for poLLtics. ' 
(FMW p127) 
Weber's reasons for claiming that onLy together do these two ethics 
transform the poLitician into a man with a calling for politics are readity 
apparent, given his commitment to defend Llberat insitutions without 
recourse to LLberal ideoLogy (as Eden has cogentty argued). In the context 
of this commitment, one can see that the ethic of uLtimate ends in its 
pure type can be represented in modernity by the f igures of the 
revolutionary terrorist and the religious fanatic, whiLe the ethic of 
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responsibiLity can be seen in its pure type in the f Lqures of the 
machiaveLL! an opportunist and 'Tammany HaLP boss. OnLy in the combination 
of these two ethics is, what Bruun Labels, 'goat responsEbiLtyl maintained; 
that is, a commitment to a goal without ignoring the consequences of the 
means of achieving that goaL or getting so LnvoLved in the importance of 
the means that the goai Ls Useff negLected. 
To sum up the gist of our discussion so far. FlrstLy, we have outLined 
Weber's concept of charisma and iLLustrated how he transforms this concept 
via a process of 'professional ! sat ! on' into the idea of a calling, a 
conception he has borrowed (and secuLarised) from Protestantism. In the 
sphere of poLLtics, this transformation has been achieved through a 
paratleting of the two major types of charismatic man with two ethics of 
political practice. Secondly, by drawing out the Logical consequences of 
these two eth ics, as embodied in given types of poLiticaL man, we can see 
how Weber requires their combination, as a condition of having a genuine 
calling for politics. And this in itself is part of his stategy for 
defending a Liberal conception of politics. Thirdly, Weber grounds meanin_q, 
in the existentiat sense, in the idea of a caLLLng. This is significant both 
as a mode of overcoming nihiLism and in its reLation to Weber's conception 
of 'vocationaL man' as a seff-discLpLining subject. We wiH now turn to a 
discussion of Weber's attempt to preserve a space for individuaL liberty in 
an increasingly disciplinary society. Before illustrating the relationships 
between these three themes. 
(c) Charisma and the Fate of the Subject in Modernity 
We have already discussed the rationaLlsation of modern politics, in 
retat[on to the state and the party, as the encroachment of bureaucratic 
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power over democratic forms. Weber's probtem thus becomes the formuLation 
of that type of democratic organisation most abte to resist such 
encroachment. In Nietzschean terms, this involves the reLationshLp between 
AppoLLonian and Dionysian forces in modernity. Weber's transformation of 
this issue operates on a number of distinct Levels. 
We can approach this issue through an initiat consideration of Weber's 
discussion of two opposing types of democractic organisatLon that may be 
taken up by the modern state; these, Weber LabeLs, 'Leadership democracy 
with a "machine" and leaderLess democracy. ' (FMW p113). The latter of 
these is constituted by 'the rule of professional politicians without a 
caLLIng, without the inner charismatic qualities that make a leader, and 
this means what the party insurgents In the situation usuaLty designate as 
"the ruLe of the cLique. '" 
represented, for Weber, 
representation: 
(FMW pl 13). Such a form of government is 
by democrac les emp Loy Lng proportLonaL 
This is the case not only because it facilitates the horse- 
trading of the notables for placement on the ticket, but 
also because in the future it will give organised interest 
groups the possibility of compelling parties to include 
their officials In the List of candidates, thus creating an 
unpolitical Parliament In which genuine Leadership finds no 
place. (FMW p114)1 
Weber goes on to point out, with reference to Germany, that 'the President 
of the Reich could become the safety-vaLve of the demand for leadership if 
he were e Lected Ln ap Leb isc Ltar [an way and not by Par L lament. ' TMW pl 14). 
This Leads us to a consideration of the former of Weber's democratic 
types, I leadership democracy with a "machine"' (FMW pl 13), and its potent !aL 
impLlcat[ons for End[vLduat L Lberty. In his The Theory of SociaL and 
Economic Organisation Weber devotes a short section to this Issue under 
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the tit Le 'The Transformation of Charisma in an AntL-Authoritarian 
Direction' in which he Mustrates some of the dangers that this form of 
democratLc organisation entaiLs: 
The use of the plebiscite as a means of LegitImising 
Leadership on a democratic basis is the most conspicuous 
type in which democracy is combined with an important role 
of Leadership. In its fundamental significance it Is a type 
of charismatic authority in which the authoritarian element 
is concealed, because the traditional position of the Leader 
is held to be dependent onthe will of those over whom he 
exercises authority and to be LegLtImLsed only by this wit[. 
In actual fact the Leader, in this case the demagogue, is 
able to influence action by virtue of the devotion and trust 
his political followers have in him personalty. In the first 
Instance his power is only a power over those recruited to 
his fol, [owing, but In case, with their aid, he Is able to 
attain positions of wider authority it my extend to the 
political group as a whole. The type is best illustrated by 
the 'dictators' who have emerged in the revolutions of the 
ancient world and of modern times. (TSEO p387/388) 
Weber's approach to the probLem raised by the demagogue, 'the type of 
individual who is most spectacutar, who promises the most, or who empLoys 
the most effective propaganda measures in the compet it ! on for 
Leadership. '(TSEO p389), proceeds by reference to his concept of a caLLing. 
I 
in 'PoLitics as a VocatLon', Weber suggests 'that three pre-emLnent 
qua L it les are decisive for the po L It ic ian: passion, a feeLLng of 
respons ib, 1L Lty, and a sense of proport ion. '(FMW pl 15), remember ing that by 
'passion' here is denoted a 'sense of met ter-of-factness'(FMW pl 15). What 
Weber is attempting to do here, is to undercut the potentiaL 
author Uar Lan ism of the pLebiscitory Leader through a pincer movement: 
firstly, by making the criteria of political personality quaLities that ruLe 
out the mere power-hungry demagogue and secondLy, as Eden points out, 
'ItIhe folLowers of the Weberlan Leader ... need have no reverence for 
the 
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person of the leader, as in Fasc ist and Commun Lst reg imes. What they f ind 
" irres ist lb Le'' is the man who approachs poLLtLcs with matter-of-fact 
devotion. '(Eden p208). It is with respect to the second of these points 
that the foLLowlng of Weber's comments is approprLate: 
the relative immunity of formerly Puritan peoples to 
Caesarism, and, in general, the subjectively free attitude 
of the English to their great statesmen as compared with 
many things we have experienced since 1878 both positively 
and negatively. On the one hand, there is a greater 
willingness to give the great man his due, but, on the 
other, a repudiation of alL hysterical LdoLisation of him 
and of the naive idea that political obediance could be due 
anyone from thankfulness. (PESC p224/225, fn. 30)'c' 
Thus through the transcription of charisma into the conceptions of calLing 
and personaLity, Weber seeks to negate the dangers of pLebiscitary 
Leadership democracy whUe preserving its potentiat for ameliorating the 
I forces of rationaLlsatlon and thus retaining a space for individuaL liberty 
and se Lf- express Lon. We are not concerned at this point with the efficacy 
of Weber's soLution to this diLemma of modernity as he has formuLated it, 
rather my concern is that of Mustrating the potitics of Weber's soclaL 
theory as Lt is expressed through the dlLemma's and soLutions he sets out. 
At the start of th is sect ! on were set out three centrat issues in 
Weber's discussion of POL it lcs: the poss ! bL L ity of ind iv idua L se Lf- 
expression in an increasingly disciplinary society, the possibility of 
generating a meaningfuL existentiaL ethic for modern man, and the 
possibiL[ty of producing a non-ideoLogLcal defence of LlberaL institutions. 
The reLationships between these three shouLd be relativeLy cLear; Weber's 
defence of Liberal institutions is grounded in the self-disclpL [nary 
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character of a calling and orientated towards the retention of a space for 
individual self-expression, at the same time the conception of caLL! ng 
operates as an existential grounding for meaningful action by the 
individual. The political dimension of these relationships emerges at 
several points: in Weber's treatment of democratic types, his account of 
bureaucracy and his settLng out of the idea of caLLIng. In each of these 
instances, the fact/value distinction is undermined on at Least a 
rhetorLcaL Level. Thus under the guLse of settLng forth the two forms of 
democratic organisation availabLe In modernity, he states: 'there is onLy 
the choice between Leadership democracy with a "machine" and Leadertess 
democracy, name Ly, the ruLe of professLonaL poLiticLans without a 
caillng, '(FMW pl 13). Given the rhetoricaL force with which Weber endows the 
conceptLon of 'caLlIng', we are Left Ln LLttLe doubt as to whLch of these 
forms is preferred. SLmLLarLy, Weber's appraisaL of the structuraL forms of 
domination encouraged by bureaucratic deveLopment is juxtaposed to his 
attempt Limit or undermine such forces of domLnation, in this context, 'the 
iron cage' is hardLy a modet metaphor of scientific objectivity. FinaLLy, in 
his delineation of the poLiUcal as a calling, Weber prescibes a set of 
criterLat cond! tLons that effectLvely ruLe out poLitLcLans who wouLd 
undermine the democratic apparatus. Thus, through these and other devices, 
Weber imposes a LLberat conception of poLLtics through his socLoLogicaL 
anatysis. 
ConcLusion 
In this chapter, it has been showm how Weber characterises the fate of 
the human subject in modernity and his attempt to Mustrate a mode of 
coming to terms with this fate and transforming it into an affirmation of 
- 171 - 
the modern condition through the concept of a caLling. By focusing of the 
idea of discLpL! ne (as expressed through bureaucracy) and charisma (as 
expressed through, in this instance, the poL! tLcaL caLLLng), U has been 
shown how Weber's anaLysis of the modern intertwines existentiaL, soclaL 
and poLlticaL moments in an attempt to overcome the threat posed by 
nihilism on both structural and individual Levels. At this stage, the 
question of the roLe of the human sciences in this overcoming of the 
meaningtessness of existence in modernity must be raised. 
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Notes 
1. The Angto-American appropriation of Weber is discussed in Lassman and 
VeLody Max Weber's 'Scýence as a Vocation' (1988) pp160-167. 
2. Does Catholicism have a similar militant symbolism? 
3. Cf. Chapter 1, section 3. 
4. Compare Weber's notion of discipLine with that deveLopedby Foucautt 
notably in DP. 
5. Cf. Chapter 2, section 2. 
I 
6. In this art1cLe, 'The DiaLectic of Individuation and Domination: Max 
Weber's RationatLzation Theory and Beyond' (1987), Atexander deveLops an 
interesting comparison between Weber and Sartre. 
7. Is discipLine after Nuremburg barbaric'? 
8. A virtuaLLy LdentLcaL definition of the state is deveLoped in a radicaLLy 
different manner in Nozick Anarchy. State, and Utopia (1974), ch. 3. ALthough 
NozIck's argument is expLicLtLy prescriptive rather than descriptive. 
9. An exampLe here might be Israeti poLitics over the Last five years. 
10. A good exampLe of this is the Labour Party victory over ChurchIlL in 
the 1945 eLection. 
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LIBERALISM. SCIENCE AND THE POLITICS OF THEORY 
In" Sc I ence as a Vocat I on, 11 hIs great essay about how It1s 
possible to know, Max Weber Insists in a very NLetzschean 
mode that the acceptance of the essential ultimate 
inconsequent iality of scientific achievement is a 
prerequisite for being able to do sc ience. His problem is 
Nietzsche's: How does one write, the n, so as not to deny 
precisely that which one is asserting? - Tracy B. Stron_q. 
Introduct ion 
This chapter wiLl be concerned with taking up the issues of Weber's 
character ! sat ! on of science and its LmpLLcations for the poLltlcaL dimension 
of his texts. InitiaLty this wilL be considered through an anaLysis of his 
structuring of the vocation of science or scholarship. The extent to which 
this invoLves an LmpLLcit commitment to an evaLuatory theory of modernity 
wilL be examined. The figure of the scientist that Weber constructs in the 
course of his disquisition wiLL atso be taken up. The question wILL be 
ra Ised as to whether Weber's pract1caL vaLues intrude Into his 
investigation to the extent undermining the dichotomy between theoret1caL 
and practical values. FLnaLty, we will assess Weber's conception of the rote 
of the human sciences. 
1. ScLence as a CaLLinci 
In our time, the internal situation, in contrast to the 
organisatton of science as a vocation, is first of all 
conditioned by the facts that science has entered a stage of 
speciatisatLon previously unknown and that this will forever 
remain the case. Not only externally, but inwardly, matters 
stand at a point where the individual can acquire the sure 
consciousness of achieving something truly perfect in the 
field of science only in case he is a strict specialist. 
(FMW p134). 
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This matter of 'fact' statement opens Weber's discussion of the idea of 
having a callin_q for science. His explication of what it means to have a 
vocation for science and whether such a conceptuaLlsatLon can make sense 
in this instance. Weber's formulation of what is requLred to justify the 
ascription of such a caUlng to oneseLf in the modern age is sharpLy 
articuiated: 
A really definitive and good accomplishment is today always 
a speciaLLsed accomplishment. And whoever Lacks the capacity 
to put on blinders, so to speak, and to come up with the 
idea that the fate of his soul, depends on whether or not he 
makes the correct conjuncture at this passage of this 
manuscript may as well stay away from science. He will never 
have what one may call the 'personal experience' of science. 
Without this strange intoxication, ridiculed by every 
outsider; without this passion ... you have no calling for 
science and you should do something else. For nothing is 
worthy of man as man unless he can pursue It with passionate 
devotion. (FMW p135). 
Weber's rhetor[caL Language is orientated towards dispeLLing a disjuncture, 
which he envisages as gaining popular credence, between the categories of 
calcuLatLon and imagination, or hard work and inspiration. However, this 
rhetoric atso operates as a means of enabLing him to cLaLm that In 'the 
field of science only he who devoted solely to the work at hand has 
'PersonaLity'. ' (FMW p137). The entwining of the idea's of personality and 
callin_q was noted in the last chapter with regard to poLitics', it is a 
theme which wilL again concern us as we expLore Weber's deLlneation of the 
scientific vocation. At this stage, however, it is useful to return to the 
issue of 'passionate devotion' and schoLarship. Weber's espousaL of the 
interdependence of science and passion was by no means originaL as 
Nietzsche had earlier ennunclated a sLm! Lar point: 
ALL prob I ems demand great L ove, and of t hat on Iy st rong, 
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round, secure spirits who have a firm grLp of themselves are 
capable. It makes the most telling difference whether a 
thLnker has a personal relatLonshLp to his problems and 
finds in them his destiny, his distress, and his great 
happiness, or an 'impersonal' one, meaning that he can do no 
better than to touch them and grasp them with the antennae 
of cold, curious thought. In the Latter case nothing witt 
come of it ... for even if great problems should allow 
themselves to be grasped by them, they would not permit 
frogs and weaklings to hold onto them. (GS 345 in Eden 1984 
p40). 
In Weber's work however this cLalm is turned towards the professions in a 
way absent from (and atien to) Nietzsche's thought. Further, aLthough Weber 
is here concerned spec[fLcaLty with science as a vocation, the issue of 
'passionate devotion' is generallsabLe across cakings. Wherein then [Les 
the specifity of science as a caLLLng? What is the particutar form of 
'passionate devotion' integraL to science-? The pursuit of these questions 
requires an examination of 'progress' as a defining characteristic of 
sc ience. 
For Weber, scientific work is 'chained to the course of progress; whereas 
in the reaLm of art there Ls no progress in the same sense' TMW p137). 
What Weber means by this is that in science 'each of us knows that what 
he has accomplished wiLL be antiquated in ten, twenty, fifty years. That Is 
the fate to which science is subjected; it is the very mean Lng of 
scientific work' TMW p138), white on the contrary a 'work of art which is 
genuine IfulfiLment' is never surpassed, it w1IL never be antiquated' TMW 
p138). If this is the case, questions arise as to the value of science as a 
mode of practLcaL act[vity2-. This point haý been eLegantly expressed by 
L6w ith: 
Homer was not supplanted by Dante, nor Dante by Shakespeare. 
But the cosmology of Aristotle was indeed supplanted by that 
of KepLer, Galileo and Newton, just as Newton was Later 
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displaced by Einstein. Indeed the very 'point' that makes 
scientific work 'meaningful' is precisely that every answer 
should produce new questions, that science should desire to 
be superseded as knowledge develops and progresses. ... Yet 
this in itself raises the question ... why should one pursue 
an activity or harness oneself to a professional enterprise 
which has no prospect of futfiLment? (1-8with 1988 p139). 
For Weber, the pursuit of Limited practicaL or technicaL goaLs is not an 
adequate answer to the dlLemma posed for scLence, rather he argues one 
must attempt to make sense of the idea of 'science pursued for Its own 
sake'. This task is given an existentLat urgency by Weber through his 
interreLation of scientific progess with the concept of disenchantment. 
For Weber, scientific progress represents 
a fraction, the most important fraction, of the process of 
Lnte[Lectuallsation which we have been undergoing for 
thousands of years and which is usualLy judged in such an 
extremeLy negative way. (FMW p138/139). 
The meaning of this 'process of intetLectuaLisatlon' resides not in 'an 
increased and general knowledge of the conditions under which one Lives' 
TMW p139). But rather in: 
the knowledge or belief that if one but wished one could 
Learn it [the mechanics of a car, for example] at any time. 
Hence, It means that principally there are no mysterious 
incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one 
can, In principle, master all things by calculation. This 
means that the world Is disenchanted. ... Technical means 
and calculations perform the service. This above all is what 
intetLectuaLisation means. (FMW p139). 
Weber eLucidates the existentiaL problematic raised by the discenchantment 
of worLd by reference to the thought of Tolstoy: 
ALL his brooding increasingly revolved about the problem or 
whether or not death is a meaningful phenomenon. And his 
answer was: for civiLised man death has no meaning. It has 
none because the individual Life of civiLised man, placed 
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into an infinite 'progress', according to its own immanent 
meanings should never come to an end; for there is always a 
further step ahead of one who stands in the march of 
progress. And no man who comes to die stands on the peak 
which LIes in infinity. ... And because death is 
meaningless, civiLLsed Life as such is meaningless; by its 
very 'progressiveness' it gives death the imprint of 
meaninglessness. (FMW p139/140). 
The question at this juncture is no Longer mereLy that of the meaning and 
vaLue of an individuaLs caLLIng for science. For to raise this quetion 'is 
to ask for the vocation of science within the totaL life of humanity' (FMW 
p140). If science as 'the most important fraction ... ' is constitutive of a 
poLitLcs of nihiLism, as is suggested by Weber's interpretation of ToLstoy, 
it foLlows that Weber must resurrect the question of the value of science. 
In a section reminiscent of Nietzsche's How the 'Real World' at last 
became a Myth, Weber approaches the questlon of the vatue of scLence 
through a consideration of the foundations ascribed to the vaLue of 
science in different historical periods. For Plato, the value of science Lay 
In that it seizes not upon Muslons and shadows but upon the true being. 
To expand this a LittLe: 
True science or knowledge is, for the Greeks, the pathway to 
true bein_q, and above aLL to true politics, which demands a 
truly just regulation of communal, Life within a public 
community. True being is, moreover, also _qood 
and beautiful 
being; for it is not possible for the beautiful or good to 
exist in the absence of true insight into what it is that 
makes anything good or beautiful. (Lbwith 1988 p141). 
In the Renaissance, these vaLue-cLaims shift to science as rational 
experiment, science as representing the 'pathway to true art and thus at 
the same time the pathway to true nature' (Ldwith 1988 p142). Again: 
Copernicus, Kepter, GaLlLeo and Newton were att equaLly 
convinced that God had ordained the worLd rnathematicatLy and 
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that they could come to know Him by reading what, by analogy 
with the Bible, they termed the 'book' of Nature. The 
biologist Swammerdamm's triumphant declaration, 11 bring you 
here the proof of God' s providence in the anatomy of a 
Louse' gives an indication of the confidence with which a 
belief in natural science as a pathway to God could be 
assumed in the period before Kant produced his critique of 
physico-teLeoLog[caL arguments for God's existance. (L-6with 
1988 p142). 
L6w! th points out that there was the 'fear aLready expressed in Kant that 
the new mechanicaL view of the worLd might become "a profane, secuLar 
science"' (Lbwith 1988 p142). For Weber this fear is a modern reatLty: 
And f inal Ly, sc L ence as a way to God' 'ý' Sc i ence, this 
specifically irreligious power? That science today is 
irreligious no one will doubt in his innermost being, even 
if he will not admit it to himself. (FMW p142). 
As for science as a way to happiness, Weber dismisses this by referring to 
Nietzsche's criticism of the 'Last men' who 'Invented happ[ness'3. In a 
disenchanted worLd, the Musory nature of these historicaL vaLuations of 
science emerges. Who today believes In science as a way to true being, to 
true nature, to God, to happiness? No one 'aside from a few big chiLdren in 
university chairs or edLtor! aL offices. ' TMW p143). Weber's question is 
now: 
Under these internal presuppositions, what is the meaning of 
science as a vocation, now after all these former illusions 
... have been dispelled. Totstoy has given the simplest 
answer, with the words: 'Science is meaningless because it 
gives no answer to our question, the only question important 
f or us: ' What sha IL we do and how sha IL we L1 ve? II That 
science does not give us an answer to this is indisputable. 
The only question that remains is the sense in which science 
gives no answer, and whether or not science might yet be of 
some use to the one who puts the question property. (FMW 
p143). 
At this stage, as part of putting 'the question property', Weber takes up 
- 179- 
the related issue of whether 'what Is yielded by scientific work is 
important in the sense that it is 'worth being knownY TMW p143). Can this 
centraL presupposition of science be validated? For Weber, in this: 
are contained aLL our problems. For this presupposition 
cannot be proved by scientific means. It can only be 
interpreted with reference to its ultimate meaning, which we 
must reject or accept, according to our ultimate position 
towards Life. (FMW p143). 
Hav ing argued that, in Tolstoy's sense, sc ience Is existentially 
meaninglesv, it now appears that it is logically valueless. Strangely, it is 
prec[seLy at this point that Weber begins to reconstruct science as a 
meanLngfuL act[vLty. The probLematisation of the vaLue of scLence - 'Is 
life, the object of the doctor's efforts, worth preseving? ' (Curtius 1988 
p7l ). - 'can on Ly be reso Lved by human be ings who adopt pos it ions for or 
against avaLLabLe options' (Lbwith 1988 p144). Science is given meaning and 
value by the leap of' faith involved in accepting its presuppositions, in 
adopting an ultimate position towards life which affirms these 
presuppos it ions. 
The grounds on which Weber deveLops the idea of a calling for science 
become cLear at this point. For given that the centrat presupposition of 
science cannot be ratLonaLLy grounded, it foLLows that the affirmation of 
the vaLue of science is a matter of personaL decision. As Weber puts it: 
whether, under such conditions, science is a worthwhile 
vocation for somebody, and whether science Itself has an 
objectively valuable vocation are again value-judgements 
about which nothing can be said in the Lecture-room. (FMW 
152). 
However, and here the purpose of Weber's historicat tour becomes apparent, 
this personaL choLce must be an informed decisLon. Here Weber's remarks on 
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the nature of science in modernity are reLevant: 
Science today is a vocation organised in special disciplines 
in the service of self-cLarLfication and knowledge of 
interrelated facts. It is not the gift of grace of seers and 
prophets dispensing sacred values and revelations, nor does 
it partake of the contemplation of sages and ph! Losphers 
about the meaning of the universe. This, to be sure, is the 
inescapabLe condition of our historical situation. We cannot 
evade it as Long as we remain true to ourselves. (FMW p152). 
The thrust of Weber's argument here is to argue that it is not enough 
that one commits oneseLf to an uLtimate position towards life which 
affirms and prLoritises the preconceptions underlying the claim to value of 
science. Beyond this, it is necessary that in making this commitment one 
recognises the 'historicaL situation' of science. Onty then, in facing up to 
the demands of the day whUe retainLng 'the pLain duty of intettectuaL 
integrity' TMW p156), does one satisfy the criteria of having a vocation 
for science. 
To develop this issue of the 'historical situation' of science further 
requires that we return to what is, for Weber, a centraL element of this 
situation: 'the sense in which science gives us no answer' to the question 
What shaH we do and how shaLL we Live? "' (FMW p143). To take this up 
necessitates an examination of Weber's formuLation of the reLationship 
between sociaL science and politicaL practice. 
It was pointed out in our discussion of Weber's methodology that the 
fact-vatue dLstinction he operates revoLves about a separatLon of 
theoretical and practical vaLues. What is it though that motivates this 
distinction? According to LdwLth, Weber is impetied to make such a 
distinction because of his Lnsight into the fact that: 
we here today Live in a worLd that has become relfled 
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through sclentif ic technoLogy whi Le, at the same time, the 
obj ect iv1 st rat i ona L1 ty of sc i ence has L1 berat ed us f rom an 
adherence to unLversaL Ly binding moraL and ret lgLous norms. 
Since the progress of science is unstoppabLe, it must be 
seen as a force which destroys the authorLty of tradition. 
The vaLue judgernents we uLtimateLy make can therefore 
neither find support in tradition, nor cLaim scientific 
foundation; they are, whether we Like it or not, a matter of 
personaL decision. (Lbwlth 1988 p145). 
SimiLarLy Landshut notes that the process of rationatisation constitutes 
the 'progressive destruction of any generally binding force in the public 
sphere' (Landshut 1988 pl0l). CtassLcaL socLaL theory, for Landshut, fLnds 
its raison detre in the quest for the sumum bonum and its telos in the 
reconstLtutLon of the 'b[nclLng character of the pubLLc sphere' (Landshut 
1988 p102). CLassicaL theories: 
start from the presupposition that the prLncipLe of binding 
force itseLf, the criterion of LegaLity, can be discovered 
and derived from man's existance in the worLd. Indeed the 
cLaim to generaL binding force is supposed to have its 
foundation in this very fact. (Landshut 1988 p102). 
For Weber though, given that the 
end of the nineteenth century brought with it the most 
radicaL dismantLLng of a[L received pubLlc vaLues, forms of 
Life and principLes (Landshut 1988 p103), 
the possibiLity of deducing the good life from the experience of facts has 
become an LnteLLectuaL absurdity: 
the vaLldity of a practicaL Lmperative as a norm on the one 
hand, and the cLaLm to truth of an emp! rLcat observation of 
facts on the other, beLong on absoLuteLy heterogenous LeveLs 
of any given compLex of probLems. (Weber in Landshut 1988 
P104). 
What is significant here is the suggestion by both L6w! th and Landshut 
that Weber's conception of an increasingly rationaLlsed world acts as a 
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preconception informing his notion of the socLaL sciences and Lmpetknq him 
towards his formuLation of the fact-vaLue distinction. Yet Weber's claim as 
to the ratLonaLLsed make-up of modernity is, supposedLy, founded in this 
very same scientific activity. This probLem Leads on to the issue as to 
whether Weber's positing of the fact-vaLue distinction, and thereby his 
conception of science is rooted in a transcenclentat or historicist 
f ramework. 
On the one hand, if Weber is making a transcendentaL cLalm about the 
status of science as his use of the terms 'progress' and 'Utusion' suggest 
and which his formulation of a mehodoLogy delineating the Legitimate 
activity of science indicates, then we are brought up against the probLem 
of his grounding science in subective orientations towards Life and his 
use of rationaLlsation as a preconceptLon [nforming Ms own conceptLon of 
the soclaL sciences. On the other hand, if Weber is depLoying a historicist 
conception of science, then his use of the terms 'Muslon' and 'progress' 
becomes probLematic. The former term might be accounted for by arguing 
that Weber utiLises it in the Nietzschean sense whereby no claim is being 
made as to the possibLLity of being LLLusiontess, rather it is the cLalm 
that the 'ILLusion' in question has Lost its prooF of' power'. However, even 
in adopting such a reading, Weber's commitment to a conception of 
'progress' militates against such a historicist interpretation. It wouLd 
appear here that a genuine tension disrupts Weber's account of science. 
This tension creates a probLem regarding the Issue of the reLationship 
between social science and politics. 
If Weber is operating a transcendentat cLaim about the status of the 
fact-vaLue distinction, it is readiLy apparent that he wishes to preserve 
an absotute separation between science and poL! tlcs. However this wouLd 
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negate his concern to formulate a conception of social scientific activity 
for the fate of' our times. If the fact-vaLue distinction operates within a 
historicist framework, however, then it wouLd be necessary to specify the 
sense in which a separation of science and poLitLcs is pecuLLarLy 
appropriate to modernity. Moreover, given that the process of 
rationaLisation involves an inherently poLiticaL dimension, this formulation 
would allow for the re-introduction of poL! tLcs into a Weberian soclaL 
science. It is this Latter point which wiLL concern us in the second part 
of this paper, for the moment though it is usefuL to summarise the points 
estabLished to date. 
In this section, Weber's account of science as a vocation has been 
sketched out. The movement in his text from the issue of scientific 
progress to the question of the vaLue of science has been cLarified. His 
discussion of the commitment invoLved in having a caLling for science and 
the meaning of this affirmation for the vaLue of science has been brought 
out. FLna[Ly, the tension In Weber's concept of science was indicated. The 
questions which concern us now relate to the politics of this conception 
of scLence. 
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2. LiberaLLsm and the PolLtics 
_of 
a CaLLIng for Science 
Methodology is mind engaged in the legitimation of its own 
political activity. (WoLln 1981 p106). 
This perceptive remark by WoLln neatLy opens up the space to be examined 
in this section: the politics of Weber's theoretical operation in 'Science 
as a Vocation'. In his essay 'Max Weber: Legitimation, Method, and the 
POLUIcs of Theory,, WoLLn argues cogentLy that Weber's ldeaL sociaL 
scientist is shaped in the image of, or rather an image paralLeL to, the 
CaLvinist as presented by Weber Ln The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
CapftaLlsm. Thus WoLLn notes: 
The dogma of predestination decrees that the CaLvinist wiLl 
Labour amidst unreLLeved uncertainty. ScLentLflc man is in a 
similar predicament. 'Our highest vaLues' are 'a matter of 
faith. ' ALthough they are cruclaL in orientating us towards 
our scientific work, there is no way that we, as scientists, 
can be assured that these vaLues are 'true'. KnowLedge of 
vaLues, Like the knowLedge of secret eLection by God, is 
inaccessibLe. (WoLln 1981 p413/414). 
This modern formulation of the 'politics of the soul' is, for Weber, 
artLcuLated about the fact-vaLue distinction: 'As Long as science couLd not, 
in principLe, determine choice, men were forced to be free to choose. ' 
(Wolin 1981 p414). For Wolin, the significance of this is clear: 
The inherent Limitations of science, its [nabLLlty to make 
good the deficiencies of the worLd's meaning, provide the 
backdrop to the poLltlcaL roLe of the methodoLogist. His 
task is not to undertake scientific investigations or even 
to instruct his co-workers on how best to conduct research, 
much Less to offer a speclaL f leLd of study. Rather it is to 
show them that sLgnif ! cant act ion in their chosen rea Lm is 
possibLe. It is, therefore, a form of poLitical education in 
the meaning of vocation. Its poLiticaLness comes from the 
seriousness, even urgency, of the relationship between 
vocationat action and the worLd. (WoLLn 1981 p416). 
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Here, WoLin suggests an affinity between Weber's concepts of science and 
charisma and indeed an affinity wh ich informs the poLitics being 
Legitimated In 'Science as a Vocation", 
Science is charisma ' in a godless and prophetless time' and 
it is displayed by the person 'with an inward calling' who 
can endure that 'the world is disenchanted'. It is for the 
chosen few, 'the affair of an intellectual aristocracy'. It 
i S, above all, charisma because science requires 
I inspiration' I Ein_qebungl. It has nothing to do with any 
cold calculation. ... 'Whether we have scientific 
inspiration, ' he [Weber - RDOI continued, 'depends upon 
destinies that are hidden from us, and besides upon 
"gifts". ' (WoLin 1981 p417). 
It is at this stage that Wolin's analysis becomes problematic. The 
inspiration or frenzy he refers to is not unique to science: 
Inspiration in the f ieLd of science by no means plays any 
greater role, as academic conceit fancies, than it does In 
the field of mastering problems of practical Life by a 
modern entrepeneur. (FMW/SV p136). 
CertalnLy, WoLln's point that charisma is exhibited by the person with an 
'inward ca LL ing, who stoicaLLy accepts that the modern worLd is 
'disenchanted', is essentlaLLy correct. However, it is not the specificity of 
science which unLqueLy dispLays this feature, rather it Is in reLatLon to 
the concept of a calling as such that Weber's notion of charisma appLies. 
It wiLL be recaLLed (from the opening remarks of this chapter) that Weber 
depLoys the idea of personality reLative to the individuaL with a caLL! ng. 
The significant of this concept of personality is that It embodies a 
vocationalised concept of charisma. In a 'prophetLess 
time' Weber 
reorientates the concept of charisma into the professions 
by way of the 
notion of a caLting so that it re-emerges as personality. 
This specific 
theme wLtL be taken up again Later; for the moment 
however, it is 
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necessary to return to the generaL issue of the poLitLcs of 'Science as a 
Vocat ion. 
In a recent argument5, Eden has suggested that 'Science as a Vocation' 
constitutes part of Weber's strategy for presenting a defence of liberal 
institutions without recourse to classical L lbera L ideo Logy. For Eden, 
Weber's reformulation of the Thucydidean politikos, the unending and 
inevitable tragLc conflict between ultimate values, entails his affirmation 
of the fact-vaLue distinction. This in turn requires science to transcend 
liberalism as an ideology. Consequently, the liberal dilemma concerning the 
destructive potentiality of science is avoided. 
The tragic outlook of "the ancients" enabLes Weber to invest 
science with a skeptical empiricism that claims not to be 
shakeable by the reaLisation that scientific technique has 
made the human future problematic and uncertain as never 
before, By abandoning Liberalism, Weberlan science surmounts 
the discovery that modern scientific progress has become 
"the great pain-bringer" or that technological 
humanitarianism is in actuality profoundly inhumane. (Eden 
1984 p138). 
It is Eden's argument that despite Weber's commitment to the fact-vaLue 
distinction and thus to the separation of science and ideoLogy, his 
formuLatLon of science as a human practice does LndLrectLy offer a defence 
of LiberaL institutions. ConsequentLy, two questions arise for Eden (and 
for us): (1) How does this defense operate? and (11) Is it based on 
intelli-qible and acceptable _qrounds? 
For Weber, 11berat democracy is founded on the division of tabour, 
consequentLy a defense of LiberaL institution requires that Weber provide a 
legitimation of the division of Labour which undermines both the 
Nletzschean critique of decadence and the Marxist critique of alienation. 
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This clifficuLty of this is indicated by the fact that for Weber: 
The probity of a scholar today, and above all of a 
phi tosopher today, can be measured by how he stands towards 
Nietzsche and Marx, Whoever does not admit that he could not 
conduct the most weighty part of his own work without the 
work these two have done, swindles himself and others. 
Intellectually, the world in which we ourselves exist is to 
an exceptional degree a world formed by Marx and Nietzsche. 
(Weber in Eden 1984 p143). 
Here our concern is with Weber's defence against Nietzsche's comments on 
decadence. It w! LL be recaLLed that for both Weber and Nietzsche 'nothing 
is worthy of man unLess he can pursue it with passionate devotion' (FMW/SV 
p135). It is at the point after this agreement that their paths diverge. 
For Nietzsche, this imperative manifests itself in the individual's self- 
formation as an aesthetic whole; the indLviduaL has a calling towards 
welding all the diverse practices he engages in into a coherent totality 
and none of these practices have a necessary priority over the otherS6. 
However, for Weber, this 'passionate devotion' needs necessariLy to be 
expressed within the framework of a single vocational practice: the 
'professions are the testing grounds for that devotion' (Eden 1984 p143). 
As Eden puts it: 
Weber's intention is to compeL men to prove their nobility 
and greatness, above all to themselves, within the "Iron 
cage". (Eden 1984 p143). 
CentraL then to Weber's argument is his focus on the issues of self- 
d[scLpLLne and setf-del imitation. However, before deveLoping these concerns, 
it is necessary to return to the question of the status of science. 
The Nietzschean critique of the autonomy of science rests, Eden 
suggests: 
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upon the comprehensive responsibility and creativity of the 
philosopher. Science cannot be independent, because there 
are no inteLLIqLbLes beyond the becoming, the endless 
creation and destruction, of the world as will to power. The 
philosopher's affirmation is superior to the highest theory 
because it is a ranking of values consonant with an 
eternally recurring world. (Eden 1984 p156). 
This critique undermines the classical transcendental defence of the 
autonomy of sclence as founded on the autonomy of inteLLIgIbLes. To repty 
to Nietzsche here, Weber must Locate a non-transcendentat site on which to 
ground science's autonomy. Eden argues that: 
What the new basis might be seems to be revealed in the fact 
that science can survive the collapse of these former 
illusions. The new foundation of scientific autonomy would 
take account of what is permanent, the dstinctive means of 
scientific work: science would have to generate a critique 
of itself that could comprehend all the means of scientific 
work. But it would also have to account for the experience 
of disillusionment, as Weber does. Weber's survey [of former 
grounds put forward as foundations for science] adumbrates a 
historicist explanation of disillusionment. ... The sequence 
culminates in the uniqueness of the present age. "We Live in 
a godless and prophetLess time" but also a time in which 
these former philosophical and political ideals no Longer 
move science. (Eden 1984 p156). 
Eden Locates Weber's argument as a form of practical historicism and yet, 
at the same time, imbues it with a teleological strain. This issue wilt be 
taken up shortLy, but fIrst we must relate this account of scientIfLc 
autonomy to Weber's emphasis on se Lf-de Limitation. 
The self-deLimitatlon of science is an instance of the more 
general problem of how the modern self can determine itself. 
What authenticity (holding true to one's individuality, or 
becoming what one is) would require is not primarily a 
matter of doctrine or right belief. In the case of science, 
self-determination would entail affirming the full means of 
science and the articulation of science as an enterprise in 
the world with a specLaLlsed division of tabour. More 
generally, this instantLates the rquLrement that the self 
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affirm the conditions of its own autonomous activity, hence 
its own necessities. (Eden 1984 p157). 
Today, therefore, the scientist must affirm the uniqueness of the 
scientific predicament in modernity and 'thus pose to science the choice of 
responsibility for the ultimate meaning of its own conduct' (Eden 1984 
p158). FinaLLy, science is to take its responsibit[ty upon itseLf. The 
ultimate foundation of scientific autonomy, on this account, is the self of 
the scientLst, a seLf attuned to the probLematic moraL character of scLence 
and taking 'a new pride in its unprecendented morat seriousness' (Eden 
1984 p158). If Weber's argument holds good, it acts as a de facto defence 
of LlberaL LnstLtutLons; thus Eden states: 
having broken the connections between Liberal cause and the 
cause of sc i ence at the Level of theory, Weber can 
nevertheless assert that the defense of Liberal democratic 
institutions is a cause worthy of man as man. At the Level 
of practice, there can be no doubt that a professional 
science resolved to take responsibility for itself along the 
lines we have sketched could do so energetically within the 
framework of the Liberal commercial republic. (Eden 1984 
p158). 
For Eden, however, the case Weber constructs involves a set of 'dubious 
assertlons about the hLstory of sclence' (Eden 1984 p159). 
These 'dubious assertions' reLate to Weber's treatment of Bacon. Weber's 
critique of Bacon is that this conception of science faiLs to perceive its 
nihLtlstic potentiaL, onLy in modernity does this responsibility come to be 
pLaced fuLly on the scientist. The Baconian chimera 'denied to the scientist 
... that distinctive moral sobriety which Weber holds out 
for science today 
as the wet[-sprlng of its great dignity in the total ethical economy of 
human L ife' (Eden 1984 pl 60). Weber's readLng of Bacon though Is 
fundamentatLy fLawed for Eden who argues that, in actuatity, Bacon's 
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description of science is radically similar to Weber's own character isat ! on: 
In his writings on science, Bacon advocated the 
transformation of science into a speciaLised experimental 
enterprise such as Weber describes. He propounded the 
elaborate division of Labour on which Weber dweL Ls in the 
opening part of Science as a Vocation ... Weber's conception 
of empirical knowledge as the inversion of means/ends 
propositions is Baconian. ... Weber's definition of science 
is straight from Bacon: it is 'knowledge of the techniques 
by means of which one masters Life, both external things and 
the actions of men, through reckoning. ' (Eden 1984 p161). 
If this is so, then the dlLemma posed is this: does this description which 
seems to suggest that Bacon's pLans for science have been adequatety 
reaLLsed, square with Weber's interpretation of Bacon's pLans, whereby this 
outcome is seen as an unintended consequence? If the account of science in 
modernity offered by Weber and his interpretation of Bacon do not square, 
if the account of Bacon offered by Weber is inadequate, then it may weLL 
folLow that Weber's defence of LLberaL institutions is sLmiLarLy fLawed. For 
Eden, this is entaiLed by the reading that: 
Weber' s entire argument for the autonomy of science stands 
or faLls with the ethicaL doctrine conveyed by his treatment 
of Bacon, the doctrine of the unique predicament and 
respons 1bLILty of contemporary sc L ence. (Eden 1984 pl 65). 
If the telos that Eden Locates in Weber's argument cannot take the strain 
of exposure to "Inconvenient facts" raised through the study of the hisory 
of science, a discipline which operates as a branch of science, then the 
I. consequence ts a profoundly troubling ambivalence regarding the pursuit of 
truth' (Eden 1984 p165). 
Eden's own argument, however, is [tseLf by no means unprobLematic and 
it 
may be that by Identifying lacunae here a way out of the diLemma posed 
for Weber's account of science wilL emerge. The fundamentaL fLaw 
in Eden's 
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case is a confLation of scientific activity with the meaning of that 
scientific activity. That science in modernity is consonant with the 
description of its form and activity as described by Bacon does not imPLY 
that the meaning of the practice of science is sLm! LarLy identicaL. The 
'unintended consequence' of the development of Bacon's plans for science is 
that this cleveLopment has itseLf undermined the foundation of science as a 
way to true nature For Bacon, the vaLue of science is unprobLematic yet, 
in modernity, this vaLue has been rendered probtematic by the very 
deveLopment of science ltseLf. The 'unique predicament' of modern science 
reLates to the shift in its existentLaL meaning. As such, Weber's account 
of the autonomy of science in terms of its ethical responsibility in 
modernity is resistant to the line of argument Eden depLoys. 
I To concLude this section, it is usefuL to summarise the significant points. 
We began by indicating the poLlticaL character of the concept of vocation. 
This vocationat politics was then taken up specificalty in reference to the 
I 
caLting of science and it was Mustrated how Weber's conception of science 
in terms of a vocation couLd act as an afternative to Nietzsche's critique 
of Liberaksm. To raise the question of whether this afternative is 
effective requires that the coherence of Weber's project for the soclaL 
sciences in modernity be examined. 
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3. The PoLitics of the Human Sciences 
In the interpretation deveLoped in both this chapter, and in our 
discussion of 'PoLLtLcs as a Vocation', it has been noted that Weberian 
social science involves a commitment to a Liberal democratic form of 
society. In this final section, the nature of this affirmation will be 
brought out in reLatlon to the question of the roLe of the human sciences 
for Weber. FLrstLy, the Lssue of the fact-value dLstinction wILL be raLsed 
again to demonstrate the nature ofthe liberal values involved in Weber's 
form of argument. SecondLy, we wILL return to the roLe of the concept of a 
'ca LI Lng' in Weber's work, retating th is to the prob lem of the 
groundlessness of existence which is posed for Weber by modernity. Finally, 
Weber's conception of the meaning and vaLue of the human sciences in 
modernity will be elaborated. 
In our discuss[on of Weber's methodoLogy, it was argued that the 
distinctLon drawn between empirLcat statements of fact and judgements of 
value rests on a prior distinction between theoreticaL and practical 
values. This prior d[stLnct[on is embodied in the separation of the notions 
of value-sphere and value-orientatiori7. It was aLso noted that Weber's 
conception of a calling operates as a device for the articuLation of his 
LlberaL poLU[cs- What must be estabLlshed here is the connection between 
the formuLatLon of the fact-vaLue distLnction and the Wea of a caLLIng. 
To begin with we must note the intimacy of the notions IvaLue-spherel 
and 'ca LL Ing 1. A value-sphere, It will be recalled, is the abstract 
expression of the theoretical values Immanent to a particular way of Life 
or mode of activity. Modernity is characterised, on one level, by the clash 
of contrasting vaLue-spheres. One must affirm a particular value-sphere 
to 
the exclusion of others. This Is an Integral aspect of Weber's 
'polytheism'. 
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A given vaLue-sphere is, for Weber, the articulation of the nature of the 
'god' appropriate to a specific calling. The vaLue-sphere of science, for 
example, Involves a commitment to truth as immanent in the vocational 
activity of science. For Weber, without this prior[tisation of truth as a 
theoretical value one cannot be said to have a calling for science and yet 
the concept of a calling is, for Weber, the product of Protestant 
asceticism. As such Weber's formulation of the idea of a vaLue-sphere is 
made possible only in modernity. 
The central point here is that Weber's formulation of the fact-value 
distinction involves an affirmation of the form of society where work in a 
calling is made possible or necessary and where one may decide on the 
'god' one will adopt. In other words, underlying his formulation of the 
distinction between value-spheres and vaLue-orientat ions, is a practical 
commitment to Liberal democracy as the form of society most able to aid 
the articulation of the individual's calling within the disciplinary 
framework of modernity. We have noted the way this commitment emerges in 
'Politics as a Vocation', for example, in Weber's rhetorical advocacy of 
'Leadership democracy' against 'Leaderless democracy". It appears then that 
LntegraL to Weber's formuLatlon of the fact-vaLue distinction, there is 
always already an affirmation of the vaLue of Liberal institutions. As 
Lbwlth has put it: Weber 'denied the intrinsic vatue of aLL modern 
institutions, but affirmed them nevertheless as the given means towards a 
freety chosen purpose' (LbwLth 1982 p49). Here we must ask the question as 
to why Weber shouLd feet such a poiLtical move necessary. The expLoration 
of this issue requires a brief resum6 of Weber's character isat ion of 
modernity before we take up once more the concept of caLLIng in his work. 
Landshut has argued that a centraL theme for Weber is that the 
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'dLsenchantment of the worLd puts the "ground Lessness" of free exIstance, 
in alL its mysteriousness, at the center of the the debate' (Landshut 1988 
pl 10) on the nature of modernity. Why shou Ld th is be the case? We can 
begin with HennLs' suggestion that Weber 'accepted without reservation 
Nietzsche's diagnosis of the time: God is dead' (Hennis 1988 p158). This 
acceptance takes the form of a reatisation of the irrationality of 
capitatism (and thereby of the ways of Life concommitant with capitaLism) 
in modernity. 
For the Puritan, economic behaviour in the form of' the rationaL 
accumuLation of capLtaL was founded upon certaLn reLigLous beLLefs. Yet, [n 
modernity, these betiefs have disintegrated under the force of the process 
of ratlonaLlsation which they, in part, created. As Weber puts it: 
Since asceticism undertook to remodel the world and work out 
Its ideal in the worLd, material goods have gained an 
increasing and finally an Inexorable power over the Lives of 
men as at no previous period in history. Today the spirit of 
religious asceticism - whether finally, who knows? - has 
escaped from the cage. But victorious capitalism, since It 
rests on mechanical foundations, needs its support no 
Longer. The rosy blush of Its laughing heir, the 
Enlightenment, seems also to be irretrivabLy fading, and the 
idea of duty In one's calling prowls about in our lives Like 
the ghost of dead religious beliefs. (PESC p181/182). 
Under the aegls of capitaLLsm, there Ls a reLfIcation of materlaL products 
which finally cuts capitalism free from its religious foundations. At this 
po int, an 'Irrationality' may be Located within the very process of 
ratLonallsation. As Ldwith notes: 
the economic beLlefs of the bourgeois stratum of society, 
which were originaLLy IreLlgiouslyl motivated ... become 
lirrationaLl when, emptied of their religious content, they 
are transformed into profane economic activity. 
(Lbwith 1982 
p50). 
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Expressed generaLLy, modernity is marked by the fact that what were 
previousLy mereLy means to given vaLued ends are transformed into ends in 
themse Lves. Moreover: 
In this way, means as ends make themseLves independent and 
thus Lose their originaL 'meaning' or purpose, that is, they 
Lose their originaL purposive rationaLity orientated to man 
and his needs. This reversaL marks the whoLe of modern 
civiLlsation, whose arrangements, institutions and 
activities are so 'rationaLised' that whereas humanity once 
estabLished itsetf within them, now it is they which encLose 
and determine humanity Like an I iron cage' . (Lbw[th 1982 
p48). 
God is dead: as with Nietzsche, this indicates the coLLapse of the 
foundations of aLL vaLues and ends. Activity in modernity is divorced from 
the context of vaLues which gave it meaning, this separation renders 
modern modes of Life meanIngLess. Yet, again as with Nietzsche, this 
colLapse of foundations for vaLues has made us what we are, nostaigia for 
a binding pubLic sphere is a fLight from the reaLity of our being in 
modernity. This is why, for Weber, any attempt to operate a cLassical form 
of sociat theory in modernity is mereLy to present 'a mixed posy of 
cultural, evaluations' (Weber in Landshut 1988 p103). The Loss of binding 
values, the disintegration of the public sphere - these facts render 
modern existance 'groundLess'. Our task now is to uncover how and why 
Weber attempts to reaffirm the meaning of [ndMduaL Life in modernity 
without recourse to foundations. 
A starting point for this topic is given by Lbwlth's discussion of 
Weber's indLviduatism. Disenchantment, the Loss of faith in vaLues, is the 
fate of modernity. Yet this disenchantment is an ambiguous phenomenon, at 
the same moment that faith is Lost so to a new space 
is opened up for the 
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possibiLity of giving meaning to one's [ndividuaL actions. The foLlowing 
two comments by L8wlth indicate the positive side of this ambiguity: 
The positive 'opportunity' presented by this disappointment 
of ma n and the disenchantment of the worLd through 
rationaLlsation is the 'sober' affirmation of everday life 
and its 'demands'. (Ldw[th 1982 p56). 
The positive element of this Lack of faith in something that 
goes beyond the destiny of the times and the demands of the 
day - this Lack of faith in the objective presence of 
values, meanings and validities - is the subjectivity of 
rational responsibility as the pure responsibility of the 
individual towards himself. (1-6with 1982 p56). 
The fate of the indiv[duaL in modernity is to face up to the demands of 
the day or to take flight from the reality of the times to the 'arms of 
the oLd churches' (FMW p155). The basic attitude: 
which Weber assumed in this rationaLlsed world, and which 
also governed his 'methodology', is therefore the 
objectively unsupported obligation of the individual to 
himself. Placed into this world of submission, the 
individual, qua 'human being', belongs to himself and relies 
on himself. (Ldwith 1982 p57). 
SeLf-responsibility, then, is to be the attitude assumed by the strong 
indLvLduaL in modernity. Our question becomes: how is this doctrine of 
LndLviduaL self-responsibLLIty to be articuLated? It Ls at thLs juncture 
that Weber's secularised conception of a calLing becomes significant. He 
notes: 'The Puritan wanted to work in a caLting; we are forced to do so. ' 
(PESC pl8l). With the Loss of faith, the reLigious content and meaning of a 
calling is also Lost. This may be expressed as the movement from a caliIng 
to a profession. We have become 'specLatists without spirit' yet, as Lbwlth 
noted, Weber: 
deLiberatety renounced the aspiratLon to 'universaL 
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humanity', L LmItLng himself to the special Lsed work of the 
specialist, which he regarded as being 'in today's world the 
precondition for any kind of worthwhi Le action'. (Lbwith 
1982 p59). 
It is because meaningfuL action in modernity requires speciallsation that 
Weber, to express his doctrine of seLf-respons[bility, attempts the 
revItatisation of the idea of a calling. His 'polytheism', the demand that 
one choose one particular god, h[s rhetor[cal deployment of the terms 
'fate', 'destiny', 'demon' - aLL of these factors are orientated to the 
reinvestment of the idea of a caLLLng with meaning. This is necessariLy so 
for Weber, given his cLaLm that meanlngfuL action in modernity Is aLways 
speclatised action, since 'self-responsib[LLtyl presupposes that one's action 
relatLve, to one's self are meaningfut. As Lbwlth has expressed it: 
The ant inomy of Weber' s pot it ! cat science is basicaL Ly that 
it is just this inexorable adjustment to the rational, 
enterprise-Like character of all modern institutions that 
becomes the Locus of possible setf-reaLisation: the cage of 
'subordination' becomes the only available space for the 
'freedom of movement' which was Weber's primary concern, 
both as man and as politician. (Lbwlth 1982 p49). 
Having Located the nature of, and the reasons for, Weber's devetopment of 
the Ldea of a calLIng as a means of overcomLng the groundLessness of 
modern existence, we may now examine the roLe he assigns to the human 
sciences retatLve to this existentiaL poL! tlcs. 
As a proLegomenon to this task, it may be usefuL to reLate Weber's 
project to Nietzsche's character L sat ion of the modern. For Nietzsche, in its 
preLLmLnary form, nihilism is expressed as pessimism: the cry 'In vain so 
farV (WP 8), an [nablLity to answer the question 'for what? '. In its 
developed form, nihilism Is expressed as a Lack of aim: "'why? " finds no 
answer' (WP 1). Weber's conception of the human sciences may be read as an 
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attempt to address and overcome both these questions. We shalL take them 
together as Weber presents a s[n9le SoLution to both of the ProbLematics 
posed. 
Much of Weber's answer has aLready been outLlned in our earker 
discussion of the concept of a caLLLng. To the question 'for what? ', Weber 
poses the possibiLity of existence without Musions. To the question 
'whyT, he advocates seif-responsibiLity, the creation of a meaningfuL 
LLfethrough the self-affirmatLon of a specific set of theoretical values. 
Through the idea of a caLling, Weber reinvests Life with an aim and 
thereby with meaning. To face up to the meaningtessness of the worLd and 
to create meaning for it through one's own activity - this is the 
chaLLenge Weber places before the modern subject. What then is the role of 
the human scLences? 
SpecificaLLy, the functLon of the Weberlan sociaL sclentIst Ls to enabLe 
the indivLduat to '9[ve Mmsetf an account of the ultimate meaning of' his 
own conduct' TMW p152). Th[s roLe requIres at Least two kLnds of account 
to be given by the sociaL scientist. The first Is to put forward an account 
of the nature of modernity in terms of how we have come to be as we are. 
The purpose of this presentation is to persuade the individuaL of the 
reality of the dilemma posed for meaningful human action by modernity. The 
second task is to cLarLfy the nature of the different vocations. To bring 
into view the theoretical values which relate to the different caLLIngs so 
that the Individual is made aware of the commitment involved in opting for 
a particuLar calLing and the kind of seLfhood this commitment requires of 
h im. It is not for science to adjudicate the vaLue of the different 
ca LL ings (including itself), rather its purpose is to articulate the 
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presuppositions LnvoLved in the various vocations. It need hard[y be said 
that this vaLue-freedom ltseLf presupposes the vaLue of caLLIngs as such. 
To concLude this section, It Is usefuL to review the points estabLlshed. 
We began by L[Lustrating that Weber's formulatLon of the fact-vaLue 
invoLves an inherent affirmation of LlberaL democracy. By examining Weber's 
diagnosis of the nature of modernity and his deveLopment of the idea of a 
ca LL Lng, it was established that his central concern was with the 
possibLL[ty of articuLating a space for human seLf-reailsation withLn the 
'Iron cage'. FinaLLy, It was pointed out that Weber's conception of the roLe 
of the human sciences invoLves an existentlat poLitics which is geared 
towards the individual's seLf-cLarificatLon of the meaning of his Life. 
a 
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ConcLusLon 
In concLuding both this chapter and the section of this thesis dedicated 
to Weber's work, it is usefuL to Locate this discussion in reLation to the 
anaLysis of Nietzsche aLready put forward. We wiLL begin on a phLLosophicaL 
and methodologLcaL LeveL before moving to their anaLyses of modernity and 
the rote they assume for their work. 
Various phLLosophicaL paraLLeLs run through the writings of Nietzsche and 
Weber, and yet these sLmiLar! tLes never merge into identical positions. 
This can be Mustrated by reference to three issues: perspect[vism, 
subjectivity and geneaLogy, Weber's perspectivism is distinguished from 
Nietzsche's by its affirmation of a distinction between practical and 
theoretLcaL vaLues. Afthough this separation is never entireLy free from 
tension in Weber's work, as his ImpLLcit commitment to a LLberaL democratic 
form of society Mustrates, It is a distinction which Lies at the heart of 
his social science. This can be seen again in the respective positions 
occupied by Nietzsche and Weber in reLation to the theme of subjectivity. 
Nietzsche's commitment is to the human Life as a totaLity, whereas Weber's 
affirmation of the idea of a caLLing (that is a set of theoretLcaL vaLues) 
presents a transfigured form of indivLduaLism. This point being Mustrated 
by their respective attitudes to Goethe. FinaLty, the separation of facts 
and vaLues emerges again in their geneaLogicaL forms of anaLysis. Despite 
Weber's evaLuat[on of the value of the duty of a caMng, for the most part 
he refuses to engage in the IrevaLuation of vaLues' which was such a 
centraL feature of Nietzsche's projec . 
With regard to their diagnoses of the nature of modernity, again 
simiLaritles rapidLy emerge. WhLLe Weber's anaLysLs tends to be more 
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concrete in its focus, it is clear that he takes on Nietzsche's formulation 
of the collapse of the foundations for values. Similarly, Weber's concern 
with asceticism and the discIpLinary nature of the modern wouLd appear to 
owe much to Nietzsche. His insight into the ambiguity of modernity as an 
achievement is aLso articuLated in Nietzschean terms as a distinction 
between discipL[ne and seLf-dLsc[pline. However, Weber's perceptLon of 
modernity as fundamentaLLy structured about a division of Labour contrasts 
with Nietzsche's Linking of the division of tabour to ressentiment'. As 
such Weber's formulation of the mode of overcoming the groundlessness of 
modern existence takes a different route to that of Nietzsche. 
This brings us to the rather different views each had of roLe of his 
work. WhlLe that both men were concerning with overcoming nihiLism and 
thus with developing an existentIaL politics which could reinvest 
individual life with meaning, Weber saw this process as occuring within the 
L Lbera t democratic forms of society which characterlsed the Western 
nation-states. Nietzsche's caLl for a thoroughgoing destruction of the 
values characteristic of modernity is transformed by Weber into an implicit 
affirmation of LlberaL vaLues. For Nietzsche, Weber's fataListic acceptance 
of the dLvision of Labour and the consequent articuLation of selfhood 
about the idea of the caLLLng represents bad conscience, the domination of 
one seLf over aLL others. This shouLd not surprise us given the comparison 
WoLln draws, and with which this chapter opened, between the Weber's 
Puritan and the Weberian scientist'O. From Weber's perspective, Nietzsche's 
concept of the Overman represents a naive denlaL of the speciaLised nature 
of modernity. For Foucautt, the third figure in our tradition, we shalL see 
that this issue of subjectivity and modernity is transformed once more. 
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NOTES 
1. Cf. Chapter 5, sectLon 2(c). 
2, But do these questions arise on a KuhnLan view of science-ir' Is Weber's 
existentLat cILLemma generated out of an inadequate phLLosophy of science? 
Or Ls Kuhn's phLLosophy of scLence the LdeoLogy of a reLativist age'? cf. 
Kuhn The Structure of ScLent[fLc RevotutLons (1970). 
3. Cf. Z 'ProLoque' S. 
4.. Cf. Chapter 1, sect Lons 3 and 4. 
5. Eden PoLlUcat LeadershLI2 and N[hLLLsm (1984). 
6. Cf. Chapter 1, sectLon 3. 
7. Cf. Chapter 4, sectLon 1. 
8. Cf. Chapter 5, section 2 (c). 
9. For a good discussion of this see Strong FrederLch Nietzsche and the 
Politics of TransfLquaration (1975), ppl98-202. 
10. Cf. Chapter 2, section 2. 
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Michel Foucauit 
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THE FORMS OF GENEALOGY. 
We can say that in his great work of critique Kant Laid down 
and founded that crLtIcaL tradition of ph[Losophy which 
defines the conditions under which a true knowLedge is 
possIbLe; and one can say that a whoLe area of modern 
philosophy since the nineteenth century has been presented 
and deveLoped on that basis as an anatytic of truth. 
But there aLso exists In modern and contemporary 
phlLosophy another kind of questioning, another mode of 
crItLcaL interrogation: this is one whose beginning can be 
seen preciseLy in the question of Auf*Larung or in Kant's 
text on the RevoLution; this other cr[tLcaL tradition asks: 
what is our present? What is the contemporary fieLd of 
possLbLe experience? Here it is not a question of an 
anaLytLc of truth, but of what one might caLL an ontoLogy of 
the present, an ontoLogy of ourseLves, and It seems to me 
that the phLLosophLcat choice which today confronts us is 
the foLLowing: one can opt for a crLtlcaL phlLosophy which 
is framed as an anatyt[cal ph! Losophy of truth in generaL, 
or one can opt for a crLticaL thought which has the form of 
an ontoLogy of ourseLves, an ontotogy of the present; It is 
this Latter form of phitosophy which, from HegeL to the 
Frankfurt SchooL by way of Nietzsche and Max Weber, has 
founded a form of refLection within which I have tried to 
work. 
- Michel Foucault 
Introduction 
In thLs chapter, we w[LL expLore thLs 'form of refLection' by way of the 
reLatLonship between FoucauLt's various projectsand trajectories, and 
those 
of Nletzsche and Weber'. Primarily, we wLLL outUne, and 
interpret, 
FoucauLt Is methodoLogLcaL posLtion(s) and trace connections between 
these 
positions and those occupied by Nietzsche and Weber. 
IntegraLLy to this 
enterprise we wILL aLso anatyse various criticisms which 
have been made of 
Foucau Lt's texts. 
OperationaLty, FoucauLt distLnguLshes three abInains of geneaLogy7-: 
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F1 rst, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to 
truth through which we constLtute ourselves as subjects of 
knowledge; second, a historical ontology of ourselves in 
relation to power through whLch we constitute ourselves as 
subjects acting on others; third, a historical ontology in 
relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves as 
moral. agents. (Reader p351) 
In broad terms, these three approaches to anatysis correspond to the 
movement of Foucault's own theoretical trajectory. Thus the archaeological 
works (partLcuLarly The Order of ThLngs) are orLentated towards truth, 
DiscipLine and PunLsh and voLume 1 of The History of SexuatLty are 
orientated to power, and the Later voLumes of The Histor)ý of SexuaLL4 are 
orientated towards ethim ConsequentLy, we shaLL distinguish between these 
three domains in attempting to trace out FoucauLt's retatLons to Nietzsche 
and Weber. In arguing that such reLations exist, it shouid be noted that 
our anaLysis witt be both 'sLanted' and lidealised', that is to say, it wILL 
invoLve the construction of ideal-typLcaL versions of Foucauit and makes no 
claim to exhaust the interpretive richness of Foucault's texts. 
Section One: ArchaeoLogy and EpLsteme 
My problem was ... to pose the question, 
"How is it that at 
certain moments and in certain orders of knowledge, there 
are these sudden take-offs, these hasten[ngs of evolution, 
these transformations which fail to correspond to the calm, 
continuist image that is normally accredited? " But the 
Important thing here is not that such change can be rapid 
and extensive, or rather it is that this extent and rapidity 
are only the signs of something else: a modification in the 
rules of formation of statements which are accepted as 
scientifically true. It is a question of what governs 
statements, and the way in which they govern each other so 
as to constitute a set of propositions which are 
scientifically acceptable, and hence capable of 
being 
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verified or faLsified by scientific procedures. In short, 
there is the probLem of the regime, the poLitics of the 
scientific statement. (Reader p54) 
The archaeotogicaL project may then be read as an attempt to Ireveat a 
positive unconscious of knowLedge: a Levet that eLudes the consciousness of 
the scientist and yet is part of scientific discourse, instead of disputing 
its validity or seeking to diminish its scientific nature. ' (OT pxD. 
FoucauLt's concern is wLth 'these ruLes of formation, which were never 
formulated in their own right, but are to be found only in widely differing 
theories, concepts, and objects of study, that I have tried to reveat, by 
isolating, as their specific locus, a Level that I have called, somewhat 
arbitarily perhaps, archeaLogicat. 1 (OT pxD. 
This project is most cLearLy reveaLed In The Order of Things, where 
FoucauLt attempts to deLlneate three distLnct epistemological fields; the 
Renaissance epLsteme, the ClassicaL episteme and the Modern episteme. Using 
these, we may Mustrate what we take this curious term lepistemd to 
signify. An LnitiaL formuLatLon by FoucauLt states: 
what I am attempting to bring to Light is the 
epLstemoLogicaL field, the epistem in which knowledge, 
envisaged apart from aLL criteria having reference to its 
rational value or to its objective forms, grounds its 
positivity and thereby manifests a history which is not that 
of its growing perfection, but rather that of its conditions 
of possibility; in this account, what should appear are 
those configurations of knowledge which have given rise to 
the diverse forms of empirical science. (OT pxxiD 
Thus by attempting to identify the relationship between generai grammar, 
naturaL hLstory and the study of weaith on the one hand, and between 
phiLogy, biology, and political, economy on the other; Foucault is making 
the 
cLaim that: 
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If the naturat history of Tournefort, Linnaeus and Buffon 
can be retated to anything at aL L other than itseff, it is 
not to bloLogy, to CuvLerls comparative anatomy, or to 
Darwin's theory of evoLution, but to Bauzee's generai 
grammar, to the anaLysis of money and weaLth as found in the 
works of Law, or Veron de Fortbonnals, or Turgot. (OT 
pxxill) 
It wouLd seem then that by epistame is meant the 'hidden network' that 
constitutes this reLationshLp, the underLyLng princLptes of organisation 
that determine this form of empirkat science. Thus, 'epistemd is the name 
iven to: 
the totaL set of reLatLons that unite, at a given period, 
the discursive practices that give rise to epistemologLcat 
figures, sciences, and possibLy formaLised systems... The 
episte me is not a form of knowLedge or type or rationaLity, 
whLch, crossing the boundaries of the the most varied 
sciences, manifests the sovereign unity of a subject, a 
spirit or a period; it is the totality of relations that can 
be discovered, for a given period, between the sciences when 
one analyses them at the level of discursive regularities. 
<AK p191, my itaLics) 
We can concretise this by reference to the reLatLons that FoucauLt 
suggest constitute the CLassicaL period; these revoLve around the centraL 
figure of the table organised about the terms 'cofnparison' and lordef'. The 
project of the representative mapping of the order of the worLd consists 
in the identification of sLmitarities and differences through comparative 
analysis, the tabulation of results, and the discussion of cLassificatory 
systems. The centraL point for FoucauLt concerning this episteme 
is the 
activity of tabulation is not itself, and cannot be, represented on 
the 
table. For, in this account, 
what CLassicai thought reveaLs is the power of 
discourse. In 
other words, language in so far as it represents - 
language 
that names, patterns, combines, and connects and 
disconnects 
things as it makes them vislbLe in the transparency of 
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words. .,. The profound vocation of Classical Language has 
always been to create a table -aI picture' : whether it be 
in the form of natural discourse, the accumulation of truth, 
descriptions of things, a body of exact knowLedge, or an 
encyctopaedLc dictionary. It exists, therefore, only in 
order to be transparent; ... in the CLassicaL age, discourse 
is that translucent necessity through which representation 
and being must pass - as beings are represented to the 
mind' s eye, and as representation renders beings visible in 
their truth. (OT p311) 
Given the unprobiematic nature of tanguage and, therefore, 
representation, man's roLe in this process is that of vesset through which 
Language flows unimpeded about its task of representing the world. For 
FoucauLt, it foLLows that: 'ClassicaL language, as the common discourse of 
representation and things, as the place within which nature and human 
nature intersect, absoLutely excLudes anything that couLd be a 'science of 
man'. '(OT p311). To put it another way, it appears that Foucault is making 
the cLaLm that, w[thin the CiassicaL epLsteme, Man as both subject and 
object (in the Kantlan sense) does not exist, that the structure of the 
Classical episteme rules out the possibility of conceiving Man in this way, 
and consequentLy, the conditions of possibility of a 'science of man' do not 
ex ist, 
The depLoyment of the concept of episteme, about which FoucauLt's 
archaeoLogLcat method operatesq to generate a descriptive, non-trLumf. *ialist. 
account of the history of the human sciences, should now be relatively 
cLear. The strength of the ckalm being made however, is, perhaps, Less 
transparent and this issue wLLL feature strongLy in the attempt we now 
make to reLate FoucauLt's archaeoloqLcat methodotogy to Nietzsche and 
Weber. 
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Nietzsche's comments on the reification of grammaticaL catagorLes onto 
the worLd are reasonabLy weLL known2l, in partLcuLar his remarks concerning 
the subject /predicate distinction in Language as resu It ing Ln the 
subject/object distinction in the world (TI 'Reason' in Philosophy 5). An 
aspect of this discussion which has received tess attention however, occurs 
in the section 'On the Prejudices of Ph! Losophers' from Beyond Good and 
Evil, where Nietzsche makes the following claim: 
That individual philosophical concepts are not something 
arbitary, , something growing up autonomously, 
but on the 
contrary grow up connected and related to one another; that, 
however suddenly and arbitariLy they appear to emerge in the 
history of thought, they nonetheless belong just as much to 
a system as do the members of the fauna of a continent: that 
fact is in the end also shown in the fact that the most 
diverse philosophies unfailingly fill out again and again a 
certain basic scheme of possible philosophies. ... The 
singuLar family resemblance between all Indian, Greek and 
German phLLosophising is easy enough to explain. Where there 
exists a Language affinity it is quite impossible, thanks to 
a common philosophy of grammar -I mean thanks to the 
unconscious domination and directing by similar grammatical 
functions - to avoid everything being prepared in advance 
for a similar evolution and sucession of philosophical 
systems: just as the road seems barred to certain other 
possibilities of world interpretation. (BGE 20)" 
Nietzsche is making two Lnter-reLated points here. FirstLy, that the 
emergence of a concept or theory, at any given time, however origLnaL is 
governed by a set of underlying principles which relate it fundamentally 
to other existLng concepts or theorLes. SecondLy, that these underLyLng 
princLpLes are generated out of the grammatical catagories of our 
language. Thus the realm of what may intelligibly be spoken, what counts 
as being 'up for grabs, as true or falses, is circumscribed by the 
'unconscious domination' of grammatical catagories. 
-210- 
There is a certain kinship between these comments of Nietzsche's and the 
project Foucault undertakes in The Order of ThIngs this can be illustrated 
by reference to Foucautt's character ! sat ions of both the ClassicaL and the 
Modern episteme. These, he cLaims, are constituted as foLtows: 
the Classical, episteme can be defined Ln its most general 
arrangement in terms of the articulated system of a 
mathesis, a taxinomia, and a 
_qenetic anaiysis. 
The sciences 
always carry within themselves the project, however remote 
Lt may be, of an exhaustLve ordering of the world; (OT p74) 
The connection of the posLtLvLtLes with finitude, the 
reduplication of the emp! rLcaL and the transcendentaL, the 
perpetuaL retationship of the cogito and the unthought, the 
retreat and return of the origin, define for us man's mode 
of being. It is in the anaLysis of that mode of being, and 
no Longer on the anatysLs of representation, that refLection 
since the nineteenth century has sought a phLLosophLcat 
foundation for the possibiLity of knowtedge. (OT - p335) 
Here we are presented, in each case, with three princLpLes which, It Is 
suggested, structure and cleLlneate the reatm of possibLe meaningfuL 
discourse within the ciassicat and the modern respectLvety. In each case, 
these prLnc[pLes present us with the project of the respective epistemes. 
An analysis of representation, that makes possible the ordering of the 
worLd, in the CLassicaL epLsteme and an anatysis of man's mode of being in 
the Modern episteme. It is these projects which define man's mode of being 
in the respective periods. To put it another way, the principles of an 
episteme constitute an opening of the way to 
certain 'possible philosophies' and a barring of the way to others. In this 
I ight, we may locate Foucau It as of fer Lng an expos it Lon of the 
phiiosophicaL grammars of given periods. On this reading, Nietzsche's 
comments are on an abstract or meta-epLstemic level, whereas Foucault is 
operating in a functionaLty LsomorphLc manner but on a more concrete 
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pLane. This reLationship can be l[Lustrated by their respective treatments 
of the subject as a grammatical Fictiorr. Nietzsche notes that the positing 
of the T is the resuLt of the reLfication of the subject /predicate 
distinction in Language onto the worLd and he is content with noting the 
subject's fictivity; Foucault, on the other hand, is concerned with the 
historicalLy specific modes that this 'fiction' has taken, that is to say, he 
is attempting in The Order of Things to bring out those historkaity 
specific mechanisms, or grammars, which structure the fLctioning of our 
subjectivity, in given periods. 
However, whatever the status of the interpretation we are offering here, 
what is, perhaps, stLLI uncLear here is the precise nature of the cLaim 
that Foucault is making. Is he ascribing an ontological status to these 
relations which constitute given epistemes? Or is his text operating on a 
more ironic LeveL refLect[ng on the practice and rhetoric of the historicaL 
schoLar? Given the critique of FoucauLt by Merquiord,, for exampLe, thIs 
question assumes significant proportions. For while it is in the very 
process of crLtIcIsLng Foucault that Merquior also notes his Nietzschean 
heritage, he claims that any such use of Nietzsche implies that Foucault 
cannot make epistemological claims for his archaeoLogies. Moreover, 'far 
from despairing at such a cognLtLve plight, Foucault rejoices In it. 
Knowledge, for him, is not geared towards truth but to the everlasting 
skepsis of endless random interpretations - and his Nietzschean souL 
refuses to be depressed by U. ' <Merquior 1985 p 75). We will return 
to 
this issue as we examine Foucault's relation to Max Weber in this context. 
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In his essay 'Objectivity in SOciai Science and Soclat Poticyl, Max Weber 
eLucidates some of the features of the LdeaL-type: 
SubstaniveLy, this concept in itself is Like a utopia which 
has been arrived at by the analytical accentuation of 
certain elements of our reality. ... This ideai-typicat 
concept will help to develop our skLLL in research: it is no 
'hypothesis' but It offers guidance to the construction of 
hypotheses. It is not a description of reality but it alrns 
to give unambiguous means of expression to such a 
description. (MSS p140) 
A given LcleaL-type may, in this context, be read as an enabLLng device, a 
usefuL fictLon. This 'heuristics' is echoed by Foucault (with a typically 
Lronic twist) in the 'Foreward to the EngLLsh Edition' of The Order of 
Th ings, where he states: 
In this work, then, I Left the problem of causes to one 
side; I chose instead to confine myself to descLbing the 
transformations themselves, thinking that this would be an 
LndispensLble step if, one day, a theory of scientific 
change and epistemological causality was to be constructed. 
(OT px! iL) 
The device whereby this description is brought out Is, as we have noted, 
the episteme, wh ich in LtseLf constitutes neither description nor 
expLanation. LeavLng the detail of this claim for the moment, let us 
address the aLternatLve readings of FoucauLt's archaeologicaL works which 
might be made. 
On the one hand, we may read Foucauft as offering a kind of BacheLardian 
versLon of LevL-Strauss (cf. Habermas 1987 p242) and, on the other hand, 
we may read hLm, a La MerquLor, as a Metzschean' rejoicLng Ln the infLnity 
of Lnterpretat Lon. 
The first reading wouLd impLy the unprobLematic openLng out of history 
through a systematLsed semLot[cs, the LntroductLon of the paradLgm-ilke 
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concept of episteme as a means of over-coming the problems of historical 
change that pervade the work of Levi-Strauss, and a strong ontoiogicaL 
claim for the status of epLstemes. If one adopts this 'strong' reading of 
Foucau Lt, however, then the achaeologicaL gaze involves a strict 
caesura i ise. This raises various LnterepLstemic problems 
concern ing'transep istem ic prob iemat ics, epistemLc tags and dialectical 
returns' (MerquLor 1985 p67) in the body of scientific knowledge; as well 
as opening up Foucault's account to arguments concerning the accuracy of 
his LntraepLstemLc representations, particularly with reference to the 
homogenLty of the picture he offers; finatLy, it also raises the question 
of intraepistemic collapses or breaks (unless these are ruled by 
definition, a procedure which would raise yet further probLems)(Merquior 
1985 p68/69). Within this framework, MerquLor's waspish remark : 
If epLstemes are far more internaLLy differentiated than the 
archeaLogicaL gaze cares to acknowLedge, it comes as no 
surprise to hear that, in the name of its unitary obsession, 
The Order of' Thin_qs often overrates the position and 
prestige of some intelLectuaL trends. (MerquLor 1985 p68) 
and Habermas's wry comment: 
Under the stoic gaze of the archeologist, history hardens 
into an iceberg covered with the crstaLlLne forms of 
arbitary formations of discourses. (Habermas 1987 p253) 
become understandable complaints despite their polemical overtones. This 
reading of Foucault's archeatogicaL project seems to raise several problems 
and opens up his accounts to aLL kind of query. Perhaps the second kind of 
reading we indicated will present us with a less problematic picture, that 
which Merquior Labels 'Nietzschean'. 
The basic position, for this second interpretation of Foucault's 
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archeoLog[es, Is that he adopts an extreme form of retativism which 
undercuts any notion of Mstorkaj objectivity, Leaving only the infinite 
pLay of interpetations. On this reading, FoucauLt is engaged in some form 
of quasL-ph! LosophLcak, quasi-historLcal rhetoric cetebratLng its own wiii- 
to-power. History is set up as being capabLe of having innumerabLe 
typotogles or schemata imposed on it in the interpretive process. The text 
of The Order of Things for exampLe, becomes an exercise in the poLLtics, of 
hLstoricaL scholarship, a rhetorical critique of Whig historiography. 
UnsurprIsLngLy, this position is also extremely problematic, for, while it 
effectiveLy aboLlshes as irretevant the probtems of our previous reading, 
it simuttaneousty undermines the critique of triumphaLlst accounts of the 
sciences on aLt but the rhetor[caL LeveL. SimitarLy, FoucauLt's attempt to 
describe the emergence of the human sciences in their modern form, and his 
probLematLsatLon of thIs form, Loses any cLalm to epLstemoLogicaL status. 
The issue of 'what governs statements', which he Locates at the heart of 
his enterprise, is reduced to the fantasies of FoucauLt's own intetlectuaL 
imag inat ion. 
In contrast to these two accounts of Foucauit's epLstemic enterprise, let 
us offer a treatment of the epLsteme as an ideaL-type. Firstly, we can 
note that it is a feature of Ldeal-type that they invoLve the one-sided 
accentuation of certain features of re&LLty, thus the probtems raised by 
MerquLor (and sLmilarLy by Huppert and MleL, cf. Racevskis 1983 p58) 
concernLng The Order of Things homogenLsing misrepresentatLon of 'the 
facts' can be answered, in that, FoucauLt is LnvoLved in presenting a 
deLiberatety sianted perspective which does not make the cLaLm of truth- 
status, U is, rather, a utopian representatLon. SecondLy, the caesuraLLsm 
which Led Boudon and BourrLcaud to suggest that (as Merqulor puts it) 
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'FoucauLdian history of science ... [is) a mere typoLogy, 15 (Merquior 1985 
p75), is both weakened and strengthened in a way which renders their 
remark trlv! aL. It is weakened in that the status of the cLaLm being made 
with the episteme is no Longer an ontoLogicaL one but rather a nomLnaL! st 
one, and strengthened in that, as a consequence of this, its typotogicaL 
character reduces Us vu Lnerab 1L ity to crLtLques based around 
interepistemic tags, etc. ThirdLy, vLewLng the epLsteme as an LdeaL-typicaL 
construct undercuts MerquLorls compLaint that Foucauit is mereLy rejoicing 
in the infinity of interpretation; whLLe ideal-type analysis may be Linked 
to Nietzsche's theory of perspectLvism7, there is a stronger cLaim be made 
than Merqulor's reading of Nietzsche and Foucauft suggests. WhUe it is 
correct to note that Nietzsche undercuts the idea of historLcaL objectivity 
Un Lts trad! tLonaL sense), thIs does not impty the extreme retatLvism that 
MerquLor cLaLms for it. On the contrary, Nietzsche transfigures our notion 
of object 1v Lty, suggest Lng that it is: 
not ... 'contemplation without interest' (which is a 
nonsensical absurdity), but ... the ability to controi one's 
own Pro and Con and to dispose of them so that one knows how 
to employ a variety of perspectives and affective 
interpretations in the service of knowledge (GM, 111,12 in 
Nehamas 1985 p84)10 
Nehamas has provided a cogent counter-argument to the reLatLvistLc 
interpretation of Nietzsche that MerquLor depLoys. Firstty, he notes with 
regard to perspect Lv ism: 
[ it] does not imply that we can never reach correct results 
or that we can never be "objective, " ... The fact that other 
points of view are possible does not by itself make them 
equally tegLt ! mate: whether an alternative is worth taking 
... must be shown 
independently in each particular case. 
(Nehamas 1985 p49) 
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Nehamas illustrates this point by reference to criticisms made of M. H. 
Abram's Naturat SupernaturaLLsm, with regard to whic h he quotes Wayne 
Booth's repLy: 
It ... seems Likely that we could have other Legitimate 
histories of Abram' s subject ... But whether or not one 
could be written that would falsify any or his central 
theses will be settled not by propositional argument but b 
the argument peculiar to writing a history: can the history 
be written and, once written, can it be read? ... If someone 
can write a debunking history of Wordsworth and Romanticism 
... then of course we must take his view into account. Go 
try. (In Nehamas 1985 p64) 
Sim! LarLy if it is argued that FoucauLt's ideal-typLcal epLstemes divide and 
misrepresent the histories with which he is concerned, this must be 
established by an alternative account which avoids whatever pitfalls 
FoucauLt is supposed to have faLlen Lnto. Further, the very fact that 
FoucauLt has written a particuLar kind of interpretation and not another 
shouLd itLustrate that he is not engaged in the nihitistic operation that 
MerquLor ascribes to him. It is not denied that other histories of 
FoucauLt's subject might be written but, in so far as we treat epistemes 
as ideaL-types, we have seen that the majority of criticisms raised rest on 
grounds which are negated by this ideaL-typicaL status. Our finaL point 
concerns the politics of FoucauLt's archaeoLogies, that Is, their attempt to 
undermine traclitionat Whig historiography, to act as a critique of standard 
triumphaLlst narratives. It is a feature of our first reading that this 
eLement is figured strongLy, however we have already noted the problems 
raised by such a 'strong' reading, our issue becomes, therefore: can we 
retain the crItLcal thrust of Foucault's mode of writing white reading 
epistemes as LdeaL-types? 
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In answering this, we shouLd note again the points made by Nehamas 
above, however, it must be recognised that wh[Le Foucautt's criticaL 
intentions are not reduced to a mereLy rhetorical levet, neither do they 
retain the force our f irst reading generates. In so far as we are 
concerned with the politics of Foucault's 'scientific statements', It is 
clear that the critique of trLumphatist accounts similarly stands or falls 
with the status of his ideaL-types. This status, however, is by no means 
clear - In the essay 'Objectivity In Social Science and Social Policy', 
Weber suggests that: 
Historical research faces the task of determining in each 
individual case the extent to which this ideal- construct 
approximates to or diverges from reality, ... (MSS p140) 
This formulation presents us with certain problems, for if it Ls the ideal- 
type which, while 'not a description of reality', is our mode of giving 
'unambiguous means of expression to such a description' <MSS p140), then it 
is difficuLt to see how one can compare ideat-type and reaHty except by 
reference to other IdeaL-typical constructs whose status would be 
s[m! LarLy open to question". In order to avoid this coLLapse, it becomes 
necessary to read the LdeaL-type as a form of perspect! vLsm which entaiLs, 
as we have a Lready noted, that it is grounded in the r ichness of its own 
account rather than on epistemoLogicaL foundatLons. As we have poInted out, 
this does not impLy some form of rhetorical relativism, moreover, it goes 
on to a rejection of the famework within which such epistemologLcalLy 
m inded cr It jC ISMS 12 are raised in favour of the interpretive fruitfutness 
of NLetzschean perspectivLsm grounded in its rejection of the naturaL and 
given unity of the subject. In the context of our initiat character isat ion 
of FoucauLt's project as being concerned with Locating the h[storicalty 
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specific modes or grammars by which man fictions his subjectivity, the 
resoLution offered here between two extreme readings of Foucauit wouLd 
appear to have a certaLn eLegant circuLarity. 
To concLude this section, Let us sum up the version of FoucauLt's 
archeatogicaL project being offered here in terms of its methodologicat 
operatLon. Firstty, FoucauLt Is depLoyLng a form of LdeaL-type based 
perspectivism, we have seen that such a reaclLng undermLnes the traditLonaL 
criticisms offered of FoucauLt's accounts wh! Le retaining the politicaL and 
criticaL impulses to a greater or Lesser extent. Secondly, by combining 
this reading of Foucauft with the grammatical interpretation we offered, it 
becomes apparent that the archaeologicaL enterprise is on one LeveL an 
attempt to present a geneakogy of man's modes of fLctioning his 
subjectivity, the grammars that pattern the Interpretive moves by which 
the subject has been constituted, in various ways, as a having a 'naturaL 
given unity'. Given the common nominaLLsm that runs through Nietzsche, 
Weber and Foucauft, we shouLd not perhaps be aftogether surprised that 
methodolog[caL paraLLeLs exist in their work. We shaLl see, however, that 
the connections run deeper stitt than this, a point which wLLL be brought 
out as we move to the discussion of FoucauLt's geneaLogLes of power and 
subject iv i ty. 
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2. POWER/KNOWLEDGE 
In this section we wLL[ examine the underpinnings of FoucauLt's second 
geneaLogicaL domain: 'a hLstorLcaL ontology of ourselves in relation to a 
fleLd of power through which we constitute ourseLves as subjects acting on 
others. ' (Reader p351). CentraL to this enterprise is the notion of 
power1knowledge and it wM be one of the prLncipat tasks of this section 
to exempLify this often confusing idea. The second major task to be deaLt 
with here Is to bring out FoucauLt's geneaLogIcaL method, partLatly In an 
edificatory mode. Contemporaneous Ly, we wILL be continulng to locate 
FoucauLt in reLatLon to Nietzsche and Weber. 
In an interview with Alessandro Fontana and PasquaLe Pacquino entitled 
'Truth and Power', FoucauLt comments 'When I think back now, I ask myseff 
what eLse it was I was taLking about, in Maohess and Civilisation or The 
Birth of the Clinir, but powerT (Reader p57). This unformuLated issue 
becomes centraL in the period which produces DiscLpLine and PunLsh and The 
History of SexuaLity Vo[. 1 (hereafter The History of SexuaLityl. We can, 
perhaps, best approach by this examining the confusion Foucault sensed in 
his own work and, foLLow[ng from this, hLs critique of tradLtLonaL 
conceptLons of power. In The Order of Discourse FoucauLt presents a 
retatLonship between discourse and power organised about the notion of 
excLusion: 
In a society such as our own we all know the rules of 
exclusion. The most obvious and familiar of these concerns 
what is prohibited ... We have three types of prohibition, 
covering objects, ritual with its surrounding circumstances, 
the privileged or exclusive right to speak of a particular 
subject; these prohibitions interrelate, reinforce and 
complement each other, forming a complex web, continually 
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subject to modification. I will note simply that the areas 
where thLs web is most tightly woven today, where the danger 
spots are most numerous, are those dealing with politics and 
sexuality. ... In appearance, speech may well be of little 
account, but the prohlbLtons surrounding it soon reveal its 
Links with desire and power. (OD p8) 
In a Later interview with Lucette Finas, FoucauLt refLects on this 
conception of the power/knowLedge reLationship in the Hght of his concerns 
Ln The HistoU of SexuaLlty: 
I think that in The Order of Discourse I conf Lated two 
concepts, or rather that for what I take to be a Legitimate 
probLem (that of the articuLation of the data of discourse 
within the mechanisms of power) I provided an inadequate 
soLution. It was a piece I wrote at a moment of transition. 
TILL then, It seems to me, I accepted the traditionai 
conception of power as an essentLaLLy jurldicaL mechanism, 
as that which Lays down the Law, which prohibits, which 
refuses, and which has a whoLe range of negative effects: 
excLuslon, rejection, denLaL, obstruction, occuttation, etc. 
Now I beLieve that conception to be inadequate. (P/K p183) 
What precLsety is this juridLc&L conception of power? What forms does it 
take? What is its effects? Racevskls notes that normaLLy power has been 
conceieved 'as a negative force of oppression or repression: there are the 
subjects who possess power and those subjected to Lt' (Racevskis 1983 
p92). Foucault's position in Madness and CiviLisation and The Order of 
Discourse can be read as two more or Less sophisticated versions of this 
juridico-discursive conception. At Least three (and probabty rather more) 
exempLars of this form of power can be isotated. FLrstLy, there is the 
traditional idea of power operated in terms of Law about the notion of 
sovereignty. Secondly, the Marxist conception of power geared around class 
strUggLe and modes of production, and articulated as an economic 
flunctionallty of power, in Foucauit's terms. FinaiLy, there is the 
pyschoanaLytic notion of power which moves about Freud's and, Later, 
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Reich's ideas of repressionl3. These three conceptions of power have 
certain 'family resemblances' for Foucault and, in The History of Sexuality, 
he sets out some of the prIncLpaL features of this kLnshLp In reLatkon to 
sex: 
- The negative relation, It never establishes any connection 
between power and sex that Is not negat 1 ve: rejection, 
exclusion, refusal, blockage, concealment, or mask. ... 
- The insistence of the rule. Power is essentially what 
dictates its Law to sex. ... 
- The cycle of prohibition: To deal with sex, power 
employs nothing more than a law of prohibition. It's 
objective: that sex renounce itself. It's Instrument: the 
threat of a punishment that is none other than the 
suppression of sex. ... 
- The logic of censorship. This Interdiction is thought to 
take three forms: affirming that such a thing is not 
permitted, preventing it from being said, denying that It 
exists. ... 
- The uniformity of the apparatus, Power over sex is 
operated In the same way at aLL levels. ... Confronted 
by a power that is law, the subject who is constituted 
as a subject - who Is "subjected" - is he who obeys. 
... A Legislative power on one side, and an obedient 
subject on the other. (HS p83-85) 
Why, given the sophistication with which Foucault formulates this model of 
power, does he suggest it is inadequate to his needs? There are severaL 
factors involved here, but centraLLy pLaced is the issue of the 
productivity of power, FoucauLt comments: 
If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did 
anything but say no, do you really think one would be 
brought to obey it? What makes power hold good, what makes 
it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh 
on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and 
produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, 
produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a 
productive network which runs through the whole social body, 
much more than as a negative instance whose function is 
repression. (P/K p119) 
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At this point, It ties with Foucault to Illustrate the benefits of treating 
power as a 'productive network'. It is in thLs context that he suggests 
that If we are to concentrate on 'the multiple forms of subjugation that 
have a place a function within the social organism' (P/K p96), certain 
methodological precautions are necessary. As Smart has noted, these concern 
'the form, Level, effect, direction, and 'Ideology' of power. ' (Smart 1983 
P82). Firstly, Foucault suggests that we should analyse power In Its more 
local forms, that is 'at the extreme points of its exercise, where U is 
always Less Legal In character' (P/K p97), since if his reformulation of 
power is to operate it will be seen most clearly In the more 'marginal' 
instances. Secondly, instead of saying 'Who has power and what is being 
done with It? ', we should examine It in terms of its manifestations, its 
relationship to a IfIeLd of application' and the effects produced. Thirdty, 
power should not be treated as coming from individuals or collectivities, 
rather, he suggests, Individuals are constituted by power while also being 
'the elements of its articulation' (P/K p98). Fourthly, the analysis of 
power should operate in an ascending manner, that is 'starting ... from its 
infinitesimal mechanisms ... and then see how these mechanisms have been - 
and continue to be - invested, cotonised, utlilsed, ... by ever more more 
general mechanisms and by forms of global domination. ' (P/K p99). Finally, 
while there may have been certain ideological effects produced by power, 
we should eschew the idea of ideology. Foucault has expanded this final 
point in an interview which it may be useful to note: 
The notion of Ideology appears to me to be difficult to make 
use of, for three reasons. The first is that, Like it or 
not, it atways stands in vErtuaL opposition to something 
else which is supposed to count as truth. ... -The second 
drawback is that the concept of ideology refers, I think 
necessarily, to something of the order of a subject. Third, 
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LdeoLogy stands Lna secondary position reLative to 
somethlngwhich functions as its infrastructure, as its 
materiaL, economic determinant, etc. For these three 
reasons, I think that this is a notion that cannot be used 
without circumspection. (Reader p6l)14- 
If one is concerned, as Foucauft is, with attempting to examine the 
emergence of 'regimes of truth' and the ways in which the subject is 
constituted, it shouLd be apparent that the notion of ideoLogy has no reaL 
roLe to pLay. 
At this point, that is, as we move meanderingLy towards an exposition of 
Foucault's reformulation of the notion of power, a certain wariness Is 
requLred, Utterances such as 'Power Ls everywhere; not because Lt embraces 
everything, but because it comes from everywhere' (HS p93) have led 
FoucauLt to be accused of determLnism, hyper-funct lona I Ism, hyper- 
rationaLlsm, etc., Ln other words, an absolutising of power. As Merquior, 
I for exampLe, puts it: 
How can readers avoid the impression of an omnivorous power 
monoLIth when, for each sporadic reassuring clause granting 
power does not embrace everything, they tumble over scores 
of totaL[st expressions such as 'disciplinary society', 
'disciplinary generaLlsatlonl, 'general, tactics of 
subjection', 'generaLised carceraL system', 'carceral 
continuum', IcarceraL texture of society', 'society of 
surveillance', and so on. How can they readily discard the 
idea of an omnipotent domination when they are told that our 
schools and hospitals and factories are essentially mirrors 
of the prison, our Lives being everywhere InormaLLsed' from 
cradle to tomb? After all, if Foucault did not mean it, why 
the deuce did he keep saying it? (Merquior 1985 p115) 
Moreover, this Leads to a potentially serious methodolog[caL problem for 
FoucauLt, as Couzens Hoy has noted, sLnce Lf the soclaL is totaLLy 
normaLLsed, how is it that FoucauLt can write geneaLogles criticaL of it? 
The conditions of possibiLlty for the enterprise he is invoLved in wouLd 
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appear to be ruLed outl For the moment, we wILL suspend this issue which 
we shalt be examining in detail when we come to Look at the notion of 
'geneaLogy', let it suffice to say for now that our repLy to this issue 
wM have recourse to the Nietzschean and Weberian threads that permeate 
FoucauLt's texts at this point. 
Returning to the issue of power, or, more accurateLy, power /know Ledge, we 
shou Id note, f irst Ly, that Foucau Lt's anaLyses are character ist ica L Ly 
nominalistic. We are not concerned with identifying a 'thing' that is Power, 
but rather 'power' is 'the name that one attributes to a compLex 
strategicaL sLtuation Ln a part[cutar socLety. 1 (HS p93). SecondLy, FoucauLt 
cLaLms that power is (a) intentionai and non-subjective and (b) power 
relations presuppose re[ations of resistance. To expLain these strange 
sounding notions, it becomes necessary to note that, as with Nietzsche", 
the underLying metaphor for FoucauLt's anaLyses Ls one of struggle 
ContLnuLng thLs metaphor, Foucauft argues that three LeveLs of anaLysis are 
possibLe: a leveL of tactics, a LeveL of strategies, and a LeveL of 
apparatuses. The reLatlonshLps between these LeveLs has been nLceLy 
summar [sed by Th le Le, who notes: 
Apparatuses are groupings of strategies that respond to a 
particular historical problem. Strategies, "anonymous and 
almost unspoken, " are co-ordinated groupings of tactics that 
"becoming connected to one another, but finding their base 
of support and their conditions elsewhere, end by forming 
comprehensive systems. " Tactics, on the other hand, are 
I'locquacious, " often being "quite expLicit at the restricted 
Level. where they are inscribed. " They are the conf Lgurat ions 
taken by relations of power imbued with knowledge, and are 
the forms of power-knowLedge retations to serve particular 
ends. Tactics, in turn, are the form that struggLes take. 
(Thiele 186 p256) 
Bearing in mind Foucault's nominalism, i. e. that these are levels of 
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anaLYSLs, hLs cLalm that power can be read as both intentionat and non- 
subjective becomes inteHigible at Least on the LeveLs of apparatuses and 
strategies. ThleLe, again, draws this point out neatLy: 
Apparatuses and strategies of power-retations may be 
proposed as "both intentionaL ad non-subjectIve" because 
their lnteLL1gLbiLUy, if they are inteiLigibLe, resuLts 
from their be i ng "Imbued, through and through, with 
catculation: there is no power that is exercised without a 
series of aims and objectives. " Their inteLLigibility, then, 
derives from the caLcuLation that goes into each of their 
tactics. Their non-subjectLvLty derives rom the Lack of any 
LclentiflabLe co-ordinator of these same tactics. ... This 
means, however, that one cannot say that tactics, Like 
strategies and apparatuses are non-subjective. Like the 
struggLes they manoeuvre, tactics remain tied to subjects. 
(ThLeLe 1986 p256) 
In the essay 'The Subject and Power', FoucauLt recognLses this point noting, 
among a series of criteria that a adequate anaLysLs of power relations 
must sat Lsfy, that Lt Ls necessary to Locate 'Itlhe types of object ives 
pursued by those who act upon the actlons of others: the mantenance of 
priviLeges, the accumutation of profit ... ' (SP p223). (This is, perhaps, why 
FoucauLt suggests that his anaLyses of 'technoLogLes of domination' need to 
be suppLemented by anaLyses of the 'techniques of seLf'. (cf Habermas 1987 
p273)). SLmiLarLy, the concept of resistance becomes reLatively cLear at 
this point, for once struggle is identified as the root of FoucauLt's 
conception of power, resistance operates as an immanent eiement of this 
conceptuaL[satLon, as aI counter- power'. 
Having noted this, Lt must be said that FoucauLt's anaLyses in DiscLI? Llne 
and PunLsh and The History of Sexuatity operate at the leve I of 
apparatuses, a term whLch does not do justLce to the subtLety of the 
French term dispositif'. Dreyfus and RabLnow note, for exampLe, that an 
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equaLty accurate transtatLon mLght be 'grid of intelligibility, a phrase 
which more cLearLy conveys FoucauLt's nominaLism and the fact that 
dispositif is 'the method of the effective historian as weLL as the 
structure of the cuLturaL practices he is examining, ' (Dreyfus & Rabinow 
1982 pl2l). We shaLl return to this Later, however, Lt might be apposite at 
this moment to give an example of Foucault's power-knowLedge analyses. 
In The History of Sexuality, Foucault identifies two modes in which the 
strategies of power become manifest: (a) an anatomo-poiLtLcs of the human 
body and (b) a bio-potitics of the poputatLon. The former of these concerns 
'the body as a machine: Its discipUning, the optimlsation of its 
capabilities, ... its integration into systems of efficient and economic 
controLs, ' (HS p139). The latter 'focused on the species body, the body 
imbued with the mechanics of Life and serving as the basis of the 
bLologLcaL processes- propagation, births and mortality, the Level of health, 
Life expectancy and Longevity, with aLL the conditions that can cause these 
to vary. ' (HS p139). The ways in which, and through which, these two modes 
become integrated operates as the central issue in Foucault's analyses; 
thus in 'The PoLitics of HeaLth in the Eighteenth Century', he conciudes 
that: 
The return of the hospitals, and more particular the 
projects for their architectural, institutional and 
technical reorgan[sation, owed its importance in the 
eighteenth century to this set of problems relating to urban 
space, the mass of the population with its biological 
characteristics, the close-knit family cell and the bodies 
of the individuals. (P/K p182) 
We can see a further exempLar of this kind of anaLysis, which is quite 
revealing, if not so elaborated, in an example Foucault gives to Mustrate 
what he means by describing power as intentionat and non-subjectLve. We 
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shall quote this at Length: 
From around 1825 to 1830 one f Lnds the Local and perfect ty 
explicit appearence of definite strategies for fixing the 
workers in the f Lrst heavy industries at their work-pLaces, 
At Mulhouse and in northern France various tactics are 
elaborated: pressuring people to marry, providing housing, 
building cities ouvrieres, practising that sly system of 
credLt-sLavery that Marx talks about ... Around all this 
there is formed Little by Little a discourse, the discourse 
of philanthropy and the morat[satLon of the working class. 
Then the experiments become generaLLsed by way of 
institutions and societies conscLouty advocating programmes 
for the moraLisation of the working class. Then on top of 
that there is superimposed the problem of women's work, the 
schooling of children and the relations between the two 
issues. Between the schooling of children, which is a 
centraLised, Parliamentary measure, and this or that purely 
Local LnitiatLve dealing with workers' housing, for example, 
one finds all sorts of support mechanisms (unions of 
employers, chambers of commerce, etc. ) which invent, modify 
and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment 
and the place - so that you get a coherent, rational 
strategy, but one for which Lt is no Longer possible to 
identify a person who conceived Lt. (P/K p202/2O3) 
The series of reLays, FoucauLt traces here, from the economic utiiity of 
the worker to the future of the nation invoLves severaL further features 
which are not elaborated on in this interview. Thus the threefold 
retatLonship between statistLcal socletles (promLnent Ln EngLand from the 
1830's onwards), the women's movment and the 'scientLsation' of charitable 
practices, retate into a series of LocaL campaigns concerning temperance, 
hygiene, education, family planning, etc., which acted as further relays, 
supports, and buttressesl, 6. Returning to our centraL theme however, we 
have here a concrete exampte of how power operates both Ln terms of an 
anatamo-poL Uics of the body and a blo-poL[tics of the population, but 
&Lso, further, how it can LnteiLlgLbly anatysed as both [ntentlonaL and non- 
subjective. On this second point, it is worth noting that Catherine Millot 
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foLLows the above exampie by Foucauft with the question 'But then what 
role does social class play?, (P/K p203). Foucault's answer illustrates his 
(sympathetic? ) critique of Marxist analyses: '101ne can say that the 
strategy of moraLlslng the working cLass is that of the bourgeoisie. ... But 
-O"I%L 
what I don'tLone, can say is that it's the bourgeois cLass on the level of 
its ideology or eonomic project which, as a sort of at once real and 
f ictive subject, invented and forc! bLLy imposed this strategy on the 
working cLass. ' (P/K p203). 
One couLd multLpLy further exampLes of this form of anaLyses (DonzeLot's 
The PoLlcLng of Fam! _Ltes, 
for exampLe, as weLL as FoucauLt's own studies), 
but, at thLs moment, we shaLL return to two Issues we have Left suspended 
at eartier points in our discussion. Let us, therefore, conciude this area 
of anatysis by summarlsing the principaL features of FoucauLt's anaLytics 
of power which we have examined. Firstly, power should be treated 
nominaLlsticalLy and as a relationaL concept . SecondLy, 'power' denotes 
struggLes and is anaLysable at three Levets (tactics, strategies, 
apparatuses). ThlrdLy, conceptuaLty it appears that reLatLons of resistance 
are immanent in reLations of power. One might extend this List further, but 
to do so wouLd pre-empt our coming discussion which wiLL continue to 
cLarLfy this notion of power/knowLedge by Locating it within the context of 
the genealogical project Foucauft Is operating. 
We have atready noted that the term diSPOSitif refers both to the 
method of the historian and the structure of the practices being examined. 
In the first section of this chapter, we expLored the retatLonship of the 
concept of episteme to the notion of anideal type. By retatLng the concept 
of dispositif to that of episteme we may find a route into the further 
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uncovering of Links between FoucauLt's work and that of Weber and 
Nietzsche. 
In the Lnterview 'The ConfessLon of the Flesh,, Foucault states: 
What I shouLd Like to do now is to try and show that what I 
call an apparatus (dispositif] Is a much more general case 
of the ep ist eme; or rather, that the epistelne Is a 
specifically discursive apparatus, whereas the apparatus in 
its general form is both discursive and non-discursLve, its 
elements being much more heterogeneous. (P/K p197) 17 
Thus if, as we have argued, the epLsteme can be seen as a form of ideal- 
type, it foltows that the concept 'dispos[tLf' is slmLlarLy a form of ideat- 
type, albeit one which deals with non-discursive, as well as discursive, 
phenomena. ConsequentLy, the dispositif that Foucautt sets up about the 
figure of the Panoptican consists of discourse about the prison as welt as 
the practices deptoyed in reLatLon to the prison. That the Panoptican 
operates as a perspective concept through whLch FoucauLt generates a 
deliberateLy one-sided anaLysis of modernity shouLd, therefore, not 
surprise us since it Is depLoyed in an ideaL-typicaL fashion. At this point, 
it becomes necessary to raise what, at first sight, appears to be a 
difficulty for my interpretive strategy here, which is simpLy this: FoucauLt 
totaLLy rejects that he is doing an ideal typical analysis within some kind 
of history of rational isation. Both in The ArcheaoLogy of Knowledge (p15) 
and in 'Questlons of Method: An Interview with MlcheL FoucauLt'll, he 
rejects the Weberian tag. The manner in which this occurs, however, is 
revealing. FLrstly, Let us note Foucault's descriptLon of the concept 'ideal 
type': 
SchematicaLly one can say that the "IdeaL type" is a 
catagory of historLcat interpretation; it' sa structure of 
understanding for the historian who seeks to integrate, 
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after the fact, a certain set of data: it aLLows; him to 
recapture an "essence" (CaLvinism, the State, the capitaList 
enteprLse), working from generaL prLncipLes that are not at 
aLL present in the thoughts of the LndLviduaLs whose 
concrete behaviour is nevertheLess to be understood on their 
basis. (QM p109) 
This interpretation is somewhat strange to put it mLLdly, since Weber Ls 
cat I agorkaLLy not concerned with Locating "essences" but rather with 
deveLopLng perspective concepts, LogLcaLly coherent utopials, which aid us 
to order the muLti-dimensionaL fLux of reaLlty, thus he states: 
Nothing ... is more dangerous than the conFusion of theory 
and history stemming from naturalistic prejudices. This 
confusion expresses itself firstly in the belief that the 
"true" content and the essence of historical reality is 
portrayed in such theoretical constructs or secondly, in the 
use of these constructs as a procrustean bed into which 
history is to be forced or thirdly, in the hypostatization 
of such "ideas" as real "forces" and as a "true" reality 
which operates behind the passage of events and which works 
itself out in history. ( mss oL,. --) 
That Weber should be accused by Foucault of the very InaturaList[c 
prejudice' he warns of is rather harsh. Indeed, FoucauLt's own comments on 
geneaLogy TR p76-100) - patLcuLarLy on its expLLcLtLy sLanted perspective 
- serve to re inforce both the re Lat Lonsh ip between genea logy and idea L- 
type, and between ideat-type and dispositif. We can take this further by 
MustratIng another Lnstance of FoucauLt's m[sLnterpretatlon of Weber 
(noted by CoLln Gordon), shortly before the above quote he says: 
I don't believe one can talk in this [Weberian] way of 
Irationatisation' as something given, without on the one 
hand postulating an absolute vaLue inherent in reason, and 
on the other taking the risk of applying the term 
empirically in a completely arbitary way. I think one must 
confive ones use of thLs term to an instrumental and relative 
meaning. (QM p107) 
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Merquior qLves us a good IndLcatlon of where to begLn when he makes the 
fo I Low ing po int: 
In chapter VI I of The Joyous [Gay] Science Nietzsche gives a 
List of histories yet to be written: the history of Love, 
greed, envy, conscience, pity and cruetty; a comparative 
history of Law; another of penattLes. ... Can anyone read this without instantLy recognls[ng at Least part of 
Foucautt's h1storicaL enterprise? (MerquLor 1985 p143) 
ProbabLy not. The Nietzschean thrust of FoucauLt's work is weLL recognised 
and, in 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', Foucault makes hLs bow to 
Nietzsche's Lnftuence; severaL points in that essay are saLLent to our 
current discussion. A reasonabLe starting pLace is to consider the 
distinctions Foucautt makes between Nietzschean geneaLogy and trad[tonaL 
history, these move about history's tacit depLoyment of hidden metaphysics. 
Thus, for FoucauLt, traditionat history assumes: 
a suprahLstoricaL perspectLve: a history whose functLon is 
to compose the finally reduced diversity of time into a 
totality fully closed on itself; ... a history whose 
perspective on ail that precedes it implies the end of time, 
a compLeted deveLopment. The historLan's history finds its 
support outside of time and pretends to base its judgements 
on an apocalyptic objectivity. This is only possible, 
however, because of its belief in eternal truth, the 
immortatity of the soul, and the nature of conscLousness as 
always identical to itself. (Reader p86/87) 
GeneaLogy, in contrast, 'refuses the certainty of absoLutes, ' combining both 
ontoLog[cat and ethical scepticism. Thus, for exampte, in contrast to Whig 
historiography, FoucauLt presents the darker side of the Entightenment 
project thereby LLLustrating the crucLat ambiguity of modern humanism - 
both in content and styiistLc terms, Foucautt detiberatety reverses the 
triumphaList rhetoric of Whig history as a means of undermining the 
dLsc! pL[nary rationatity embodied in this discourse. This is significant 
-233- 
aLso as FoucauLt notes that: 
The f inaL trait of effective history is its aff irmation of 
knowledge as perspective. Historians take unusual pains to 
erase the elements in their work which reveal their 
grounding in a particular time and place, their preferences 
in a controversy - the unavoidable obstacles of their 
passion. Nietzsche's version of historical sense is explicit 
in its perspective and acknowledges its system of injustice. 
(Reader p92) 
To read Foucauft's studies as making standard historicat truth-cialms is, 
therefore, to misunderstand the nature of the enterprise. His nominatist 
hLstorles, like Nletzsche's essays Ln The GeneaLogy of MoraLS, operate both 
as attempts to undercut the presuppositions in which tradLtionat h1storicat 
discourse is grounded and as accounts which, through their dellberateLy 
one-sided accentuation of certain features of reaLlty, render ambiguous 
standard versions of historLcat events. 
In this context, we can see that, apart from certain formal similarities 
with Weber's IdeaL type, the concept of dispositif aLso operates for 
s[mLLar functionaL purposes: just as the IdeaL-type impticLtLy critLcises 
the presuppositions of (Hegetian and Marxist) teleotogLcaL versions of 
hLstory"?, so too the dLsposit[f enables Foucault to mount a two-pronged 
attack on triumphalist accounts of modernity. We have been concentrating 
on FoucauLt's reLatLons to Weber here, LargeLy because his reLatlons to 
NLetzsche, Ln th[s area, are aLready weLL documented. There are some 
aspects of these reLationshLps, however, which we have not yet expLored. To 
facilitate this, we wilt return to that other issue that we Left suspended 
in our discussion: does Foucault absoLutise power and, thereby, rule out 
the possibELLty of his own discourse? 
In Its standard form, this assumes Foucautt views modernity as totalLy 
- 234- 
normaLLsed Q. e. the Panoptican is modern SocLety), however, a sLightLy more 
sophisticated version is offered by Charles Taylor, who argues that 
FoucauLt taiks: 
as though regimes of truth were all encompassing, governing 
a domain of second- and first-order discourse alike. But, in 
fact, they are more porous'and elastic, as his own work 
shows. -. - If this were not so, none of the books he 
produced could have been written; we would have no meta- 
discourse at all on epistemai and regimes of power. (Taylor 
1985b p381/382) 
We may deal with the standard version of this critique- relatively rapidly 
in order to get on to the rather more Interest Ing po Lnts ra Lsed by Tay Lor. 
At Least three points of rebuttaL have been depLoyed here: (a) FoucauLt's 
accounts are 'terrIbLy one-sided' (TayLor 1985a p164) precLseLy because he 
is operating an [deaL-typicaL/geneaLogLcaL mode of representation, he Is 
not saying 'Here is a true and accurate representation of modernity, ' but, 
rather, 'Here is a version of modernity which counteracts tradLt[on&L 
versions and LLLumLnates that the modern is an essentLatty ambiguous 
achievement. ', (b) FoucauLt is not suggesting that the various programmes 
that he focuses on correspond to strategIcat reaLlty, rather, he is 
interested preclseLy Ln their non-correspondences, their unintended 
consequences (P/K p250), and (c), as David Couzens Hoy points out, Foucauft 
'paints the picture of a totalLy normaLLsed society, not because he 
believes our present society is one, but because he hopes we wLLL find the 
picture threatening. ' TCR p14) i. e. to provoke us to resist the trends that 
are taking our society in this direction. Can these pointS211, sLngutarLy or 
in some combination, undermine or defLect Taytor's criticism? To examine 
this, we should clarify the criticism itself - Taylor, in 'Foucault on 
Freedom and Truth,, quotes the foLlowing passage to exempLify FoucauLt's 
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Nietzschean reLatLvism. - 
Each society has its regime of truth, its 'generaL poLitics, 
of truth; that is, the types of discourse which it accepts 
and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances 
which enabLe one to distinguish true and faLse statements, 
the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and 
procedures accorded vatue in the aquisition of truth; the 
status of whose who are charged with saying what counts as 
true. (P/K pl3l in TayLor 1985a p177) 
Two points arise, for TayLor, out of this threeway Nietzschean Unk-up 
Foucault operates between the w it I-to-know Ledge, the w[IL-to-truth and the 
wiL L- to-power. FirstLy, different historicaL regimes of truth are 
incommensurabLe, therefore, 'transformation from one regime to another 
cannot be a gain in truth or freedom, because each Ls redefined in the new 
context. ' (TayLor 1985a p178). SecondLy, 'because of the Nietzschean notion 
of truth imposed by a regime of power, FoucauLt cannot envisage liberating 
transformations within a regime. ' (TayLor 1985a p178). The consequence of 
these Issues Is, for Taylor, that Foucault's operatlon becomes Incoherent 
in that the Logic of his discourse ruLes out that same discourse by fiat. 
We can argue, foLLowLng Connolly, that Taylor's crLtique of Foucault rests 
largeLy on a misreading of his rhetoric and, consquentLy, his enterprise. On 
his first point, we may note the foLlowing misunderstanding: he suggests 
that by representing regimes as discrete units for rhetoricat purposes 
(the ironic critique of triumphaUsm), Foucault denies the porousness of 
these regimes but, as ConnotLy has noted, FoucauLt taLks of 'this wiLl to 
truth which has crossed so many centuries of our history' (ConnoLLy 1985 
p369). While Foucault takes up a stance of ethLcat sceptLcism reLatLve to 
the notion of progress, this does not imply an out and out ethical, 
neutrality. Taylor's second point manifests quite clearly the misreading at 
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work here; for to criticLse Foucault in terms of the issue of Liberation, is 
to m Lss the po Lnt entireLy. Foucauft precLseLy rejects the 
repress Lon/ L Lberat Lon d1chotomy as part and parceL of the role of the 
juridico-discursive conception of power in acting as a means of disguising 
the operations of power in modern society (HS p86). A more serious point 
ties behind this though, if Foucault rejects the 'ideology of Liberation', in 
what terms are movements counter to the power apparatus of modernity to 
be posed?. Here we are brought back to the issue of resistance and its 
forms. In the Lnterview 'Truth and Power', FoucauLts states: 
It' s not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of 
power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already 
power), but of detaching the power of truth from the forms 
of hegemony, social, economic, and cultural, within which it 
operates at the present time. (Reader p75) 
This LmpLies, for instance, that we can read FoucauLt's own texts, as 
exampLes of resistance, as attempts to undermine the modern forms of 
hegemony within which power operates. This wouLd expLain, aLso, why 
FoucauLt says he wouLd Like his books to be Like 'Mototov cocktaiLs' (in 
MerquLor 1985 p118). A final point remains, relative to Taylor's critique, 
that is his suggestion that Foucault fails 'to recognise the ambivalence of 
modern dLsc! pL! nes, whIch are the bases both of dominatLon and self-ruLe. ' 
(TayLor 1985a p179). Now this wouLd be significant were such an attentive 
reader of NLetzsche to deny, what has aLready been referred to as the 
essential ambiguity of modernity. However, Foucault is guilty of no such 
offence, statLng, for example, 'If one wants to analyze the genealogy of 
the subject in Western societiesq one has to take into account not only 
techniques of domination but aLso techniques of the seLf. ' (in Habermas 
1987 p273). The anaLysis put forward in Discil? LLne and Punish is, thus, 
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acknowLedged as onLy a partlaL account. 
Before concluding this section, we must examine one Last problem raised 
for Foucault's accounts. This perspicious point is made by Frederic 
Jameson: 
What happens is that the more powerful the vision of some 
increasingly total system or Logic - the Foucault of the 
prisons book is the obvious example - the more powerless the 
reader comes to feet. Insofar as the theorist wins, 
therefore, by constructing an increasingly closed and 
terrifying machine, to that degree he Loses, since the 
critical capacity of his work is thereby paraLysed, and the 
impulses of negation and revolt, not to speak of those of 
social transformation, are increasingly perceived as vain 
and tr! vLaL in the face of the model itself. (FCR p1l) 
Now it is not enough here to say that there is a misreading of Foucault 
going on, since it is presciseLy this kind of misreading that is common 
enough in the crLticat responses to Foucautt to make Jameson's point a 
serious one. Here is the true roLe of the secondary text (Rajchman's, and 
Dreyfus and Rabinow's commentar Les/ inter pretat ions are the best exampies 
here), to clear up misunderstanding and to prevent the 'winner loses' Logic 
that Jameson points to taking effect. This soLution does seem somewhat 
inadequate though. ' '- 
Let us conctude this section, however, by reviewing what Foucauft offers 
us here. FirstLy, a reformuLation of power (drawing on Nietzsche) in terms 
of the tripLe axls: power- know Ledge- truth. SecondLy, a geneaLogLcat project 
(folLowing on from Nietzsche and Weber) which maps the essentIaLly 
ambiguous achievement that constitutes modernity. ThLrdLy, a rhetoricaL 
strategy that attempts to disrupt power retations of domination by acting 
as an exempLar of resistance to such retations. These three points give us 
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some Indication of the weight of FoucauLt's achievement, In the next 
section we wilt expLore how he moves on from these concerns. 
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SELF-MAK ING 
In th is sect Lon, we take up the th Lrd doma in of genea Logy Ldent if led by 
FoucauLt: 'a historicaL ontoLogy in reLation to ethics through wh[ch we 
constitute ourselves as moraL agents. ' (Reader p351). Foucault's use of the 
term ethics is, as we shaLl see, a touch unorthodox, however during the 
course of thLs sectLon we wLLL reach an understanclLng of precLseLy what 
this latest move Ls meant to achieve. We wiLL, of course, be continuing to 
reLate FoucauLt's trajectory to Nietzsche and Weber. 
Foucault's point of departure in these studies was a probLematLsatLon of 
the notLon of the desiring subject. That Ls to say, in order to be 
rigorousLy nominaLlstic, FoucauLt couLd not just take on board the notion 
of the desLrLng subject as a 'generaLLy accepted theoret[caL theme' (UP p5), 
on the contrary, Lt seemed: 
that one could not very well analyze the formation and 
development of the experience of sexuality from the 
eighteenth century onward, without doing a historical, and 
critical study dealing with desire and the desiring subject. 
Thus, in order to understand how the modern individual 
could experience himself as a subject of "sexuality, " it was 
essential first to determine how, for centuries, Western man 
had been brought to recognise himself as a subject of 
desire. (UP p5/6) 
ConsequentLy, Foucauft reLocates his project in the period from cLassicaL 
antiquity through the first centuries of ChristLanLty, since it is here, he 
suspects the moves Leading to the notion of man as a desiring subject 
emerge. How then is this probl6matique approached? For FoucauLt, the quest 
begins with a question: 'How did sexuaL behaviour ... come to be conceLved 
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as a domain of moraL experienceT (UP p24). 
At this point, it becomes necessary to focus on Foucault's conception of 
lethLcs' and the methodological elements implied by this conception. The 
concern is not merety with codes of moraLLty or tabLes of Laws for, as 
FoucauLt points out, any given rute of conduct may be interpreted in a 
variety of ways. Rather we must focus on the rapport & soi, the 
relationship of the actors seLf to ItseLf, the "practices of seLf" (UP p28) 
whLch support the constitution of the suject as a moral agent and, thereby, 
particular moral domains. 'Ethics', for Foucauft, is this seLf-activ[ty, the 
k Lnd of relationship one has with oneself. He identifies four 
methodotogicaL implications as arising out of this approach. 
FLrstty, a concern with the determination of the ethicaL substance; thLs 
invoLves anaLysing 'the way in which the LndividuaL has to constitute this 
or that part of himseLf as as the prime materLaL of his moraL conduct. ' (UP 
p26), in other words: 
[This] aspect answers the question: which is the aspect or 
the part of myself or my behaviour which is concerned with 
moral conduct? For instance, you can say, in general, that 
In our society the main field of morality, the part of 
ourselves which is most relevant for morality, is our 
feelings. ... Well, it's quite clear 
that from the Kantian 
point of view, intention is much more important than 
feelings. And from the Christian point of view, it is desire 
(Reader p352). 
In the same interview with Dreyfus and Rabinow, from which the above quote 
is taken, Foucault gives a useful example of the way the ethical substance 
may sh ift: 
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For the Greeks, when a ph! Losopher was in Love with a boy, 
but did not touch him, his behaviour was vaLued. The probLem 
was: does he touch the boy or not? That' s the ethical 
substance: the act linked with pleasure and desire. For 
Augustine, it's very cLear that when he remembers his 
reLationshLp to his young friend when he was eighteen years 
old, what bothers him is what exactly was the kind of desire 
he had for him. So you see that the ethical substance has 
changed. (Reader p353). 
The second element Foucault indicates as relevant is a concern with the 
mode of subjection (mode dlassujettissement), by whLch Ls signMed 'the 
way in which the individual establishes his relation to the rule and 
recognLses himseLf as obL! ged to put it into practice. ' (UP p27 )22 . Thus, 
for example, one may be faithful to a conjugaL partner on a variety of 
grounds: because infWeLLty is sinfuL, because one wishes to set an 
exampLe, because one is giving a certain aesthetic form to one's Life, 
because one is obeying the conventions of a community of which one is a 
member, etc. The mode of subjection concerns the particular relation and 
form of practice a subject takes up. 
Thirdly, FoucauLt points to the notion of ethical work, that is, 'the 
seLf-form[ng activity (practique de soi) or Pasc6tisme - asceticism 
in a 
very broad sense' (Reader p355) which one operates on oneself. 
This refers 
to kinds of procedures one deploys to upon oneself 'not only in order 
to 
bring one's conduct into compliance with a given rule, but 
to attempt to 
transform oneself into the ethical subject of one's behaviour. ' 
(UP p27). 
FoucauLt Mustrates this with regard to sexuaL austerity: 
[Which] can be practised through a Long effort of 
Learning, 
memorization, and assimiLation of a systematic ensembLe of 
precepts, and through a regutar checking of conduct aimed at 
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measurLng the exactness with which one is applying these 
rules. It can be practiced in the form of a sudden, aLl- 
embracing, and definitive renunciation of pleasures; it can 
also be practiced in the form of a relentless combat those 
vicissitudes ... can have meaning and value in themselves; 
and it can be practiced through a decipherment as 
p&Lnstaking, continuous, and detailed as possible, of the 
movements of desire in all its hidden forms, including the 
most obscure. (UP p27) 
In other words, just as an adequate anaLysis of meaning requires that we 
identify the particuLar mode of subjection depLoyed so, aLso, we must 
dellnLate the specific kind of ethicat work going on in order to grasp the 
regime of self-making in operation. 
Foucault final methodological point concerns the telos of ethical 
activity: 'What is the kind of being to which we aspire when we behave in 
a moraL way? ' (Reader p355). Are we aspiring to seLf-mastery, purity, 
immorta L ity, freedom '[a] moraL action tends towards its own 
accompLLshment; but it aLso aims beyond the Latter, to the estabLishing of 
a moraL conduct that commits an indLviduak, not onLy to other acLons 
aLways in conformity with vaLues and ruLes, but to a certain mode of 
being, a mode of being characteristic of the ethicaL subject. ' (UP p28)13. 
To understand, to grasp, how sexuaL experience entered the moraL 
domain 
and to trace the emergence of man as a desiring subject requires 
that we 
examine not the codes of moraLity in the ancient worid but, rather, 
that 
we shift our emphasis to an inspection of the changing reiations of seff 
qua seLf, the mutating ways in which 'the individuaL 
is summoned to 
recognLse himself as an ethicat subject of sexuai conduct. 
' (UP p32). This 
constitutes a significant reformutat[on of the question concerning 
the 
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reLatLonship between Antiquity and Christianity, it is however one 
prefigured in the writings of Nietzsche. Before we go on to examine this 
point however, it may be usefut to Look at the kind of resuit which 
emerges from this styie of anaLysis and how it reLates to the kinds of 
analyses by Foucault we have examined in the previous two sections. 
The four aspects of the kind of relationship to oneself, which we have 
illustrated, are deployed by Foucault to generate schema's of Greek and 
Christian ethics. Thus, he suggests, that: 
the substance 6thique for the Greeks was the aphrodisia; the 
mode d'assuiettisselnent was a polit[co-aesthetic choice; the 
form d'asc6se was the techne which was used - and there we 
find, for example, the techne about the body, or economics 
as the rules by which you define your role as husband, or 
the erotic as a kind of asceticism towards oneself in Loving 
gie was the mastery of boys, and so on - and the t6l6olo ' 
oneself. (Reader p357) 
In contrast, the ChrLstian rapport & soi revolved about rather dLfferent 
se Lf-pract ices: 
the teLos has changed: the teLos Is immortal ity, purLty, and 
so on. The asceticism has changed, because now self- 
examination takes the form of seff-deciphering. The wde 
d1assujettissement Is now divine Law. And I think that even 
the ethical substance has changed, because it is not 
aphrodisia, but desire, concupIscence, and flesh, and so on. 
(Reader p358) 
This change in the kind of reLationship one has with oneseif is 
significant, however, not merely in terms of the emergence of the Christian 
hemeneutics of the 'subject of desire' but, perhaps principally, in 
reiatLon to the issue of subjectivity in Foucautt's thought. it wILL be 
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recaLLed that in the 'Foreward to the EngLLsh Edition' of The Order of 
Things, FoucauLt states that: 
If there is one approach that I do reject, however, it is 
that (one mL ght caL L it, broadLy speaking, the 
phenomenoLogical approach) which gives absoLute priority to 
the observing subject, which gives a constituent roLe to an 
act, which ptaces its own point of view at the origin of att 
historicity - which, in short, Leads to a transcendentat 
consciousness. (OT pxiv) 
In anaLyslng FoucauLt's epistemLc version of history, it was argued that 
he was concerned with the historicaLLy specific grammars which structure 
the fLctioning of our subjectivity, that is a set of rules which delineate 
the framework within which the fashioning of our subjectivity occurs. Given 
th is interpretation LmpLLes the rejection of any notion of a 
Itranscendentai consciousness', FoucauLt's rejection of phenomenotogicaL 
approaches was reLatlvely st ra Lght forward. It is in the Latter two voLumes 
on sexuatity that Foucautt provides an account of the constitution of 
subjectivity which concretises his earLLer objections towards trad[tLonaL 
philosophicaL treatments (particuLarLy the phenomenoLog[cai treatment) of 
this issue. 
In The Use of PLeasure Foucautt makes a point aLong these lines when he 
says: 
The archaeotogical dimension of the anaiysLs made it 
possibLe to examine the forms (of the probtematisatLons) 
themseLves; its genealogicaL dimension enabLed me to anatyze 
their formation out of the practices and the modifications 
undergone by the tatter. (UP p12) 
His concern in these later texts is Largely with the emergence of rapport 
& soi in relation to particular practices. To Mustrate Foucauft's critique 
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of standard accounts of subjectLvity, we have to examIne how the concept 
of 'seLf' reLates to the concept of 'subjectivity, as he depLoys them. Mark 
Poster, in 'Foucault and the Tyranny of Greece', suggests that there is 
some Lack of c Lar ity here: 
CharacteristLcaLLy Foucault does not spend much time 
defining his categories of analysis, in this case those of 
' self' and ' subject' . It appears from the text that ' self' 
is a neutral, ahLstoricaL term, almost a synonym for 
individual. 'Subject' is an active, historical term that 
refers to the process of interior izat Lon. Foucault, of 
course, continues to reject philosophies of consciousness by 
which the individual constitutes himself or herself through 
mental activities. Still, there Is some ambiguity in 
Foucault's use of the term 'subject'. It is not always clear 
that he avoids a 'subjectivist' use of the term. (FCR p212) 
There is some truth to Poster's remark, however, he mIsses the polnt a 
[LttLe when he suggests that the term 'seLf' acts as a virtuaL synonym for 
'Lndlviduat', and that this IsUp' is significant to generating a coherent 
interpretation of what Foucault is doing here. To br Lng out this 
significance requires that we attempt to (re)construct the notion of seLf 
that Foucautt is depLoying here. 
ConcernLng 'The MoraL ProbLematization of PLeasures', Foucauft expresses 
the intention of trying to litustrate: 
how ... three pract ices were conceptual ised 
in medicine or 
philosophy and how these reflections resulted in various 
recommendations, not for codifying sexuaL conduct in a 
precise way, but for "styLLzing" it. styLizations within 
dietics, understood as an art of the everyday relationship 
of the individual with his body; in economics as an art of a 
man's behaviour as head of a family; and in erotics as an 
art of the reciprocal conduct of a man and a boy in a Love 
relationship. (UP p93) 
Here the use of the notion of stylisation is crucLaL to Locating FoucauLt's 
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position reLative to the concept of seLfhood. To make an initial connection 
on this issue, Let us compare the above quote to Nietzsche's comments on 
the giving of styLe to one's character: 
One thing is needful - To give 'styLe' to one character -a 
great and rare art. It is practised by those who survey aLL 
the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then fit 
them into an artistic ptan untit every one of them appears 
an art and reason and even weaknesses deilght the eye. Here 
a Large mass of second nature has been added, here a piece 
of originat nature has been removed - both times through 
Long practise and dalty work, ... (GS 290) 
Davey has pointed out that it is in Nietzsche's remarks on character and 
styLe that a coherent (if LmpLLcit) version of the seLf as muttlpUcity 
emerges. This consists in the recognition of the point that Nietzsche's 
notion of whoLeness with reference to the seLf is of an aesthetic 
whoLeness, not a LogicaL whoLeness, thus, as Davey puts it: 
Giving style to one' s character does not involve a change of 
physical person but the enforcement of an interpretive 
homogeneity throughout all aspects of one's being. The task 
is regulative and will never be complete for just as the 
changing web of historical and cultural relations in which 
an art work exists will alter the readings that constitute 
it, so the changing web of complexities surrounding 
subjects-as-ffuLtipticities will affect how they construct 
and re-construct themselves as characters. (Davey p276) 
In fact, FoucauLt has expLLc! tLy acknowLedged thLs reLatLonship to Wetzsche 
in an interve1w with Dreyfus and RabLnow TR p35l)2-*. ConsequentLy, we can 
see that Foucault's concept of self is not synonomous with the individual, 
but rather, cLosety retated to Nietzsche notion of character. Of those 
eLements invoLved in FoucauLt's anaLysis of the styLlsatlon of seLf, perhaps 
the most important as regards the hermeneutLc organLsatLon and integration 
of one's multipie selves is the telos of one's ethical, action. While we can 
- 247 - 
recognLse that within the framework of any given telos, a variety of 
distinct specific stytisations are possibLe, we can, perhaps, say that the 
telos sets the styLLstic parameters withLn whIch one's seff-StyLlsing 
activity operates. What are the LmpL! catLons of this for the issue of 
subjectivity'? Cook has suggested that subjectivity is constituted through 
'the seLf-refLexLvity that comes of practLcLng varLous; moraL precepts on 
oneself, ' (Cook 1987 p2l 9). Th is leads to the stronger cLaIm that 
I(t]hLnkLng LtseLf is made possibLe by the self-refLexLvity of various 
historicaL pract[ces. ' (Cook 1987 p220). CertalnLy, there appear to be good 
grounds for this suggestion; FoucauLt has, after aLl, stated that he is 
concerned with 'the games of truth and error through which being is 
hLstoricaLLy constituted as experience; that is, as something that can and 
must be thought. ' (UP p6/7). The mechanLcs of this seLf-refLexLve process, 
however, have been Left at the LeveL of beLng subsumed under the phrase 'a 
fold or double' (Cook 1987 p219). Foucault gives us a fuller description: 
Of course all moral action involves a relationship wLth the 
reality in which it is carried out, and a relationship with 
the self. The Latter is not simply I'seLf -awareness" but 
seLf-formation as an "ethical subject, " a process in which 
the individual delimits that part of hLmseLf that wLLL form 
the object of his moral practice, defines his position 
relative to the precept he will follow, and decides on a 
certain mode of being that wILL serve as his moral goaL. And 
thLs requires him to act upon himself, to monLtor, test, 
improve, and transform himself. There is no specific moral 
action that does not refer to a unified moral conduct; no 
moral conduct that does not call the forming of oneself as 
an ethical subject; and no forming of the ethical subject 
without "modes of subjectivation" and an "ascetics" or 
"practices of the self" that support them. (UP p28) 
In other words, the formation of subjectivity reLates to the active 
relation of self qua self grounded in particular cultural practices. By 
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specLfying particular historal subject 1v ity- format ions, Foucault not only, 
geneaLogicaLLy, undermines versions of history and phitosophy that take the 
subject as, in a variety of senses, givel he aLso provides us with a set 
of procedures for the anaLysis of the emergence of 'modern man'. Whereas, 
in DiscipLine and Punish, he had been concerned with the emergence 
(Entstehung) of particular constellations of power relations which act to 
normalise the subject in its constitution; he is now concerned with the 
ItechnoLogles of the seLfl by which the subject qua subject constitutes 
itseLf. It shouLd be noted that there is no theoretLcatLy necessary or 
smooth LncorporatLon of these technologies of self-production Into 
networks of power relations. Only detailed geneaLogicaL analysis wILL 
illustrate how, over a given period, relations between technologies of 
self and relations of power (and resistance) are articuLated". 
Having outlined the kind of operation that Foucault is involved in these 
later works, we are now in a position to reLate this to Nietzsche and 
Weber. On one LeveL, of course, we have aLready argued that the notLon of 
self that FoucauLt depLoys is closely reLated to Nietzsche's reflections on 
character. However, Poster has aLso noted that Nietzsche has been important 
in a variety of ways for the constitution and operation of Foucautt's work 
in this area, thus: 'Even more than to Marx, Foucault demonstrates his debt 
to Nietzsche, especialty in The History of Sexuality [Vots. 2&3- my 
insert], ' TCR p210). FirstLy, it is not dLfflcuLt to perceive that the 
trajectory of Foucault's project Ln the Latter volumes of The History of 
SexuaL[ty mirrors Nietzsche's concerns in the GeneaLogy of MoraLs. 
Nietzsche, in setting up a contrast between good-bad moraLity-and good- 
evil morality, recognises that the analysis of systems of ethics has to be 
grounded in an anaLysLs of reLations to setf, be it in the seLf-affirmation 
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of the Greeks or the setf-negat[on of the sLave. SecondLy, Ln the essay on 
bad conscience., he argues that the emergence of man as 'an animaL wLth the 
right to make promises' (GM p189), that is the emergence of conscience, is 
grounded in a series of sociaL practLces. It is Nietzsche's depLoyment of 
these two strategies that Foucault develops in his studies on sexuality; 
thus he Isubstitutels] a history of eth1caL problemat isat ions based on 
practices of setf, for a history of moraLity based, hypothetLcaity, on 
interdictLons. 1 (UP p13). Their treatments of the reLation between 'pagan' 
and Christian ethics, sLm[L&rLyt operate on paraLLeL Lines. Nietzsche's 
comment that: 'Christianity onLy takes up the fight that had already begun 
agaLnst the classical IdeaL and the noble reUglon. ' (WP 196, cf. aLso WP 
195), and his observation that Christianity both draws on and re-interprets 
particular ways of Life existing within Antiquity (GS 353), whlLe differing 
In emphasis and some detaLLs, makes essentLaLly the same points as 
Foucauft does when, for example, he discusses four aspects of similarities 
between 'pagan' and Christian practices and ethics (UP p15-20), whiLe 
stressing 'they do not have the same place or value within them. ' (UP p2l). 
Beyond these points, it has been suggested in reLatLon to these texts, as 
it has been for the earLier writing, that Nietzsche's concept of truth is 
centrat to FoucauLt's enterprise. For Poster, for exampLe, it is the 
adoption of a Wetzschean notion of truth that Leads to Foucautt's 
rejection of the foundationaL subject and, consequentLy, his preference 
for a version of the subject that is 'both cle-centered and reLatLvist' TCR 
p212). ALL in all, the sign! fLcance of Wetzsche permeates the work on 
sexuality on a Levet much more apparent than in some of FoucauLt's earlier 
work, 
The reLationship of these studies to the work of Max Weber is Less 
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immediately apparent. CertaLnLyt Foucault Is operating an analysis set up 
about a dispositif (grid of Intel L Lgib[ Lity) of desire as an ethicaL 
problem; beyond this point, however, few points of similarity spring to 
mind. By drawing on HennLs's recent work on Weber, however, it may be that 
buried connections wiLL emerge. 
Hennis points out that Weber's analysis of religions treated them as 
'systems for the regulation of Life' (HennLs 1988 p42) whose practicaL 
effects concern the social scientist. For HennLs, this mode of anaLysis 
develops out of Weber's 'CentraL Question', a concern with '[nlothLng Less 
than the requisite comprehension of the genesis of modern man - no! 
Menschentum - by way of a h[storLcaL-differentLaL investigation! ' (Hennis 
1988 p43/44). This Investigation being constituted by two accounts: a 
history of modern science and a history of modern LebensfUhrung (style of 
life/form of Life/manner of Life). If Hennis is correct In his suggestions, 
that is, if Weber is fundamentally concerned with generating a 'history of 
the present' by tracing the genealogy of the modern Typus Mensc4 then It 
is apparent that his project is rather closer to Foucault's than might be 
initially imagined. Certainly, on a formal Level, Weber's use, In The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of CapltaiLsm of Benjamin Franklin's 
Necessary Hints to Those That Would Be Rich and Advice to a Young 
Tradesman parallels Foucault's use of prescriptive texts In The Use of 
Pleasure and The Care of the Self. Similarly, Weber's distinction between 
the meaning of making money for Fugger and Franklin (PESC p5l) formatly 
parallels Foucault's comments on the difference in meaning of sexual, 
austerity for Greeks and Christlans in The Use of Pleasure. While they are 
both concerned with modes of being-In-the-worLd, however, their emphases 
are distinct. Foucault, as we have already noted, is concerned with 
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changing 'practices of self' in relation to the way, as Poster has put it, 
'through which individuals become, in the modern period, subjects whose 
truth is their sexuality., (FCR p212). Weber, in contrast, examines changing 
styles of Life in relation to their consequences for the constitution Of 
the modern subject as disenchanted 
To conclude this section, we wLLL comment on the significance of this 
portion of Foucault's work for his over-all project, that is, a history of 
the present. While at first sight, being incomplete, The History of 
Sexuality series seems a distance from Foucault's general concerns, 
however, as he pointed out, a genealogy of the desiring subject demands 
the humble beginnings represented by the Latter volumes. His comment at 
the start of the essay 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' is singuLarly 
apposite here: 
Genealogy Is gray, meticulous, and patientLy documentary. It 
operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on 
documents that have been stratched over and recopied many 
times. (Reader p76). 
On a theoretical and methodological level though, Foucault's attempt to 
rethink the relationship between seLfhood and subjectivity is particularly 
rich. With regard to seLfhood, he avoids the customary problems concerning 
the seLf-as-muttLpticity by operating a hermeneutic procedure organ1sed 
about the telos of the individual which allows for LntegatLon without 
sacrificing the notion of change and movement by the self. By making 
subjectivity an outcome of this setf-refLexive hermeneutic, he undermines 
traditional versions of the subject whILe offering a mode of anaLysing the 
constitution of this subject. This is relevant to both the eartLer work on 
epistemes and power. With regard to the former, it clarifies his rejection 
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of lphenomenonotogicaL' approaches and illustrates the concern with modes 
of be ing in a Less abstract manner. In relation to power, these 
formulations offer the possibility of resolving the problem of anaLysing 
power on the level of the subject while indicating how we may concretise 
the rather vague comments on the role of power in the constitution of 
the subject which were offered in the first volume of The History of 
SexuaLLt_y- It may be that so far as generating a genealogy of man in 
modernity is concerned this Latter issue will be the most significant of 
aLL Foucault's theoretical shifts and reformulations. 
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Notes 
1, The retatLonship between Nletzsche and Weber themseLves has been 
recently explored by Hennis: 'Traces of Nietzsche in Weber' in Max Weber: 
Essays Ln RenconstructLon (1988). A tso Ln Fteischmann's 'De Weber 
Nietzsche' in Archives Eurol? 6ennes de SocloLoqte, (1964) VoL. 5, pp190-238. 
It is interestLng to note that 'archaeoLogy' is subsumed under 
'geneaLogy' here. On the whote, FoucauLt tends to suggest they constitute 
different LeveLs of anaLysis, cf. UP pl 1/12. 
3. Cf. Schacht Nietzsche (1983) pp130-32, for exampLe, or Strong Frederich 
Wetzsche and the PoLLtics of TransfLquratLon (1975) pp78-86, amongst 
others. 
4.. It wou ld be interesting to know if WLttgensteLn was aware of 
NLetzsche's use of the phrase 'famLLy resembLances', particularLy gLven 
their paraLLeL devetopments in reLatLon to Schopenhauer. 
5. This general idea of being 'up for grabs' as true or false was developed 
by Ian Hack Ing cf 'Language, Truth and Reason' Ln RatLonaLlty and 
Relativism (1982) ed. M. Hoills and S. Lukes. 
6. Cf. hLs Foucault (1985) especLaLty Ch-5. 
7. This term originally appLied to FoucauLt by Herminio Martins in his 
'T ime and Theory in Soc io Logy'. 
InterestingLy this remark echoes a comptaLnt made by TaLcott Parsons 
about Weber, cf. Max Weber's IdeaL-Typg Theory (1969) ed. Rogers p6l. 
9. Cf. chapter 4 
10. This can be compared with Weber's notion of the necessity of 
'passionate devotion' for meaningfuL schoLarshLp. Cf. Weber's 'Science as a 
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Vocation' in FMW. Cf. aLso p174, 
11. This prob Lem, I think, deveLops out of the tension between 
Nietzschean and neo-kantian etements Ln Weber's work. 
12. This point is nLceLy deaLt with by Strong's 'Texts and Pretexts: 
RefLectLons on PerspectivLsm in Nietzsche, (1985) in PoLiticaL Theory VoL. 
13, No. 2, which brings out the point that Persectivism Is not an 
aLternatLve epistemtogy but an afternative to epistemoLogy. 
13. Cf. P/K 'Two Lectures, pp 78-109 
14. The ideoLogy/truth dichotomy, Foucautt suggests, is generated out of 
the constitution of man as an empirico-transcendentaL doubLet in the 
modern episteme. Cf. OT pp319-321- 
15. For Nietzsche, struggle is the manifestation of the wiLL to power both 
Ln reLation to the worLd and oneseLf: 'Every Living thing reaches out as 
far from itself with Its force as It can, and overwhelms what is weaker: ' 
(WP 769). 
16.1 LLLustrate this in my 'Fictioning Feminism: The Construction of 
"Woman" 1750-19301 (unpubLished B. A. dissertation). 
17. This quote aLso Mustrates why FoucauLt can treat archaeoLogy as a 
sub-section of geneaLogy. 
18. This interview is in After PhiLosopby (1987) ed. Baynes et aL. pplOO- 
118. 
19. This criticism being the third mentioned in the quote from Weber on 
p26 of th[s paper. 
20. NB, the first two points of rebuttaL here operate on theoreticaL 
grounds, while the third provides a practical instance of defence. 
21. It m[ght be possibLe to deveLop a defence aga[nst Jameson's poLnt by 
suggesting that the interpretation depends on the type of reader, i. e. the 
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'strong' reader wLLL Lnterpret the text Ln terms of struggLe agaInst the 
society portrayed, whLLe the 'weak' reader wiLL acquLese. A paraLLel with 
Nietzsche's distinction between active and passive nihilists could be 
utiLlsed here. 
22. This notion of 'fL[Ling in, the ruLe might be compared with the 
ethnomethodoLogLcaL position on the insufficiency of ruLes in themseLves. 
23. The notion of the individual's telos has also been deployed by 
Macintyre in the narrative conception of seLfhood he deveLops in After 
Virtue. (1981), aLthough for ends dLametrLcalLy opposed to Foucautt. 
24. Foucault: I would Like to say ... : we should not have to refer the 
creative activity of somebody to the kind of retatLon he has to himself, 
but shouLd reLate the kind of reLatLon one has to oneseLf to a creative 
activLty. 
Dreyfus/Rabinow: That sounds Like Nietzsche's observation in The Gay 
Science (no. 2901 that one shouLd create one's Life by giving styLe to it 
through Long practice and daiLy work. (Reader p351). 
Foucault: Yes. My view Ls much closer to NLetzsche's than to Sartre's. 
25. Cf. Habermas The PhUosophýcaL Discourse of ModernLty (1987) p273. 
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DISCIPLM, SUBJECTIVITY, POWL, 
Introduct ion 
In the Last chapter, we examined Foucault's theoretical trajectory in a 
fairly abstract manner. Our concern now is to ground this trajectory 
through an analysis of its concrete exempt if Lcat ions. In other words, we 
shaLL be delineating Foucault's theorlsation of modernity. In our earlier 
analyses of Nietzsche and Weber, we have seen how the concept of 
ldiscLpLinel occupies a central role in the diagnoses of the modern they 
offer'. This moves about 'discipline' in the sense of the disciplining of 
the individual by external forces but also in the sense of the disciplined 
self-creation of the individual by the individual. The ambiguity of the 
modern for Nietzsche and Weber is generated through the tension embodied 
in these two senses of 'discipline'. Having illustrated some of the ways In 
which Foucault's mode(s) of theorising relate to the work of Nietzsche and 
Weber, our analysis of Foucault's account of modernity will, therefore, 
operate in terms of this dual sense of discipline. 
InitiaLty, we will take up Foucault's earlier concerns, as manifested in 
Madness and CiviLisation in order to examine the rationale behind the 
movement from archaeoLogy to genealogy. Secondly, we shaLL took at 
Foucault's depictions of the various measures, devices, discourses, etc. 
which act to discipline the individual. Here we will be concerned, Largely, 
with the arguments presented in Discipline and Punish and in The History 
of Sexuality VoL. 1. In the third section, we will examine the implications 
of Foucault's suggestions for anaLysing the subject's seff-constitution, as 
illustrated in volumes 2 and 3 of the Sexuality series: The Use of 
Pleasure and The Care of the Self. We will throughout be touching on the 
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issue of the politics of FoucauLt's theorLsing, particularLy in reLation to 
its potentlat operation as a critique of LLberaL! sm. This theme, it wILL be 
recaLLed, has aLready been shown to be significant in reLatLon to Nietzsche 
and Weber - FoucauLt joins in the conversation. This issue wiLL, however, 
be Large Ly suspended tiiL the next chapter 
1. DiscLptine and Archaeotogy 
We have referred to the sense of IdiscLpLLne' being examined here as the 
discipUning of the subject by externaL forces. However, we should note 
that this rather schematic way of posing the issue misses much of 
subtlety of the analyses offered in this tradition of theorising. It is, 
aLmost, one of the tenets of the tradition constituted about Nietzsche, 
Weber and Foucault that this disciplinary dimension of modernity operates 
in a dual manner. This duality is brought out clearly Ln Foucault's 
conception of power where it is cLalmed that, beyond operating on the 
subject, power reLations are constitutive of the subject's formation. Before 
we go on to examine this cLaLm, in the next section, we shaLl brlefly 
consider the issue of discLpL! ne in relation to Foucault's earlier work; 
this is in order to, both, demonstrate the importance of this theme 
throughout his writing and to Locate the reasons for his shift from the 
site of archaeoLogy to the geneaLogLcal terrain. 
In Madness and CiviLlsation the themes of excLusLon, Lnternment and 
subjection, which characterise his Later work on power, are atready 
present. After aLL, as FoucauLt himseLf put it: 'When I think back now, 
ask myself what else Lt was I was taikLng about Ln Madness and 
Civilisation or The Birth of the Clinir, but power? ' (Reader p57). Here we 
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wilt touch on only two aspects of this study: Q) the account of the 
emergence of the 'sclentifLcl asyLum and QD the condLtions of possLbitity 
for the enterprise FoucauLt is undertaking here. 
Foucault's account argues that in the classical period, confinement is 
related to moral laxity and, thereby, to ! dLeness. In 1656, the time of the 
foundation of the H6p! taL G6n(? raL in Paris, the category of 'the idle, 
incLuded the poor, the unemptoyed, the sick, the mad, the vagrant, etc. This 
institution had as its task the prevention of "mendicancy and idieness as 
the source of ali disorders. " Foucauit notes that: 
When the Board of Trade published its report on the poor in 
which it proposed the means "to render them useful to the 
public, " it was made quite clear that the origin of poverty 
was neither scarcity of commodities nor unemployment, but 
"the weakening of discipline and the relaxation of morals. " 
(Reader p136/37) 
The form of thLs LnterventLve preventLon, the remedy of d[sorder, was 
sLmpLy work. That the Lnterned shouLd do 'honest Labour' was not just an 
economic imperative but, more importantly, a moral one. Idleness was seen 
as constituting both a deLlberate Lndiv[duaL rejection of bourgeois 
moraLity and a coLLectLve threat to bourgeois order. The internee who 
fuifilLed the Labour demands made couLd be reLeased as having 'again 
subscrLbed to the great ethLcaL pact of human exLstance. 1 (Reader p137). 
The move from the homogen! sLng schema of 'LdLeness' towards the 
differentiation of the figures subsumed under that schema occurs for a 
variety of reasons having little to do directly, Foucault suggests, with 
the progress of humanitarian enLLghtenment. On one levet, there is the 
emergence of a dLfferentLation generated through the protest of 'the 
confLned themseLves. 1 Thus FoucauLt notes the authorlties were bombarded 
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by compLaints from prisoners at being "'forced to mingie with madmen, some 
of whom are so vLoLent that at every moment I risk suffering dangerous 
abuse f rom them"' (MC p224). Th is differentiation being offLc! aLLy 
recognLsed by La Rochefoucau Ld-Liancourt: "'One of the punishments 
infLicted upon the ep[Leptics and upon other patients of the wards, even 
upon the deserving poor, is to piace them among the mad. "' (MC p225), a 
consequence of whLch was to render them mad themselves. The deployment of 
the phrase 'the deserving poor' is an indicator of another shift which 
reinforces the nascent differentiation emerging here: poverty was being 
transformed Lnto an economLc phenomenon. The pauper, whose very be[ng 
represented for mercantLLLsm a morat probLematLc, Ls rehabiiltated by 
cLassicaL economics as 'a part in the body of the nation'. The confinement 
of the poor, according to the economic critique, represents a 'dangerous 
financing' for on 'cLose scrutiny, the classicat forms of aid were a cause 
of impoverishment, the graduaL immobLLLzatLon and in a sense the sLow 
death of all productive wealth: ' (MC p233/34). With the moral rehabilitation 
of the poor, the 'undifferentiated unity of unreason had been broken' (MC 
228) and within confinement, 'Itlhe presence of the mad appears as an 
injustice; but flor Others. ' (MC p228). The political critique of confinement, 
FoucauLt suggests, 'Linked madness more firmLy than ever to confinement, 
and thLs by a double t1e: ' 
one which makes madness the very symbol of the confining 
power and its absurd and obsessive representative within the 
world of confinement; the other which designated madness as 
the object par excellence of all the measures of 
confinement. ... by a paradoxical, circle, madness 
f inaL ly 
appears as the only reason for a confinement whose profound 
unreason it symbolizes. (MC p227) 
It is at this point that madness becomes Isotated, becomes an object whose 
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forms may be differentiated and cLassified; it is at this moment that the 
asyLum emerges not as a Liberation of the mad but as a mastering of 
madness. ThLs mastery is operated aLong two axes, surveMance and 
judgement, which are embodied in four dimensions: (I )sL Lence, (2) 
recognition by mirror, (3) perpetual judgement, and (4) the medicaL 
personage 2. These dimensions set up a jurid[co-medicaL compLex in which 
the madman is rendered up to be 'observed, condemned, and punished; a trlaL 
wh Lch has no outcome but In a perpetua L recommencement Ln the 
internaLlsed form of remorse. ' (MC p269). The humanttarian deL[verance of 
the madman is rather a shift to new, more insiduous forms of subjection 
which are given epistemoiogicaL status through the psychiatrists encLosure 
of his knowLedge within 'the norms of positivism'. 
Afthough, in Madness and CivitIsation Foucautt's rhetoric embodies a 
nolstagLc romantLcism3 which has LargeLy disappeared by the time of 
NscipUne and Punish, we can see that here aLready is a series of concerns 
which wouLd mark his geneatogicaL studies. Confinement, surveiLtance, the 
compticity of IscientLfic knowLedges' wlth structures of power - alt these 
are thematic eLements which distinguish FoucauLt's writing. This being the 
case, the question arises as to why the theoretLcaL shift from this form 
of archapoLogy to geneatogy occurs. We can Locate a possibLe set of 
reasons Ln the problems raised for Foucault by the romanticism of Madness 
and CMLLsatLon in relation to the subject, to power, and to reason. 
Although not expHcItLy theorLsed as such, on one Level Madness and 
Uvitlsat[on is concerned with power. The conceptuatisation of power which 
is LmpL! citLy depLoyed here however is essentlaLLy a jurldicaL one, 
defined 
negativeLy In terms of its repressive operation on the body and souL of 
the madman. ConcomitantLy, the subject upon whom this power operates 
Is 
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treated as an unprobLematLcaLLy given entity. In the prevLous chapter, we 
indicated FoucauLt's movement from this juridLcat conception of power to a 
positive anatytics of power wherein the subject is conceived as being both 
produced by power reiatlons as weil as articuLatLng these reLations - here 
at Least is one ground for the shift from archaeology to genealogy. An 
aLtogether deeper probLem is encountered however when we consider the 
issue of reason in reLatLon to the activity of the ph! LosophLcat historian. 
Here we are faced wLth Derrida's comments on the possibUlty of FoucauLt's 
enterprise in attempting an archaeoLogy of madness's slLence. 
Foucault is concerned with disclosing representations of 'fundamentaL 
structures of experience', in this case, the experience of madness. That is, 
as Derrida points out, an attempt I to write a history of madness itself'. 
Itself. Of madness itself. ... that is madness speaking on the basis of its 
own experience and under its own authority, and not a history of madness 
described from within the language of reason, the Language of psychiatry 
on madness -' (Derrida 1978 p33/34). As FoucauLt puts Lt: 'We must try to 
return, in history, to that zero point in the course of madness at which 
madness is an undifferentiated experience, a not yet divided experience of 
division itseLf., (MC pix) and again 'A history not of psychiatry but of 
madness itself, in its most vibrant state, before being captured by 
knowiedge. ' (Derrida 1978 p34-). The fundamentaL probLems with this 
enterprise are that, firstly, any access to 'madness' Ln its historical 
dimension that FoucauLt has is through texts within which madness is 
represented as Other, within which madness is operated on. That is, the 
madness FoucauLt encounters is always already a madness captured by 
knowtedge. And secondLy, the activity of writing a history, even an 
archaeoLgicaL history, is one circumscribed by Reason, one which depLoys a 
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ianguage of reason. As such the experience of madness wouLd again be 
rendered up bound by the chains of a Post-Cartesian ratLonaLLty. Derrida 
has put the critique of FoucauLt's enterprise succintty: 
A history, that is, an archaeology against reason doubtless 
cannot be written, for, despite all appearences to the 
contrary, the concept of history has always been a rational 
one. It is the meaning of "history" or archia that should 
have been questioned first perhaps. A writing that exceeds, 
by questioning thený the values -"origin, " "reason, " and 
"history, " could not be contained within the metaphysical 
enclosure of an archaeology. (DerrLda 1978 p36) 
WhUe the subsequent archaeoLogies produced in the 1960's show LittLe sign 
of the romanticism which characterLses Madness and CLvILLsatlon and thus 
avoid this finaL criticat probLem, they Leave the issues of power and 
subject! vLty unresolved. In short, while we may already sense the presence 
of themes and issues which wilL occupy FoucauLt in his genealogicaL work, 
these etements are theoreticaLLy unarticuLated and It is onLy after the 
experience of 19684- that Foucault will reformulate his position, initially 
with regard primarlLy to power and, LatterLy, with a greater focus on 
subject Lv Lty. 
-263- 
DiscLptlne and Power 
We have a Lready considered the concept of 'geneaLogy, in its 
methodologicaL dimension. By focusing here on its concrete depioyment, the 
diagnosis of the modern which Foucault offers wILL be clarified. InLtLa[Ly 
we shaLL be concerned with detineating further the not ion of a 
geneaLogicaL history as deployed by Foucault. This can be facilitated by 
comparing FoucauLt's enterprise to Nietzschels. We shaLL then go on to 
consider in detalk the concept of 'dLscipL[nel being utLL! sed here, before 
f Lna L Ly ana Lys ing some object Lons to th Ls mode of account Lng. 
Let us begin by noting FoucauLt's character isat, ion of Nietzsche's 
geneaLogicat project. In INLetzsche, Genealogy, HIstory' Foucault claims that 
'descent attaches itself to the body': 
The body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by 
Language and dissolved by ideas), the Locus of a dissociated 
self (adopting the illusion of a substantial unity), and a 
volume in perpetual dis[ntergratLon. Genealogy, as the 
analysis of descent, is thus situated within the 
articulation of the body and history. Its task is to expose 
a body totally imprinted by history and the process of 
history's destruction of the body. (Reader p83) 
The text of Nietzsche's which most readily Lends itself to such a 
character isat ion is the essay "'Guilt", "Bad Conscience" and the LLke'5. In 
this essay, Nietzsche considers the institution of promising: 'To breed an 
anLmaL with the right to make promises - is this not the paradoxicaL task 
that nature set herseLf in the case of man. Is this not the reaL probLem 
concernLng Man? ' (GM 11 1 Ln Minson 1985 p65). He begLns by notIng the 
relationship posited between the capacity to make promises and the human 
attrIbute of setf-determination, and in a series of manoeuvres, depLoys 
this retationship as a means of undermining the transcendentaL status of 
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human freewLLL. By contrasting seLf-determLnation, as a seff-evident human 
attrLbute, wLth the capacity to forget - the active apparatus of repression 
that enables us 'to cope with the inexhaustible and exhausting multiplicity 
of thoughts, feelings and perceptions which enter the manifold of human 
experience. ' (Minson 1985 p64) - Nietzsche cLaims forgetting as Log[caLLy 
plor to remembering. For without the capacity to forget there wouid be no 
thought, no memory, and, therefore also, no ability to make promises. 
ConsequentLy, 'the acquisition of memory as a partlaL and positive 
overcoming of forgetfuLness must be accounted for. ' (Minson 1985 p65). In 
this context, the issue of self-determination, and thus the capacity to 
make promises, becomes a historical question concerning the conditions of 
emergence of this attribute. Nietzsche's account suggests that self- 
determLnatLon as 'memory of the wLILI Ls a consequence of the operatLon of 
penaL practices (physicaLLy and symboLicaLLy) on the body of the subject: 
Consider the old German punishments; ... stoning ... 
breaking on the wheeL ... piercing with stakes ... 
quartering ... cutting flesh from the chest. With the aid of 
such images and procedures one finally remembers five or six 
'I will nots' in regard to which one has given one' s 
promise. (GM 11 3 in Minson 1985 p66) 
It is this brutat rendering of men caLcuLabLe which aLLows for the 
emergence of setf-determination and promising, of 'ordaining the future in 
advance' as Nietzsche puts it. 
The critLcaL impuLse of this geneatogicaL strategy of accounting is, 
thus, generated out of twin tactics. F[rstLy, an anaLytic critique, the 
undermin[ng of the transcendentaL status of IseLf-evLdent' attrLbutes and 
values. Secondly, a rhetorical critique, the relation of these, now 
historlsed, attributes and vaLues to the lowest, most antitheticaL of 
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condLtions of emergence. 
We can now examine the extent to which FoucauLt adopts this kind of 
strategy in his account of modernity. FoucauLtls primary target, in 
DiscIpLine and Punish, is Liberat humanism, that Legacy of EnLightenment 
rat[onaLlsm which sets the tacit framework within which human science 
accounts and socio-poLiticaL poLlcles operate. To generate the distance he 
requires for this task, Foucault initiates a variety of moves. Firstly, he 
adopts a position of ethicaL scepticism, that is to say, he suspends the 
assumption that humanism represents a position of morat superiority with 
regard to previous ethical positions. SeconclLy, he suspends the conception 
of the subject as a given rational unity, suggesting instead that we treat 
this subject as an historLcatiy achieved figure. ThirdLy, he suspends the 
notion that power and knowLedge are antLtheticaL, suggesting that we may 
conceive of them as posLtLveLy co-productLve. This series of suspensions 
aLLows FoucauLt to generate an account of the emergence of modern penaL 
practices which undermines the ethicaL cLaims of humanism. How is this 
done? 
FoucauLt begins by juxtaposing the death of the regicide DamLens in aLL 
its grotesque brutality, a carnival, of violence, to Faucher's rules "'for 
the House of young prisoners in Paris"' (DP p6). For aLL its extremity, 
FoucauLt suggests, the Locus of punishment as regards Damiens is his body; 
in the amende honorableý corporaL pain and the cessation. of corpoaL being 
constituted retribution for the cr! mLnaL act. Yet, Foucauft aLso points out, 
that here there operates a precise reguLation of pain reiatLve to crime. 
What this operation of punishment on the body of the condemned represents, 
FoucauLt ctaims, is a juridico-politLcaL reconstitution of sovereignty. A 
crime constitutes an injury to the kingdom and as such represents an 
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affront to the person of the king, The physicaL redress, most spectacuLarLy 
Mustrated in the pomp and rituaL of a pubtic execution, marks (in a very 
reaL sense) 'the dissymmetry between the subject who has dared violate the 
Law and the aLL-powerfuL sovereign who dispLays his strength. ... The 
ceremony of punishment, then, is an exercise of 'terror'. ... [T]o make 
everyone aware, through the body of the crLmLnaL, of the unrestraLned 
presence of the sovereign. ' (DP p49). In contrast, whlLe Faucher's ruLes 
operated on the body of his 'young prisoners' this was not the target of 
their operation, rather, a means of access to the true locus of their 
punishment: the sout. The nature of 'crime', of 'judgement' and of 
'punishment' undergo profound changes. As Foucautt puts it: 
The question is no Longer simply: 'Has the act been 
established and is it punishable? ' But also: 'What is this 
act, what is this act of violence or this murder? To what 
Level or to what f LeLd of reality does it belong? Is it a 
phantasy, a psychotic reaction, a delusional. episode, a 
perverse action? ' It is no Longer simply: 'What Law punishes 
this offence? ' But: 'What would be the most appropriate 
measures to take? How do we see the future development of 
the offender? What would be the best way of rehabilitating 
him? (DP p19) 
In modern judgement, a whoLe army of scientific discourses anatyse the 
nature of the act and the best form of punishment reLative to act and 
offender. The artLcuLatlon of this shift rests, for FoucauLt, not in the 
region of Liberal humanist politics but, rather, in a whole series of 
tactLcaL engagements between diverse and contradictory protagonists. On 
the one hand, a concern with the paraLysLs of the system of justice which 
was generated out of the sovereign 'constantLy creating new offices that 
muLtipHed the confUcts of power and authority. ' (DP p8O). This was 
manifested in the critique of 'not so much, or not onLy, the prLviLeges of 
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justice, its arbitrariness, its archaic arrogance, its uncontroiLabLe rights 
that were criticized; but rather the mixture of its weaknesses and 
excesses, its exaggerations and LoophoLes, and above aLL the very principle 
of this mixture, the 'super-power, of the monarch. ' (DP p8O). On the other 
hand, it involved a concern with 'popular MegaiitLesl. This can be 
illustrated by reference to the figure of the vagabond, a figure tolerated 
by the Ancien R6gLme is now transformed into a centrat threat to civ[L 
society: "'A reward of ten pounds is given for anyone who kills a wolf. A 
vagabond is inflnUeLy more dangerous for society. "' (DP p88). With the 
emergence of capitaLlst society, the increasing movement of Lower cLass 
crime from violence towards MegaLltes of property represented a threat 
whLch had to be controLLed: 'It proved necessary, therefore, to controL 
these illicit practices [pilfering, theft, etc. ] and introduce new 
LegisLation to cover them. The offences had to be properLy defined and 
more sureLy punished; ... I (DP p86). For FoucauLt, 'the humanization of the 
penaLties' represents 'a caLculated economy of the power to punish. ' (DP 
101), to speak of which in terms of a progress in ethLcaL standards is to 
miss the point. Indeed, the point of this transformation, this 'reform', was: 
to make of the punishment and repression of illegalities a 
regular function, coextensive with society; not to punish 
L ess, but to punish better; to punish with an attenuated 
severity perhaps, but in order to punish with more 
universality and necessity; to insert the power to punish 
more deeply into the social body. (DP p82) 
It Is in reiation to this deepening of the power to punish that new forms 
of knowledge (connaissances) and technologies of power develop and emerge 
to inscribe the criminal within a new disciplinary space. A space that 
emerges in relation to the plaque and is architecturally displayed in the 
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construction of the Panoptican. Plague quarantine controls set up a 
segmentation of space which contrasts with the binary spatLal split which 
character ised the Great Conf inement. Whereas the exc Lus ion of Lepers, for 
exampLe, had represented a purification of the body of the community, the 
fLxed and surveyed spaces of plague control represent 'the penetratLon of 
reguiatLon into even the smaLLest detaiLs of everyday Life through the 
mediation of the complete hierarchy that assured the capillary functioning 
of power;... The piague as a form, at once reaL and imaginary, of disorder 
had as its medicaL and poLiticaL corretative discLpLine. ' (DP 198). The 
Panoptican is the ordering of disc! pLLnary space in which this penetration 
of regulation operates at its most 'scientific'. But whereas the plague 
controks had represented a Locus of extremity, panopticism represents the 
transformation of this disciplinary space from the margins into the centre 
of the social body itself. In this ordering, three disciplinary effects 
operate, one negativeLy and two positiveLy. The negative effect is 
represented by the abolition of the crowd, in its place a 'collection of 
separated individuaLItLes' (DP p201). As Foucauft puts it: 
The arrangement of his (the inmates' I room, opposite the 
central, tower, imposes on him an axial visibi Lity; but the 
divisions of the ring, those separated cells, imply a 
Lateral invisibility. And this invisibility is the quarentee 
of order, If the Inmates are convicts, there is no danger of 
a plot, an attempt at collective escape, the planning of new 
crimes for the future, bad reciprocal influences; if they 
are patients, there is no danger of contagion; if they are 
madmen, there is no risk of their committing violence upon 
one another; if they are schoolchildren, there is no 
copying, no noise, no chatter, no waste of time; if they are 
workers, there are no disorders, no theft, no coalitions, 
none of those distractions that slow down the rate of work, 
make it Less perfect or cause accidents. (DP p200/201) 
Separation and visibLLLty; these are the twin tactics which ensure the 
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economIc deptoyment of power relatLons, InscrIbed withIn a reLatLon of 
being observed but unabLe to observe the observer, the operation of power 
becomes automat [c, the inmate 'becomes the prLnc! pLe of his own 
subjection. ' (DP p203). This negative operation of power opens up the 
possibility of its positive effects: as menagerie and as Laboratory. The 
former of these effects operates a system of cLassificatLon, 'the anaLy[caL 
arrangement of space' (DP p203): 
makes it possibLe to draw up differences: among patients, to 
observe the symptoms of each ind[viduaL, wLhout the 
proximity of beds, the cLrcuLation of miasmas, the effects 
of contagion confusing the cL! nlcaL tabLes; ... (DP p203) 
... and so on ... To generate systems of classLficatory types through which 
forms of knowLedge may be generated, organised, depLoyed; this Ls the 
project of the PanoptIcan. Here, menagerle meets Laboratory; 
experLmentation with different med1caL treatments, the use of varying 
types of punishment, different techniques of teaching, aLL these procedures 
given a scienticity through the controLLed categories of d[sc! pLLnary space. 
The Panoptican represents a poLyvaLent poLLticaL technoLogy whLch pLaces 
relations of discipline Into, and throughout, the social body, that Is, the 
constitution of a dLsc! pLLnary society. 
Let us briefly reflect on the tactical structure of Foucault's argument. 
FLrstty, Foucau It's juxtapos it ion of cLassicaL and modern modes of 
punishment wh! Le formaLly suspending ethicat judgement, on a rhetoricaL 
teveL presents modernity as a space permeated by power reLatLons, as a 
totaLLy normaLised body6. SecondLy, he argues that the emergence of modern 
penaL techniques shouLd not be Located within an evoLutionary schema of 
increasing humanitarianism but in a series of diverse and confLicting 
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tact1caL engagements. ThirdLy, he suggests that power and knowtedge are 
inextricabLy entwined in these penaL techniques, as in the positive effects 
of panopt! cLsm. Fourthly, he claims that the subject as the focus of 
var lous class If icatory sc lent if ic discourses is, partially at Least, 
constituted through the practices operated by these discourses; thus the 
patient is conceived of as a depressive, the schoolchild as a delinquent, 
etc. Through these anaLyticaL and rhetoricaL arguments, LlberaL humanism is 
subjected to the characteristic two-pronged geneaLogicaL critique. On a 
rhetoricaL LeveL, its progressive ethLcaL ctaLms are ironicised; whLLe on an 
anaLyticaL plane, its assumptions and claims about power, knowledge and the 
_WU Pt c; m 
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vision of modernity. 
However, if FoucauLt rejects, as he does, the moraL vision of L[beraL 
humanism, what precLseLy is the nature of this aLternatLve vision of 
modernity we to replace it with? Here we must, at Last, come to grips with 
the conception of modernity as a disciplinary society which Foucault offers 
and examine in rather more detail the senses of discipline deployed here. 
In some part, we have aLready seen that 'dLscipL[ne', for FoucauLt, refers 
to the emergence of a mode of operation of power reLations which can be 
s1ted, on one Level, [n the appearence of the PanoptLcan. We have also 
noted that this mode of power operates not onLy on the subject but is, to 
some extent, constltutlve of the subject. The fLrst aspect, we have 
mentioned, is reLativeLy unprobtematic; one notes the emergence of 
meticulous detailed training regimes throughout the social body, as 
'general formulas of domLnat[on' (DP p137). We can Locate several prinCLptes 
embodied in these regimes: 
1. An arrangement of space: 'De La SaLle dreamt of a ctassroom in which 
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the spatiat distribution might provide a whote series of distinctions at 
once: according to the pupLL's progress, worth, character, appLlcatLon, 
cLeanLLness and parents' fortune. ' (DP p147) 
An arrangement of Ume: Time-tabLing - 'a Ume of good quaLLty, 
throughout which the body is constantLy appLled to its exercise. '(DP pl5l) 
-a technology of 'rhythm and reguLar activities' which governs every 
aspect of the subjects' day. 
3, TLme and Movement: The framLng of an activLty - for Lnstance, the 
drMLng of soLdiers which LnvoLves a 'degree of precision In the breakdown 
of gestures and movements, ' (DP pl5l) - 'A sort of anatomo-chrono log ica L 
schema of behaviour is defined. The act is broken down into its eLements; 
the position of the body, Limbs, articutations is defined; to each movement 
are assigned a direction, an aptitude, a duration; their order of succession 
is prescribed. ' (DPpl52) 
4. Body and Gesture: 'DiscipLInary controL ... imposes the best reLation 
between a gesture and the overaU position of the body, which is its 
condition of efficiency and speed. ... A weLL-discLLLned body 
forms the 
operational context of the slightest gesture. Good handwriting, for 
exampLe, presupposes a gymnastics -a whoLe routine whose rigorous code 
invests the body in its entirety, from the points of the feet to the tip of 
the index f inger. ' (DP pl 52) 
5. Body and Object: The artIcutation of the activity of object use: 'it 
consists of a breakdown of the totaL gesture into two paraLtel series: that 
of the parts of the body to be used ... and that of the parts of 
the object 
maipuLated ... - then the two sets of parts are correlated 
according to a 
number of simple gestures ...; lastly, it 
fixes the canonical succession in 
which each of these correlations occupies a particular pLace. 1 (DP p153) 
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6. Exhaustive Use: 'Disclpi, Lne ... arranges a Positive economy [of time]; it 
poses the principle of a theoreticati ever-growing use of time: exhaustion 
rather than use; it is a question of extracting, from time, ever more 
available moments and, from each moment, ever more useful forces. ' (DP 
p154), consequently, in the school., for example, the rhythm imposed by the 
timetable, with all its signals, whistles, bells, "'is to accustom the 
children to executing weLL and quickly the same operations, to diminish as 
far as possible by speed the loss of time caused by moving from one 
operation to another'. " (DP p154). 
These prLncipLes indicate the dimensions of the disciplining of the subject, 
a subject organised, occupied and trained. To put it another way, such 
principles delineate an anatomo-politics of power, its mLcro-physLcs, yet 
their coalition in the spread of panoptLcism sets up another anaLysabLe 
level of the operation of dLscLpL! ne: Ibio-politics. Whereas discipline on 
the level of an anatomo-poLLtLcs concerns the individuaL, blo-poL[tics is a 
concern with the social body as a whole. Thus the introduction of birth 
certificates at the anatomo-poLItLcaL level relates to the generation of 
statistics analysing birth rates at the bio-politicaL level, the examination 
as a mode of disciplinary surveillance relates to the statistics concerning 
pass rates as an 'external index' of the state of the education systemt 
etc. As Foucault pus it: 'The disciplines of the body and the reguLatLons 
of the population constituted the two poles around whLch the Organisation 
of power over Life was depLoyed. 1 (HS p139). It is through the articulation 
Of these two poles that there emerges an array of forms of knowledge 
which attempt to anaLyse the relationship between the individual and 
society, individuals in terms of society or socLety in terms of individuals. 
That Is to say, there emerges the human sciences. 
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At this stage, we must explicate the sense of discipline as constitutive 
of the subject, for here we can see a kind of cognitive panoptLcLsm. In 
other words, here the effects of the Panoptican escape architectural 
enclosure. That is, while the Panopt[can is a point of emergence for the 
cLassLficatory analysis and experimentation which will develop into the 
human sciences; with the fuller development of these sciences, society as a 
whote becomes a PanoptLcan. Every aspect of human existance is exposed to 
the unreLenting gaze of the soclaL scientist on the theoretLcaL pLane and 
the sociaL worker on the practicaL pLane (aLthough the distLnct[on between 
theory and pracLce here is by no means clearcut). Modernity constitutes 
itself, through the human sciences, as the disciplinary society par 
exce 11 en ce. 
With this emergence of the human sciences come a whole series of 
figures: the dekinquent, the incapabLe mother, the chLLd abuser, the 
psychopath, etc. Here we see the Line of FoucauLt's argument when he 
states that power-knowLedge reL ations are constitutive of the subject. Here 
the subject as infant, as chLLd, as adotescent, as aduLt, as middLe-aged and 
as senior citizen is anaLysed in terms of age, maturity, capabLLity and 
normalcy, is labelled in relation to a given context, is placed within a 
specific regime of judgement, and is subject to a particular set of 
measures dependent on the outcome of that judgement. The young offender 
becomes a 'delinquent' subject to a form of correction geared specifically 
to his being as a delinquent from a particular type of enviroment, with a 
certain level of education, and a given record of character, of past 
offences, of cupabULty. However, while we may sense Foucault's argument, 
that by defining the subject as exemplifying a given mode of being and, 
consequently, gearing the general disciplining of the subject 
to that mode 
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of being, it does seem that a further step in the argument is required, 
that is, an account of the construction of subjectivity through which the 
disc! pLLnary mechanism operate. Here, however, FoucauLt offers no such 
account. 
We can Mustrate this point by reference to FoucauLt's consideration of 
four figures he Locates as emerging through 'this preoccupation with sex 
which mounted throughout the nineteenth century -I (HS p105): 
1. the hyster ica L woman. 
2. the masturbating chlLd. 
3. the MatthusLan coupLe. 
4. the perverse adu Lt. 
Each of these figures, he suggests, corresponds to a given strategy 
'which, each in its own way, invested and made use of the sex of women, 
chiLdren, and men. ' (HS p105). In these strategies, arch[tecturat, bLoLogLcaL, 
moral, psychological, and pedagog[caL knowLedges are deployed on the 
subject in question. Yet, despite Foucautt's indications as to the forms of 
knowledge depLoyed in the given combinations of 'dLsc! pLLnary techniques 
with regulative methods' (HS p146) that these strategies embody, it Ls not 
enough to poLnt to these technoLogles of power to justLfy the cLaLm that 
power-knowLdge reLations are constitutive of our subjectivity. White we 
may welL agree that the pychLatric delineatLon of homosexuaLLty or femaLe 
hysteria may generate sets of practices which, in acting on the subject, 
are constitutive of the subject as a 'homosexuat' or 'hystericat woman#, if 
this is to have a meaning beyond that of the way in which subjects are 
soclaLly defined and treated, an account of the mechanism of this 
subject ivisation is necessary. 
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To conctude this section, Let us sum up the significant points. FirstLy, 
we have Mustrated the nature Of such a geneaLogicaL account, in 
partLcuLar, its combination of anLyticaL and rhetorLcaL LeveLs of critique. 
SecondLy, we have expLored the senses of lexternaL dLscipLine, (we use the 
term 'externaL' here to dLfferentLate, for the moment at Least, this use of 
'discipline' from 'self-discipline' in its more or Less voluntary intentLonaL 
mode) indicating that Foucautt's attempt to clepLoy a duaL meaning in this 
term requires further theoreticaL eLaboratLon Lf it is to achieve Us 
intended effect. This Last point is one we wilL return to as we move to 
consider Foucault's analyses of 'self-discLptinaryl practices, of modes of 
setf-construction. Finatly, we shouLd note the roLe of the human sciences 
within the vision of modernity offered here, far from being, as LiberaL 
humanism wouLd have us beLieve, potentiaL guides to a utopian form of 
sociaL Life, they represent panopt! cLsm taken to its Limits, not the 
formation of a utopia but rather the creation of a disc! pLLnary society. 
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3. Disciptine and Sub. iect! Kit_y 
In this section, we shaLL be concerned with three Lnter-retated issues. 
FLrstLy, a grounding and cLar[fLcatLon of Foucau Ltls account of 
subjectivity. SecondLy, the impLLcatLons of this account for his conception 
of power- know Ledge. ThirdLyl the consequences of these first two points 
for his account of modernity. WhiLe we shaLL be largeLy drawing on the 
Later work on sexuaLity, other pieces wILL aLso be ut! L[sed. These works 
help us to delineate the notion of 'seff-discipL[nel which Foucault deploys 
and, further, to [ndLcate the reLationship between lexternaL dLscLpLLne' and 
'se Lf-d Lsc lp L Lne', though these terms themseLves may prove aIL too 
schematic in representing Foucauft's theorisation of the disciplinary 
nature of the modern. 
FoucauLt's attempt to anaLyse the rapport 6 -so!, the seLf-reLationships 
by which we constitute oureseLves as ethLcaL subjects, operates, as we 
have noted, about four aspects: 
1. The ethical substance - 'the aspect or the part of myseLf or my 
behaviour which is concerned with moraL conduct' (Reader p353). 
2. The mode of subjection - 'the way in whLch peopLe are invited or incited 
to recogn[se their moraL obLLgatLons' (Reader p353) 
3. The self-formin_q activity or asceticism - 'the means by wh[ch we change 
ourselves in order to become ethical. subjects' (Reader p354) 
4. The telos - 'Which is the kind of being to which we aspire when we 
behave in a moraL way' (Reader p355) 
We can ground thLs formuLation concreteLy by reference to FoucauLt's 
anaLysis of Greek self-practIces. Here he suggests that the ethicaL 
substance can be Located through the concept of aphrodisiA the mode of 
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subjection through the notion of chgsis, the asceticism through the concept 
of enkrateia, and the telos through the notion of s6phrosyna By examining 
these aspects we may be able to generate a clear picture of how Foucault 
conceives of the ' construction of seLfhood and its relation to the 
construction of subjectivity. 
'The aphrodisia are the acts, gestures, and contacts that produce a 
certaLn form of pteasure. 1 (UP p4-0). However, the eth[caL substance, for the 
Greeks, was not the form of the act(s), their morphology, nor was it 'the 
pLeasure that was associated with them ... [or] the desire to which they 
gave rise. ' (UP p42), rather, it was: 
'the dynamics that joined at L three in a circular fashion 
(the desire that Leads to the act, the act that is Linked to 
pleasure, and the pleasure that occasions desire). The 
ethical question that was raised was not: which desires? 
which acts? which pleasures? but rather: with what force is 
one transported "by the pleasures and desires`il (UP p43) 
Two aspects structure the analysis of this dynamics: firstly, a 
quantification of the degree of sexuaL activity, of the intensity of this 
practice; excess or moderation, and secondly, the role of the sexual actor; 
passive or active, penetrated or penetrator. If the individual succumbs to 
the enjoyment of pteasure ungoverned by reason or takes up a roLe 
contradLctory to hLs natural posLtion, he becomes degenerate, unable to 
govern himseLf how can they govern others? The issue thus becomes one of 
'right use'; that Is to say the male citizen should exercise moderation and 
operate as the active partner in accordance with his naturat roLe, he 
should enjoy his pleasure "as one ought". This "ought" leads us to the 
mode of subjection, to 'the way in which the ind! vLduaL estabLishes his 
relation to the rule and recognises himself as being obliged to put It 
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into practice. ' (UP p27). 
The refLection on the aphrodisia in terms of its dynamics leads to the 
notion of chrLssis aphrodisidn, the use of pLeasures, a reference to 'the 
manner in which an LndividuaL managed his sexuaL activity,, (UP p53). The 
deLineatLon of "right use", of the correct management of one's sexuaL 
activity, is structured around three varlabLes: 
1. The strategy of need - 'people should "L! mLt themselves to such 
induLgence as the souL wouLd reject unLess the need of the body were 
pressing, and such as wouLd do no harm when the need was there. "' (UP p55) 
2. The strategy of tLmeLLness - '(This) consisted in determining the most 
opportune time, the kairos. ... That time couLd be decided according to 
severaL scates. There was the scaLe of a person'sentire Life. There was the 
scate of the year with its seasons: ... It was aLso recommended to choose 
the right time of day: ... The choice of the moment - of the kairos - ought 
to depend on other actLvities as well. If Xenophon could poInt, to Cyrus as 
an exampLe of moderation, this was not because he had renounced pLeasures; 
it was because he knew how to distribute them properLy over the course of 
his exLstance, not permitting them to divert him from his occupations, and 
aLLowing them onLy after a prior period of work had cLeared the way for 
honourabLe recreation. ' (UP p57-59) 
3. The strategy of status - 'The art of making use of pleasure also had to 
be adapted to suit the user and his personal status. ... In order to show 
the advantages of moderation to his disciple Aristippus, who "was rather 
intemperate in such matters, " Socrates, still according to Xenophon, asks 
the question: if he had to educate two youths, one of whom would go on 
to 
lead an ordinary Life and the other would be destined to command, which of 
the two would he teach to "control his passions" so 
that they would not 
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hinder him from doing what he had to do? ' (UP p59-61). 
These strategies define the dimensions of the ind[viduaLs reLation to 
aphrodisia, we now have to bring out the active ways in which these 
strategies are brought into practice, how the indivLduaL makes himself into 
a person who depLoys himseff correctLy in reLation to these strategLc 
L ines. 
At this point, one encounters the notion of enkrateia, of 'an active form 
of seff-mastery, which enabLes one to resist or struggLe, and to achieve 
domination in the area of desires and pLeasures. 1 (UP p64). For the Greeks, 
the achlevement of seLf-mastery demanded an askiffsisý an ascetics, thus, 
'the Pythagorean traditLon recognised many exerclses: dLetary regImens, 
reviewing of one's misdeeds at the end of the day, or meditation practices 
that ought to precede sLeep to ward off bad dreams and encourage the 
VLSLons that might come from the gods. ' (UP p74). This ascetics, however, 
was not, on the whote, separated from the ascetics which were depLoyed to 
create the c! tLzen, mastery of oneseLf and mastery of others were 
organised about the same set of exercises. Through the seLf-mastery which 
emerges as a consequence of these training regimens though, one couLd 
approach s5phrosyn6 which Is 'characterised as a freedom' (UP p78). 
S6phrosyn@, according to Foucault, 'is described ... as a very general 
state which ensures that one wLLL do "what is fitting as regards both gods 
and men" - that is, one wLLL not onLy be moderate but righteous and just, 
and courageous as well. ' (UP p64. ). Thus the significance of two moral 
figures: firstLy, the tyrant: 'he was incapabLe of mastering his own 
passions and was therefore always prone to abuse his power and to do 
violence (hubrizein) to his subjects' (UP p8l), and secondly, in contrast, 
'the positive image of a Leader who was capabLe of exercising a strict 
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control over himself in the authority he exercised over others. ' (UP p8l ). 
These two images point to the importance of the relationship between self- 
mastery and mastery over others, onLy by achieving the former can the 
proper exercise of the latter be ensured. As the telos of the individual's 
rapport A soi, sdphrosyn4g represents the final eLement in this brief 
summary of Foucault's analysis of Greek seLf-retatLonships, at this point 
we can reftect on thLs mode of anaLysis of seLfhood and subjectLvLty. 
In the Last chapter, it was argued that FoucauLt's concept of seLfhood is 
strongLy reLated to Nietzsche's conception of character, this Led to the 
further suggestlon that FoucauLt Ls depLoyLng, Ln these texts, a verson of 
seif-as-mu Ltipt ! city and, moreover, that the formation of subjectivity 
retates to the refLexive reLation of this seLf to itseLf. If we regard our 
muLtIpLe seLf as a series of stories which, through the mediation of our 
teios, interactively resolve themselves into an overarching narrative, then 
subjectivity emerges as this narrative's reftection on itseff. We can 
Mustrate this by reference to the Pythagorean practice of noting down at 
the end of the day a review of one's actions. This practice is both an 
action performed by the seLf and a reflectLon on the nature of this setf, 
it is the refLexLvity of this seLf-practice that accounts for the emergence 
of subjectivity. Thus the Greeks - through the specification of aphrodisia 
as a domain of moraL concern, of ch6sls as the perception of 'the type of 
subjection that the practice of pLeasures had to undergo in order to be 
morally vatorized; l (UP p37), of enkrateia as the actLve work one had to do 
on oneself, and of s5phrcýsynd as 'ethical subject in his futfMment. ' (UP 
p37) - are deLineatLng a set of styListic parameters within which the 
(narrative) seLf may operate. This is, at the same time, a definition of a 
mode of formatlon of the subject, a mode of being- Ln-the-worLd set up, 
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FoucauLt suggests, about the idea of the 'care of the seLf'. If we have 
here something approaching an account of Foucault's reformulation of the 
issues of selfhood and subjectivity, it is fitting at thLs point to consider 
the impLications of this account for the Lacunae present in his concept of 
power. 
It wHL be recaLted that FoucauLt's conceptuaLlsatLon of power LnvoLves 
the twofo[d cLaLm that power relattons not onLy operate on and through the 
subject but are atso (partlaLLy) constitutLve of the subject. FoucauLt's 
arguments as presented in Discipline and Punish and The History of 
Sexuality VoL. J. do not present an adequate justification of this cLaim and 
such a justification requires an account of the mechanisms of the subject's 
formation. Since we now have the outLine of such an account, we shouLd be 
able to ascertaLn whether an adequate justification of Foucault's claim is 
possIbLe or whether thLs Lssue poses a deeper threat to the cogency of 
FoucauLt's account of modernIty. 
Let us begin by returning to the prisoner we Left in Bentham's 
Panopt[can, we can attempt to generate a sort of externaL rapport 6 soi 
through which power relations can operate in the (re)constitution of the 
prisoner's subjectivity. What wouLd be the ethicaL substance here? We can 
suggest that 'intention' may be taken as constituting the primary materLaL 
of the prisoner's moral conduct, thus the immense battery of forms of 
knowiedge brought to bear on the offender: 'What is this act, what is this 
act of violence or this murder? To what Level or to what field of reality 
does it beLong? Is it a phantasy, a psychotic reaction, a deLusLonaL 
episode, a perverse actLon. " (DP p19). The question posed is one of the 
nature of the offender's intention and its retationship to the offender's 
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act(s) -a question of respons[bil[ty7. What then is the mode of 
subjection, what strategic elements are involved In defining a style of 
respons lb II ity? In this case, it seems to be that one strategy concerns 
correct obedience to the conventions of a community of which one is a 
member, the doctrine of the ruLe of Law'. Another strategy might be that 
of 'samaritanism', heLping one's fetLow man, being courteous, kind, etc. The 
seff-forming activities wouLd be all those exercises and employments 
whereby the prisoner is made, to some extent, responsible for the 
performance of a given act together with the structures of reward and 
punishment which operate consequent to the performance or non-performance 
of the act'?. FinaLLy, the telos is the prisoner as a responsibLe c[tizen, as 
[LberaL man, rationat, autonomous, respectfuL of the socLal contract he has 
impLIcItLy slgned'cl. 
What differentiates the technoLogy of seLf outtined here from those 
FoucauLt discusses is, of course, that here it is not the indivicluaLls own 
seLf-constLtutLng practLces but rather a set of seLf-constitutive 
activities imposed upon the InclLviduat. At this point, our distinction 
between setf-discipLine and externat discipLine begLns to break down, both 
the indLv[duaLls own technotogy of seLf and that technoLogy of seLf imposed 
on the indLvidual represent forms of seLf-dLscLpLLne, but what we may caLL 
voLuntary and LnvoLuntary forms of se Lf-dLscLpL ! nary acivity. The 
impL[cations of this for Foucautt's concept of power shouLd be emerging 
here, Let us cLarify them further. 
DiscLpL! ne as a modaLLty of power operates through the construction of 
technolog[es of the seLf, Lt operates as the form dlasc6se, the techne 
whIch are used to transform the subject. The Panoptican represents the 
pure form of this asceticism, a surveMance which pLaces the prisoner 
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within a perpetuaL structure of punishment and reward according to their 
exhibition of the characteristics of responsIbLe action (for exampLe, the 
cleanLlness, tidiness and content of their ceLL wouLd be one sign used to 
judge theLr degree of responsibiLitY)' 1. Here we can see the depLoyment of 
power reLations as constitutive of the subject. However, it wLLL be 
recaLLed that FoucauLt states that 'Iwlhere there is power, there is 
resistance, and yet, or rather consequentty, this resistance is never in a 
position of exteriority in relation to power. ' (HS p95). Resistance, in our 
exampLe, operates through the prisoner's own technotogy of seLf which Ls 
likeLy to be consLderabLy dLfferent to that deveLoped by the prLson 
authorities. Resistance is the asceticism of the prisoner exemplified [n 
the rejection or alternative usage of the disciplinary forms imposed by 
the Panoptican. The formation of the prisoners subjectivity is, thus, 
generated through the struggLe of reLations of power and reLations of 
resistance, a struggLe articuLated through two (more or Less) opposed 
technoLogles of the seLf. Gordon has suggested that FoucauLt's interest in 
anatysing such institutions as the prison is, preciseLy, the non- 
correspondence 'between the orders of discourse, practice and effects, ... 
the manner in which they fail to correspond and the positive significance 
that can attach to such discrepancies. ' (Gordon 1979 p36). In other wordsý 
as regards the prison, how is it that the discourse of the reformers, the 
practice of the aurthorLtles, and the subjectivity of the prisoners falLed 
to rehabilitate prisoners and reduce crime? Locating this as one of 
FoucauLt's foci makes good sense since it is at the Level, of the struggle 
of power and resistance articulated through opposed technologies of the 
self that, at least, one aspect of this non-correspondence is rendered 
accountabLe. Having Mustrated that an account of the reLationship between 
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power, subjectivity and resistance in FoucauLt, s texts can be given, we can 
now go on to consider the LMPL! catLons of this account for FoucauLt-s 
representation of modernity. 
At the start of this chapter, it was noted that FoucauLt, Like Nietzsche 
and Weber, conceives of modernity as an ambiguous achievement. We are now 
in a position to cLarify the nature of this ambiguity. In contrast to 
Whiggish accounts of modernity, the narration of a trLumphaL progression 
on the part of the forces of LiberaL humanLsmt Foucautt's account stresses 
the dark side of EnUghtenment. DiscipLine and Punish in part lcu Lar, 
presents the spectacLe of a totaLLy normalised socLety, a socLety 
penetrated throughout by panoptLcism, each aspect of existance subject to 
dLscipLLnary reguLatLon. In the Last chapter, it was argued that this 
totaLLsing account of the dLscLptinary nature of modernLty operates as a 
deliberate rhetorical. strategy to undermine standard historicaL accounts, 
the perspectivist, nature of FoucauLt's method deptoying an expLicLtLy one- 
sided accentuation of the features of modernity. Yet there is aLso a sense 
in whLch the logic of Foucault's formulatLon of power at that point pushes 
him to give such an account of modernity. Despite the gesturing to the 
concept of resistance, in the Wstory of Sexuatity. Vol. 1 there is LittLe 
eLucidation of this concept or its roLe. At this point, it wouLd appear that 
FoucauLt's account of modernLty Ls mereLy an inversLon of Whig hLstorLes. 
However, once the anaLyticaL apparatus he sets up about the Ldea of 
'technoLogles I of the seLf' Is brought into pLay, this situation is aftered. 
We now have a concept of resistance that can be put to work, while the 
nature of modernity as a disciplinary society takes on a new d[mension. 
In the previous chapter, it was noted that "struggLe" was the root 
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metaphor of Foucault's reformulation of the concept of power. ThLs notion 
of struggle is now perceivable as the battLe of relations of power and 
resistance in the construction of the individual's subjectivity, the 
struggle for the subject's soul. To be sure, modernity is penetrated 
through and through by panopticLsm, but it is aLso penetrated throughout 
by relations of resistance, by local seLf-practices and asceticisms. The 
ambiguity of modernity now emerges clearly, at the same time offering up 
increasingly sophisticated mechanisms for the operation of power relations 
and a growing number of LocaLLsed popular forms of knowledge which can 
act as grounds for the development of seLf-practices resisting the 
operation of power into, on and through the subject. For Foucault, the 
question becomes one of the role of the human sciences and of the 
intellectual in this struggle between power and resistance. 
The ambiguity we find in Foucault's disciplinary representation of 
modernity recalls the ambiguity of the processes of rat[onaLLsatLon for 
Weber and the ambiguity of nihilism for Nietzsche. With each of these 
theorists, a concern with the disciplinary Leads to portrayal of modernity 
at once more complex and understandabLe in terms of our everyday 
experience of the modern than that offered by conventional trlumphakst 
accounts. In concluding this chapter, Let us note that in developing this 
account of the dLsc! pLLnary nature of the modern, Foucault has raised large 
areas of the social to the Level of the theoretically perceivable. By 
utilLsing a mode of anaLysLs which examines diverse and humbLe points of 
emergence, in contrast to the isoLatLon of origins that characterlses 
mainstream accounts, the mundane becomes significant, the ImeticuLous 
detaLLs' of geneaLogy represent a gaze for whLch no event is too humbte 
to 
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be examined. At this point, we can to Sum up the points that have emerged 
from our consideratLon of the concept of dLscipL[ne Ln Foucaultis work. 
Firstty, we have seen that there are at Least two discLpL! nary dimensLons 
to modernity, which we may describe roughLy as (1) the disc! pL! nLng of the 
individuaL through externaL constraLnts and QD the voLuntary seLf- 
disciplining of the individual. Secondly, we have noted that these two 
forms of dLscLpLtne represent respectLvety the modern modaLitLes of power 
and resistance. ThlrdLy, that the operation of these modaLitLes is 
articulated through technologies of the self. Fourthly, we can see that 
this conception of discipLine renders modernity an ambiguous achievement. 
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Notes 
1. Cf. ch. 2 sect Lon 3 and ch. 5 
2. These d imens ions br Lef Ly are: (D s1 Lence - not ta tk ing tc) the inmate, 
(LD recognition by mirror - confronting the madman with his own madness, 
forcing madness to observe itself, MD perpetual judgement - forcing 
madness to judge itself through the use of punishments such as cold 
showers, (Mmedical, personage - the opening of the asylum to medical 
personaLity, physician as absoLute authority. cf. MC pp260-278. 
3. This romanticism comes across most ctearLy In the 'Preface', cf. In 
partLcuLar MC ppix-xi. 
4. Cf. Reader p53. 
5. GM 11. 
6. By 'normaLised', FoucauLt means organised and constLtuted around norms 
which act as clemarcators of one's 'normaLcy', as criteria of judgement. 
7. cf. Reader p352, here Foucault Links intention as the ethical substance 
to Kant; given that discipLine is the mode of power of modernity and this 
period begins with Kant, it does not seem unreasonabLe to Locate intention 
as the ethicaL substance as regards the technotogies of the seLf set up 
about the prLson. 
This poLnt comes out in FoucauLt's reference to the both the critique of 
the 'super-power' of the monarch TP p8O) and the concern with popuLar 
iLLegaHties (DP p88). 
9. Foucault provides a morphology of this asceticism DP pp149-156, the 
schema of punishment involved in this disciplinary power is examined also 
DP ppl 77-184. 
10. This point most cLearly comes across in FoucauLt's discussion of the 
release of the mad, Reader p137. 
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11. Th is cr Lter ia is rendered up by the permanent v is ib iL ity in wh ich the 
Panoptican pLaces the prisoner. 
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THE POLITICS OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 
ALL my analyses are agaLnst the idea of universal 
necessities in human experience. They show the arbitariness 
of institutions and show which space of freedom we can still 
enjoy and how many changes can still be made. 
Michel Foucault 
To change something in the minds of people - that is the 
role of the intellectual. 
- Michel Foucault 
In this chapter, we shail be examining the poLLtics of FoucauLt's 
theorisLng, concentrating primarLLy on his account of the emergence, and 
rote, of the human sciences in modernLty and his conception of the rote of 
the modern inte L Lectua L. Through this anaLysis we shaLL attempt to 
Mustrate the nature of FoucauLt's critIque of humanýsm and, moreover, to 
specify the reLationship between the socLaL and politicat that we find 
depLoyed in FoucauLt's work, We have seen, in our interpretations of 
Nietzsche and Weber, that a strongLy poLlticaL dimension appears 
characteristic of the tradition of theorlsing that is being clekneatedl it 
wiLt be consequentLy sLgnLficant to determLne the extent of thLs dimension 
in Foucau Lt's thought. 
We wiLL beg in by considering FoucauLt's archaeoLogLcaL argument 
concernLng the conditLons of possibUlty of the hurnan scLences and the 
dichotomies that structure their formuLatLon and operation. Proceeding from 
this, in the second section, we wLLL examine the soclaL conditions of 
emergence of the human sciences and the rote Foucault's sees them playing 
in reiation to power and resistance in modernLty. In the third section, we 
will Look at the significance, and role, Foucault attaches to his own 
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theorising; th Ls wLLL [nvo Ive a cons[deratLon, part[cuLarLy, of his 
refiections on Kant's essay 'What Ls EnLLghtenment?,, as wek as anatysing 
the position FoucauLt assLgns to the modern LnteLLectuaL. 
An Archaeo[oqy of the Human Sciences 
FoucauLt's deLlneation of the modern episteme in The Order of Things 
remains one of the most controverslaL aspects of his work (cf. Merquior 
1985, Habermas 1987). In this section, we witt expLicate the sense in 
which his observations on the human sciences raise a series of probLems 
for the practice of this caLlIng. It wlLt be recatled that eartler it was 
argued that the episterne as a methodoLogLcat device represents an attempt 
to outLlne the modes by which man has fictioned his subjectivity, it wouLd 
follow that there is a sense then in which the oppositions Foucault notes 
as both structuring and probLemat! sLng the human sciences emerge out of 
his comments concerning the constitution and operation of the modern 
subject'. We shaLL bring out the way in which this probLematisation of the 
human sciences in the modern is dealt with by Foucault and what its 
impLicatLons are for the trajectory of his work. Let us begin, however, by 
sketching his representation of the modern episteme. 
SchematicaLly, we may depict the reLation between Language and knowiedge 
of things in the CLassicaL episteme as one of 'word-object': 'words ... 
intersect with representations ... to provLde a spontaneous grid 
for the 
knowLedge of things' (OT p304). In contrast, the Modern epLsteme may be 
depicted as Language-man-worLd,, that is the activity of representLng, 
wh Ich is immanent to Language in the CtassLcaL episteme, becomes 
probLematic wLth the insertion of the fLgure of Man, as representing 
agency, Into the equation. But how did man come to be inserted here? 
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FoucauLt noted with regard to the CLassLcaL episteme that : 'CLassicaL 
language, as the common discourse of representation and things, as the 
Place within which nature and human nature intersect, absoLuteLy excludes 
anything that could be a 'science of manY (OT p311). To put it another 
way, if the Classical, project was a tabuLation of the order of things in 
the wor Ld, and yet man's activity as tabulator can itself not be 
represented on this table, this rules out the possibiLity of a 'science of 
man' since man as both subject and object does not, at this point, exist. 
The point of emergence of this 'Man' can be, Foucault suggests, Located in 
relation to Kant, or more specifLcaLLy, to Kant's transformation of the 
finitude of being into the condition of the possibility of knowledge. As 
FoucauLt puts it: 'modern man ... is possibLe only as a figuration of 
finitude. ' (OT P318), that is, modern man is the product of an analytic of 
finitude which, FoucauLt suggests, is artLcuLated about three dimensions or 
doublets: the empirical and the transcendentaL, the cogito and the 
unthought, and the retreat and return of the origin. It is to an 
examination of these, therefore, that we must turn. 
'Man, ' Foucault suggests, 'in the analytic of finitude, is a strange 
empirico-transcendentaL doubLet, since he is a being such that knowledge 
will be attained in him of what renders aLL knowledge possible. ' (OT p318). 
This doublet constitutes the IthreshoLd of modernity' and is announced in 
Kant's Lecture 'What is Man? ' (FCR p32). For FoucauLt, 'the constitution of 
an empLrico-transcendentaL doubLet which was caLLed man' (OT p319) is the 
condition Of pOssibiL[ty for the engendering of two forms of anaLysis. The 
first of these forms of knowLedge 'functions as a sort of transcendentaL 
aesthetic' (OT p319), that is to say, it operated upon the physLcaL body of 
the subject and, through the anaLysis of perception, sensory mechanisms, 
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etc., 'Led to the discovery': 
that knowLedge has anatomo-phys! oLogicaL conditions, that it 
is formed graduaLLy within the structures of the body, that 
it may have a priv! Leged pLace within, but that its forms 
cannot be dissociated from its pecuLlar functioning; in 
short, that there is a nature of human knowLedge that 
determLnes its forms and that can at the same time be made 
manifest to it in its own empiricaL contents. (OT p319) 
The second of the forms of knowtedge, engendered by the formation of marý 
'functioned as a sort of transcendentaL dLaLectic; l (OT p319), which is to 
say, that it Mustrated that: 
knowLedge had hLstoricaL, soclaL, or economic conditions, 
that it was formed within reLations that are woven between 
men, and that it was not independent of the particuLar form 
they might take here or there; in short, that there was a 
history of human knowLedge which couLd be both given to 
empiricaL knowLedge and prescribe its forms. (OT p319) 
What is significant for concerning these two forms of knowLedge, for 
FoucauLt, is that 'the search for a nature or history of knowLedge, in the 
movement by whLch the dimension proper to critique is fitted over the 
contents of empirical knowledge, already presupposes the use of a certain 
critique -I (OT p319), that is, impLlc[t in the structure of this search 
are a set of assumptions which already imply the operation of a crLtique. 
These presuppositions, which function as a series of LmpL! cit divisions in 
the structure of these knowtedges, constitute a primary probLematic for 
these knowLedges. To Mustrate this requires that we outLlne the divisions 
Foucault diagnoses: 
I. 'the division that distinguishes rudimentary, imperfect, unequaL, 
emergent knowledge from knowledge that may be ca[Led, if not complete, at 
Least constituted in its stable and definitive forms (this division makes 
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possibLe the study of the naturaL conditions of knowtedge); 
2. 'the division that distinguishes LL Lus ion from truth, ideotogicaL 
fanatasy from scientific theory (this division makes possibLe the study of 
the histor[caL conditions of knowLedge); 
3. 'a more obscure and more fundamental division: that of truth itself; 
there must, in fact, exist that is of the same order as the object - the 
truth that is graduaLLy outlined, formed, stabilized, and expressed through 
the body and the rudIments of perceptlon; the truth that appears as 
Musions are dissipated, and as history estabLLshes a disaLlenated status 
for LtseLf; but there must also exist a truth that is of the order of 
discourse -a truth that makes Lt possible to empLoy, when deaLing with 
the nature or history of knowLedge, a language that wM be true. It is the 
status of this true discourse that remains ambiguous. (OT p319/320) 
If we can concentrate on the finaL of the divisLons impLicitty structuring 
modern thought, it becomes rapidLy apparent that the entLre enterprLse of 
the human sciences (which is, after aLL, our concern) is being undermined, 
that is It is being pLaced In an unstabLe oscILLatlon between operating as 
a transcendental form of knowledge and operatLng as an empLricaL form of 
knowledge, or, as FoucauLt puts the same point but slightly differently: 
either this true discourse f inds its foundat [on and modeL in 
the empiricaL truth whose genesis in nature and Ln history 
Lt retraces, so that one has an anatysis of the positivist 
type (the truth of the object determines the truth of the 
discourse that describes its f ormat i on); or the true 
discourse anticipates the truth whose nature and history it 
defines; it sketches out Ln advance and forments it from a 
distance, so that one has a d1scourse of the eschatoLogicai 
type (the truth of the philosophicaL discourse constitutes 
the truth in formation). In fact, it is a question not so 
nuch of an atternatve as a fLuctuation inherent in aLl 
analysLs, which brings out the vaLue of the empiricaL at the 
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transcendental level. (OT p320) 
in effect, Foucautt is claiming that the constitution Of man as an 
emp[rico-transcendentaL doubLet both acts as the condition Of possibitity 
for the human sc iences and, simultaneousLy, engenders withLn these 
knowLedges an instability which undermines them. The history of the human 
sciences may thus be read as an ongoing attempt to Locate 'the Locus of a 
discourse that wouLd neither be of the order of reduction nor of the order 
of promise: a discourse which wouLd keep separate the empiricaL and the 
transcendentaL, whlLe being directed at both; ' (OT p320). This rendering of 
the human sciences as inherently problematic is, we must remember, the 
outcome of onLy one dimension of the anaLytic of finitude FoucauLt posits, 
Let us move then to consLder the second d[mension of modern man. 
ThLs second doubLet Ls that of the 'cogito' and the unthought, that of 
Man and hLs Other. To. express this Less enigmatLcaLLy, it seems that 
FoucauLt is suggesting that 'man cannot posit himself in the immediate and 
sovereign transparency of a cogito' (OT p322), that is, given that act of 
thought, of refLection, operates in a space which is permeated by 
conditions both naturaL and hLstoricaL, then this act is no Longer the pure 
and LmmedLate act Lt was conceptuaLised as wLthin the CLasslcaL episteme. 
On the contrary, this thought is now surrounded by the unthought, by the 
psyche of the thinker, by soc[aL, economic and historLcaL conditions of the 
thinker; the act of refLection has become refLection in a dark mirror. 
Consequently, a second dynamic of the human sciences emerges, just as they 
are compelled to seek an order of discourse which will, 'keep separate the 
empirical and transcendental, while being directed at both; ' (OT p320), so 
to they are impelled to render the unthought up as thought, to shine a 
light into the darkness: 'the whole of modern thought is imbued with the 
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necessIty of thinkLng the unthought -I 
manifests itseLf in various forms: 
(OT p327). This compuLs[on 
of ref Lecting the contents of the In-itself in the form of 
the For-itself, of ending man' s aL lenation by reconciling 
him with his own essence, of making explicit the horizon 
that provides experience with its background of immediate 
and disarmed proof, of Lifting the veil of the Unconscious, 
(OT p327). 
Yet the logic remaLns the same. This Logic Leads us to another probLematLc 
for the operat[on of the human scLences. As FoucauLt puts it: 
Whatever it [thought) touches it LmmedlateLy causes to move: 
it cannot discover the unthought, or at Least move towards 
L t, without immedlateLy bringing the unthought nearer to 
LtseLf - or even, perhaps, without pushing it further away, 
and in any case without causing man's own being to undergo a 
change by that very fact, since it is clepLoyed in the 
distance between them. (OT p327) 
To put this argument in its simpiest form: by 'making expLicit the horizon 
that provIdes experience with its background of immediate and disarmed 
proof, ' (OT p327), we alter the horizon. By rendering up the unthought as 
thought we change both thought and unthought, both Man and the/hLs Other. 
The Logic of the necessity of rendering up the unthought thus Leads to an 
unending sequence, an infinite regress: 'modern thought is advancing to 
that region where man's Other must become the Same as himself. ' (OT p328). 
Having examined the problem posed for the human sciences by the 
lcogLtol/unthought doublet, let us proceed to the final dimension of 
Foucautt's anaLytic of finLtude. 
ThLs last doubLet concerns 'the retreat and return of the ortgLn', 
FoucauLt's point here is that the ideal _qeneses 
about which thought in the 
CLassicat episteme reftected on origins broke down as 'tabour, 
Life, and 
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ianquage acquired their own historicity, ' (OT p329). The origin of language, 
for exampte, becomes a matter of histor[caL investigation, its beginnings 
perpetuakly 'shrouded in mystery' (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982 p38). Man, in 
re-Latton to these hLstorlcltles, finds hLmseff within an arrangement of 
Labour aLready institutionatised, in an evoLutLonary system of Life which 
began miLkons of years before him, and using a tanguage which is aLready 
established: 'It is always agaLnst a background of the already begun that 
man is ab Le to ref Lect on what may serve for h im as an or Lq in. ' (OT p330). 
Consequently: '[w1hat Ls conveyed in the immediacy of the original is, 
therefore, that man is cut off from the origin that wouid make him 
contemporaneous with his own existence: amid aLl the things that are born 
in time and no doubt die in time, he, cut off from all origin, is already 
there. ' (OT p332). Man's be[ng aLways aLready there though impties, Ln one 
sense, that it is through man that time is constituted; so whLLe man, on 
the one hand, is perpetuaLLy pLaced in reLation to a time of things into 
which he is thrown, on the other hand, it is his belng-there that enabLes 
the art[cuLation of time. As FoucauLt. has put it: 'though aLl man's 
beginnings have their Locus within the time of things, his LndividuaL or 
culturaL time makes it possibLe, in a psychoLogLcaL or historLcal genesis, 
to define the moment at which things meet the face of their truth for the 
first time' (OT p333). With regard to what may serve for man as an orLgtnj 
modern thought then offers up our IcuLturaL t ime I, that is, our 
historicisLng PractIces. The probLematLc thLs embod[es has been n1cety 
illustrated by Dreyfus and RabLnow who point out that. 
Like aLL attempts to relate the positive and fundamental 
(here the temporal beginning and the temporatizing clearing 
as kinds of sources or origin) so as to make 
factual 
Limitation the ground of its own possibility (in this case 
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to make the historical, practices found history as the source 
of their own beginning) this solution is unstable. The 
origin, once regained as man's hLstoricizing practices, 
retreats again since these practices turn out to be 
inaccessible to the practitioners. Although man is defined 
by the cultural practices which establish the temporal 
clearing in which objects can be encountered, and this 
temporality is "preontoLogicaLty close" to man since it is 
his very being, he cannot reflect on what these practices 
are precisely because they are too near to him and thus too 
encompassing. Thus man's primordial temporality Is 
"ontotogicalLy farthest" from his understanding. (Dreyfus 
and Rabinow 1982 p39) 
The remorseLess logic of this probLematic goes further however, for this 
origin - our historLsing practices - which retreats through our inability 
to articuLate the Being of our being (or, in more foucauLdian terms, to 
articulate the epistemLc principles through which our being is articulated), 
retreats again for what of the origin of this origin, what of the origin of 
our historiclsing practices, when is it 'that the histor[caL cLearing which 
makes history possLbLe' (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982 p4O) is UseLf first 
opened up"? As Dreyfus and RabLnow put It: 
The attempt to pinpoint those practices which begin our 
history, rather than enabLing us to get clear about the 
sources of our culture, finds those practices retreating 
further and further in to the distant past until they become 
what Heidegger calls "the essential mystery". (Dreyfus and 
Rabinow 1982 p40) 
This project of Locating an orLgLn for man, which is also the project of 
understanding the meaning of man, that is of finding meaning in history, 
leads to two kinds of hermeneutic approach in the. human sciences, to two 
kinds of attempt to uncover, to decode, the truth of man's being hidden 
behind HeLdegger's 'essential mystery'. The first of these strategies 
embues history wLth a teleological character. So we find 
Hegel, Spengler 
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and Marx with history as a movement towards the totaL return of the 
origin, that is the 'fUHILLment Of man's true meaning, ' (Dreyfus and 
RabLnow 1982 pA2) - man recovers his essentlaL being at this point where 
history ends and yet history truLy begins. The second strategy - which 
FoucauLt associates with HdLderL! n, Nietzsche and HeLdegger - suggests that 
once man had an understanding of his Being, but that this understanding 
has been Lost. The onLy way we can get in touch with this Being is through 
a detaiLed tracing of what it Is we have Lost. For FoucauLt, both these 
strategies of future or past rupture are ultimately doomed. In their 
positing of a dichotomy of appearance and reaLity into which man's 
historicity is placed as both real and unreaL, they collapse into the same 
instabiLity which marked the first aspect of this anaLytic of finitude, 
that is, the transcendental and empiricaL - defined both by relation to 
I man's Being and in reLation to the absence of this Being, the human 
sciences seek a discourse in an overLapping space which does not exist. 
To sum up our anaLysLs of this anatytLc, let us briefLy borrow FoucauLt's 
r6sum6 of this structuring of modern thought. We can depict the eLements 
of the ana Lyt ic of f in [tude as foI lows: 
In showing that man is determined, it [the anaLytic of 
finitude] is concerned with showing that the foundation of 
those det ermL nat I ons is man' s beLng In its radical 
Limitations; It must aLso show that the contents of 
experience are aLready their own conditions, that thought, 
from the very beginning, haunts the unthoughts that elude 
them, and that it is aLways striving to recover; It shows 
how the origin of which man is never the contemporary 
is at 
the same time withdrawn and given as Imminence- 
In short, It 
Is atways concerned with showing how the Other, 
the Distant, 
is aLso the Near and the Same. (OT p339) 
The human sciences represent the attempt of thought 
in modernity to set 
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up a discourse which occupies simuLtaneousLy the space of the Other and 
the Same. In this discussion we have tried to indicate the inherent 
prob Lemat LCS wh ich Foucault suggests are implicit within such an 
enterprise. At this point, the very significance of doing human scientific 
activity is at all mLght be called into questionand, further, what is 
Foucault operating in the human sciences for if the very conditions of 
possibility of these knowledges simultaneously undermine that possibility. 
We shall take up this question In the third section of this chapter, 
however, for the moment, Let us turn to the politics of the human sciences 
in their practical dImenslon, that Is the relationship between the human 
sciences and the dLsc[pL! nary constitution of modernity. 
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Human ScLentific DLsc! Rilnes 
In this section, we shatt be expLoring FoucauLtls insights concerning the 
interaction of power and knowledge in the formation of discLpLine as the 
mode of power/knowledge operatLon characteristic of modernity. We shall 
look firstly at the parasitic forms deployed by the human sciences and the 
relation of the human sciences to humanism. Secondly, we shail Look at the 
role which Foucault suggests was (and, largely, is) occupied by the human 
sciences in relation to the disciplinary techniques that emerge In 
modernity, commenting on the relation between the human sciences and the 
formatLon of technologies of the self. Finally, we will suggest the grounds 
on which Foucault rejects humanism. 
KnowLedge in the modern episteme, FoucauLt suggests, may be represented 
as a votume of space open in three dimensions' (OT p347), these dimensions 
being: 1. the naturaL sciences - 'for which order is aLways a deductive and 
linear Linking together of evident or verified proposLtLons; l (OT p347), 2. 
the semi-hard sciences (biology, economics, ph! Lotogy) - 'that proceed by 
reLatLnq discontinuous but anaLogous eLements in such a way that they are 
then able to establish causal relations and structural constraints between 
them. ' (OT p347), and 3. phitosophicaL refLection - 'where concepts and 
probLems that first arose in different emp[rLcaL domains are transposed 
into the philosophLcaL dimenslon' (OT p347). The fLrst two axes define a 
plane whLch may be represented 'as the field of application of mathematics 
to these empirical, scLences, or as the domaLn of the mathematLcLzabte in 
tingu[stLcs, biology, and economics. ' (OT p347). The second and third axes 
define a plane which generates 'whose regional ontologies which attempt 
to 
define what life, tabour and Language are in their own being; ' (OT p347). 
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The f irst and Last axes def Lne ap Lane which constitutes 'the forma L izat ion 
of thought. ' (OT p347). The human sciences are not themselves dLrectty to 
be Located on any of these axes or pLanest rather, they exist in the space 
defined by these three dimensions, that is, they exist three dimensionally. 
Foucault, has expLained this claim by suggesting that this situating of the 
human sciences: 
(in one sense minor, in another sense prLviLeged) pLaces 
them in reLation to aLL the other thoughts of knowLedge: 
they have the more or Less deferred, but constant, aim of 
giving themseLves, or In any case of utlLising, at one 
[eve[ or another, a mathematicaL formaLlzat[on; they 
proceed in accordance with modeLs or concepts borrowed from 
bloLogy, economics, and the sciences of Language; and they 
address themseLves to that mode of being of man which 
phiLosophy is attempting to conceive at the tevek of 
radLcat finitude, whereas their aim is to traverse aLl its 
empirical manifestations. (OT p347). 
The human sciences, then, occupy a space which is related to these three 
dimensions, in a sense, these sciences exist within the interstices of 
these three axes. For the moment, however, we wILL focus on the second of 
the relations Foucau[t. has noted; the human sciences use of 'models or 
concepts borrowed from biology, economics, and the sciences of Language; ' 
(OT p347). 
The history of the human sciences (and the methodoLogLcaL divisions that 
occupy this history) is, FoucauLt suggests, generated out of three modeLs 
acquired from biology, economics and Linguistics. From bioLogy come the 
conceptions of man 'as a being possessing functions' (OT p357) and of 'the 
possibUity of finding average norms which permit him to perform his 
funcLons., (OT p357). From economLcs come the conceptions of man as 
'in an 
irreducibLe situation of conf'llct; ' (OT p357) and of 'a body of rules which 
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are both a limitation of this conflict and the resuLt of it., (OT p357). 
From Linguistics comes the conception Of man's behaviour as having 
meaning, as signification and of the totality of his significations as 
const itut ing 'a coherent whole and a system of signs. ' (OT p357). 
Consequently, Foucault claims, 
these three pairs of function and norn; conflict and rule, 
signification and system compLeteLy cover the entire domain 
of what can be known about man. (OT p357). 
Further, whiLe these three pairs correspond roughLy to psychoLogy, 
socLoLogy, and the stidy of Literature and myth respectiveLy - 'the human 
sciences interlock and can aLways be used to interpret one another: their 
frontiers become bturred, intermediary and composite discLpLines muLtipty 
endLessLy, and in the end their proper object may disappear altogether. ' 
(OT p358). 
Two movements reLative to these modeLs structure, for FoucauLt, the 
history of the human sciences. FirstLy, a movement from one modet to the 
next, thus: first, the biologicaL modeL is ascendent and man is defined in 
functionaL terms; second, the reign of the economic modeL and man's being 
is Located in conflict, thirdly, the Linguistic model where man's beLng is 
deflned as a hermeneutLcs or as a structuraL eLement'. The second 
movement occurs w[thLn the modeLs, the movement from the dominance of the 
first element of the pair to the dominance of the second: 3. WhLLe the first 
term was dominant, a series of oppositions operated - 'the normal and the 
pathotogicaL, the comprehensible and the incommunicable, the significant 
and the non-significant' (OT p361) - as a mode of analysis based around 
norms, rules and systems overcomes that based on funclon, conflict and 
signification, however, these oppositions are erased, e. g. while analysis 
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operated from a functionaL po[nt of view, 'it was of course necessary, de 
ractoý to share the normaL funclons with the non-normaL; thus a 
pathotogicaL psychoLogy was accepted side by side with normaL psychoLogy, l 
(OT p360); once, however, a normative perspective is adopted, this 
functionat distinction coLLapses and the normaL and pathologicaL graduate 
into each other. The distinction between the normat and the pathologicaL is 
repLaced, FoucauLt suggests, by the distinction between consciousness and 
the unconscious4. FunctLonaL ident Lf ! cat Lon is repLaced by depth 
hermeneutics. We wiLL return to this issue when we consider the roLe of 
the human scLences in reLation to the formation of discipLinary modes of 
power. At this stage, however, it is apposite to return to the question of 
the reLationshLp of the human scLences to humanism. 
The doctrine of humanism can be broadLy defined as the beLief that man 
is the singLe sufficient source of alt our vaLues. As Fraserls has pointed 
ou t, however, three kinds of reading of FoucauLt's conception (and 
rejection) of humanism can be given. The first reading suggests that 
FoucauLt rejects the philosophicaL framework within which humanism has 
been articuLated, but 'not necessar! Ly the vaLues and forms of Life which 
that framework has served to underpin and Legitimate. ' (Fraser 1985 p168). 
On this reading, humanism as a distinct form of moraL and poLitLcaL praxLs 
emerges with the constitution of 'Man' in the modern episteme, yet it is 
geared to the subjective side of this 'Man doubLet', to ratLonaLLty, 
autonomy, and a transcendentaL subjectivity which as soon as 
they are 
posited are undermined by their double--. - As Fraser puts 
it, humanism, here, 
'is the contradictory, ceaseLess, seLf-defeating project of reso[ving 
this 
Man probLem. 1 (Fraser 1985 p169). This reading, then, wouLd suggest 
that 
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humanism and the human sciences, sharing the same conditions of emergence, 
are impticitLy interwoven with one another. The phiLosophicaL grounds of 
humanism are beset by the same unstabLe Logic which we have aiready 
examined in reLation to the human sciences. 
The second versLon of FoucauLt's rejectLon of humanLsm suggests that the 
phitosophicaL rejection is backed up by a strategic rejection. Here, the 
point is that whiLe the aim of humanism, as a form of pOL[tLcaL praxis, 
was to oppose premodern forms of power, its effect has been to aid the 
formatlon of modern dLscipL! nary power, a mode of power more subtie and 
widespread through the soclaL body. The nature of the humanist vocabuLary 
renders it bLLnd to the formation of operations of power which are non- 
jurld1caL in character and heLpLess Ln the face of these operatlons once 
they are estabLished. Moreover, the compL[city of human[sm and the human 
sciences is one of the grounds which make possible the formation of this 
modern form of d1scipLinary power. Humanism's positing of the subject as 
a rationaL, autonomous agent demands the human sciences investigate 
LndividuaPs reLation to this norm, consequentLy, from 'the standpoint of 
sociaL controL, the reLevant catagorLes ceased to be the oLd-fashioned 
juridicaL ones of gu! Lt and innocence. Instead they became the socLaL 
scientLfic ones of normaLcy and devlancy. ' (Fraser 1985 P174. ). HumanIsm Ls 
reLated to the human sciences here as partners in the constitution of 
modernity as a discipL[nary society. 
The third form of rejection of humanism, which may be ascrIbed to 
Foucault, is a treatment and rejection of it on substantive grounds. 
This 
implies that Foucault is suggesting that 'humanism is intrinsically 
undesirable, that the conception of freedom as autonomy is a formula 
for 
domination tout court. ' (Fraser 1985 p177). This is an altogether stronger 
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cLaim tham either of the two previous readings, LmpLying as it does that 
there can be Located an immanent connect Lon between a conception of the 
subject as rational and autonomous, and a conception Of power as 
dlsc! pLLnary. Such a claim might go along the Lines that the humanist 
treatment of the subject as possessing a given ratLonat, autonomous unity 
ruLes out the possibiLLty of conceptuaLising a form of resistance to the 
discipUnary mode of power which does not become compLicit with this 
operation of power at another leveL, onLy by treating the subject as 
muLtip[LcLty can we formuLate a concept of resLstance whLch wouLd be 
counteract on aLL teveLs the operation of a dlsc! pL! nary mode of power. 
Humanism, here, is reLated to the human sciences through the Latter's 
identification with the subject as having a given unity, a point we wiLL 
return to as we consider the reLatLonship between the human sciences and 
the formation of disciplinary technologies of the self. 
At this stage, we shaLL not commit ourseLves, directty, to any of these 
readings of Foucault, instead, we will move to an examination of the 
relationship between the human sciences and the formation and deployment 
of power in its modern disciplinary mode. This will clarify which, if any, 
of the above readings of Foucault is most coherent within the framework of 
interpretat Lon we have been of fer ing. 
We have noted above that the human scLences operate LnitLaLLy on a modeL 
borrowed from biology, that is, an organic modeL structured about the 
concepts of function and norm. The significance of this model, 
for the rote, 
initially, assigned to the human sciences in DiscLpilne and 
Punish and The 
History of SexuaL[ty Vo[. 1 is that we may conceLve of 
the concept of 
flunction as corresponding the LeveL of anaLysis 
FoucauLt refers to as an 
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anatomo-politics of the human body, and the concept of norm as 
corresponding to a bio-politic-s of' the population. In others words, these 
two levels of analysis operated by the human sciences are correspondent 
with two Levels of the operation of disciplinary techniques. How does this 
work out? 
Firstly, given the human science model, operating is an or_qanic one, this 
implies that the heaLth of the whoLe is dependant on the health of the 
parts, I. e. it sets up an imperative that, for the health of society, It is 
necessary to examine, render visible, every aspect of society, for who 
knows where a germ culture may be developing, and, further, once identified 
such an aspect must be neutraLLsed and then transformed Into a positive 
element of the social whole. The first part of this imperative is the role 
played by an analysis about average norms and the second is the function 
of an analysis built about man's functioning. We can show how these are 
related to the respective Levels of power deployment by considering these 
two roles. 
The relation of normative analysis to bio-poLiticaL power can be brought 
out by considering the emergence, in Britain, of the National AssocLation 
for the Promotion of Social Science and of the great statistical societies 
from the 1830's onwards, a movement which resulted eventually Ln the 
establishment of Population Census. Through the statistical examinationt 
according to the normaL distribution curve, of birth rates, death rates, 
examination pass rates, etc., broken down according to age, income, sex, 
region, etc., average norms could be established and deviations from these 
norms rendered visible. Through normative analysis, bio-poUtlcal, power - 
bodies responsible for placing deviation under surveillance, e. g. charity 
workers and social workers among others - comes into operatLon6. 
If 
-307- 
normative anaLysLs and bio-poL Ltica L power are responsible for the 
identification of deviation, the preilminary diagnosis; functionaL anaLysis 
and anatomo-potiticaL power represent the secondary dLagnosts and means of 
treatment. Thus the functionaL anaLysis examines how it Is that deviation 
is occurrLng, whIch of man's functLonaL etements Is Lmpaired, and anatomo- 
poLiticaL power pLaces the devLant within a disciptinary framework which 
attempts the repair of this functionaL disabiLity, e. g. as regards the 
crLmLnal, functLonaL anaLysis examLnes the reasons behLnd the performance 
of the crime and the LeveL of reaLLty It beLongs to, and anatomo-PoLlticaL 
power produces a discLpinary regime geared to overcoming these reasons 
through the reconstitution of the deviant ind[viduaL. 
This example, which refers to the renormalisation of the deviant fails to 
Mustate that, as FoucauLt suggests, such post hoc treatment is onLy one 
d1mensLon of the operatIon of power/knowledge relations. The other 
dimension is the panopticisation of society, which, folLowing our medicaL 
metaphor, can be seen as preventative treatment. The supervLsory roLe of 
normative anaLysLs/blo-pot it ica L power exaimes not just the appearence of 
deviancy but aLso the imposition of discipLinary techniques formuLated to 
encourage the development of the LndLviduaL towards the norm. These 
techniques being formuLated at the functLonaL/anatomo-poLit ! cat LeveL Ln 
response to the average norms suppL[ed by the normative/b[o-poLiticaL 
leveL and we exam[ned some of them - Ume-tabLing, spatLaL arrangement, 
coordinatLon of body and gesture, etc. - Ln the Last chapter. 
This indication of the Linkage between the human sciences and the 
emergence of a discLpHnary mode of power, however, does not go 
far 
enough. What we must move on to examine now is subject-constitutive rote 
played by these power-knowLedge reLations. At this point, we will 
leave 
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aside the LnItIaL (bLoLogLcaL) model of the human sciences, and move the 
discussion to a more general level. It will be recalled that, in the Last 
chapter, it was argued that disciplinary power is articulated, in its 
constitution of the subject, through technologies of the self. So far in 
this chapter, we have indicated how the human sciences are related to the 
discIpLinary operations of power In a generaL sense but not In relation to 
this specific point, which is the strongest point in Foucault's claims about 
power/knowledge relations. To estabLish a connection between the human 
sciences and the discLpLinary constitution of the subject, we must, then, 
illustrate a relation between the human sciences and the technologies of 
the seLf through whLch discip[nary power Ls articuLated. 
To produce such an MustratLon, Let us refer back to the technology of 
the seLf artLcuLated about the prisoner in the panoptican. There the 
ethicaL substance was intention Linked to reponsiblLity, the mode of 
subjection was Linked to the conventions of one's community, the techne 
were the cliscplinary exercises and empLoyments imposed on the Prisoner, 
and the telos was a ratlonal, autonomous individuaLity. It was argued that 
humanism constitutes the tacit framework within which human sciences 
accounts and soclo-poLiticaL poLicLes operate. These two aspects provide 
pointers to the reLatLonship between the human sciences and technologies 
of the self. It will be argued here is that the human sciences provide the 
techn[caL apparatus necessary for the deveLopment of spec[fic technoLogies 
of the seLf. 
Firstly, let us note that Intention and responsLbiLty are both central 
elements of a humanist conception of man. Within this framework, it should 
not surprise us that intentionalitY is a cruciaL theme in the human 
sciences, we need mereLy note that the structure/agency clLchotomYt which 
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has dominated debate in the human sciences since their emergence, revoLves 
about this issue. Secondly, the mode Of subjection, in so far as it 
concerns the conventions of one's Communityq demands the identification of 
those conventions relevant to a given individual. Thirdly, the techne 
involve the comparative analysis and elaboration of effective disciplinary 
techniques. Finally, the telos is humanist man. What is apparent here is 
that while the ethical substance and teLos may be defined by reference to 
the humanist framework within which the human sciences are depLoyed, at 
least, the specification of the mode of subjection and the production of 
the techneý by which the telos is to be achieved, demand the utMsation of 
the human sciences. The precise identification of the cuLturaL conventions 
of a community, the ethical rules that are operant within a society, may, 
roughly, be assigned as a sociological task. The development of the 
technicaL practices through which one's subjectivity is restructured may be 
assigned, primarily, to the psychologist. While these are only crude 
catagor isat ions, they can give us a sense of the rote of the human 
sciences (and of humanism) in the construction and elaboration of 
technologies of the self. If this argument is sound, it would indicate that 
the human sciences play an absolutely central role in the development of 
the disciplinary mode of power which, Foucault has argued, characterlses 
modernity. 
At this moment, one might be tempted to accept aLL three interpretations 
of FoucauLt's rejection of humanism which Fraser offered. However, before 
such a move Ls made, another question must be posed: do humanism and/or 
the human sc[ences present resources for the deveLopment of 
technoLogies 
of the seLf by the individual which can resist the effective 
depLoyment of 
institutionaLLy generated technotogLes of the seLf 
imposed on the 
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individual? Our answer to this question will be a key determinant of what 
kind of rejection of humanism we see Foucault offering. Unfortunately, 
there are very few resources in Foucault's works to aid us in replying to 
the issue posed. Two points do allow us some entry into this area however: 
(j) the commitment of humanism to a philosophical anthropology which 
treats of man as a subject as possessing a given unity and GD, reLatedly, 
the operation in the human sciences of a dichotomy between appearance and 
rea L ity. 
On the first point, it is apparent that FoucauLt's commitment to the 
not ! on of Imu It Lp I 1C ity, (De I eu ze 1988 P1 4) invo Ives a reject ! on of 
humanism's acceptance of a unity subject, which is, at the same time, the 
acceptance of a sovereign consciousness. In so far as the notion of 
'sovereign consciousness' is immanentLy LnvoLved In the generation of 
humanist vaLues, e. g. ratLonaLLty and autonomy, then his rejection of the 
phiLosophicaL conceptuaLLsation of the subject as having a given unity 
necessarily implies a rejection (or reconceptuaLisatLon) of humanist values. 
Further, there is a less abstract LeveL of rejection buLLt in here, since, 
for Foucauft, this aspect of humanism aLso generates what he considers to 
be the bLLndness of humanism to the operation of modern dLscipLinary modes 
of power. A blindness which moves into complicity since the juridical Model 
of power analysis promoted by humanism acts as a veil over the operation 
of disciplinary power'. Our second poLnt concerns the obsessive concern of 
the human sciences with epistemology and methodology, with attempting to 
perceive through the appearance of social events to the 'real forces' 
operating behind them. What is significant about this model is its 
commitment to humanist values on both methodological and utopian grounds 
- that is, it is through the (more or Less disinterested) operation of 
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rationality by a sovereign consciousness that the levels Of appearance and 
reality are to be distinguished, yet the aim of human science analysis is 
the generation of the state of rationally autonomous consciousness 
presupposed in its mode of analysis, As we have noted, however, it is 
precisely this mode of analysis which engenders the construction of 
discipLinary technoLogies of the seif, e. g. the psychiatrist who gives 
evidence as to the capability of the delinquent, the level of reality to 
whLch the deLinquent's act beLongs, the best mode of recourse for the 
rehabilitation of the delinquent, etc. It appears then that humanist values 
are inexorabLy invoLved in the operation of disciplinary power. It wouLd 
appear that in so far as humanism is committed to the notion of a 
sovereLgn consciousness, th[s Lmp L Les a constLtutLve complicLty with 
disciplinary power which rules out the possibility of humanism (and the 
human sciences) operating as a resource for the generation of technologies 
of resistance. 
In reLation to the three potentiaL forms of rejectionLsm that Fraser has 
detineated then, we shouLd note that in one sense the rejection of the 
ph i Losoph ica L underp[nnLngs (or vocabuLary) of human[sm necessariLy 
invoLves a rejection of humanist vaLues since without this phiLosophicaL 
back-up the nature and meaning of these values changes, that is they are 
no Longer the same values. Consequently, it appears that Foucault rejects 
humanism tout court, which does not involve, necessarily, a rejection of 
something we might want to call, 'rationality' or 'autonomy' 
but rather a 
reconceptuallsation of these values within a non-humanist 
framework. We 
wilt go on to expLore this idea further in our final, section, which 
is 
concerned with Foucault's conceptuaLisation of his own philosophical 
pos It ! on 
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To concLude this section, Let us sum up the major points. FirstLy, we 
have noted Foucault's conceptuaksation of the epistemological space 
occupied by the human sciences. Secondly, we have delineated the models 
and movements deployed in this space which have structured the history of 
the human sciences. Thirdly, it was argued, using the biological model as 
an exampLe, that these models set up imperatives such that one term, of 
the pair which defines the model, operates inherently at the Level of bLo- 
pol[ticaL power and the other term at the LeveL of anatomo-po[LticaL power. 
we Mustrated the way in which such a power/knowiedge reiatLon couLd 
operate. FourthLy, we indicated how the human sciences may be Linked to 
the construction of technoLogLes of the seLf through which discipLinary 
power is artLcuLated. FLnaLLy, we pointed out the ways in which the human 
sciences may be reLated to humanism, and what kind of rejection of 
humanism FoucauLt's work may invoLve. In the next section, we shaLL be 
considering how Foucault situates his own texts vis-6-vis the human 
sciences, this shed further light on his retation to humanism and on the 
roLe pLayed by humanism and the human sciences in modernity. 
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telLectuals 
In this section, we shaLl be examining FoucauLtls comments on Kant's 
'What is EnLLghtenment? l in an attempt to position FoucauLt in retatLon to 
the human sciences. We wiLL then move to a discussion of FoucauLt's 
conception of Kulturkritik and the impLications this has for my comments 
on FoucauLt's situating of humanism and the human sciences in reLation to 
discLpLLnary power in modernity. FlnaLLy, we wiLl consider how FoucauLt 
formuLates the roLe of the modern inte L Lectua L. In aLL, we wiLL be 
continuing our expLoration of the poL! tLcaL dimension of FoucauLt's thought. 
Kant's essay 'Was ist Auf'kIYrung? ' CWhat is Enlightenment? ') represents, 
for Foucault, a focal point in the history of thought (and being) in that 
it poses, for the first time, the question of the present not in terms its 
'belonging to a certain era of the world, ' (Reader p33) or as 'the heralding 
signs of a forthcoming event. ' (Reader p33) or as 'a point of transition 
toward the dawning of a new world. ' (Reader p34), but, rather, in terms of 
a triple questioning- 'What is my present? What is the meaning of thLs 
present? And what am I doing when I speak of this present? ' (KER p90). 
Kant's reflections on the Enlightenment denote the point at which a certain 
reflexivity between the philosopher's utterance and the conditions of this 
utterance emerges: 'it seems to me that with this text on Aufkldrunq one 
sees ph! Losophy ... probLemat! sLng its own 
discursive present-ness: a 
present-ness which it interrogates as an event, an event those meaning, 
value and philosophical. singuLarity it is required to state, and In which 
it is to elicit at once Its own raison d16tre and the foundation of what 
It 
has to say. ' (KER p89). If the question 'What is Aufk1iYrung? 
defines one 
dLmens[on of our refLectLon on our present-ness, the second 
d[mension of 
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th is ref Lect Lon, Foucau Lt argues, can be Located Ln re lat Lon to Kant's essay 
on Revotution. Here, according to FoucauLt, Kant suggests that the 
signHicance of the RevoLutLon Lies not so much Ln the RevoLutLon-as-event 
but, rather, in the Revo Lut ! on-as-man ifestat Lon, as a manifestation of the 
will to revo Lu t ion. Th is w1L L- to- revo Lu t ion constitutes a perpetuaL 
questioning of the the present, an on-going interrogation of its social and 
poLit[caL forms; perhaps, we may say It is 'eternal vigilance' in VoLtaLre's 
sense. The signifLcance of these two essays, for FoucauLt, is twofoLd; 
fLrstLy, in reLation to the artLcuLation of a mode of phLLosophy, and 
secondLy, in reLation to reconceptuaLisation of modernity as an etho-s. 
The mode of philosophy that is engendered by the form of reflection 
exempLified in these two essays represents, for FoucauLt, an afternative 
kind of questioning to that engendered by Kant's works of critique: 'Here 
it is not a question of an anaLytic of truth, but of what one might caLL 
an ontoLogy of the present, an ontotogy of ourseLves, ' (KER p96). The 
fundamentaL question posed by this form of theorlsing is 'How did we come 
to be constituted as we are? ', a question which is addressed by each of 
the three domains of genealogy Foucault explores. This is also the 
question of Nietzsche in his investigation of the emergence of nLhLLism and 
of Weber in his examination of the condition of modern man. As such we can 
read FoucauLt's remarks on Kant as a del[neatLon of the situatedness of 
his own theorLsLng and as a sketching of the tradition of theorLsing 
within which he operates: I it is this ... form of philosophy which, 
from 
Hegel to the Frankfurt School by way of Nietzsche and Max Weber, has 
founded a form of reflection within which I have tried to work. ' 
(KER p96). 
It should be noted that this Location by Foucault of his enterprise places 
it within philosophy not the human sciences, afthough 
it might be more 
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accurate to suggest that this form of reftection exists in the interstices 
between phlLosophy and the human scLences, at once margLnai and centrat to 
both. 
In reLation the second significant aspect of these essays, that is in 
retatLon to modernLty, FoucauLt suggests we may usefuLLy adopt, from Kant's 
comments on the wILL to revoLutLon, the idea of treating modernity as an 
attitude or ethos, 'a mode of reLating to contemporary reaL! ty; l (Reader 
p39). To expLore th is idea br lef Ly, Foucault has recourse to the 
'consciousness of modernity' (Reader p39) represented in the work of 
BaudeLaLre. For BaudeLalre, as FoucauLt presents him, whiLe modernity may 
be character ised as ' "the ephemera L, the f Leet Lng, the cont Lngent. 11 I (In 
Reader p39), it is not this 'consciousness of the discontinuity of time: a 
break with tradition, a feeLlng of noveLty, of vertigo in the face of the 
passing moment. ' (Reader p39) which constitutes being modern, but, rather, 
It Is the adoption of an attitude with regard to this consciousness which 
'consists in recapturing something eternaL that is not beyond the present 
instant, nor behind it, but within it. ' (Reader p39). Modernity, then, is 'the 
wiLl to "herolze" the present' (Reader p4O): 
For the attitude of modernity, the high vaLue of the present 
Is [ndLssociabLe from a desparate eagerness to Imagine it, 
to Imagine it otherwise than it is, and to transform it not 
by destroying it but by grasping it In what It Is. (Reader 
P41 ) 
Yet modernity is also a mode of seLf-retationsh[p which, for BaudeLairej 
is 
represented by dandysmeý the demand that man creates himself- Both of 
these aspects of modernity ca n be produced, Baudetaire suggests, only 
in 
the realm of art. The relation of the human sciences to this exemplar 
of a 
character ! sat ! on of modernity is somewhat curious an 
d, while FoucauLt 
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indicates that he has mereLy been seeking to: 
[ 1.1 emphasize the extent to which a type of phi LosophLcaL 
interrogation - one that SimuLtaneously probLematizes man' s 
reLat ion to the present, man' s historicaL mode of being, and 
the constitution of the seLf as an autonomous subject - is 
rooted in the EnLightenment. (Reader p42) 
(and 2.1 stress that the thread that may connect us to the 
EnLightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal eLements, but 
rather the permanent reactivation of an attitude - that is, 
of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a 
permanent critique of our historical era. (Reader p42), 
we can also ut[lise this character ! sat ion of modernity as a further way of 
situating Foucault in relation to the human sciences. The aspects of our 
relationship to modernity, noted above, may also be read as defining the 
project of the human sciences. The need to imagine modernity otherwise 
than it is corresponds to the utopian dimension of the human sciences, 
here Marx's communist society and Durkheim's organic society represent the 
other of modernity15. While the necessity of grasping the true nature of 
modernity as means for achieving its transformation is indicated in 
perpetual debate over the 'real' forces generating modernity, only by 
locating the essential. nature of alienation and anomie can we hope to 
transform the modern. In contrast, the kind of self-reLationshLp one has to 
modernity, the ways in which we invent ourseLves, corresponds to that form 
of human science anaLys[s which examines the meanings and actions of the 
individuaL. This aspect can be Mustrated by Schutz's anaLysis of meaning 
and subjectLvity7. What is both obvious and significant in the history of 
the human sciences is that these two kinds of approach have appeared 
to 
be, more or less, irreconciLabLe. The problematic posed 
for the human 
sciences by the structure/agency dichotomy is an enduring one which 
has 
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shown LittLe sign of disappearing. 
Yet, we can also read these two passages in relation to Foucault's 
theoretical trajectory. In this context, however, the meaning of these two 
forms of relation to modernity is markedly different. Rather than 
indicating a theoretical project, these two aspects constitute problematics 
whose emergence is to be explained. It would follow from this that instead 
of taking the path defined by the human sciences, Foucault's concern is 
with how this particular path was constituted. In other words, while a 
relation to the present and a relation to one's self as weH as 
constituting the orientation of man to modernity also define the twin 
projects of the human sciences, what they constitute for Foucault is a 
distinct problematic which requires investigation. On this reading, 
Foucault's concern with the conditions of possibiLty and emergence of the 
human sciences is a necessary element in the exploration of the 
constitution of modernity. FoucauLt, in a sense, is operating a meta--human 
science, that is, as we have noted, a project which exists in the intertices 
between the human sciences and philosophy. Can we apply this meta- label 
to those other thinkers in relation to whom Foucault places hImself"? Here 
we need to be careful. White, on the one hand, we could argue that, for 
exampLe, the Frankfurt SchooL are engaged In a project which can be 
treated as operating between phitosophy and the human sciences, and, 
further, that they are concerned with the reLationship between the human 
sciences and modernity, that is, there is a refLexLvity Immanent in their 
mode of theorlsing concerning the relation between the human sciences as 
objective theory and as historicatty specific production. On the other hand, 
there is a teleotogicaL and utopian strain to their thought which reLates 
it more cLosely to the depiction of the human sciences we have 
just noted. 
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To cLarify this (potentlaLLy) three-way relationship between FoucauLt, the 
Frankurt SchooL and the human sciences, it may be usefuL to look at the 
different notions of critique with which they operate. This approach may 
have the further advantage to ctarifyLng Foucautt's reLation to humanism. 
Before moving to this issue, however, we shouLd aLso note that Foucautt-s 
depLoyment of BaudelaLre has a further significance which LnvoLves reading 
the passages noted above In the Light of a remark FoucauLt offers nears 
the end of his essay on 'What is EnLightenment? '. Here, he suggests: 
The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, 
certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent 
body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be 
conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical Life In 
which critique of what we are is at one and the same time 
the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us 
and an experiment with going beyond them. (Reader p5O) 
Given this comment, we can read Foucault as being involved in a 
reconceptualisation of the project of the human sciences. What is 
significant In this rethinking is twofo Ld: (I) a rejection of the 
structure/agency distinction, or, rather, the adoption of a philosophical 
methodology which avoids raising such a dichotomy, and (I! ) the employment 
of a political dimension (experimenting with transgressing socLo-historicaL 
limits) which does not have recourse to utopian thinking. Foucault's 
reading of, Baudelaire's conceptuatisation of modernity would appear to 
contain within it both an LmpLLcit deLLneation of the project of the human 
sciences and, aLso impLLcLtLy, the possibitity of setting up a criticaL 
ontoLogy of ourseLves, whLch LtseLf necessar i ly LnvoLves a radicaL 
rethLnking of the very project of the human sciences. It is hoped 
that as 
we now take up the issue of 'critique', which we have rnomentar[Ly 
Postponed, the kind of rethinking of the human sciences invoLved 
here wUL 
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be made c tearer. 
For Foucau L t, the cha LL enge of the Kant texts he has chosen 
is to decode that wLLL once contained in the enthusiasm for 
the French RevoLutLon, nameLy, the wL L 1-to-knowt edge, which 
the lanaLysis of truth' was unw! LL[ngLy to concede. Up to 
now, FoucauLt has traced this wiLL-to-knowLedge in modern 
power-format ions onLy to denounce Lt. Now, however, he 
presents Lt in a compLeteLy different light, as the criticai 
LmpuLse worthy of preservation and in need of renewa[. This 
connects his own thinking to the beginning of modernity. 
(FCR p107) 
Habermas, in a more than usuaLLy sympathetic piece, has suggested that 
Foucault's reflections on Kant may indicate to us that Foucault had 
reaksed that the notion of critique he wished to operate was caught 
withLn a contradicion: 
... Kant entangled himself in an instructive contradiction 
when he declared revolutionary enthusiasm to be an 
historical indLcator that reveals the intelligible 
arrangement of mankind in the world of phenomena. Equally 
InstructLve Ls another contradLction in which Foucault 
becomes enmeshed. He contrasts his critique of power with 
the 'analysis of truth' in such a fashion that the former 
becomes deprived of the normative yardsticks that it would 
have to borrow from the latter. Perhaps the force of this 
contradiction caught up with Foucault in this last of his 
texts, drawing him again into the circle of the 
phL[osophicaL discourse of modernity which he thought he 
could explode. (FCR p107/08) 
This is an interesting point which raises two, related, questions. FirstLy, 
are the 'normative yardsticks' we acquire from an 'analysis of truth' 
necessary for the deployment of something we would recognise as a 
'critique". -' SecondLy, does the notion of 'critique' imply some 
form of 
commitment to a variety of humanism? To answer these points requires 
a 
careful examination of the concept of 'critique' Foucault 
is ut! L[sLng. 
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We can begin by distinguishing Foucault, s version of critique from 
Habermas's. For Habermasq 'critique' (in either Kantian or Hegelian mode) 
Imp I Les a set of under Lying postulates, that is universals, which 
legitimate the normative power of a given critique and make its 
application practical. Given the distinction between theory and practice 
that Habermas operates, this Latter point is particularly vital for the 
effectiveness of his accounts. Moreover, the generation of a foundation for 
his critique marks an attempt to answer the question: 'how can the 
possibility of critique be sustained, If the historical contextuaLLty of 
knowledge is recognised? l (Held 1980 p398). Here we get back to the 
quest ion, for Habermas, of postu Lat Ing someth ing wh Lch funct Lons as a 
universal (and transcendental) aspect of man's finitude. In his theory, this 
role is taken up by the notion of an ideal-speech situation - which ýs 
'both anticapated in [all) discourse and yet marks an unrealized actuality. ' 
(Held 1980 p399). The model of Language that Habermas takes up in 
postulating this ideai-speech situation, however, involves two crucial 
moves. Firstly, 'privileging the communicative use of Language without 
taking into consideration that other philosophers of Language ... have 
interpreted Language as that which first opens up an arena for action and 
communication by Letting things appear as something. ' TCR p119). Secondly, 
'he proceeds to exclude the perLocutLonary effect of what is said and 
assert that ideally only the MocutLonary content should play a role in 
reaching agreement. ' TCR pl 19), that isq he excludes the rhetorical 
dimension of language from having any, but a mystifying, role to play. 
Having outlined Habermas's conception of what is built into the notion of 
critique, we can utillse this as a device for bringing out 
the critical 
dimension of Foucault's thought. 
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Our first point must be that Foucauft rejects the Idea of the necessity 
of grounding one's critique on some set of universais. Indeed, it is 
precLseLy the unLversatising move made by Kant which he wishes to move 
away from LnvoLving as It does an attempt to provide 'universal norms for 
human action' (FCR pl 18), thus he states: 'The search for a form of moraL 
theory acceptabLe by everyone Ln the sense that everyone wouLd have to 
submit to it, seems catastrophic to me. ' TCR p119). For FoucauLt, the 
hLerachicaL distinction between theoretLcaL and practicaL rationaLity which 
is implicit In the search for foundations marks an attempt to transcend 
our historicity which is not only doomed to fail (cf. section 1 of this 
chapter) but, moreover, engenders a form of thought which is inherentLy 
propelLed into the construction of utopials. That is a notion of critique 
whLch involves thLs distLnction depLoys not merely an Immannent form of 
critique but also a (more or Less) transcendental cr! tLque, and this latter 
form of critique requires the postulation of a set of social arrangements 
in which man's essentLaL being is (potentlaLty) fuLfitted to Legitimate its 
criticaL accounts of past and contemorary soclaL arrangements. Foucauft 
argues that utopian modes of theorLsing, which represent 'the claim to 
escape from the system of contemporary reality so as to produce the 
overall programs of another society, of another way of thinking, another 
culture, another vision of the world, has Led only to the return of the 
most dangerous traditions. ' (Reader p46). In contrast, Foucault's notion of 
critique involves the recognition that theoretical rationality is merely a 
particular form of practical, rationality, that is, no attempt 
is made to 
construct grounds for transcending our historicity. Consequently, 
Foucault 
also jettLsons the idea of his form of critique as having universal 
application. Foucault indicates how he sees his critique 
in relation to 
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Kantls: 'The point, In brief, IS to transform the critique conducted in the 
form of necessary limitation Into a practicaL critique that takes the form 
of a possIbLe transgression-' (Reader p45). The consequences of this kind 
of move are far reaching and important for our expLoratLon of Foucauft's 
criticaL movement, we w1LI therefore quote his outLining of the form of 
this practicaL critique as transgression at Length: 
this criticism is not transcendental, and its goal is not 
that of making a metaphysics possible: it is genealogical in 
its design and archaeological in its method. Archaeological 
- and not transcendental - in the sense that it will not 
seek to identify the universal structures of aLL knowledge 
or of all possible moral action, but wILL seek to treat the 
instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, 
and do as so many historLcai events. And this critique will 
be genealogical Ln the sense that it will not deduce from 
the form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do 
and to know; but it wILL separate out, from the contingency 
that has made us what we are, the possibility of no Longer 
being, doing, or thinking what we are do or think. (Reader 
p46) 
It was noted earlier that genealogy has two crLtLcaL dimensions, an 
immanent critique and a rhetorLcal crLtique, and we can see here the way 
in whLch these dimensions are pLayed out. The immanent cr! tLque InvoLves a 
tracing of how we have become what we are, that is an examination of the 
articutatLons of technoLogles of seLf and technoLogies of power which 
constitute the formation of our subjectLvity, The narratLve generated out 
of this critique provides the possibitity of creatLng new resources 
for the 
resistance of power- format ions. The rhetorLcal critique acts as an 
incitement to produce these new resources, that is, to experiment, 
to 
transgress, to resist. Here Ls the perLocutionary or rhetoricaL 
dimension 
of language, which Habermas attempts to suppreSst operatLng as a criticaL 
resource. 
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At this point, we can return to the two reLated questions which arise 
out of Habermas's earlier comments on Foucault. With regard to the issue 
of whether some kind of lanaLytLcs of truth't that is, some sort of 
universal, is required for the operation Of something we would recognise 
as a critique; we can note that, for Foucault, such a universal requirement 
is only entailed when a sharp distinction is posed between theoretical and 
practicaL forms of rationaLity. When, on the contrary, we conceive of 
theoretical rationality as a specific form of practical rationality then the 
ideats and norms, which Habermas ctaLms we must generate and Legitimate 
through some sort of quasi-transcendentai appeaL to unLversaLs, are aLways 
aLready present within our practices, and critique, on one Levet, consists 
in precisely articukatLng the specifLc forms these norms take up and the 
area's of exper[ece whLch they are constLtut[ve of. As to whether the 
not[on of cr[tique necessarLLy LmpUes some form of relatLonshLp to 
humanism, we can note the comment Rajchman has made Ln reLation to this 
issue. In retation to FoucauLt's formuLatLon of a conception of freedom 
grounded in practice, Rajchman states: 
Within his N[etzschean or "genealogical" work, Foucault 
elaborates this conception of freedom - freedom not as the 
end of domination but as revolt within its practices, and 
domination not as repression or ideoLogLcaL mystification, 
but as dispersed formations of possible action 1 -which 
no one 
directs or controls. It is in this way thatýhe devises a 
concept of political freedom within an antL-humanist 
framework. (Rajchman 1985 p115) 
Through such a reformulation of humanist vaLues within an anti-humanLst 
framework, FoucauLt frees the notion of critique from its humanist origins 
and puts it to work in a new way. Raichman has summarised 
Foucault's 
conception of critique in a way which captures 
the central thrust of 
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FoucauLt's posLtlon: 
The central. issue in his critique is neither the 
justification nor the reaLisation of philosophical ideaLs of 
communication; it is the willingness or unwillingness of 
people to pLay their roles in specific though anonymous 
configurations of power. In his conception, critique would 
increase the estrangement with which people participate in 
such configurations, but would not supply them with another 
form of Life more in accord with philosophical principles. 
Thus he does not advance a global critique of all of society 
and its political institutions by reference to the standards 
of an ideal, form of Life. Rather he directs his "critical 
theory" to those historical, forms of experience whose 
"politics" no state or society can easily ignore. (Raichman 
1985 p79/80) 
If, however, the general tenor of our argument, that is that Foucault's 
conception of critique successfuLLy overcomes the probLems posed for it by 
Habermas, is correct, there are still two practically orientated probLems 
we may pose for this kind of critique. FirstLy, what wouLd make one 
critique of this kind better than another? SecondLy, doesn't this form of 
critique imply that we can only struggle against forms of domination on a 
local basis? A way to counter this first probLem is articulated by Dreyfus 
and Rabinow, who argue that wh! Le: 
1w1hat makes one interpretive theory better than another on 
this view has yet to be worked out, .-- it has 
to do with 
art icuLat ing common concerns and f Lnding a Language which 
becomes accepted as a way of talking about social sluations, 
whi le Leaving open the possibi Lity of I dialogue' , or better, 
a conflict of interpretations, with other shared discursive 
practices used to articuLate different concerns. (FCR p115) 
In other words, this issue w[LL be worked out pragmaticaLLy 
by a community 
of individuats and not LegisLated on by the phlLosopher. 
The second probLem 
posed has been expLLcLtLy noted by FoucauLt, he states: 
StL L L, the foL[owLng object[on wouLd no doubt be ent[reLy 
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Legitimate: if we Limit ourselves to this type of a(ways 
partial and local inquiry or test, do we not run the rLsk of 
Letting ourselves be determined by more general structures 
of wh 1ch we may we LL not be consc 1 ous, and over wh Lch we 
have no control? (Reader p47) 
Yet this, for FoucauLt, is an inherent part of our modern subjectivity: 'we 
are aLways in the position of beginning again. ' (Reader p47). On the other 
hand, the form of anaLysLs and critique which he suggests we adopt is not 
purely a matter of contingency. As we noted in relation to the first 
probLem posed here, we are members of a culturaL communLty and 
consequently share certaLn common concerns. These concerns can, Foucault 
argues, be organised about three axes whLch correspond to the three 
domains of geneaLogy he has artLcuLated: 'reLatLons of controL over things, 
reLatLons of actions upon others, reLations with oneseLf. ' (Reader p48). As 
such, afthough our operation of critique is a LocaL affair, the concerns 
I articulated are of 'general import'. 
Having deLineated at some Length FoucauLt's conception of critique, we 
can now Look at the impLications of this conceptLon for a cLuster of 
Issues which have been, more or less, suspended in this discussion. These 
issues bas Lca I Ly concern the relation of Foucault's 'critical ontology of 
the present' to the human sciences, humanism, and disciplinary modes of 
power. With regard to the human sciences and the Frankfurt School, we can 
suggest that, for Foucault, in so far as they are deploying Kantian, neo- 
Kantlan or Hegelian notions of analysis and critique, this 
involves a 
commitment to phLLosophLcaL humanism which raises more probiems 
than it 
solves in both theoretical and, more particularly, practical, senses. 
In 
these senses, the human sciences constitute part of 
the problematic 
FoucauLt. Ls concerned to anaLyse. Yet there is also a sense 
in which 
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FoucauLt Ls not meeLy doing a meta-human science operation but is 
reconceptualisLng the whoLe project of the human sciences and Locating 
hLmseLf as doing this reconceptuaLised human Science. Operating within this 
reconceptuatisation Ls an ant[-humanLst version of critique which attempts 
to open up new perspectives and incite experimentak action. The project of 
this human sciences is to create new forms of subjectivity, new ways of 
resisting the operation of discLpLinary power. The human science FoucauLt 
is arguing for, invoLves another Level of refLexivity; for the role of the 
human sc ient ist, the ro Le of the LnteLLectuaL undergoes a shIft 
concommitant with the shift of the human sciences themseLves. To concLude 
our discussion of the poLitLcaL dimension of Foucautt's thought, we move to 
an examination of the 'ethic of the inteLLectuaLl with which he presents 
US. 
For such phiLosophers as Habermas, the rote of the phiLosopher- 
inte[Lectual Ls a unLversaL one. Exempffying a concern wLth defLning the 
limits of man's finLtude, deveLoping a conception of the good Life, 
depLoying a critique which Is unLversaL in its appL[catLon. This is a 
pLcture of the LnteLLectuaL as LegLsLator, the inteLlectuaL who Lays down 
the ruLes governing whether somethLng is true or faLse, good or bad, reaL 
or unreal, central, or marg1naL. In contrast, the role of the LnteLLectuaL, 
for Foucault, Ls rather more modest. it is not the role of the inteLLectuaL 
to deveLop a form of Life more phLtosophicaLLy "sound" than that existing, 
nor to generate unLversat conditions governing truth or faLsity, rather the 
intelLectual's roLe is to open up our forms of Life to new ways of 
being 
through an anatysis of the emergence and constitution of our present mode 
of being. Moreover, the FoucauldLan Lnte[LectuaL does not Lay down 
the 
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parameters of the good life but Indicates the resources available for 
subjects se Lf -constructions of their own good Lives. In particular, the 
intellectual does not speak for others, deploying the Light of reason to 
generate a complete and certain understanding of their problems which 
renders the ir own voices silent, rather, he concentrates on creating the 
conditions whereby these others may speak for themselves. Foucau lt's 
involvement in the G. I. P. provides a concrete example of this form of 
inteLlectual praxis". FoucauLt's inteLiectuaL then is not a universaL 
iegisLator, a Lawgiver, but an assistant to the struggLes of others, 
attempting to cLarLfy the way they came to be as they are, the 
possLbMtles open to them, and making space for their voices to be heard. 
ConcLusLon 
The poLLtLcs of FoucauLt's thought Ls, thus, a poLitics of perpetuaL 
struggLe. As new ways of Life are taken up to resist the discipLinary 
technoLogies of modernLty, so to the discLpLLnary apparatus grows more 
sophist[cated, coLonising these forms of seff-construction and 
necessitating further crltque. FoucauLt's rejection of humanism does not 
impty, as Habermas suggests, a rejecton of modernLty but, rather, a 
sensitisat[on to modernity as an ambiguous achievement. The various facets 
of this poLiticaL dimension to FoucauLt's work have been examined in this 
chapter. IlLuminating his critique and reconceptuaLLsatLon of the human 
sciences, his undermining of humanism, his conception of modernity as both 
hLstoricaL event and as ethos of being, his conception of critique and of 
the roLe of the InteLlectual. This mode of theor! sLng modernity presents us 
with a conceptuaL apparatus wLth whLch we can articuLate our common 
concerns, raise the possibility of "being" in other waysq and resist 
the 
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dLsc[pLLnary technoLogLes which wouLd constitute our being. 
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In other words, the three dimensions of the anatytLc of finitude define 
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10. On this cf. P. Major-PoetzL MicheL FoucauLt's ArchaeoLogy of Western 
Culture, (1983), pp49-54. 
-330- 
ConcLuslon 
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CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, we have attempted to argue the case for conceiving of 
Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault as constituting a discrete tradition of 
theorising modernity. That is to claim their modes of theorising possess a 
certain famILy resembLance which distinguishes these modes from other 
family groupings. Having examined their individuaL positions, we should now 
be in a position to outline the general features of the tradition they 
constitute. We wLLL do this in two ways: (1) by contrasting this tradition 
of theorising to, what we may caLL, the 'mainstream' tradition of the human 
sciences, and (11) by considering the position of this tradition in reLation 
to current debates concerning modern and post-modern forms of theorising. 
This wiLL not onLy aid us in firming up the outUnes of thLs tradLtion, but 
a Lso, In po int Ing to the imp L ! cat ions of this tradition for our 
contemporary conceptua, L ! sat ions of_ the nature and roLe of the human 
sc iences in soc iety. 
Traditions of TheorLsinQ 
In this section, we wILL begin by presenting VeLody's account of the 
(mainstream) human sciences which argues that certain formaL features have 
pervaded our ways of generatIng accounts of the modern. We wILL then 
proceed to utLL! se this account as a device for deLineating, by opposition, 
the features of accounting which we can Locate in Nietzsche, Weber and 
FoucauLt. It is intended that it shall be shown how type of account of the 
modern offered by our triumvirate avoids the probLems which ptague 
tradLtLonaL human science accounts. 
In generating an account of the human sciences, Velody borrows, 
from art 
-331 - 
hLstory, Bryson's notion of the essential copy. The features which Bryson 
assigns to the doctrine of the EssentiaL COPy can, VeLody claims, also be 
regard as the features which structure human science accounts. These 
features may be enumbrated as foLlows: 
1. The image is thought of as self effacying entity ... The goal, towards 
which it moves is the perfect replication of a reality found existing 'out 
there' atready 
2. Each advance in art consists of the removaL of a further obstacLe 
between painting and the Essential Copy. 
3. ALL men are agreed that Giotto's registration of the v[suaL fieLd is 
subtLer, etc., and in every way superlor to that of Cimabue. Thus advance 
and progress in painting is open to recognition and general agreement. The 
criterion for this is of course f[deLity to the EssentLaL Copy. (Bryson 
1983 p6-7; VeLody 1989 p124). 
The EssentLaL Copy const[tutes the transcenclentaL object towards whLch art 
hLstory must progress, as VeLody puts U: 
ThLs progressive, forward moving account of art history thus 
requires its transcendentaL object. It wouLd be dLff LcuLt to 
make sense of the cLaimto progress if this cLaLm did not 
Lmply some kind of telos; here the telos is the EssentiaL 
Copy. Thus the diachrony of this type of historiography is 
encoded with its synchrony: the theme of progress chained to 
the transcendentat object. (VeLody 1989 p126) 
We can see a precisely LsomorphIc Logic being played out in the human 
sciences, VeLody suggests, a Logic which is embodied in two reLated claims 
made by the human sciences. The first of these is the tr[umphaLLst cLaim 
that society and our knowLedge of society are progressing: 
Quite consistently the analyst proffers a view of social 
change and social structure: the transitions from the 
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simpler pre-industrLaL relationships of mechanical 
solidarity to the complex processes indicated within 
organic, industrial society. ... (Moreover], wherever such 
theorists concern themselves with the nature of knowledge 
and changes in its constitution, all are constrained to 
recognise science and its cognate activities as both itself 
advancing and in some necessary sense a component of more 
general advances in society at large. (Vetody 1989 p126) 
The second clalm concerns: 'the nature of the undertyLng theoreticaL 
dimension reiatLng to the imagery of society which such theories provide. ' 
(VeLody 1989 p126)., It's most significant aspect, VeLody suggests, is 'the 
assumption of an interior mechanism beneath a (reLativeLy) superf! cLaL 
integument. ' (VeLody 1989 p127). For Lnstance, we are invited to refLect on 
Marx's cLaLm: 'If there were no difference between essence and appearence 
there wouLd be no need of science. ' (in VeLody 1989 p127). The significance 
of this comment is that it points us towards a recognition that in the 
human sciences there operates a sharp distinction between the reaL and the 
apparent whIch has wLde-reachLng effects on the formal features of human 
scientific theories. So VeLody states: 
Such theories are in agreement that immediate empirical 
evidence is quite insufficient to provide an adequate 
expLanatLon of social phenomena. Further, mainstream 
sociology requires that expLanation of the phenomena or 
happenings must be adduced to a mechanism which gives rise 
to such surface phenomena. PrecLseLy what these mechanisms 
are and how they are 6Lnked to the observational data is a 
matter of dispute. But that such mechanisms are Linked, and 
connected casually to empirical features of the world is not 
at issue. (Velody 1989 p127) 
Or Ln other words: 
this tradition 
interpretation 
social phenomer 
say or do is 
signLf y. These 
assumes social phenomena to 
and causal explanation. For 
a here is to claim that what 
not what these actions or 
signIfications Lie elsewhere, 
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require both 
to speak of 
actors, agents, 
doings reaLty 
very auch in 
the heart of society, and indeed are finally determined by 
causal mechanisms, the beating heart which both orders 
society and moves Lt through time. (VeLody 1989 p127-28). 
This beating heart, these central generating mechanisms, represents, for 
VeLody, the Essential, Copy of the human sciences. Yet we must also note 
that there is inherent within these mechanisms a utopian dimension. In a 
sense, the teLos of the human sciences is twofold relating to the duality 
of its transcendental object. What is meant by this is that the discovery 
of the essential nature of society, of its central mechanisms 
(transcendentaL object part 1) is also, at the same time, the discovery of 
the telos of society, the arrangement of its form which aLtows the fuLLest 
expression of its essential nature and towards which it is progressing 
(transcendental object part 2). To understand the 'syntax and Log[c' of this 
tradition of theor! sLng requires we grasp this duality within its EssentLaL 
Copy. 
Having delineated the form of mainstream human science theorisLng, 
VeLody considers the problems which this form generates. WhiLe these wLLL 
not be discussed in detail, it is worth noting them for reference with 
relation to the tradition of theorising we have been mapping in this 
thesis. Brief Ly, there are the issues of how to re Late structure and 
agency, cause and mean ing, sc lence and ideology, knowledge, social 
structure and progress, and, finally, the issue of the place of politics 
in 
relation to the human sciences. For VeLody, each of these issues, 
these 
probLematLcs, Is generated out of Logic of the Essential, Copy style of 
theorisLng, which, In broad philosophical terms, is to say out of 
the 
appearence/reality distinction. - 'Fundamentally the same old sun, 
but shining 
through mist and scepticism; ' Metzsche TI p4-0). 
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What can be argued here, is that it is precisely this distinction between 
the real world and the apparent world which is rejected in the tradition 
constituted about Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault. As regards Nietzsche, this 
is a relatively unprobLematLc claim, we need only recall that sketch of a 
genealogy "How the 'Real World' at Last Became a Myth" (Nietzsche TI p4O). 
As regards Weber, VeLody points out: 'No essential copy Lies in wait for 
the social investigator to discover; there are, quite simpLy, no such 
discoveries to be made. ' (VeLody 1988 p132). We can back up this claim by 
reference to my earlier discussion of Ldeat-typica[ analysis as a form of 
perspectivLsm. As was noted there, the notion of comparing an ideaL-type 
(appearence) to the world (reality) collapses since such a comparison can 
on Ly be done on the basis of other ideaL-types, consequently, the 
distinction between appearance and reality falls into itself. Finally, as 
regards Foucault, his methodology is perspectIvist in character, a 
consequence of which DeLeuze notes: 
In a certain way FoucauLt can decLare that he has never 
wr itt en anyt h1 ng but f1 ct i on, as we have seen, statements 
resembLe dreams and are transformed as in a kaLeidoscope, 
depending on the corpus in question and the diagonaL Line 
being foLLowed. But in another sense he can atso cLalm that 
he has written onLy what is reaL, and used what is reat, for 
everything is reaL in the statement, and aLL reaLlty in it 
is openty on disptay. (DeLeuze 1988 p18) 
The distinction between the reaL and the apparent cotLapses, FoucauLt has 
himself made the same point, with regard to his work, in a more generaL 
way: 
I am welt aware that I have never wrLtten anything but 
fictions, I do not mean to say, however, that truth is 
therefore absent. It seems to me that the possibility exists 
for fiction to function in truth, for a fictional discourse 
to induce effects of truth, and for bringing it about 
that a 
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true discourse engenders or manufactures' something that 
does not yet exist, that is, f Lctions' it. One 'f ictions' 
history on the basis Of a political reality that makes it 
true, one 'fictions' a politics not yet in existance on the 
basis of a historical truth. (P/K p193). 
For this tradition, the appearance/reality distinction represents something 
to be overcome. However, remembering Nietzsche's remark: 'We have abolished 
the real world: but what world is Left? the apparent worLd perhaps? ... But 
no! with the real world we have also abolished the apparent world' 
(Nietzsche TI p4l), it becomes necessary to ask what is Left, is the need 
for science, as Marx would have it, abolished at the same time? If this 
tradition rejects epistemology (even as methodoLgy), what replacement is 
offered'? The short answer to this is: perspectivLsm. However, in this 
context, a fuller reply is necessitated. 
To start, by taking a slightly obLLque route into this question, we can 
argue that it is only by taking on board the distinction between a real 
world and an apparent world that one can, similarly, operate a sharp 
distinction between theoretical reason and practical reason. That is 
between an reason which is transcendental and a reason which is 
historically contingent. Only by assuming that there is some true human 
nature, form or essence can, one posit a form of reasoning which operates 
outside of history. if, as this tradition does, we treat our being as 
hLstoricaLLy contingent, our fo rm of subjectivity as an historical 
achievement, it follows that no such basis, or foundation, is available. 
Consequently, what we refer to as Itheoret[caL reas on' - the reflexive 
reasoning of the philosopher - is a form of practical reason. 
Moreover, it 
would also follow that there are a variety of forms of practical reason, 
and that, by treating the subject as muLtipticltyt we can conceive of our 
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sense of our self as a subject as being constructed out of the interaction 
of the different styles of practical reasoning we deploy in our daily 
lives. PerspectLvism involves the claim that 'the unity of the known and 
the unity of the knower are derived the activity of knowing., (Strong 1985 
pl 71 ). In our terms, th is is the c La Lm that our un Ity as a part Lcu Lar 
subject and the unity of the world as a particular world is generated out 
of the style of' reasoning deployed. Our total subjectivity emerges out of 
the hermeneutic interaction of the different styles of reasoning deployed, 
out of the overall style that emerges from this process. 
GLven thLs framework, the tradition constituted about NLetzsche, Weber 
and Foucault involves not an appeal to the real but, rather, an attempt to 
develop a particular style of reasoning and to seduce us into the 
deployment of thLs style. The highly rhetorical nature of their texts 
constitutes not an absence of scientific precision but an integral element 
of their texts as a themselves form of political practice. Foucault 
explicitly noted this point in reference to a comment by Rorty, Foucault 
states: 
R. Rorty point out that ... I do not appeal to any 
"we" - to 
any of those "we' s" whose consensus, whose values, whose 
t rad LtL ons const L tut et he f ramework f or at hought and def 1 ne 
the conditions in which it can be validated. But the problem 
is, precisely, to decide if it is actually suitable to place 
oneself within a "well in order to assert the principles one 
recognizes and the values one accepts; or if it is not, 
rather, necessary to make the future formation of a "we" 
possLbte, by eLaborating the question. (Reader p385) 
In this Light, this tradition's elaboration of the various technologies of 
discipline in modernity is to encourage the formation of a 
"well, a 
Community of action, which will, resist these technologies. 
The form of this 
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encouragement wIll be examLned In the next section, it is, perhaps, though 
time to return from thLs theoretical flight to the somewhat more mundane 
question of the advantages of this tradition in reLation to the sets of 
probLems which, in Velody's character isat ion, pLague the human sciences. 
Yet, if we agree with VeLody that these problems are generated out of 
logic of an EssentLat Copy style of analysis, that is, in effect, out of the 
appearance/reatity distinction, then with the coLLapsing of this dLstinction 
so we coLLapse the probLems. And wh! Le Lt may be argued by Habermas, for 
exampLe, that an inabitity to distinguish between science and LdeoLogy Ls a 
serious dLLemma for a human scier)ceý one which entalLs an inabitity to 
present an effective form of critique; this is only so If one accept h[s 
terms of debate. If, as this tradition does, we reject the presuppositions 
behind the objection, then it hardLy constitutes an serious objection. Now 
this may aLL be very weLL, but, it does pose the thorny issue of how we 
adjudLcate between the cLalms of the two tradItLons we have represented 
here, assuming that is that their own presuppositions do not ruLe out the 
possibility of their successful operation. Is it, for example, possible to 
develop a formal Language which Is neutral with regard to the multiferious 
philosophical. presuppositions involved here? I think this unlikely. If there 
is to be a way of adjudicating between them, it seems to me that It must 
be one rooted In practice. By which is meant In a pragmatics, we could 
decide, perhaps, on the basis of which style of reasoning is deployed 
to 
articulate our communal concerns, which philosophical vocabulary we adopt. 
Even such a criteria as this would appear to be problematic 
though, for 
different sections of the community might deploy different vocabularies, 
different practices. Perhaps all we can do is make the 
distinction between 
these tradLtLons clear. To further this aim, which has 
been partially 
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deveLoped in thLs sectLon, Lt Ls usefuL to repose theLr reLatLonship In 
terms of the current debates over the nature of modernity and 
postmode rn1 ty - 
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Modern and Postmodern Theorising 
In this section, we wiLL depLoy a distinction devetoped by Bauman in 
order to sLtuate the two tradLtLons Outlined in relation to contemporary 
debates over the form of modern and Postmodern styLes of theorising. This 
wiLL aiso aid us in deLineatLng the form Of Politics invoLved in these 
traditions, in particuLar that tradition constituted about Nietzsche, Weber 
and FoucauLt. 
Bauman suggests the modern theory Ls fundamentaLty le_qislative Ln 
character, whiLe postmodern theory is basicaLly interpretive in form (cf. 
Bauman 1987a). These two ca4gorles present us with a usefuL schema, which 
we, therefore, borrow unashamedLy. We use le-qi-Siative to refer to those 
theories which embody a conception of the good Life and/or the good 
society, that is a telos towards which we approach. We can see two such 
iegilsLative theories in Looking at Habermas - the ldeaL-speech situation 
as a crMcat device for delineating the features of the good Life and the 
good society - and at McIntyre -a reformutation of the Aristotelian 
tradition which sets out the features of the good Life through a 
conception of the virtuous LndivLduat - in both these theories an attempt 
is made to LesgLslate from a set of phtLosoph[caL presuppositions what the 
form of the good Life wouLd be. This conception of legislative theorizing 
Is faLrty cLose to what WoLLn describes as epical theorizing and we can 
use Wolin's conception to clarify the form of such theor! sLng further. As 
WoLln puts it, in epicat theory: 
'concepts, symboLs and language are fused into a great 
poLitical. gesture towards the worLdl a thought-deed inspired 
by the hope that now or someday action will be joined to 
theory and become the means for making a great theoretical 
statement in the world' (WoLIn 1970 p8 in Lassman/Vetody 
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1988 p 170) 
As Lassman and Velody note, 'the LmPetus to theorizing comes from the 
probLematic or crisis-rLdden nature of the POLLtLcal world' (Lassman/ 
VeLody 1988 p170). Moreover, and most LmportantLy for our concerns: 
The vision of an lep[cl theorist typicaLLy encompasses a theory of knowLedge and of the future In terms of an 
aLternatLve set of possLILItles in which a transformation of 
man and his soclat life can lead to the creation of the 
'good society'. (Lassman/VeoLody 1988 pl7l) 
In other words, it Is a deflnIng feature of tegisLative or epicaL theories 
that they embody an utopian dimension. Given this, we can pLace the 
tradition of theorizing that Velody outlined about the concept of the 
EssentLaL Copy firmly within the tradition of modern theorizing. Nietzsche, 
Weber and Foucautt, however, wouLd not appear to sit easlLy within this 
catagorLzatLon, lacking, as they do, a utopian vision. 
Perhaps, we shall be able to situate them within postmodern theorizing, 
within a conception of theorizing as interpretive. Bauman gives a usefuL 
precLs of postmodern theory whLch goes as foLLows: 
it proclaims the I end of modernity' and the coming of 
'postmodernity'. Accordingly, the times of 'universal 
projects', of a world which made such projects plausible, 
are over. From this point on, however, the theorists of 
postmodernLty split. Some dwell on the growing plurality of 
the contemporary world, on the autonomy of I Language games', 
'communities of meaning' or IcutturaL traditions' which are 
impervious to objective evaluation since they themselves 
individually provide the ground of all authority that any 
evaluation may claim. Others do not feet obliged to refer to 
the changing world to justify a plurality of ideas. The 
difference between postmodernity and modernity appears to 
them as another chapter in the history of thought. They 
abandon the futile search for universal standards of truth, 
justice and taste, and modestly claim that there is nothing 
but their own conviction to justify our decision to pursue 
values we claim worth pursuLng. In varying degrees, 
both 
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forms of postmodernLst theory are philosophies of surrender. 
Both res i gn themselves to the impossibility, or 
unlikelihood, of improving the world, aware of the 
powerlessness of critique in influencing other communities. 
(Bauman 1987b p2l) 
WhLLe Nietzsche, Weber and FoucauLt share some characteristics with this 
form of theorising, most notably a scepticism towards universaL standards, 
at the same time, their seats wLthin this type of theorising would appear 
to be fairly uncomfortable given that they do not acknowledge the 
'powerlessness of critique'. On the contrary, while they abandon that form 
of critique which characterlses modern theorising, they deveLop a form of 
cr it lque wh ich operates both immanent Ly and rhetor Lca I Ly, that is a form of 
critique as seduction towards a partLcuLar styLe of' reasoning. We can 
cLarify this by reference to Lassman and VeLody's dLscussion of Weber's 
styLe of theorising. They argue that: 
'The strange and paradox[cat quaLLty of Weber's thought 
seems to reside in the fact that what we are presented with 
is the construction of an lepicaL' denlaL of the possiblLity 
of an 'epicaL' theory for the moden age. (Lassman/VeLody 
1988 p172) 
This 'strange and paradoxicat quaLlty' is characteristic of this tradition 
of theorizing. On the one hand, a styLe which is lepicat' and, on the other 
hand, a rejection of the legLislative nature of lepicaLl theorizing. And, 
sLmuttaneousLy, an acceptance of the postmodern rejection of luniversaL 
standards, but a rejection of the postmodern acceptance of 
the 
'powerLessness of critique'. The imptication of this woutcl appear 
to be 
that we cannot easily situate this tradition of theorizing within either 
modern or postmodern modes, rather we shouLd situate 
Nietzsche, Weber and 
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Foucault as operating in the space between modern and POstmodern styles 
of theorizingo on the margins of both but of neither. 
End! nQs 
In this conclusion, we indicated the various dimensions of the tradition 
of theorizing which has concerned us in this thesis. By juxtaposing this 
tradition to an alternative tradition and by situating it in re Lat ! on to 
current debates about modern and postmodern styles of theorizing, we have 
attempted to bring out the salient features of the tradition constituteg 
about the figures of Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault. We can now sum these 
significant features: Ma rejection of the appearance/reaLity distinction, 
which is to say, a rejection of epistemology in favour of perspectivism, 
QD a conception of the subject as a 'becoming what one is', as involved in 
its seLf-const[tutLon through the deployment of particular styles of 
reasoning, GiD a conception of critique as practice which is an attempt 
to seduce us into the deployment of the style(s) of reasoning embodied in 
their texts, Qv) a rejection of utopia's addressed to a particular "we", a 
particular historical agent, in favour of an attempt to constitute a "we", 
a community of action, which resists the disciplinary technologies which 
operate in the modern age, (v) a style of reasoning, a mode of theorizLngo 
which is neither modern nor postmodern but exists between the two. The 
conception of the nature and role of social theorizing which is embodied 
in these features is particularly attractive, most notably in its refusal 
to legLisate the nature of the good life or the good society. It is 
this 
modesty of purpose which most distinguishes it from the totaLlsinq claims 
of the mainstream human sciences, a modesty which addresses 
the fate of 
the subject in modernity but offers no glib or easy soLutLons 
to the 
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dLLemmals with which this subject is faced. 
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